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Abstract  
 
      “Thomas Aquinas, The Real Distinction Between Esse and Essence, and Overcoming 
the Conceptual Imperialism of Metaphysics” treats the relation between thought and 
being within medieval metaphysics, especially as it relates to the distinction between 
essence and existence. The dissertation argues against a prominent strand of Thomistic 
interpretation (i.e., Existential Thomism), which holds that Aquinas’s real distinction 
between whatness (i.e., essence) and thatness (i.e., existence) constitutes a rupture with 
the dominant essentialism of metaphysics. I contend such a distinction, which would 
make existence into an act of being irreducible to the categories of conceptual thought 
and knowledge, introduces a signifier that, in its primary and proper signification of God, 
deprives creatures of the very perfection it was introduced to signify (i.e., actual 
existence). It thus fails to identify an ontological perfection in creatures really distinct 
from the intension and extension of the concepts “substance” or “thing.” I then turn to the 
thought of Duns Scotus to show that the mere identification of existence with essence 
does not entail “conceptual imperialism.” Although situated in the period of medieval 
scholasticism, such a study resonates with more contemporary philosophical critiques of 
the limitations and presuppositions of metaphysical knowledge and intelligibility. 
 1 
      In his The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics: A Study in the Greek 
Background of Mediaeval Thought, Joseph Owens notes an unforeseeable consequence 
of Aristotle’s cursory treatment of being per accidens as unscientific. Set against the 
dominance of ‘being in the categories,’ ‘being per accidens’ nearly falls to the status of 
“non-being” for Aristotle. Although Aristotle begins the Metaphysics with the oft-cited 
“being is said in many ways,” being per accidens comes to occupy a marginal role in this 
text—treated in a few short chapters of Book Epsilon—and an increasingly marginal role 
in the ensuing tradition of metaphysics, both which tend to think being around substance. 
Being per accidens is that realm of being, Aristotle states, with which no science, 
whether theoretical, practical, or productive (poietike), need bother.1
From the viewpoint of the much later distinction between essence and the act of existing, 
this treatment [of being per accidens as unscientific] must mean that Aristotle is leaving 
the act of existence entirely outside the scope of his philosophy. The act of existing must 
be wholly escaping his scientific consideration. All necessary and definite connections 
between things can be reduced to essence. The accidental ones do not follow from the 
essence. They can be reduced only to the actual existence of the thing. There is no reason 
in the essence of a carpenter why he actually is a musician. The reason has to be 
explained in terms of the actual existence of the two habits in the same man. Likewise, 
the results of free-choice cannot be explained in terms of essence. They form an 
existential problem.
   
      In what might be read as a marginal issue in the history of philosophy, Owens 
identifies an important move in the direction of medieval “existentialism,” even though 
unrecognized and unintended by the Philosopher himself:  
2
                                                 
1 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 2 vol. trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: The Loeb Classical Library 271, 
287, 1933-1935), 1026b4-7.  
2 See Joseph Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed, rev. (Toronto, Canada: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), 309; and Ibid., “The Accidental and Essential Character of 
Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies XX (1958): 19-23. 
  
 2 
The essence of the carpenter can render no reason why she is also a musician. “Without 
why,” accidental being stands outside the necessary and definite connections governed by 
the domain of essence. Science (scientia) grounds beings by offering an account of the 
reason why: she is risible because she is human. Her human essence explains certain 
properties such as being capable of laughter. An account is thereby rendered. The fact of 
her also being a musician and a carpenter, however, cannot be derived from her human 
essence. Not all carpenters are also musicians. Such a fact, Owens explains, can only find 
ground as a matter of actual existence. The domain of the existential problem does not 
offer itself to scientific considerations as it is without why. Thus, actual existence as 
“being per accidens” suffers from groundlessness.3
                                                 
3 In terms of understanding the existentiality as the heart of all predication, Owens elsewhere 
acknowledges: “The problem, however, becomes more difficult in the case of predicates that remain within 
the category of substance, and in general wherever the predicate is a generic characteristic of the subject. 
‘Socrates is a man,’ for example, or ‘Man is an animal,’ may seem at first sight beyond the need of 
existential synthesis and above the conditions of time. Yet there is nothing in the nature of ‘man’ that 
requires it to be found in Socrates.” Joseph Owens, An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee: The Bruce 
Publishing Company, 1968), 34. Owens on multiple occasions notes Aquinas’s unmarked move to equate 
‘being as the truth of propositions’ with ‘being per accidens.’ At first, this equation may seem unwarranted 
as ‘being as the truth of propositions’ covers both substantial and accidental being. But Owens defends 
Aquinas’s conjoining of being per accidens and being as the truth of propositions. He states: “Of these the 
first two ways listed in Book E of the Metaphysics were being per accidens and being in the sense of the 
true. Being per accidens meant that something happens to be found with something else, as for instance in 
the statement ‘The carpenter is a musician.’ There is nothing in the nature of the carpenter as such that 
requires him to be a musician. That he is a musician is entirely accidental to the fact that he is a carpenter. 
The verb “is,” accordingly, expresses in this case something accidental to the nature of the subject as such. 
It expresses being per accidens. It of course presupposes being per se, for it is concerned with the principal 
type of being, namely as found in any of the categories. It is concerned with a carpenter and with music, 
both of which are types of being that are found in the predicaments. But the being expressed by the verb in 
this proposition is not a type of being found in any of the categories. It is something over and above any 
predicamental being. It is per accidens in regard to the principal type of being, that is, the being that is 
limited to the necessary grooves of the categories.” Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of 
Being,” 4. Owens’ reason for aligning the two types of being (ens) is that it allows him to demonstrate that 
we humans grasp esse not through the intellect’s operation of simple apprehension (as we would grasp an 
essence or a normal predicamental accident such as “hot” or “white”) but through the complex operation of 
judgment. Thus, our intellect does not immediately intuit esse, but demonstrates it through the formation of 
propositions derived from the simple essences grasped in the first operation. This is why Owens rejects 
intellectus essentiae as constitutive of the “real distinction” between essence and esse, as though such an 
argument that relies on the simple operation of intellectus could reveal the distinction between the two. See 
below Chapter I Section 4; Also Chapter VI Section 2.  
  
 3 
      As indicated by Owens, however, and as will be explicated in what follows, such an 
act of existence, or “esse,” remains incidental to essences in a way not completely 
eliminable by essential scientia. Instead, as Jean-Luc Marion has aptly stated: “Esse, not 
on the hither side of essence like the accident but beyond it, nevertheless happens to it as 
an incident, as the incident par excellence.”4
                                                 
4 Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness. trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 155. As Marion states in fn. 49: “As a general rule, I 
understand (and translate) sumbebekos as incident. I use accident only when I stick to the narrow and 
metaphysical concept within the limits that Aristotle often sought to restrict it. The translation by incident 
corresponds to that of the German Zufälligkeit, zufällig, ‘what falls and arrives upon’.” Ibid 355. Aquinas 
himself notes this difference between “accident” in the sense of the nine categories and “accident” as one of 
Aristotle’s four predicates and Porphyry’s five universals. See Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, 
t. 24/2: Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis. ed. J. Cos. (Roma-Paris: Commissio Leonina-
Éditions Du Cerf, 2000), a. 11, resp. Hereafter “De spiritualibus creaturis.” “Accidental” in the latter sense 
thus might better be translated as “incidental” to avoid ambiguity in terms of praedicamental accidents 
(i.e., accidents in the nine categories opposed to substance) predicable accidents (i.e., one of the five 
universal ways of linking a subject to a predicate). Unlike the essential ways of linking a subject to a 
predicate (i.e., as genus, species, property, or quality), the incidental copula proposes a contingent fact 
about something (i.e., a subject term) that does not derive from its essence. Because even a praedicamental 
accident can be a genus, in which case it is linked to its species essentially, not incidentally (e.g., color is 
the genus of whiteness), Aquinas argues that the two senses must differ. For Porphyry’s confusion of the 
categories with the predicables, see Ernst A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham. (New York: Sheed 
and Ward Inc., 1935), 66-77. 
 Marion prefers to translate being “per 
accidens” as “incidental being” so as to not confuse the categorial being of predicable 
accidents with the being that falls upon or befalls something completely outside the 
essential domain. Following Marion in this translation, we will show how the status of 
actual existence as incidental with respect to the categorial being of substances marks a 
fault line between an orthodox Aristotelian essentialism and an existentialism that 
problematizes the very foundation from which Aristotelian scientia begins. Thus, 
whereas Aristotle can relegate the incidentality of actual existence to the unintelligible 
“ground” of matter due to its non-identity with the source of intelligibility, form, once the 
Aristotelian problematic is taken over by Christian thought, in particular that of Thomas 
Aquinas, actual existence need no longer be abandoned to groundlessness. Instead, as 
 4 
part of the total order of being, the first cause provides for such being in the same way 
and to that extent that it is the total and immediate cause of all being. For this reason, 
Owens states: “St. Thomas takes great pains to show that the contingent as well as the 
necessary must be immediately caused by the Primary Being. For Aristotle, on the 
contrary, Being per accidens finds its ultimate explanation in matter.”5
                                                 
5 Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 309-310.  
  
       To understand this sentiment of Owens, reiterated by Marion, and echoed by a chorus 
of “existential Thomists,” we must understand the question of being, that is, of esse, and 
its centrality to any existential Thomism. “Esse” is a difficult term to translate in 
philosophical contexts. It literally is the Latin infinitive “to be.” To continually translate 
the “esse” of something as its “to be” becomes cumbersome in English (e.g., the “to be” 
of creatures). An alternate possibility is to use “being,” which seems to be the most 
common practice. The problem with “being,” however, is that it is indistinguishable from 
the participle “ens,” which also must be translated as “being.” “Ens” more technically 
refers to “a being,” which may or may not have being (esse), and is a transcendental 
predicate convertible with “good” and “one.”  Thus, there can be a “being of reason” (ens 
ratione) that lacks esse (e.g., a phoenix). The problem is that the English “being” can 
translate either term. For example, with the English title of Aquinas’s text On Being and 
Essence, which will be a central source in this work, “being” here translates “ente” (De 
Ente et Essentia) the ablative form of “ens.” Although “esse” comes to play a crucial role 
in this text, it is after and alongside a discussion of “ens.” Thus, using “being” to translate 
both “esse” and “ens” would give no indication to the reader that two separate issues are 
being discussed.  
 5 
      Another possibility, which I have instituted to this point, would be to translate “esse” 
as some variation on “existence.” This would seem to solve the problem of beings of 
reason: what, for example, a phoenix lacks is “existence,” and although it is a certain type 
of being (ens) it is different from other beings (i.e., existing beings). This translation is 
problematic in its own right. Although this seems to be what Aquinas has in mind by 
“esse” in the early De Ente et Essentia, “esse” comes to enjoy a wider sense both in his 
own writings and in the works that follow him. One of the problems is how to refer to 
essential “being,” which—at least for some scholastic thinkers, even if not for Aquinas—
enjoys its own status apart from the register of existing things. In order to account for the 
necessary status of eternal truths apart from the order of existing things (e.g., “A rose is a 
flower”), a thinker like Henry of Ghent would go so far as to distinguish “esse essentiae” 
(essential being) from “esse existentiae” (existential being). This is one of the problems 
with translating “esse” as “existence.” An even more basic problem is that in Latin there 
is a word for existence, “existentia” and the verb form “existere.” To equate “esse” 
simply with “existence” would leave nothing for “existentia” to translate.  
      Another less common translation (or over-translation) is “act of being.” Although this 
translation captures the sense in which “esse” is most often used in the tradition following 
from Aquinas, again there is a Latin phrase that more accurately corresponds to “act of 
being,” namely “actus essendi.” Here “essendi” is being used as it will be also be used in 
the formulas: “forma essendi,” “virtus essendi,” “natura essendi,” and “ratio essendi.” 
The problem of translating “esse” seems to be on the side of English in that our infinitive 
does not reflect the compactness of the Latin (as does, for example, the German “sein”) 
and its distinction from participle and gerund forms. Thus, in what follows, I will keep 
 6 
the Latin “esse” as much as possible. Quite often, however, the discussion will require a 
decision between of one the aforementioned options, where I will nevertheless indicate 
that the English terms translates “esse.” This will be of particular importance in contexts 
where both “ens” and “esse” is under discussion.  
      Even without a single word or phrase to translate the term, however, the general 
philosophical meaning of “esse” emerges around and in confrontation with a 
forgetfulness of being qua actual existence. According to Owens, and more largely to 
“existential Thomism,” Aquinas’s treatment of being as actual existence thus marks a 
chasm in a history of metaphysics whose dominant tendency has been to think being as 
essence. “Existential Thomism” is a reading of Aquinas’s philosophy that emphasizes the 
real distinction/composition between essence and esse in created beings as central to 
Aquinas’s philosophy. The core claim, I would argue, is that Aquinas introduces an 
unprecedented existential dimension to metaphysics fundamentally incommensurable 
with the previous forms of Platonic and Aristotelian essentialism. In Being and Some 
Philosophers, Etienne Gilson—perhaps the most polemical of all existential Thomists—
clearly expresses what is at stake:  
[…] any being results primarily from its act of existing as from one of its primary 
constituents, for, if the form is what makes it to be such a being, ‘to be’ is what makes it 
to be a ‘being.’ Precisely because existence reaches substance in and through its form, 
forms have to receive existence in order that they become ‘beings.’ But Thomas Aquinas 
could not posit existence (esse) as the act of a substance itself actualized by its form, 
without making a decision which, with respect to the metaphysics of Aristotle, was 
nothing less than a revolution. He had precisely to achieve the dissociation of the two 
notions of form and act. This is precisely what he has done and what probably remains, 
 7 
even today, the greatest contribution ever made by any single man to the science of 
being.6
Thus, according to existential Thomism, the question of being that commences and 
sustains Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the subsequent tradition of “essentialism,” is not the 
existential problem that anything be at all.
  
7
                                                 
6 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1952), 174. The story Gilson and other existential Thomists tell is that Aquinas synthesizes 
Boethius with Avicenna to create a new problematic, misread by Giles of Rome, that of the 
composition/distinction of esse et essentia in finite beings. Gilson wants to rescue a pure thinking of being 
as existence, which he believes is the true revolution of Thomism and which separates Thomism from 
metaphysical systems and conceptual imperialism/essentialism. For an excellent analysis of Gilson’s 
polemic, especially against Cajetan’s (mis)reading of Aquinas, see Ralph McInerny, Praeambula Fidiei: 
Thomism and the God of the Philosophers (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006). 
I would include in this list, at least, the following: Etienne Gilson; Joseph Owens; Jacques Maritain; 
William E. Carlo; Cornelio Fabro; and (most recently) Victor Salas. Jean-Luc Marion, I would argue, is an 
inheritor of this tradition, although he departs from it in a number of ways that will come to light 
throughout this inquiry, especially around the issue of onto-theology. See below. 
7 Joseph Owens argues that from Greek metaphysics, scholastic philosophy inherited two basic conceptions 
of being: one from Plato and another from Aristotle. And yet neither of these conceptions, the Platonic ens 
perfectissimum (being as most perfect being) or the Aristotelian ens commune (being as most common 
being), could be taken over wholesale by medieval philosophy. Being as the subject of metaphysics (i.e., a 
human science) could not be simply about the ens perfectissimum, which was the Christian God 
transcending human experience. Nor could it limit itself to the abstract and vague ens commune, which 
would be empty of all content (as had been the case with Parmenidean metaphysics). The problem with 
such an abstract concept, Owen argues, is that it excludes the most perfect being, God, who must stand 
outside and above the mere ens commune shared by sensible beings. Owens goes on to discuss how in the 
Metaphysics Aristotle attempted to fill in the abstract concept of being with content ranging from ousia, to 
essence, to even the more Platonic supersensible first mover. Owens notes that such a tension between 
being as the most empty of all concepts and being as identifiable with one of the aforementioned options 
has caused deep interpretive difficulties, not only for the text itself, but more broadly for the science of 
metaphysics (i.e., What is metaphysics’ object?: God, substance, being, etc.?).  Joseph Owens, The 
Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 35-68.  
 Despite this polyvalent sense of being, all of 
these ways pertain to being something, the primary of which is being a substance. The 
question of being concerns what something is as set against being something else (e.g., 
being substantially, not being accidentally; being said of many not just being in one), and 
not that something is at all as opposed to being nothing. Unable to think being apart from 
the conditions of essential intelligibility, esse has been forgotten as an extra-intelligible 
remainder whose incidentality is unable to meet the conditions for abstract conceivability. 
With the exception of Aquinas, who thinks being from the perspective of actual existence 
 8 
without reducing substances to unknowable bundles of concrete facticity as was the trend 
of the “existentialists” of their own century,8 existential Thomists have sought to return to 
the unthought of essentialist metaphysics and to institute another beginning for 
metaphysics around a thinking of being as actual existence.9
      This other beginning for metaphysics would restore being qua actual existence to the 
domain of metaphysical thinking without reducing such to the demands of what Gilson 
calls “conceptual imperialism.” On this matter, he states: “…the first and most necessary 
condition for things to become objects of scientific knowledge is to be purified of the 
slightest trace of existence. A perfect case of conceptual imperialism, if there ever was 
one!”
         
10
                                                 
8 One, of but many examples, from the works of Gilson, Owens, or Maritain, can be found in the opening 
lines of Maritain’s Existence and the Existent (1948): “This brief treatise on existence and the existent may 
be described as an essay on the existentialism of St. Thomas Aquinas. The ‘existentialism’ of St. Thomas is 
utterly different from that of the ‘existentialist’ philosophies propounded nowadays. If I say that it is, in my 
opinion, the only authentic existentialism, the reason is not that I am concerned to ‘rejuvenate’ Thomism, 
so to speak, with the aid of a verbal artifice which I should be ashamed to employ, by attempting to trick 
out Thomas Aquinas in a costume fashionable to our day…I am not a neo-Thomist. All in all, I would 
rather be a paleo-Thomist than a neo-Thomist. I am, or at least I hope I am, a Thomist. For more than thirty 
years I have remarked how difficult it is to persuade our contemporaries not to confuse the philosopher’s 
faculty of invention with the ingenuity that inspired the art of the dress designer. A Thomist who speaks of 
St. Thomas’s existentialism is merely reclaiming his own, recapturing from present-day fashion an article 
whose worth that fashion itself is unaware of; he is asserting a prior right.” Jacques Maritain, Existence and 
the Existent, trans. Lewis Galantiere and Gerald B. Phelen (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc. 1948), 1. 
9 “At the beginning of this inquiry we asked how it was that, if being is the first object of the human mind, 
so few philosophers have seen it as the first principle of philosophical knowledge. The answer is now at 
hand, namely, the overwhelming tendency of human understanding to sterilize being by reducing it to an 
abstract concept...It has ceased to be a ‘beginning.’ Where being no longer plays the part of a beginning, 
another beginning has to be found...Once existence has been removed, there always remains, in being, 
something for which existenceless being provides no rational explanation. The chronic disease of 
metaphysical being is not existence, but the tendency to lose existence. To restore existence to being is 
therefore the first prerequisite to restoring being itself to its legitimate position as the first principle of 
metaphysics.” Being and Some Philosophers, 213-214. To begin his An Interpretation of Existence, Owens 
invokes nothing less than the following passage from Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics (1953): 
“But still a question, the question: Is ‘being’ (Sein) a mere word, and its meaning a haze or the spiritual 
(geistige) destiny of the West?” Although neither Owens nor Gilson agree with Heidegger’s understanding 
of being, they share a certain affinity with him around the need to return metaphysics and also humanity to 
the forgotten “other beginning,” which has been covered over by essential dominance. 
10 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 106. 
 Conceptual imperialism can be defined as the reduction (or attempted reduction) 
of all being without remainder to essential principles. As without why, esse cannot be 
 9 
accounted according to “necessary and definite connections” in the essential economy. 
This existential “trace” instead reveals the existential forgetfulness of Aristotelian 
essentialism: the latter can account for why this is a rose, or why a rose is a flower, but 
not why this is. As a brief respite in the history of being, Gilson argues, Thomistic 
metaphysics has offered a remedy for the chronic disease of essentialism; the remedy—to 
think the existential actuality of being beyond categorial conceivability—would restore 
being to its proper function as beginning.11
      According to Gilson, both Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism practice conceptual 
imperialism insofar as their failure to think being as existence leads to a forgetfulness of 
actual existence. Thus, the two traditions dominating western metaphysics both engage in 
forms of conceptual imperialism, but not necessarily in the same way or with the same 
results. The latter tradition thinks being as unity, and in seeking intelligibility for the 
whole of being, Gilson argues, Neoplatonism eventually leads to an unintelligible 
 Such a forgetfulness of esse, Gilson 
maintains, has led to the conceptual imperialism of metaphysics in which being, deprived 
of its true dynamism, must become an adequate object for conceptual knowledge and the 
static determinations it lends to scientia. Esse qua actual existence becomes but a 
synonymous iteration of already conceived formal determinations, redundant in the 
essential economy of “things.” And upon confronting the groundlessness of actual 
existence and in order to provide a balanced account for all things, conceptual 
imperialism attempts to eliminate the existential remainder.  
                                                 
11 Existential Thomists mobilize such groundlessness against “the conceptual imperialism” of Aristotelian 
essentialism. Gilson, for example, states: “Yet, unless [a notion of being] be thus conceived, what is left of 
being is little more than its empty shell. Why should philosophers use such an empty shell for their first 
principle of human knowledge? Any particular aspect of being is then bound to look preferable because, be 
it even abstract quantity, it corresponds at least to some ‘thing.’” Etienne Gilson, Being and Some 
Philosophers, 213.  
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transcendent cause of intelligibility itself beyond being. Soon or later, he argues, 
Neoplatonism becomes mysticism.12 Aristotelianism, on the other hand, even when it sets 
itself against Platonism and Neoplatonism, does not overcome such essentialism. As 
Gilson states: “Being may be more complex than Plato’s selfhood, without including 
existence. It might be, for instance, substance.”13
      To cite one notable example in the history of Aristotelian metaphysics, Gilson raises 
Averroes’s attempts to reduce being to substance: “Thus far, Averroes seems quite 
successful in his effort to rid philosophy of existence, but it still remains for him to solve 
a problem, namely, the very one which Avicenna himself had tried to solve: the relation 
of possible beings to their actual existence.”
 Thus, a mere rejection of one or the 
other does not accomplish an overcoming of existential forgetfulness. Both traditions of 
essentialism when faced with “existential” considerations find some way to reduce the 
entirety of being to essence—the “selfhood” of Forms for Platonism and substance for 
Aristotelianism—and thereby eliminate any existential remainder.  
14
                                                 
12 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 39-40 
13 Ibid., 40.  
14 Ibid., 57. 
 “To rid” (or “to purify,”) any trace of 
existence from philosophy is the goal of conceptual imperialism. According to Gilson, 
Averroes attempts to purify the essential order by reducing all questions of actual 
existence back to substance: existential considerations come to be disregarded as 
conceptual redundancies. Implicit in this statement is that even those who may appear to 
make the “existential turn” (e.g., Avicenna) have failed to do so. Although Avicenna 
seems poised to make such an existential turn insofar as he begins by separating the 
conditions of something’s possibility from its actual existence, Gilson warns that such his 
metaphysics quickly relapses into essentialism. Unlike Aquinas—and here is where 
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Gilson’s consternation lay—Avicenna grounds the existential remainder, or the non-
implication by something’s essence that it actually is, in a derived or emanated 
necessity.15 All actual existence necessarily overflows from the necessity of the first, 
thereby rendering everything else necessary through its causes (ab alio), even if not 
through itself (per se). Aquinas’s existential problematic, as will be seen more clearly 
below, in a large part responds to such inflation of necessity. Thus, although Aquinas saw 
himself as inheriting an older tradition in terms of such a distinction between essence and 
esse, and drew upon resources offered by Boethius, Avicenna, the Liber de causis, and 
others, existential Thomists have argued at great length for Aquinas as the originator of 
the existential problematic —a “revolution in metaphysics” as Gilson terms it.16
      In rough summation, existential Thomism can be characterized by an attempt to 
recapture a purer form of esse from the essentialist sway of metaphysics, but also from 
bastardized misreadings of Aquinas’s move, whether it be Siger of Brabant’s critique of 
an unwarranted “fourth,” Giles of Rome’s “defense” of a real distinction between two 
things (res), or Cardinal Cajetan’s failure to elevate the existentiality of Aquinas’s 
thought. Existential Thomism thereby seeks to supplant the essentialism of metaphysics, 
most especially Aristotle, with the existentialism of Christian philosophy, based on the 
incidental gift of being, to seek out a new beginning for metaphysics from out of that 
  
                                                 
15 In other words, even though something is not necessary per se, given the being of the first per se 
necessary existent, the being of all else is grounded in the necessary emanation from this source. 
16 “Between the Avicennian extrinsicism and the Thomistic intrinsicism of existence, no conciliation is 
possible. To pass from the one to the other is not to achieve an evolution but a revolution.” Gilson, The 
Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (New York: Random House, 1956), 39. McInenry dissents 
from this opinion arguing that Boethius’s distinction between esse and id quod est reflects the distinction 
between existence and essence. See Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Boethius (Washington D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1990) and Chapter I below. That Thomas did not consider himself 
the sole innovator of this distinction can be witnessed through his constant referencing of other sources to 
support his discussion. In particular, when he raises such a distinction in De Ente et Essentia, he uses Liber 
de Causis as a corroborating source. Whether his exegeses of this and other texts were sound will be 
discussed below.  
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other essentialist beginning that dominates the history of metaphysics. They further 
maintain that those scholastics, however pious, who reject esse as a really distinct 
principle in creatures, are caught in the sway of essentialist metaphysics and cannot 
adequately account for the gift of being. Once again, such essentialism is not limited to 
Aristotelianism, but dominates Neoplatonism as well. As Gilson argues, the 
Neoplatonism of early Christian thinkers requires that they believe as Christians, but 
think as Platonists. Victorinus, for example, must follow the Plotinian lead in elevating 
the One beyond being in order that it account for all being, resulting in the failure to 
appreciate the fundamental truth not only that God is, but that He is He Who Is.17
      Against the conceptual imperialism of both Neoplatonic and Peripatetic traditions of 
metaphysics, the “acid test” of existential metaphysics becomes the ability to think being 
qua actual existence as incidental to the nature of any being and as accounted for not by 
something beyond being, but by being itself (i.e., He Who Is, or ipsum esse subsistens).
 
18
                                                 
17 See, for example, Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 30-40.  
18 Gilson uses this term in reference to such an issue. See Ibid., 33. For one of the best and most succinct 
summations of such an attempt to herald the existential problematic as the basis of scholastic and 
contemporary Christian metaphysics, see: William E. Carlo, The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to 
Existence in Existential Metaphysics (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). One particularly revealing 
passage states: “Once we have by patient historical work understood Thomas Aquinas and his relations to 
his contemporaries, the next step is a purification of temporal trappings. Now we must restate it to free it of 
the bias given it by the weight of its Greek vocabulary and philosophical principles. As we have already 
stated the doctrine of creation is the testing stone of a Christian metaphysics. To the extent to which it 
measures up to the exigencies of creation to that degree is a notion of being valid in metaphysics for the 
Christian thinker.” Ibid., 18. 
 
The importance of thinking esse as a gift of being, harkening back to Marion’s claim that 
esse is the incident par excellence, concerns its radical otherness to the substantio-
essential constitution of any creature and its radical identity with God himself (ipse). The 
latter, what I will call God’s “ipseity,” requires that God’s nature as “He Who Is” remain 
a radically self-identical pure subsistence of being, incommunicable according to the 
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same ratio to any other being and thus participated by others only according to a separate 
ratio essendi.19 When this incommunicable perfection is participated by any other being, 
such a gift remains incidental to the participant’s nature for the very reason that it 
remains identical to God. Thus, what Aquinas’s metaphysics thinks, according to 
existential Thomism, is the essential groundlessness of this existential gift upon which all 
essential economies can be founded. In other words, each being of itself lacks a root in 
being and only through a free and gratuitous act does it enjoy that which radically 
exceeds its nature. Although esse radically exceeds the nature of any being other than 
God, once given, such perfects each thing’s nature like light perfects the nature of air, 
which of itself remains unilluminated. Such a gift of being (esse) underlies the radical 
incidentality of created beings and their utter dependency on their creator.20 Only through 
such an overcoming of existential forgetfulness, so the existential argument goes, does 
thought find a new ground for metaphysics, or perhaps better still, does it return 
metaphysics to its original beginning.21
                                                 
19 “Ipseity” is a term used by Derrida to describe the condition of sovereignty and the sovereign as an ipse 
or “self” that constitutes a self-referentiality of power unopen to sharing. Such a hegemonic exercise of 
power, however, operates as a phantasm insofar as the very exercise of power requires iterability. Such 
iterability opens the ipse to an otherness, which ruptures its own ipseity and can be preserved only by even 
more violence in an attempt to eradicate the other in interest of “self”-preservation. Derrida, Rouges: Two 
Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005). I will argue below, that Aquinas’s concept of esse tantum/ipsum esse subsistens is not a pure and 
incommunicable ratio essendi, but a concept laundered from this side of finitude with univocal, not 
analogical, ties to creation. See below Chapter VI Section 1.  
20 Although I will agree with a certain understanding of contingency, using Scotus and others, I will 
critique existential metaphysics around this latter issue. I will argue that such leads to the problematic 
consequence of leaving a less than real and diminished status for created beings. Whether the existential 
Thomists would find such a consequence problematic, I will argue against such on grounds that creatures 
would never be real beings, but only less than real participants in Ipsum Esse.  
 
21 Perhaps strange and reluctant bedfellows, both Gilson and Heidegger seek a new beginning for the 
question of metaphysics. As Heidegger states: “And insofar as be-ing is experienced as the ground of 
beings, the question of the having come to pass [Wesen—translation modified] of be-ing, when asked in 
this way, is the grounding-question. Going from the guiding-question to the grounding-question, there is 
never an immediate, equi-directional and continual process that once again applies the guiding-question (to 
be-ing); rather there is only a leap, i.e., the necessity of an other beginning.” Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enownment), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1999), 
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      This critique of the conceptual imperialism parallels what Marion following 
Heidegger, calls “onto-theology” and the “onto-theological constitution of metaphysics.” 
With onto-theology, a preeminent being (ens) should ground entities and being (esse), 
“exercising a foundation on all other beings—indeed upon being and its own foundation 
[...].”22
                                                                                                                                                 
53. Perhaps not so much a new beginning as a restoration of the true yet forgotten beginning for the 
question of being. True Gilsonian “esse” and Heideggerian “Sein” (or Seyn) are separated by more than 
their respective tongues. Where they converge, however, is around the search for a new beginning for 
being. 
22 Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” in Mysticism: Presence and Aporia. ed. Michael 
Kessler and Christian Sheppard (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 42. 
 The preeminent being serves as cause of everything because it first serves as 
cause of itself (causa sui): the ground grounds itself. God as causa sui, Marion argues, 
follows the assumption that God as preeminent entity should be subject to the same 
metaphysical rules as every other entity: existence requires a cause. Thus, God as 
preeminent in existence also requires a cause, which turns out to be himself. In a 
grounded totality, exceptions cannot be made, not even for the first. Once God becomes 
part of the causal order (as ground and grounded), all other principles of metaphysics, 
such as the principle of order and of sufficient reason, also apply to God, according to 
Marion. This preeminent being, to incorporate Gilsonian terminology, sets the standard 
for the essential economy as that by which all other beings are measured. Thus, we 
find—if not altogether an isomorphism—at least a deep kinship between Gilson’s 
critique of conceptual imperialism and Marion’s critique of onto-theo-logy. In both 
thinkers, the hegemonic accounting of beings and of being itself is accomplished by the 
enshrinement of a preeminent being as the foundation of a totalized system, which does 
not leave a remainder. All beings, as Marion states, are subject to the same ontological 
grounds: “Just one condition rules all of them, however: that they should ground entities 
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and being in the name of preeminent entity, thus that they could be inscribed precisely 
without exception or remainder within the onto-theo-logical frame of the ontological 
difference, which is itself thought in a metaphysical manner, starting with and for the 
exclusive benefit of the entity.”23
     In terms of this onto-theological constitution of metaphysics, its forgetfulness, or 
“alleged forgetfulness,” of esse has transformed metaphysics into a science of beings, 
crowned by a “most being” (maxime ens) that secures the ontological field as the first and 
ground for all the rest. Occupying such a superlative status, this first is merely “first 
among equals” (primum inter pares); but unlike Caesar Augustus, who as princeps 
accepted the diminished title while wielding absolute and imperious power, the first 
being of ontology—or onto-theology—is bound by the strictures of metaphysics: it 
remains within the essential economy. It may be first and most, but only as a member of a 
class to which it belongs. God is first amongst numerical beings, and moving beings, and 
sensitive beings, and rational beings—to name but a select number of regions—but 
mathematics, physics, biology, and psychology forget the question of being as such. Due 
to the forgetfulness of esse, metaphysics has fallen into the diminished status in which 
one finds it in the twentieth-century and against which the “existentialists” of that century 
merely react by affirming the absolute priority of existence over essence (i.e., a temporal 
being-in-the-world excluding any reference to the eternal), but at the expense of any 
recourse to a science of being, albeit a science grounded in the groundless incidentality of 
actual existence. The science of being has become little more than an analytic tool for the 
positive sciences, unable to speculate beyond the limits of possible experience or logical 
  
                                                 
23 Ibid., 43. According to Marion, at least in this text, even though not in the earlier God without Being, 
Aquinas’s notion of esse does not offer an onto-theo-logy. For Heidegger’s account of onto-theo-logy, see 
Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). 
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analysis. Once metaphysics has been put under such receivership, to speak of being at all 
requires a close proximity with “regions of beings,” lest metaphysics stray too far from 
its secure ground. Being as beings must always be present at hand for the philosophical 
and scientific, not to mention technical, disciplines.24
But it is not enough to go beyond entity for God to avoid going into onto-theo-logy 
because any familiarity with being ascribes him to this metaphysical constitution. Onto-
theo-logy deals with being as well as entities, insofar as metaphysical being remains 
always oriented toward and questioned for the sake of entity. However, how could God 
amount to ‘to be’ without assuming the figure of an entity whatsoever?
  
      Despite these parallels, the two critical engagements differ in a significant respect: 
namely, around what I will call the “existential actuality” of the first. Whereas, existential 
Thomism seeks to ground all being in the pure actuality of Qui Est, or a first that is “only 
being,” Marion and presumably Heidegger read this move of holding onto existential 
actuality as still caught up in the sway of onto-theology. As Marion states in one 
particularly clear point of contact with existential Thomism, referring to Gilson in 
particular, they do not go far enough because they still identify God with esse. He states: 
25
A first that is only “to be” or esse tantum still resembles those beings that it grounds. 
Such a resemblance, as Marion is keen to target, tends toward an analogical union of 
  
                                                 
24 Although undertaking such a critical engagement with the history of being from out of a different project, 
another twentieth-century thinker, Martin Heidegger, has diagnosed the condition of being in terms similar 
to those of the existential Thomists. To naively lump Heidegger into the category of “false 
existentialism”—as a proto-Sartrean—misses a much deeper affinity between his Seinesfrage and the 
project of existential Thomists. Heidegger, like Gilson, sees the need for a “new beginning” for 
metaphysics, a beginning that has been forgotten amidst essentialism’s dominance within the history of 
metaphysics. Again like Gilson, Heidegger sees such forgetfulness as responsible for a certain destitution in 
Western humanity wherein the grounding questions have been replaced by “positivistic” or “technocratic” 
questions that require and demand a presence of being as beings. Thus, such a technocratic destitution 
presupposes a metaphysics of presence—what Gilson calls “essentialism” or “conceptual imperialism”—
that reduces being to beings. Such a reduction fully grounds beings within a metaphysical economy 
wherein everything including being itself (ipsum esse) has an account; and in this forgetfulness, the 
originary phenomenon of withdrawal and concealment upon which presencing is made possible is 
obliterated. Albeit with differing details, Heidegger along with his existential brethren see a need for return 
to something more originary, to some saving power for both metaphysics and humanity. 
25 Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” 72 fn. 55. 
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beings with God, which although claiming to protect divine transcendence around an 
analogically pure and incommunicable ratio essendi, nevertheless moves in the direction 
of univocal conflation. Analogy risks bridging the gap separating the first in its 
transcendence from everything else. Thus, Marion views the existential project as 
doomed for onto-theology so long as Ipsum Esse Subsistens and esse commune share a 
real analogical bond.  
      Despite these distinctions between the critiques of conceptual imperialism and onto-
theology, their deep family resemblance will allow us to draw upon Marion’s invaluable 
insights in the critique of conceptual imperialism that follows. As we will come to see, 
Aquinas’s existential metaphysics operates between the Scylla of reducing the first being 
to the mere order of beings, thereby making God a mundane primum inter pares, and the 
Charybdis of allowing the first to transcend the order of being altogether, thereby 
evacuating the first from all actuality. Either one or the other fails to appreciate the way 
in which esse comes to be communicated to all beings as their perfection par excellence 
and yet in itself remains an incommunicably primary and pure act, the energia of all 
essential energia.  
      Despite these attempts of existential metaphysics to overcome conceptual imperialism 
and to navigate either extreme, I will argue that such a project risks instituting an 
imperialism of its own around the identification of esse as the nature of God. In order to 
protect the purity and ipseity of ipsum esse subsistens, existential metaphysics must 
remove all traces of finitude and otherness from this pure and incommunicable act of 
being. Otherwise, its self-identity would be disrupted by reference to something outside 
itself. However, the process by which such finite traces are removed requires a type of 
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concept laundering. This means that we begin with content borrowed from finite beings 
because, for Aquinas, all knowledge for us derives from sensation. Such content then 
must be purified, however, so as to apply properly to God alone and exclude any univocal 
reference to creatures despite such mundane origins. Thus, the purity of that which is esse 
tantum is secured but only at the price of obscuring its conceptual origins. In the end, 
“esse” comes to function as a proper name, of Qui Est, and thereby becomes applicable to 
creatures only in a secondary or derived sense. “Esse” no longer signifies something’s 
ownmost perfection, but instead its borrowed refraction of another’s perfection. This is 
why, as I will argue, in attempting to surmount the imperialism of essentialism, 
existential Thomism institutes its own imperium around the ipseity of Ipsum Esse 
Subsistens.   
      In what follows, I will show how Aquinas develops this existential problematic from 
out of Aristotelian metaphysics, which combines and yet revolutionizes the threads 
picked up from Boethius and Avicenna, neither of whom had made esse an extra-
essential principle in the sense Aquinas does. Chapter One begins by exploring the 
emergence of an existential problematic in Aquinas’s early text De Ente et Essentia. This 
text provides a clear entry point into the existential problematic insofar as Aquinas 
introduces the real otherness between esse and essence against an otherwise Aristotelian 
metaphysical inquiry into being and essence. In addition, the introduction of a 
contemporary respondent and critic of Aquinas’s real distinction (i.e., Siger of Brabant) 
shows the necessary steps Aquinas must take to secure esse as a perfection outside of and 
irreducible to something’s formal determinations and thereby to overcome the essential 
sway of the Aristotelian concepts deployed by Aquinas. Chapter Two furthers this 
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investigation by looking at arguments for the real distinction outside of De Ente, 
including both Aquinas’s “exposition” of Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus and his argument 
from act and potency, in addition to the role played by such a distinction in both the 
Summas. We will see how Aquinas’s innovation of introducing real otherness between 
esse and essence is used to solve the immediate problem of how everything is really 
diverse from God and divine simplicity (i.e., how everything other than God is in some 
way composite), but more broadly, comes to unite a “constellation” of distinct 
metaphysical issues including analogy, participation, a metaphysics of creation, and 
providence.  
      Chapter Three treats the demonstrative link between beings and God such that on the 
basis of created being, human thought can be elevated to something that is most being 
and only being. Additionally, given this demonstrative link between beings and God, we 
will ask in what sense esse belongs both to beings and to God, the answer to which 
introduces Aquinas’s analogical theory of being. But, as will be seen, such an answer 
raises a deeper problem: If God is a purely subsisting act of being, incommunicable to 
anything else, then it what sense can esse be meaningfully applied to creatures? This 
leads to a larger exploration of Aquinas’s existential problematic and the meaning of esse 
when applied to creatures in terms of the metaphysics of creation. Namely, what is given 
through the gratuitous act of creation and sustained through the abiding act of 
conservation? Furthermore, how can Aquinas avoid the troubling conclusion that God is 
the formal esse of all things if he must also insist that esse cannot be really distributed to 
creatures?  
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      Chapters Four and Five take up Aquinas’s metaphysics of creation, respectively 
treating beings as related to their essential and existential grounds in the divine intellect 
and the divine will. These Chapters will ask: In giving esse, to what is it given? What is 
given?; and In what way is it given? Chapter Four will address the former question of the 
“to what” esse is given, thereby seeking to establish the recipient of such act. Our 
concern will be both the status of essences in the divine intellect prior to creation and the 
possible orders of the universe contrived by God prior to the enactment of any single 
“world.” Chapter Five will explain Aquinas’s understanding of the “existential 
perfection” given in the creative act and attempt to more broadly understand the status of 
esse as the “perfection of all essential perfections.” Both Chapters in concert will show 
the manner in which being is given according to Aquinas, such that it is fundamentally 
distinct from the mediated manner of an Avicennian overflow, but instead results from a 
divine decree based on God’s foreknowledge of a variety of distinct essential possibilities 
and compossible orders: God is the immediate and total cause of the being (esse) of 
everything that is.   
    Both of these Chapters, however, do not so much dissolve the earlier concern of what 
esse means in relation to creatures, but instead reissue the question at a deeper 
metaphysical level: Does “esse” pick out or designate some intrinsic existential 
perfection in creatures apart from their extrinsic causal relation to God? By beginning 
with an account of the status of creatures as possible in the divine intellect prior to 
creation, we see how Aquinas attempts to counter Avicennian necessitation by separating 
the conditions for something’s essential possibility in the divine intellect from its 
existential actuality in the divine will. This leads to the question of what more the act of 
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creation adds to something’s essential possibility. Can Aquinas successfully counter the 
claim that due to the incommunicable ipseity of divine being, the being participated by 
creatures is in some real way the being of God? By asking such question, we can begin to 
determine the meaning of “esse” when applied to creatures. This would mean that 
creatures enjoy no esse of their own apart from the infusion of such from the radiance of 
their causal source. In the end, if all “esse” entails is a creature’s fact of having-been-
caused, then it does not signify anything beyond something’s essential state. Thus, I 
argue that the continued insistence on the part of existential Thomism that “esse” 
signifies some existential perfection actually deprives creatures of real being, making 
them little more than reflections of being, much like—borrowing Aquinas’s favorite 
metaphor—illumination does not properly belong to air, but air merely receives and 
reflects the borrowed light of another.  
      Finally, Chapter Six draws together the findings of the previous Chapters and argues 
that an account of creation can be given in which “esse” need not signify anything 
beyond the created thing itself and further the identification of esse with essence does not 
necessarily entail conceptual imperialism. First, using Duns Scotus’s argument for the 
univocity of being, I argue that Aquinas’s analogical metaphysics is guilty of a type of 
“concept laundering” such that it borrows all its conceptual content from the side of 
creatures, but attempts to remove—or launder—any impure traces of finitude, in order to 
retain a pure and proper name applicable exclusively to God. The problem, however, as 
shown by Scotus, is that such borrowed content cannot be purified, or intensified, 
because once all finite traces are removed either a univocal concept remains or nothing at 
all. And it seems that for Aquinas only the latter can be the case since ipseity requires that 
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nothing is shared between creatures and God, and being—as the most intensive, not 
extensive of all concepts— should be applied according to a different ratio in each case. 
We seem left only with content provided through revelation, such as indicated by Gilson 
in turning to the Metaphysics of Exodus 3:14, but not any philosophic grounds upon 
which to arrive at an intensive and proper notion of “esse” exclusive only to God.26
      Second, I treat the role of judgment in Aquinas’s thought and the claim of existential 
Thomists that judgment thinks the extra-conceptual act of being covered over by the 
static images of conceptual thought. By looking at the few places in which Aquinas 
thematizes this second operation of the intellect, I argue that judgment need only think 
something’s essential fact of being, not an extra-essential act of existence. Furthermore, 
and thirdly, I argue that such a fact of being is part of the essential content of any thing, 
although unknown to us, as part of the divine intellect’s provision of what should and 
should not come to be (fiendum et non fiendum) in order to realize God’s intended order 
for the universe. Once again following Scotus, I argue that the insistence by existential 
Thomists upon an originary decisive moment of creation incidental with respect to the 
 
                                                 
26 Without the positive content of esse ipsum subsistens, which moves our conception of being from the 
most abstract and empty to the most concrete, Gilson’s concern perpetually seems to be that the extra-
essential actuality brought by esse gets lost in the shuffle of parsing out something’s essential 
determinations. One could simply remain on Augustinian or Neoplatonic grounds and assert that “esse” is 
not understood through essences (i.e., intellectus essentiae argument) because “esse” signifies nothing other 
than essence and only God is most truly essence (i.e., being). Everything other than God is not truly 
essence because it is mutable, even angels who are composed of form and “spiritual matter.” Gilson, 
Elements of Christian Philosophy (New York: Doubleday, 1960) 60-63. Furthermore, Gilson states, “…all 
the arguments one can use to establish the distinction between being and essence in Thomas Aquinas’ 
doctrine presuppose the prior recognition of the ‘act of being’ (esse).” Ibid.,130. In answering how one 
achieves this prior recognition, which even most philosophers have not accomplished, Gilson notes an 
impasse around this real distinction as such does not give rise to a philosophical demonstration. He goes on 
to state: “This impasse is an invitation to us to give up the philosophical way—from creatures to God—and 
try the theological way—from God to creatures. Thomas Aquinas may well have first conceived the notion 
of an act of being (esse) in connection with God and then, starting from God, made use of it in his analysis 
of the metaphysical structure of composite substances. Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, 131. See 
also Gilson, Christian Philosophy, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of 
Mediaeval Philosophy, 1993), Chapter 6. The theological way that Gilson recommends in this passage 
means that a philosophical path, either from knowledge of creatures or from demonstrative knowledge of 
God, cannot be reached—a concession untroubling to Gilson’s Metaphysics of Exodus. 
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being and non-being of all things is a moment quickly bypassed in Aquinas’s 
metaphysical thought. Instead, God knows what he will do and what order he has chosen 
to enact, and through such a providential scientia, the radical indeterminacy and 
incidentality of the original gift of being comes to be neutralized by the onset of the 
“normal” operations of the universe. Such a teleological, but also providential, 
normalization of each being (i.e., as part of a predetermined order) requires that the gift 
of being given to it instead function like a loan or a fief to a “repaid” through the service 
of each to its proper end. Each thing renders a “return” on the existential investment.  
      By withholding a distinct contribution for esse in this act of creation, existential 
Thomists do not find a new restoration for the destiny of being, but instead merely 
mystify the essential economy from which they attempt to escape, while overlooking the 
more dominant essential tendencies in Aquinas’s thought. Based on this inquiry centered 
around the real otherness between esse and essence and its metaphysical constellations, I 
argue that such an attempt to overcome conceptual imperialism on the part of Aquinas, 
and more so on the part of existential Thomism, which would make existence into an act 
of being irreducible to the categories of thought and knowledge, fails to identify an 
ontological perfection in creatures really distinct from the intension and extension of the 
concepts “substance” or “thing.” It instead introduces a signifier that, as a name proper to 
God, comes to deprive creatures of the very perfection it was introduced to signify (i.e., 
actual existence) and to enshrine such deprivation as the ultimate actuality of created 
beings. In the end, the project of existential metaphysics merely reverses the “imperialism 
of the concept” without actually overcoming such imperialism.  
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Chapter I. Problematizing the Question: Thomas Aquinas and the Real Distinction 
of Esse and Essence in Created Beings 
 
      This chapter will treat how esse in its real otherness to essence, quiddity, or form 
arises as a distinct “problem” for Aquinas. To understand the problematization of esse as 
a distinct area of metaphysical inquiry, we must show how Aquinas introduces such a 
distinction and develops esse as a distinct metaphysical perfection irreducible to the 
essential constitution of a substance. The task of this entire work, but of this and the 
subsequent chapter in particular, is to seek the ground and meaning for Aquinas’s claim, 
resonated throughout his entire corpus, that esse is the actuality of all acts and the 
perfection of all perfections.1
      As a point of entry into this inquiry, we will begin by addressing how the distinction 
arises within the context of De Ente et Essentia, one of Aquinas’s earliest and insightful 
 
                                                 
1 “... quod hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper 
perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. 
Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut 
etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse 
est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum [m.e.]. Nec intelligendum 
est, quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid addatur quod sit eo formalius, ipsum determinans, sicut actus 
potentiam: esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum. 
Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens, 
quod non potest esse nec forma nec materia. Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per 
actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae 
loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc 
esse ab illo esse distinguitur, in quantum est talis vel talis naturae. Et per hoc dicit Dionysius [cap. V de 
divin. Nomin.], quod licet viventia sint nobiliora quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere: 
viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita simul habent et esse.” S. Thomae Aquinatis, 
Quaestiones disputatae, t. 2: Quaestiones disputatae de potentia. Ed. P. M. Pession (8ª ed.: Marietti, 
Taurini-Romae, 1949) q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. Hereafter: “De pot.” Also: “[...] dicendum quod ipsum esse est 
perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum 
est: unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad 
alia sicut recipiens ad receptum: sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel 
equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui 
competit esse.” Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4-5: 
Pars prima Summae theologiae (Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888-1889) 
I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. Hereafter: “ST,” followed by number of the part (e.g., I), question (e.g., q. 4), article (e.g., 
a. 1), and its status as either objection (e.g., obj. 1), sed contra (i.e., s.c.), response (i.e., resp.) or response to 
the objections (e.g., ad 1).  
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considerations of the distinction.2 De Ente, which treats the metaphysical topics of 
“being” (ens) and “essence” (essentia), provides a fairly standard Aristotelian backdrop 
against which the Aquinas’s “real distinction” takes place. In tracing the Aristotelian 
inspired themes of De Ente (Section 1), we can witness the emergence of esse as a 
distinct problem around Aquinas’s “intellectus essentiae argument” and begin to chart the 
work such a distinction accomplishes not only within this text, but also in other contexts 
in which it appears (Section 2).3
                                                 
2 De Ente et Essentia, Vol. 43, Sancti Thomae De Aquino Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita. 
3 This is the name given in the secondary literature to such an argument. See, for example, John F. Wippel 
“Aquinas’s Route to the Real Distinction: A Note on ‘De Ente Et Essentia,’” The Thomist: A Speculative 
Quarterly Review 43 (April 1979): 279-295.; Joseph Owens, “Quiddity and Real Distinction in St. Thomas 
Aquinas,” Mediaeval Studies. XXVII (1965): 5; Walter Patt. “Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Some 
Interpretations,” The New Scholasticism. LXII (Winter 1988): 1-29; Leo Sweeney. “Existence/Essence in 
Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 
XXXVII (1963): 97-131. Sweeney catalogues and analyzes the various contexts in which the argument 
occurs, and also notes the same argument treated as “ratio creaturae” in De Veritate. One possible 
advantage to using the word “ratio” as opposed to “intellectus” is to emphasize the non-subjective (in the 
modern sense) character of such a comprehension. Cf. MacDonald, however, denies that De Ente presents 
an intellectus essentiae argument: “If my remarks about the underlying logical structure of Aquinas’s 
argument are right, then the IE Argument is not to be found in De ente 4.” MacDonald, “The Esse/Essentia 
Argument in Aquinas’s De Ente et Essentia,” Journal of the History of Philosophy XXII (April 1984): 162. 
 In order to evaluate Aquinas’s argument for such a 
distinction, it will be beneficial to reflect upon the essentialist preoccupations his 
metaphysics and this argument must overcome in order to necessitate such a distinction. 
Thus, due to Aristotle’s own unawareness of the distinction, Siger of Brabant—a 
contemporary interpreter of Aquinas’s distinction and defender of a more orthodox 
Aristotelianism—can serve to illustrate the “Aristotelian sed contra” that must be 
overcome (Section 3). What the argument must show, I will argue, is not merely that 
“esse is not included in our understanding (intellectus) of certain things” (i.e., the first 
stage of the intellectus essentiae argument), but that the “non-inclusion of esse” 
constitutes a real lack on the part of being. Such a lack can only be revealed by 
understanding being (esse) to be a perfection incommensurable with any other created 
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perfection and also possessed according to its true and pure ratio by a single being, which 
is esse tantum and ipsum esse subsistens (Section 4). Finally, due to the omnipresence of 
the phrase “real distinction” in reference to such real otherness, I will address how such a 
phrase must be used and the textual basis for such (Section 5). The preliminary 
conclusions drawn from De Ente will establish a basis for a tracing the “real distinction” 
in other contexts throughout Aquinas’s corpus and more broadly establish a set of issues 
with which, I will argue, such a distinction should be constellated.     
 
Section 1: Ens and Essentia in De Ente et Essentia 
      Early in his career, Aquinas composed his seminal De Ente et Essentia,4 in which he 
sets forth his thoughts on the issue of esse and its relation to essence. Although the 
discussion of esse occupies a limited role in this short text, nevertheless, it establishes a 
principle quite foreign to the Aristotelian tenor of Aquinas’s metaphysics: that the act of 
being, or esse, stands as incommensurable with the order of created essences. That is, the 
former cannot be derived or reduced to the latter, neither directly nor through an 
emanated or derived necessity (e.g., Avicenna).5
                                                 
4 Gilson dates the text around 1256, but notes conjectural dating to as early as 1252. See Christian 
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 411.  
5 See below Chapter IV Section 1. 
 Such a commitment to the super-
essential convergence of esse with essence (in created beings) will persist in Aquinas’s 
thought and will be treated similarly in more sustained expositions. Even if the text does 
not supply adequate answers for all of the problems it raises, De Ente et Essentia as read 
by itself, however, provides a sense of the overall spirit of Aquinas’s argument. Thus, it 
offers a point of entry into the existential problematic as developed throughout Aquinas’s 
corpus.  
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      In De Ente et Essentia, the discussion of esse arises in Chapter IV, only upon the 
heels of the earlier discussion of being and essence (de ente et essentia, that is). The 
discussion of the prologue and the previous three chapters entertain a relatively familiar 
Aristotelian discussion of metaphysics. The short prologue reveals, based on the authority 
of Avicenna, that the intellect first conceives ens and essentia, and thus to avoid further 
errors along the way (of intellection), what is signified by these two terms must be 
clarified here at the beginning. Generally speaking, knowledge (cognitio) of simple 
things should be derived from knowledge of complex ones, as should knowledge of the 
prior from the posterior since such is easier for beginners. For the matter at hand, 
Aquinas notes, this entails proceeding from ens to essentia. In relation to one another, 
essence is prior to and more simple than being, but to arrive at knowledge of essence, one 
must begin with what is more easily apprehensible, namely being (ens).6
                                                 
6 Despite the brevity of Aquinas’s discussion, a great deal is presupposed by this ordering of being and 
essence, as many commentators have drawn out. See, for example, Joseph Bobik, Aquinas on Being and 
Essence: A Translation and Interpretation. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965) 22-31; 
Joseph Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” 1-40. Most notably, that in keeping 
with Thomas’s empiricism, even that which is first and most immediately known (i.e., objects of sensation) 
implies a vague conception of being (ens). Even though we later come to know the simples which compose 
the category of ‘being’—for example, essences and non-essences—and that some (i.e., essences) better 
incorporate the true sense of being, such a refined knowledge of being requires an origin in the immediacy 
of sensation from which knowledge can proceed.  Bobick, in particular, equates the ease with which we 
grasp being (ens) with an implied immediacy of sensing “something there.” Even without any further 
knowledge, the perception of “something” (e.g., a human, whiteness, heat, etc.) implies at the very least 
(my terms not Bobick’s) “some being, whatever it is.” Such an immediate sensation has not yet grasped the 
essential quality of what is being experienced, and yet the vagueness of “being” broadly covers both 
essential and non-essential, substantial and accidental, beings alike. Because both the essential and the non-
essential, and the substantial and accidental, and so on fall under ‘being,’ the latter is composed of such 
simpler things. Furthermore, essence is prior to being because if being is composed, the elements that make 
up the composite are presupposed (and thus prior to) the composite itself. To illustrate these issues, Bobick 
gives the example of a child touching a hot stove. Despite the absence of any metaphysical reflection in the 
cried utterance “hot,” nevertheless, such a sensitive encounter with something there implies being. Such a 
concept, albeit vague, accompanies all levels of cognition, beginning with the most basic and immediate 
sensations and continuing through the acts of intellection (simple apprehension, composition and division, 
reasoning). This goes back to Thomas’s original point that we must begin with the more easily assessable 
(i.e., being) and proceed to that which is simple.   
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      Chapter I of De Ente takes up the clarification of ‘ens,’ and Aquinas follows 
Aristotle’s division of being into being as divided into the ten categories and being as 
signifying the truth of a proposition. Aquinas goes on to add that the difference between 
these two senses is that the first sense posits something in reality (ponat illud in re) 
whereas the second sense need not do so. Any affirmative proposition, even if it affirms a 
privation or negation (e.g., she is blind), is about a being in the second sense (e.g., her 
blindness). Such an example does not qualify for being in the first sense, however, 
because nothing is posited in re.7 Affirming her “being blind” (i.e., she is blind) does not 
name some being in re (i.e., her “blindness”) as does, for example, the “blueness” of her 
eyes.8
      Based on this distinction, Aquinas argues, following Averroes in his Metaphysics, 
that the “nomen essentiae” is taken not from being in the second sense, but instead from 
being in the first sense. Given the former’s not positing in re, essentia must take its 
meaning from real being, if it is to name something more than mental activity alone. 
‘Essentia’ designates a commonality in the natures of multiple individuals through which 
 
                                                 
7 “unde primo modo cecitas et huiusmodi non sunt entia” De Ente, Cap. I. ll. 12-13. Throughout the next 
two sections, I will cite only the chapter and line numbers from De Ente. 
8 The importance of judgment in relation to being (both ens and esse) will only emerge throughout the 
following chapters. “Being blind” from the predication “she is blind” does not predicate categorical being 
because blindness does not fall under any of the categories. Thus, in reference to the discussion above, such 
is being per accidens, and herein one sees the connection between being in the mind, being as the truth of a 
proposition, and being per accidens. In a discussion on the relation of this second sense of being (i.e., ens 
per accidens) to Aquinas’s notion of entia rationis, Klima states: “We can also illustrate the dependence of 
blindness on the activity of the mind, as opposed to the independence of a real being from the same, by 
saying that if there were no minds at all forming the concept of blindness, then there would be no blindness 
either, even if there were eyes lacking sight. By opposition, however, even if there we no minds forming 
the concept of whiteness, still, there would be whiteness in reality, provided there would be white things” 
Gyula Klima, “The Changing Role of Entia Rationis in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology.” Synthese 96:1 
(1993): 30. Bobick in his commentary calls this “true being” or “propositional being” as opposed to “real 
being” or “positive being.” As the former does not posit anything in re, its being is related to the 
proposition forming activity of the mind. See also Bobick, Aquinas on Being and Essence, 33-38. 
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they are “collected” in genera and species.9 Aquinas goes on to say that some thing’s 
(res) definition, or that through which it is constituted in a genera and species, points to 
what that thing is: thus, for example, the definition “rational animal” expresses what it is 
(or was) to be Socrates. The intelligibility of this thing here, namely Socrates, is 
grounded in indicating “quid est res.” Because the essence “human,” in the case of 
Socrates, answers this question of whatness (quidditas), Aquinas can move to identify 
‘essentia’ and ‘quidditas’ as synonymous, along with listing ‘forma’ and ‘natura’ as 
further synonyms.10
                                                 
9 “Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum diuiditur per decem genera, oportet ut essentia significet 
aliquid commune omnibus naturis per quas diuersa entia in diuersis generibus et speciebus collocantur, 
sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis” (Cap. I, ll. 20-26).  
10 “Et quia illud per quod res constituitur in proprio genere uel specie est hoc quod significatur per 
diffinitionem indicantem quid est res, inde est quod nomen essente a philosophis in nomen quiditatis 
mutatur; et hoc est etiam quod Philosophus frequenter nominat quod quid erat esse, id est hoc per quod 
aliquid habet esse quid” (Cap I, ll. 27-34).  
 
      In traditional Aristotelian fashion, Aquinas has acknowledged the role of essentia as 
that which makes something intelligible and also that which orders something to its 
proper operations (quod habet ordinem ad propriam operationem rei). The essence 
“human” of Socrates orders this individual to the proper operations of being human (i.e., 
thinking, laughing, etc.). Whatness gathers an otherwise disparate multiplicity of beings 
within varying degrees of essential order, the exact orders that make such beings 
intelligible to our understandings. The same essential principles thus connect the order of 
our understanding to the order of rerum natura. Having begun this short chapter with a 
vague and manifold sense of being, being as essence comes to have increasing primacy 
throughout the analysis. A further move will be made to order the varied senses of ‘ens,’ 
said primarily of ‘essentia,’ around a principal meaning as “substance.” 
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      If ‘essentia’ derives from ‘ens’ that posits something in re, then the primary sense of 
such “real and positive”11 being is as substance: accidents depend upon substances for 
their being, whereas substances are independent of accidents. Furthermore, complex 
substances, which later will be defined as hylomorphic composites, take their name from 
simple substances, which as pure form have essences without the commixture of matter, 
further identified by Aquinas as “the truer and nobler sense of essence.”12 Much like 
accidents could not be without substances, so complex substances could not be without 
simple ones, or at least, the first simple substance God.13
      At the end of Chapter I, Aquinas introduces his (here unnamed) “analogical 
predication of being”: in predicating ‘being’ of substance and accidents, such a term is 
not predicated in the same way in each case.
 Thus, even though being (ens) 
is said in many ways, and the mind has some grasp of this concept even in its most 
immediate and basic activities (i.e., sensation), nevertheless, being is said more 
absolutely and primarily of substances, and only derivatively of accidents.  
14
                                                 
11 Something in reality as opposed to merely in the mind (in intellectu), and as a positive addition, not 
merely as a negation, that is, not merely according to the compositional operations of the intellect but 
primarily according to being as divided by the categories. 
12 “Sed quia ens absolute et primo dicitur de substantiis, et per posterius et quasi secundum quid de 
accidentibus, inde est quod etiam essentia proprie et uere est in substantiis, sed in accidentibus est 
quodammodo et secundum quid. Substantiarum uero quedam sunt simplices et quedam composite, et in 
utrisque est essentia; sed in simplicibus ueriori et nobiliori modo, secundum quod etiam esse nobilius 
habent: sunt enim causa eorum que composite sunt, ad minus substantia prima simplex que Deus est” (Cap. 
I, ll. 54-63).  
13 Unlike Aristotle, Avicenna, or Averroes, Aquinas does not think that other simple substances other than 
God are necessary for the being of composite substances. He may mean to suggest the yet-to-be introduced 
argument for the non-simplicity of all substances save God; thus “simple substance” would name only a 
single substance.  
14 For a more extended discussion of Aquinas’s treatment of analogy, see below Chapter III.  
 Predicating ‘being’ of accidents takes its 
meaning from predicating ‘being’ of substances. Furthermore, predicating ‘being’ of 
composite substances takes its meaning from predicating ‘being’ of simple substances, 
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most especially of God.15 Thus, because certain meanings derive their meaning from 
more primary ones, the former can only say ‘being’ in an analogical sense to the latter.16
      Beginning with the nature of complex substances, the following two chapters of the 
treatise cover a standard Aristotelian fare: form and matter as the principles of 
composition in composite substances; essence as neither form nor matter alone, but as the 
hylomorphic composite; form as the act (and actualizing principle) of matter; matter as 
the principle of individuation of form; the relationship between essence and the logical 
intentions of genus, species, and differentia, and so on. As most of these issues do not 
radically depart from the teachings of Aristotle, they can be bypassed here. Two issues, 
however, should be noted before moving on to the discussion of esse in Chapter IV. 
These include the difference between “designate” and “non-designate matter” as well as 
the distinction between abstraction with precision and abstraction without precision, as 
 
Even though understanding should take the meaning of ‘being’ and ‘essence’ from those 
things (i.e., simple substances), and that thing in particular (i.e., God), of which the terms 
are most properly predicated, the essences of composite substances are more immediately 
available to our understanding, and thus are easier to grasp. So just as a more refined 
understanding of ‘being’ (i.e., as substance and essence) arose out of an easier and more 
immediate one, so too a more refined understanding of being as simple substance will 
depart from the more immediate understanding of the being of complex substances.  
                                                 
15 Wippel, following Fabro, refers to a distinction of analogy on the predicamental level and analogy on the 
transcendental level. The former concerns the analogical application of being to substances and other 
accidents. The latter treats the analogical application between higher and lower substances. See Cornelio 
Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic Philosophy: The Notion of Participation.” The Review of 
Metaphysics, 27 (1974): 449-491. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite 
Being to Uncreated Being (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 73-74. 
16 For a more developed treatment of this doctrine, see, for example, S. Thomae Aquinatis, Liber de veritate 
catholicae Fidei contra errors infidelium seu Summa contra Gentiles, t. 2-3, ed. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. 
Caramello (Marietti, Taurini-Romae, 1961) I. 32-34. Hereafter: “SCG.”  
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each of these issues will occupy an important role for the distinction between essence and 
esse.         
      Matter serves as the principle of individuation according to Aquinas.17 Socrates and 
Plato both have the same form human, but are not one and the same human. The reason 
why they are distinct humans is because they do not share the same matter: the same form 
thus informs different matters. And yet, Aquinas had previously stated that essence 
signifies the form-matter composition, and not just the form alone.18 Does this not entail, 
however, that the essence (and thereby the definition) would be of the individual because 
it contains matter?19 And that which contains matter—only the particular individual, and 
not the universal—would be defined.20
                                                 
17 See also SCG I.65. Although Aquinas seems to assume that he is following Aristotle in this regard, some 
dispute whether matter serves as the principle of individuation for Aristotle. See, for example, A.C. Lloyd, 
“Aristotle’s Principle of Individuation,” Mind, 79 (Oct., 1970): 519-529. Lloyd argues that matter alone is 
not enough to sustain individuation, but requires individuals to have specifically different forms as well.  
18 Essence cannot signify matter alone because the essence is intelligible (cognoscibilis) and ordered into 
species and genera. Matter, however, is not a principle of cognition (principium cognitionis) and is not that 
which something is determined to species and genera. (Cap. II ll. 4-10). Socrates’s matter does not 
determine him to the species human or the genus animal because the very same matter post mortem no 
longer composes a human animal even though the matter itself has not changed. The more likely candidate 
would be form alone, which Aquinas also rejects. The reason is that if essence is that which is signified 
through the definition of the thing, the definition of a natural substance must contain form as well as matter. 
Otherwise, Aquinas argues, there would be no difference between definitions of natural things (composed 
of matter and form) and mathematical things (form alone). Matter is not merely added to the essence or an 
external being (ens extra essentiam) but makes up the constitution of the essence itself. (Cap. II ll.10-24). 
This issue of “being outside the essence” will play a vital role in the discussion of esse in chapter 4, in 
particular surrounding Aquinas’ intellectus essentiae argument.  
19 An additional point should be noted concerning the use of “esse” as that being given by form. He states: 
“...essentia autem est secundum quam res esse dicitur [m.e.]: unde oportet ut essentia qua res denominatur 
ens non tantum sit forma, neque tantum materia, sed utrumque, quamuis huiusmodi esse suo modo sola 
forma sit causa [m.e.]” (Cap. II ll. 53-57). A thing is said to be (esse) according to its essence. Likewise, 
for such being (esse), form alone is the proper cause. It is unclear how to reconcile such an account of esse 
with that given in Chapter IV.  
20 “Sed quia indiuiduationis principium materia est, ex hoc forte uideretur sequi quod essentia, que 
materiam in se complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis et non uniuersalis: ex quod sequeretur 
quod universalia diffinitionem non haberent, si essentia est id quod per diffinitionem significatur” (Cap. II 
ll. 67-73).  
 Such an outcome would run afoul of scientia as 
defined by Aristotle and understood by his scholastic followers. 
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      Aquinas’s solution is to introduce “designate” versus “non-designate” matter (materia 
signata et non signata). A definition includes only the latter type of matter, and thereby 
must be distinguished from the former, which is the principle of individuation. He states: 
“Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est indiuiduationis 
principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam que sub determinatis 
dimensionibus consideratur.”21 Designate matter considers the determinate dimensions of 
matter: not just “flesh and bones” but these flesh and bones, with this weight, this 
dimension, in this area of space, and so on. All matter has spatial dimensions and 
location, and thereby makes Socrates Socrates and not Plato. In expressing the definition 
of Socrates, however, the specific dimensions that separate Socrates’ matter from Plato’s 
becomes irrelevant. Having flesh and bones makes it possible that he is human, but 
having these flesh and bones is not necessary for his being human, only for his being 
Socrates. Thus, all matter in re is designate, even though in forming definitions the mind 
abstracts from such determinate dimensions and considers only non-designate matter. 
The process of abstraction and its relation to the individuals in re from which it abstracts 
introduces the second issue: abstraction with precision and abstraction without precision 
(or imprecise abstraction), a matter of much importance in discussing how the intellect 
understands esse in relation to essence.22
                                                 
21 Cap II ll. 73-77. 
22 For the importance of the different types of abstraction in reference to the question of esse, see below 
Section 2. Owens attempts to revitalize the Thomistic distinction between abstraction with/without 
precision in order to show why the intellectus essentiae argument does not demonstrate a real distinction: 
“From this doctrine of the knowledge of species and individuals through designation, St Thomas develops a 
teaching that has been strangely neglected or forgotten in later Scholasticism, including Neoscholasticism. 
It is the doctrine of abstraction with precision and without precision. From the time of Suarez the notions of 
abstraction and of precision have been regarded as the same. It is difficult today to realize how vital is the 
notion of abstraction without precision for understanding the Thomistic doctrine of essence and being.” 
Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” 29. 
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      The discussion of abstraction arises around the ways in which the essence can be 
abstracted from the individual, which also includes an accompanying discussion of the 
way genus abstracts from the differentiae of species. This discussion treats the way in 
which genus can be predicated of species and species of the individual through 
abstraction without precision. Aquinas argues that the designation in each case (i.e., 
specific difference or signate matter) remains latent in the essence, and thus predication is 
made possible. Such designations are “indeterminate” with respect to the essence: the 
mind abstracts the genus “animal,” but without fully excluding the specific difference 
“rational.” Or in the case of abstracting the specific essence of “human,” the designate 
matter of Socrates remains latent without being altogether excluded. This is referred to as 
“abstraction without precision.”  
      Unlike “abstraction with precision,” which seeks as contained and as explicit an 
abstraction (or concept) as possible, abstracting without precision allows for an 
indeterminacy of content. The example Aquinas uses is the difference between the 
abstractions “human” and “humanity.” The former is imprecise because it signifies the 
entire essence of a human but leaves certain determinations implicit. As the whole 
essence of a human, however, it can be predicated of the individual: this human (e.g., 
Socrates) is human. The latter is precise in that it abstracts only a part without leaving 
anything implicit or undetermined in the concept. In the case of “humanity,” Aquinas 
calls this an integral part.23
                                                 
23 He also uses the example of “body” and the different ways it can be abstracted: body as the genus of 
animal and body as the part of an animal. The former requires abstraction without precision and the latter 
abstraction with precision. No animal is its body. Rather its body is integral to it, albeit only as a part. 
Every animal is “body,” however, in the sense that “body” is understood as “three dimensional thing,” in 
which case it is a genus of animal. See Cap. III ll. 105-150. 
 “Humanity” is something integral to the constitution of any 
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human, but no human is humanity. Thus, such a precise abstraction cannot be predicated 
of the individual.  
      Distinguishing these two types of abstraction concerns the possibility of an 
abstraction that carries both determinate and indeterminate content.24  Imprecise 
abstraction of an essence enables predication because the whole contained in the 
individual is implicitly contained in the essence as indeterminate content. Such 
abstraction leaves the whole in tact, but only explicates a certain dimension of it. Thus, 
although not constituting different realities, the nature or essence can be considered in 
two ways: absolutely or secundum esse.25 In regard to the former, Aquinas states: “Ergo 
patet quod natura hominis absolute considerata abstrahit a quolibet esse, ita tamen quod 
non fiat precisio alicuius eorum. Et hec natura sic considerata est que predicatur de 
indiuiduis omnibus.”26
                                                 
24 The issue of the status of essences must be noted at this point, but set aside until the following chapter, in 
which it can be treated at length. Here I will mention only the following: Aquinas argues that the ratio of 
genus or species applies more properly to the essence taken as a whole, not as a part (e.g., human, not 
humanity; animal, not animality). This he maintains against the Platonists, who by separating the essence 
from the individual, bar predication of it to a multiplicity. Essence considered in the absolute sense lacks its 
own esse even though such remains latent. For a comparison between Aquinas’s understanding of the 
common nature in comparison to Duns Scotus and Avicenna, see Joseph Owens, “Common Nature: A 
Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies XIX (1957): 1-14. 
25 “Human” as abstracted without precision from Socrates is not a separate part or reality of Socrates. It is 
instead a way of considering Socrates’ essence absolutely. According to Owens, for Scotus the common 
nature constitutes a separate and formally distinct reality, which is composed with haecceity as an 
individuating mode. Ibid., 12.  
26 Cap. III ll. 68-73. 
 Although abstracting from any esse, such an act does not exclude 
esse altogether. Esse remains latent along with universality or plurality. The latter, on the 
other hand, considers the essence according to its esse, either as multiplied in singulars 
and or as unified and universalized in the soul. The essence has esse in either way, but 
can be considered in absolution from both.  
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      Aquinas seems to draw a parallel between the implicit containment of esse and the 
implicit containment of individuality in the imprecise abstraction of essences.27
      Following along the easier path, Chapter III’s discussion of composite substances 
prepares the way for Chapter IV’s treatment of simple substances (i.e., the soul, 
intelligences, and the first cause). The latter covers familiar ground in Aristotelian 
metaphysics, even with the Christianized understanding of intelligences as “angels.” And 
yet, Chapter IV presents a new type of question. This new type of question digs deeper 
 The 
essence “human,” for example, abstracts from the determinate features of this or that 
individual’s matter in addition to abstracting from any existential considerations as 
existing in a multiplicity of real humans or as existing as a unified notion (ratio) in the 
soul. Thus, when presented with the intellectus essentiae argument in Chapter IV, one 
must ask whether the essence understood without esse is an essence abstracted without 
precision. This would entail the indeterminate containment of esse, and thereby foster 
only a rational distinction between essence and esse, but not necessarily a real 
distinction. This question will reemerge below after addressing the issue of esse.  
 
 Section 2: “Intellectus Essentiae” and the Real Distinction in De Ente IV 
                                                 
27 Masiello argues that this section is necessarily presupposed by the intellectus essentiae argument and 
makes it possible. See Ralph J. Masiello, “A Note on Essence and Existence,” The New Scholasticism XLV 
(1971): 491-494.  Sweeney casts doubt upon the validity of this comparison. The relationship essence: 
individual is one of act: potency because signate matter receives specific form, form actualizes the potency 
of matter. The relationship essence: esse is the reverse (i.e., potency: act) for the reasons outlined in 
Chapter 4. Leo Sweeney, “Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” 107. Also see Walter 
Patt, “Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” 1-29. At stake (to be discussed further below, 
see Section 5) is what type of distinction is entailed by “not knowing” one of the members of the couplet. 
Abstraction without precision translates the “not knowing” the individual determinations not as complete 
ignorance, but the leaving indeterminate (although not excluded) individual determinations. Thus, I can 
know the essence “human” without knowing (yet not being completely ignorant of) every individual 
human’s individuating features. But essences are only rationally distinct from individuals and thus 
abstraction without precision does not necessarily reflect real distinctions. The intellectus essentiae 
argument, however, requires more of a distinction and thus must show that esse is not merely “unknown yet 
implicated” in such an understanding of essences, but that esse is unknown because it is really distinct.  
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than had the previous ones by problematizing the existence (esse) of things, or how to 
account for the fact that anything is at all. For Aristotelian metaphysics, such a fact had 
been the starting point from which scientia could begin: things appear before us and 
subsequently we may ask “what are they being?,” with an emphasis on the “what.” The 
starting point itself, however, did not foster its own question of “why there are things at 
all.” Because essential considerations cannot answer this question, as Aquinas shows in 
Chapter IV, such constitutes an existential problem.  
      The discussion of esse arises around and in opposition to the Augustinian-inspired 
position of universal hylomorphism, even though here Aquinas mentions only 
Avicebron’s Fons Vitae by name. Taking off from the preceding chapter’s consideration 
of how essences are in composite substances, he now addresses the same question in 
terms of simple substances. Aquinas states:  
Nunc restat uidere per quem modum sit essentia in substantiis separatis, scilicet in anima, 
intelligentia et causa prima. Quamuis autem simplicitatem cause prime omnes concedant, 
tamen compositionem forme et materie quidam nituntur inducere in intelligentias et in 
animam […]28
Aquinas immediately recognizes that even though now speaking of “simple substances,” 
he must be careful to avoid thinking of all such substances as equally simple. The 
assumption here is that the first cause is itself absolutely simple and unmarked by any 
degree of potentiality, whereas intelligences and separated souls cannot enjoy such 
absolute simplicity. In composite substances, the presence of potentiality is explained by 
matter, which remains inseparable from their essences. With intelligences and souls, 
however, matter by definition seems to be precluded. The position of universal 
hylomorphism, however, rectifies this problem by introducing a “spiritual matter” into 
 
                                                 
28 Cap. IV ll.1-6. 
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intelligences and souls in order to provide the compositionality necessary to distinguish 
such created beings from divine simplicity.29
      Against universal hylomorphism, Aquinas maintains that like the first cause, souls 
and the intelligences are not composed of matter and form. They are immaterial. He 
rejects the claims of universal hylomorphism by pointing to “the excellence of 
understanding” found in intelligent substances, which implies an intelligibility of forms 
apart from any conditions of materiality.
 This would allow the first cause to be 
unique in its absolute simplicity and separate it from everything else, which is composed 
of form and some kind of matter.  
30 The intelligibility of forms, Aquinas argues, 
requires an eduction from matter of the form to be received in an intellectual substance. 
Intelligibility, Aquinas insists, requires a complete absence of matter. He argues that to 
maintain this other type of matter, unlike corporeal matter, would not impede 
intelligibility would mean that matter’s unintelligibility comes from its corporeal form. 
This implies that of all types of matter, only that with a corporeal form is unintelligible; 
matter with a incorporeal form remains intelligible. But even a corporeal form, Aquinas 
states, like any form abstracted from matter, is intelligible. Matter thus cannot be called 
unintelligible on account of its corporeal form, but must be unintelligible on account of 
that which is other than its formal element.31
                                                 
29 For a discussion of Aquinas’s understanding of hylomorphism in reference to Liber de causis, see 
Richard C. Taylor, “St. Thomas and the Liber de causis on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate 
Substances,” Mediaeval Studies XLI (1979): 506-513. 
30 An implied premise is that intellectual substances understand apart from all conditions of materiality.  
 Thus, “corporeal form” cannot be invoked 
31 “Cuius demonstratio potissima est ex uirtute intelligendi que in eis est. Videmus enim formas non esse 
intelligibiles in actu nisi secundum quod separantur a materia et a conditionibus eius, nec efficiuntur 
intelligibiles in actu nisi per uirtutem substantie intelligentis, secundum quod recipiuntur in ea et secundum 
quod aguntur per eam. Vnde oportet quod in qualibet substantia intelligente sit omnino immunitas a 
materia, ita quod neque habeat materiam partem sui, neque etiam sit sicut forma impressa in materia ut est 
de formis materialibus. Nec potest aliquis dicere quod intelligibilitatem non impediat materia quelibet, sed 
materia corporalis tantum. Si enim hoc esset ratione materie corporalis tantum, cum materia non dicatur 
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as what makes matter unintelligible and diverse from other types of matter. If there were 
other types of matter, they too would be unintelligible (i.e., qua matter, not qua 
“corporeal” or qua “spiritual”) because only through an educed form—whether 
corporeal or incorporeal—does it take on intelligibility.   
      The burden of the victor following the defeat of universal hylomorphism is rendering 
souls and intelligences unlike the first cause. That is, how to avoid absolute simplicity in 
intelligences and souls such that the first cause alone is entirely simple.32
      At this point, Aquinas introduces a new principle of composition in order to maintain 
the non-simplicity of immaterial substances. This principle is the act of being, or 
existence (esse), that enters into composition with what something is (i.e., its quiddity). 
Thus, by maintaining a real composition between being and the form in all entities other 
than the first cause, Aquinas can uphold the non-simplicity of material and immaterial 
substances alike. On this issue, he states:  
 The appeal of 
the vanquished position had been to uphold the uniqueness of divine simplicity by 
locating a material element in all creatures thereby limiting them through the potency of 
matter. Aquinas, thus, must provide some way of distinguishing even the most noble 
creatures (i.e., souls and intelligences)—which are also immaterial—from God. This 
requires showing why even the most noble of entities other than the first cause are 
nevertheless marked by some degree of inherent limitation.  
                                                                                                                                                 
corporalis nisi secundum quod stat sub forma corporali, tunc oporteret quod hoc haberet materia, scilicet 
impedire intelligibilitatem, a forma corporali; et hoc non potest esse, quia ipsa etiam forma corporalis actu 
intelligibilis est sicut et alie forme, secundum quod a materia abstrahitur.” Cap. IV ll. 11-33. 
32 Even the distinction between the soul, for example, and its powers is a distinction between an essence 
and its essential properties. Thus, such properties follow from, or are a natural consequence of, the soul. 
See De spiritualibus creaturis, a.11, resp. At ST I, q. 54, a. 1, resp., Aquinas explains that an angel’s 
substance (and he extends this argument to any creature) cannot be its action (as the actuality of a power) 
because an angel has an admixture of potency insofar as God alone is pure act. Thus, Aquinas grounds the 
composition between substance and action on the composition between essence and existence.   
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Vnde in anima uel in intelligentia nullo modo est compositio ex materia et forma, ut hoc 
modo accipiatur essentia in eis sicut in substantiis corporalibus. Sed est ibi compositio 
forme et esse; unde in commento none propositionis libri De causis dicitur quod 
intelligentia est habens formam et esse: et accipitur ibi forma pro ipsa quidditate uel 
natura simplici.33
And here we find what is arguably one of Aquinas’s greatest innovations in metaphysics, 
and also one of the most controversial: although there is no composition of form and 
matter in simple substances, there is composition of form and esse.
 
34
      Accepting such a principle of composition, however, is not intuitive. So far, the 
foundation for such a principle has been the need to posit some principle of non-
simplicity for everything other than the first, and the insufficiency of universalizing 
hylomorphic composition for achieving this goal. But even this foundation requires 
further justification.
 The “having of 
esse” requires a non-identity between what something is and its act of being, which it has 
but is not.  
35
                                                 
33 IV ll. 33-40. 
34 Taylor argues that Aquinas’s reading of the Liber, although correct in its refutation of hylomorphism, 
mistakes Aquinas’s own esse/essentia composition for the Liber’s composition between form and being 
because being serves as the potential substrate for formal determination;  see Richard C. Taylor, “St. 
Thomas and the Liber de causis on the Hylomorphic Composition of Separate Substances,” 506-513. In 
reference to Liber de causis and the Plotiniana Arabica, Taylor states: “[…] Aquinas can be said to have 
been influenced by these and other Arabic philosophical materials as well as philosophical and theological 
materials from the Latin tradition, but his critical synthesis of these notion into his own doctrine of Essence 
and Existence is a new and exciting philosophical development building upon but not identical with what 
preceded him in the history of philosophy.” Richard C. Taylor, “Aquinas, the ‘Plotinian Arabica’, and the 
Metaphysics of Being and Actuality,” Journal of the History of Ideas 59.2 (April 1998): 238. As will be 
seen below, of central importance for Aquinas is the role of God as esse tantum and the sole cause of esse 
in things. Thus, being is not given through intermediaries, nor is esse tantum as mere reflection upon esse 
commune.  
 In terms of the simplicity of the first cause, Aquinas has only 
35 In his Scriptum Sententiarum, Aquinas treats the issue of esse in a number of places. (For books 1 and 2 
of Aquinas’s Commentary on the Sentences, see Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri 
Lombardi, t.1-2 Ed. P. Mandonnet. P. Lethielleux, Parisiis, 1929). For example: One notable discussion of 
this issue arises around the issue of the accidentality of esse in God. He states: “...quod accidens dicitur hic 
quod non est de intellectu alicujus, sicut rationale dicitur animali accidere; et ita cuilibet quidditati creatae 
accidit esse, quia non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatis; potest enim intelligi humanitas, et tamen dubitari, 
utrum homo habeat esse” (I Sent. d. 8 Expositio Primae Partis Textus). The language of this passage, in 
which Aquinas refers to “esse” as an accident of a created quiddity, reflects that of Avicenna, who in his 
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claimed that “everyone concedes the simplicity of the first cause” (“omnes concedant 
simplicitatem causae primae”). Such a claim is noteworthy because De Ente has not 
already demonstrated the existence of such a simple first cause, nor has it argued that 
everything else, including simple substances, must be composed because of the 
uniqueness of the first cause as pure actuality. The manner in which Aquinas arrives at 
these conclusions and also grounds his principle of “existential” composition needs to be 
addressed at present. The argument Aquinas offers for the real distinction between 
essence and esse consists of three stages that will be worked out in what follows. How 
the states fit together, and at what stage the real distinction is established, will be 
discussed in Section 4 below. 
      In the spirit of Avicenna,36 Aquinas argues that whatever is understood as not 
belonging to an essence comes from outside it and makes up a composition with that 
essence.37 This is what commentators have called the intellectus essentiae argument.38
                                                                                                                                                 
Metaphysics treats of esse as an accident that happens to an essence. The use of “accidit” to describe this 
relationship of esse to essence does not seem to accord with Aquinas’s usual understanding of the matter.  
36 Sweeney cites both Alfarabi and Avicenna as providing forms of the intellectus essentiae argument. See 
Leo Sweeney, “Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” 109.  
37 The understood essence is the absolute consideration discussed in Chapter 3 of De Ente. As Owens 
states: “The argument, then, proceeds from the nature absolutely considered, from the nature as it is the 
formal ground or ratio of its occurrence in individuals or in the mind.” Owens, “Quiddity and Real 
Distinction,” 7. But such an abstraction does not establish a real distinction, as Owens argues. 
 
38 Aquinas invokes a type of intellectus essentiae argument in many early texts: In De Veritate on the 
question of whether God’s existence is self-evident to the human mind, Aquinas offers another version of 
the intellectus essentiae argument. The issue arises in explaining how an account of God’s quiddity (ratio 
quiditatis) includes existence (esse). As such is per se nota only in itself, but not to us, thus God’s esse 
must be demonstrated. He prefaces this conclusion with a claim about creatures: “Hoc autem quod est esse, 
in nullius creaturae ratione includitur: cuiuslibet enim creaturae esse est aliud ab eius quiditate; unde non 
potest dici de aliqua creatura quod eam esse sit per se notum etiam secundum se. Sed in Deo...” (Sancti 
Thomae De Aquino, Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 22: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate 
(Editori di San Tommaso, Roma, 1975-1970-1972-1976) 3 vol. 4 fascicula, q. 10, a. 12, resp. ll. 174-178). 
In Scriptum Sententiarum, in answer to the question whether there are many first principles, Aquinas 
presents another argument for the real distinction. Similar to the De Ente presentation, Aquinas begins with 
an understood distinctness between esse and essence in order to establish some being who has esse per se, 
and thus can explain the reception of esse in everything else (which is understood not to include esse). 
Aquinas introduces this argument in reference to the oneness of the first principle. He thus makes this 
argument for the existence of a first principle simpliciter invoking an intellectus essentiae type argument: 
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Esse is not included in an understanding of essences (save one). Therefore, esse is distinct 
from such essences.39
                                                                                                                                                 
“Invenitur enim in omnibus rebus natura entitatis, in quibusdam magis nobilis, et in quibusdam minus; ita 
tamen quod ipsarum rerum naturae non sunt hoc ipsum esse quod habent: alias esse esset de intellectu 
cujuslibet quidditatis, quod falsum est, cum quidditas cujuslibet rei possit intelligi etiam non intelligendo de 
ea an sit. Ergo oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus natura sit ipsum 
suum esse; alias in infinitum procederetur, et hoc est quod dat esse omnibus, nec potest esse nisi unum, 
cum natura entitatis sit unius rationis in omnibus secundum analogiam; unitas enim causati requirit 
unitatem in causa per se…” (In II Sent. d. I, q. 1, a. 1). This familiar language of something’s intelligibility 
apart from its actual existence (an sit) is echoed by the De Ente argument. The natures of entities (natura 
entitatis) are not the esse which they have because otherwise esse would derive from an understanding of 
their quiddities (de intellectu cujuslibet quidditatis). In the world, a variety of more or less noble natures are 
discovered in all things. And yet, esse does not accompany the quidditative understanding of “whatever” 
because its an sit is not entailed. One need only think of the intelligibility of the essence “phoenix.” 
Because the quiddity of such entities does not include their an sint, they must receive esse from another, 
necessitating the eventual arrival at a nature that has esse per se (“…oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et 
oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus natura sit ipsum suum esse”). Without such a nature, the reception of esse 
ab aliquo would extend to infinity, and there would be no first that could ground the reception of esse in 
each posterior existent.  
39 “Huiusmodi ergo substantie, quamuis sint forme tantum sine materia, non tamen in eis est omnimoda 
simplicitas nec sunt actus purus, sed habent permixtionem potentie; et hoc sic patet. Quicquid enim non est 
de intellectu essentie uel quiditatis, hoc est adueniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia, quia 
nulla essentia sine hiis que sunt partes essentie intelligi potest. Omnis autem essentia uel quiditas potest 
intelligi sine hoc quod aliquid intelligatur de esse suo: possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et 
tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate. Nisi 
forte sit aliqua res cuius quiditas sit ipsum suum esse, et hec res non potest esse nisi una et prima: quia 
impossibile est ut fiat plurificatio alicuius nisi per additionem alicuius differentie, sicut multiplicatur natura 
generis in species; uel per hoc quod forma recipitur in diuersis materiis, sicut multiplicatur natura speciei in 
diuersis indiuiduis; uel per hoc quod unum est absolutum et aliud in aliquo receptum, sicut si esset quidam 
calor separatus esset alius a calore non separato ex ipsa sua separatione. Si autem ponatur aliqua res que sit 
esse tantum ita ut ipsum esse sit subsistens, hoc esse non recipiet additionem differentie, quia iam non esset 
esse tantum sed esse et preter hoc forma aliqua; et multo minus reciperet additionem materie, quia iam 
esset esse non subsistens sed materiale. Vnde relinquitur quod talis res que sit suum esse non potest esse 
nisi una; unde oportet quod in qualibet alia re preter eam aliud sit esse suum et aliud quiditas uel natura seu 
forma sua; unde oportet quod in intelligentiis sit esse preter formam, et ideo dictum est quod intelligentia 
est forma et esse. Omne autem quod conuenit alicui uel est causatum ex principiis nature sue, sicut risibile 
in homine; uel aduenit ab aliquo principio extrinseco, sicut lumen in aere ex influentia solis. Non autem 
potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa efficiente, quia 
sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret: quod est impossibile. Ergo 
oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio. Et quia omne quod est 
per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet quod sit aliqua res que sit causa 
essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in infinitum in causis, cum omnis res que 
non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum est. Patet ergo quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et 
quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa prima que Deus est.” (Cap. IV ll. 90-
146).  
 Understanding an essence (e.g., human, triangle, phoenix) brings 
with it certain determinations without which the essence could not be understood: with 
triangle, for example, comes the determination “three sides equaling 180 degrees.” What 
does not accompany such understandings, according to Aquinas, is a determination to 
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being (esse). The essence of a phoenix, for example, can be understood and yet we know 
nothing of whether any phoenix is.40 Nothing about the essence “phoenix,” or “human” 
for that matter, specifies that any phoenix or human is in the same way that the essence 
specifies that “human is risible” or “phoenix regenerable.” Here one finds the distinction 
between the principles that govern what something is (e.g., the essence of phoenix) and 
those that govern that it is (e.g., the actual existence of individual phoenixes). The latter, 
Aquinas maintains, come from outside the province governed by the essence: otherwise 
how could we understand the essence “phoenix” (not a contradiction) and all the 
determinations attached to it and yet there be no phoenixes?41
                                                 
40 Aquinas’s discussion in De Ente implies, but does not acknowledge, a series of deeper metaphysical 
questions: What is understood in understanding the essence “phoenix”? Is a positive reality understood or 
merely an ens rationis? Furthermore, what type of being can be granted to the essence of a non-existent 
entity (e.g., a phoenix)? Finally, on what grounds can “phoenix-ness” be considered a possibility that does 
not involve an inherent contraction (like “squared circle” or “chimera”)? These questions cannot be 
answered on the basis of De Ente and require a more sustained exposition of Thomas’s position on divine 
rationes, divine exemplars, and creaturely essences visa-vis universality, all of which ask after Thomas’s 
commitment to metaphysical realism in general. I will provide such an exposition in Chapter IV, but here 
only note the importance of this intellectus essentiae for existing and non-existing essences alike.  
  
41 Ralph Masiello maintains that such a reading of Aquinas is based on a mistranslation of the term 
“ignorare” in the intellectus essentiae argument., and thus generates an apparent departure from Aristotle’s 
epistemic model. Ralph J. Masiello, “A Note on Essence and Existence,” 492. See also, Owens’s response: 
Owens “’Ignorare’ and Existence,” The New Scholasticism XLVI (1972): 210-219. Instead of translating 
the term as “to be ignorant” or “to not know,” Masiello argues that it should be translated as “to ignore.” 
Otherwise, how could Aquinas “immediately conclude” that existence is obviously other than essence if 
“ignorant” of one of the terms of the distinction? The consequence of such a mistranslation, Masiello 
argues, is that scientific knowledge, “episteme” as outlined by the Posterior Analytics, would be 
undermined by Aquinas. On the traditional reading of intellectus essentiae, according to which intellectus 
operates independently of experience, he states: “But this is opposed to St. Thomas’ realistic position that 
the universals are inductively derived from the knowledge of individuals. Not to be able to relate the 
universal to the individual would render all scientific knowledge useless. Actually, St. Thomas’ argument 
that essence is other than existence is the culmination of a rather lengthy treatment in the previous chapter 
on the manner in which the essence as universal is understood in relation to individuals: the knowledge of 
the nature involves knowledge of individuals […]” “A Note on Essence and Existence,” 492. According to 
Masiello, the mistake of treating essences in complete separation from actually existing individuals is 
twofold: first, it fosters the mistaken conclusion that the intellectus essentiae argument insufficiently 
establishes the real distinction between essence and esse; second, it dissolves contact with the actually 
existing individuals to which universal scientific knowledge must relate. The work of abstraction, however, 
as outlined by Aquinas in De Ente III and referred to by Masiello in this passage, does not sever its ties so 
radically from the experiential ground. Because the intellectus—as the extreme in both directions— 
sustains contact with the existing individuals of experience, there can be both knowledge of existence as 
distinct, and also knowledge of the particular as understood through the intelligible species. Based on this 
reasoning, Masiello concludes that existence for Aquinas thus must be self-evident through immediate 
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      In a move praised by Gilson as “the Thomistic revolution in metaphysics,”42 Aquinas 
here begins to dislodge the act of being, which the essence phoenix lacks in re, from the 
determinative actuality brought by the essence. What this entails is that the determinate 
actuality of being this or that (e.g., being phoenix or human) governed by form must enter 
into composition with the act of being anything at all. Whether intellectus essentiae by 
itself establishes a “real” or a “conceptual” distinction remains to be seen below.43
                                                                                                                                                 
experience, as it had been for Aristotle. He claims “[i]n a word, our knowledge of the existence of any 
individual thing which comes under the purview of our immediate experience is self-evident.” Ibid., 494. 
Masiello argues that this conclusion, made possible by the retranslation of “ignorare,” goes against both 
Gilson’s theological claim for the indemonstrability of esse as really distinct from essence (because esse in 
its immediacy is not open to the question of demonstrable or indemonstrable) and Maritain’s intellectual 
intuition of being: by relying on a conceptually inaccurate understanding of “ignorare,” both Gilson and 
Maritain have made the path to esse unnecessarily convoluted, when in fact it stands clearly before us 
through immediate experience. At stake in this matter is what type of distinction is entailed by “ignoring” 
one of the members of the couplet essence/esse: does a real distinction follow from this intellective activity 
or is something else required to know the real distinction? What if, following Masiello, the taking of 
essence in intellectus essentiae “ignores” esse, but it is not “ignorant” of it? Thus, just as the individuating 
or universalizing modes of an essence can be ignored when considering the nature absolutely, so too its 
existence either in the mind or in re can be ignored. Even if Masiello is correct, which I do not dispute, a 
real distinction does not follow from “ignoring” existence, in the same manner as “ignoring” an essence’s 
universality in the mind or its individuality in re does not entail a real distinction. The so-called self-
evidence of the existing individual, from which essential considerations can be taken (i.e., immediately 
grasped through intellectus), does not reveal existence to be “really distinct” from essence. Masiello is 
correct in pointing to the indemonstrability of the existence of the individual thing for Aristotle, but this by 
no means entails a real distinction. Even such a strong critic of the real distinction as Ockham also claims 
that we grasp the existing individual through intuitive cognition and we intuit this as an indemonstrable 
fact. And yet for Ockham—who seems to be thoroughly Aristotelian on this point—this does not entail that 
existence is something really distinct from the thing.  
42 Gilson, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 365.  
 
43 I will run through all three stages of the argument before returning to address if and when Aquinas 
demonstrates a real distinction. The position of Joseph Owens accords with my own, except for our 
ultimate conclusions. According to Owens, the original intellectus, a simple operation of the mind, only 
grasps the essence; the compositional activity of judgment is required to discover being (esse). In tracing 
the creatures act of being back to that from which it was received, one discovers the giver of being’s nature 
to be identical to being itself (ipsum esse) and thus unable to enter into the nature of any other recipient. 
Thus, the received being must be really distinct from created natures. See, for example, Owens, “Being and 
Natures in Aquinas,” The Modern Schoolman LXI:3 (March 1984): 158. I will discuss the issue of 
judgment in relation to esse. See below Chapter VI Section 2. My argument will agree with Owens’s such 
that intellectus essentiae does not reveal a really distinct perfection of “being” (esse). For example:  “…a 
real distinction between a thing and its being cannot be shown until after completion of the demonstration 
that God exists. Only then is one in a position to see that existence cannot coalesce in reality with any finite 
thing. It cannot enter in reality into the thing’s nature, nor be regarded as a part (De Ente, p. 376.97) of that 
nature, without entailing the Parmenidean consequences. It has to remain really other than the thing.” 
Owens, “Stages and Distinction in De Ente: A Rejoinder,” The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 
45 (January 1981): 110. See also Owens, Aquinas on Being and Thing (Niagara Falls, NY: Niagara 
University Press, 1981), 9-10. He structures his argument around the hypothesis that if God as ipsum esse 
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      At the end of this discussion, Aquinas adds a slight caveat to his claim: “therefore, it 
is obvious that esse is other than essence or quiddity. Unless perhaps there was some 
thing whose quiddity were itself its own esse, and this thing could not be unless one and 
first [...].” He here entertains the possibility of something whose essence and esse are 
identical. This initiates what has been called the “second phase” of the argument, 
following from the intellectus essentiae argument as the “first phase.”44
      A thing whose essence is only existence (esse tantum) would be subsisting existence 
itself (ipsum esse subsistens), just as something whose essence were heat alone would be 
subsisting heat. If esse were to be multiplied, then it would have to be multiplied by the 
addition of some difference; or as received in diverse matters; or as something receives 
that which is separate in another.
 This phase of the 
argument maintains that if an identity between essence and esse is possible, the 
conditions of its possibility restrict such an identity to a single being. This does not prove 
that such a being exists, but only that such an identity can be possible in no more than 
one being. The conditions of multiplication prohibit the multiplication of esse. 
45
                                                                                                                                                 
subsistens and esse as received in every other being (entia) were not really distinct, being, or being as God, 
would absorb all things and thereby undermine the distinction between God and created entities. This 
argument requires Stages 2 and 3 such that God that whose nature is ipsum esse subsistens has been 
determined. Whether Aquinas can avoid the outcome of collapsing created beings into God will be seen in 
Chapter III. Owens argues against such a conclusion, whereas I will show the trouble Aquinas encounters 
in avoiding it.  
44 See Wippel, “Aquinas’s Route,” 286-287; also, Patt, “Aquinas’s Real Distinction,” 17-18. For the “third 
phase,” see pp. 47-49 below.  
45 As will be argued below, Aquinas’s treatment of esse at this point blurs the distinction between esse 
tantum and esse commune. Whereas the former—as a distinct subsisting perfection—can only be 
participated, the latter could be contracted in a manner other than the three offered here. Scotus, for 
example, presents being as a univocal concept contracted through disjunctive modes. He thus avoids 
making being into a genus or species, but also resists Aquinas’s temptation to transform it into an 
intensified perfection. For this reason, the first being need not be esse tantum, but only esse/ens infinitum. 
See Chapter V and VI below.  
 The first way reflects how a genus is multiplied into 
species. The addition of differentiae multiplies the genus “animal” into the species 
“human, dog, lion, worm, etc.” Esse cannot be multiplied in this way because, with the 
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addition of something else, it would no longer be esse tantum. Neither can esse be 
multiplied in the way matter added to form multiplies a species into individuals, because 
here again, with the addition of matter, it would no longer be esse tantum.  
      Although ipsum esse subsistens cannot be multiplied either through accidents or 
through matter, a third way of multiplication remains open.46 This third way, however, 
retains the oneness of the subsisting thing while enabling it to be participated. Aquinas 
uses the example of separate heat in order to illustrate this type of multiplication. If there 
were separated heat—something whose essence were heat alone—then all non-separated 
heat would receive heat from outside itself, but it would not be heat alone. This would 
entail a distinction between that which receives heat and the received heat in everything 
other than heat alone. The case is the same for esse. Thus, even though participation 
multiplies the participants, the participated—in this case ipsum esse subsistens—remains 
one. The relationship between participated and participating esse is not along the lines of 
genus to species or species to individuals because participation does not divide or 
otherwise break up the participated esse, but leaves it in tact. Thus, despite the 
participative sharing amongst a multiplicity, the distribution of the perfection (e.g., esse 
or heat) does not disrupt the absolute self-identity, or “ipseity,” of the subsisting form.47
                                                 
46 Wippel explains why Aquinas need not return to the third possibility: “The implication is that the third 
alternative really concedes his point. Then there would only be one separate and subsisting existence. In all 
others, existence would be received by something else. But this is to acknowledge that any such being 
would consist of existence and that which receives it.” Wippel, “Aquinas’s Route,” 288-289. This reception 
of esse into another will play an important role in accounting for the diminished and participated (i.e., non-
essential) esse of creatures. Aquinas’s account of creatures-participating-esse (and creator as participated) 
will be discussed in following chapter. See below Chapter II Section 1.  
47 For a definition of this term, see above fn. 19 of the Introduction.  
 
In order to address how such a perfection comes to be multiplied and yet retain its 
subsisting self-identity, Aquinas will introduce an “analogical theory of predication” 
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whereby the former receive the perfection of the latter in a diminished and limited 
capacity.  
      Whether there is such a subsisting esse or a subsisting heat remains a matter for 
further demonstration. In the case of the former, a third phase of the argument must be 
undertaken for such a demonstration. In the case of the latter, no such demonstration is 
possible lest one unnecessarily posit Platonic forms. This means that the second stage of 
the argument operates in the realm of possibility without demonstrating the actuality of 
such subsisting things: for every essence, it is logically (and thereby ontologically) 
impossible for there to be more than one subsisting thing (i.e., who is identical to that 
essence alone) even if that thing itself does not exist. Many commentators on this text 
argue that the third phase of the argument, which actually demonstrates the existence of 
such a subsisting esse, adds nothing to securing the real distinction between esse and 
essence because the logical impossibility of multiplying such an identity already has been 
shown.48
      The third phase of the argument enlists efficient causation in order to demonstrate the 
existence of ipsum esse subsistens.
 After reviewing the third phase of the argument, it will be necessary to 
determine at what point the real distinction is actually secured and how the three stages 
complement each other.  
49 Aquinas begins by distinguishing principles intrinsic 
to something’s nature (i.e., formal and material causes) and those extrinsic to its nature 
(i.e., final and efficient).50
                                                 
48 See fns. 56, 57, 121, and 123 below.  
49 On the question of whether this is a proof for the existence of God, see Owens, “Stages” 110-111; 
Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Existence of God: Owens vs. Gilson, and Beyond,” in God and 
Argument/Dieu et L’Argumentation Philosophique. ed. by William Sweet (Ottawa: University of Ottawa 
Press, 1999): 115-141.  
50 See also ST I q. 3, a. 4, resp. and below Chapter III Section 1.  
 The intrinsic principles, such as risibility in humans, he argues, 
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cause in accordance with something’s nature: Socrates is risible because he is human. 
Such essential predicates and properties belong to something on account of its nature. 
Extrinsic principles, such as light in the air from the influence (ex influentia) of the sun, 
cause something pertaining to a nature, but outside the power of that nature itself. 
Illumination, which is not opposed to the nature of air but which exceeds the power of its 
essence, thus requires the influence of the sun as an extrinsic principle. Aquinas goes on 
to show why the cause of being (causa essendi) must originate in a principle extrinsic to 
all natures except that single nature whose essence is to be (esse). 
      Based on the disjunction of intrinsic and extrinsic principles, it becomes clear why 
existence (esse) must be an extrinsic principle. Something’s form or quiddity cannot 
cause that thing’s existence (esse). If something were the efficient cause of its own 
existence (esse), it would be causa sui and would produce itself in existence (“aliqua res 
se ipsam in esse produceret”). Something cannot produce itself in existence because such 
a production entails that it previously lacks esse (i.e., it does not exist). And if something 
lacks esse, then it would be impossible for it to produce esse for itself: something cannot 
give what it does not have. Because it is impossible for something to be causa sui, esse 
must be received from another that has esse.  In tracing the reception of esse from 
another, understanding is led back to (reducitur) a first, which does not receive its being 
from another, lest a reductio ad infinitum. This first must be esse tantum because if it 
were not, its essence would be something other than esse, and thus require esse from an 
extrinsic principle. In other words, its essence would not imply esse because only that 
thing whose essence is esse alone implies esse, and for all other essences, esse can be 
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excluded. Aquinas names this causa essendi God. God thus is both the beginning and the 
efficient cause of all esse and Himself ipsum esse subsistens. 
 
Section 3: Esse as Otherwise than Essence in De Ente IV—Sed Contra 
      In order to highlight the unique sense of existentiality introduced in De Ente IV, the 
unthought of essentialist metaphysics, it will be necessary to show that the occluded esse 
adds something more to the essence than just another predicative property corresponding 
to the conceptual domain, but is itself something exceeding and grounding the essential 
order. Esse does not merely determine an already entitative essence as a “plus one” to an 
already existing essential arsenal, but constitutes the very being of the essence itself. This 
also means showing against the essentialism of the Aristotelian tradition that in not 
emerging as an essential property, esse is not thereby a conceptual redundancy, signifying 
at most the extantness—or presence at hand—of the essence apart from its causes.   
      In order to respond to both scholastic and contemporary critics of such a real 
distinction,51 Aquinas will need to address the question of how to establish the real 
distinction between esse and essence in creatures and whether the first stage by itself of 
the intellectus essentiae argument (i.e., the understanding of essence apart from 
existence) reveals a real distinction or only a conceptual one.52
                                                 
51 A “real” distinction differs from a “rational” distinction in that x is really distinct from y when even with 
the non-existence of y, x still be can posited. That is, could God destroy the one while preserving the other. 
A common example is a substance and a non-essential accident, such as Socrates and his musicality or 
snub-nosedness. In terms of his risibility, which follows from his being human, however, Socrates is only 
rationally distinct from such. One can only distinguish Socrates from his risibility in one’s mind because 
without risibility, Socrates would not be what he is (i.e., a human being). It will remain to be seen how 
Aquinas characterizes this real otherness between esse and essence in any created being. See below Section 
5. 
 It seems that part of the 
52 Some confusion may arise between “intellectus essentiae” as the first stage of the “intellectus essentiae” 
argument, the latter which includes all three stages. The question here concerns whether the first stage 
insofar as it inspects essences apart from existing things, reveals a real distinction between the two, which I 
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problem, however, is the anachronism of the very question insofar as Aquinas himself 
never concerns himself with “types of distinctions,” but instead uses various 
characterizations to highlight the otherness of esse to essence, characterizations treated 
below.53 Nevertheless, in what follows it will be important to determine what each stage 
secures for the argument and also what resources each offers for introducing an 
existential problem whose very recognition must establish itself within an essential 
domain.54
      Throughout this section, I will use Siger of Brabant to provide a sed contra to an 
existential reading of esse. Siger provides an important refraction of Aquinas’s 
existentialism as he predates the multitude of readings and misreadings as are later 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
will argue it does not. Thus, the intellectus essentiae argument as a whole concludes to a real distinction 
although an intellectus essentiae does not.  
53 See Section 5 below. Carlo has also noted such a misplaced question of “distinctions.” He states: “The 
whole question of the ‘distinction’ between essence and existence is located within a metaphysics of unity 
and has to be reformulated in other terms to make sense within a metaphysics of existence.” The Ultimate 
Reducibility, 109. He argues that in addressing the question in terms of unity, thinkers such as Duns Scotus 
and Suarez made existence into a mode of essence. Instead, Carlo argues, essence must be conceived as an 
intrinsic principle of determination of esse. This helps to overcome the question of “distinction” whereby 
creation can be thought not as a “marriage, a joining of esse and essence, but a truth birth.” Ibid., 111.  
54 Many existential Thomists argue that such a strong and spirited response to Aquinas’s “real distinction” 
results from a misreading on the part of his interpreters. Such a “bastardized” reading becomes enshrined in 
the work of Giles of Rome, whose views often come to be mistaken for Aquinas’s own. Peter Nash 
disagrees with this reading of Giles as a misguided Thomist. Nash instead emphasizes the Neoplatonic 
dimensions of Giles thinking, which are recalcitrant to Thomas’s thinking: “…a legend took firm hold that 
he [Giles] was an authentic disciple of St. Thomas. The myth, thanks mainly to the work of Father Edgar 
Hocedez, has been exploded. Giles’ doctrine reveals a dominant Neoplatonic strain that makes it 
impossible to describe his philosophy as Thomist.” Peter W. Nash, “Giles of Rome on Boethius’ ‘Diversum 
est esse et id quod est,’” Mediaeval Studes XII (1950): 57. Thus, Nash opposes the view that Giles misreads 
Thomas thereby presenting a bastardized version of existential metaphysics. Giles, instead, develops his 
position from fundamentally different grounds (i.e., Neoplatonism, esp. Proclus), which means that 
structurally his position is incompatible with Thomism. Nash goes so far as to argue the created esse, in 
being a per se diversity, is what brings diversity to natures. Thus, instead of conceiving of esse as the 
fullest actuality and perfection of created beings, Giles considers it as that which diversifies and makes [a 
nature] unlike divine unity and simplicity. In a subsequent article, Nash asks: “Why this difference from St. 
Thomas? I think it is because Giles never lost his logical approach to the problem of being dictated by his 
Boethian-Proclean metaphysics. Given the priority of essence and of its logical unity, the only way he 
could safeguard the coming-forth of the many from the One, and of the creaturely contingency of this 
many, was by such accidentality of the act of essence [i.e., esse].” Nash, “The Accidentality of Esse 
According to Giles of Rome,” Gregorianum 38 (1957): 114. Esse, according to Nash’s reading of Giles, 
explains not the perfection of the creature (as it does for Thomas) but the diversification of a created 
essence.  
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generations (e.g., Scotus or Suarez). Siger, as pointed out by Gilson, represents the first 
generation of thinkers who openly address the distinction between esse and essence as 
part of the Aristotelian repertoire. It has, we might say, become a “metaphysical 
problem” by this point, due in no small measure to Aquinas’s problematization of the 
question. As Gilson explains, Siger can help us to understand how certain philosophers 
thought they could think as philosophers (e.g., as Averroists) and believe as Christians, 
especially on the matter at hand: on the compossibility of existence with a metaphysics of 
being qua substance. Siger thus, for us and for Gilson, reflects an attempt to really 
identify esse with essence and yet one that must grapple with the (yet untainted) 
innovations of Aquinas’s existentialism.55
      The basic problem at hand is whether the occlusion of esse that occurs from an 
inspection of essences by itself reveals the otherness (i.e., real distinction) of the occluded 
perfection or whether an understanding of God as ipsum esse subsistens is necessary to 
ground our knowledge of such real otherness in them: that is, does an inspection of 
  
                                                 
55 Due to the clarity with which Gilson presents this confrontation, I have quoted it in bulk. He states: “One 
of the most paradoxical episodes in the history of Western thought has been the rise, in the thirteenth 
century, of a philosophical school whose members imagined that they could think as Averroists while 
believing as Christians. If there is a crucial experiment on the compossibility of existence with being a 
metaphysics in which being is identified with substance, here is one, and there is good reason to hope that 
its study will throw some light on the truth nature of their relation. One of the most famous Averroists of 
the thirteenth century, Siger of Brabant, is exactly the man we need to help us with our problem…This, I 
think, should account for the remarkable decision made by Siger of Brabant when, having to raise questions 
about Book IV of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, he found himself confronted with the definition of this supreme 
science: a science whose object is being qua being. The problem was not for him to find something to say 
about it; in fact, he had only too much to choose from, but he made an unusual choice. The very first 
question asked by Siger on this occasion was: ‘Whether, in created things, being (ens) or to be (esse) 
belongs to the essence of creatures, or is something added to their essence.’ Obviously, we are now 
reaching a time when the problem of the distinction of essence and existence has already been openly 
raised and widely discussed. For Siger to have asked it in the very first place, the question must have 
already become, if not, as it now is, a perennial question, at least a question of the day. Between Siger and 
his own favorite master, Averroes, there stands Thomas Aquinas. For him, that is the trouble, but for us, 
that is what makes his case extremely interesting. If, as he naturally will do, Siger wants to identify essence 
and existence, it won’t be enough for him to play Averroes against Avicenna, whom Averroes had both 
known and already refuted; he will have to play Averroes against Thomas Aquinas, whom Averroes could 
not refute, because he could not foresee his coming.” Being and Some Philosophers, 61-62. 
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essences reveal esse as a necessary perfection lacking in such substances or only as a 
rationally distinct conceptual iteration of one and the same reality? 56
      A central problem in establishing the real otherness of esse to essence is to convince a 
would-be essentialist that the esse occluded by intellectus (i.e., the first stage of the 
argument) does more than bracket part of the thing’s (res) essential complexion, but 
instead withholds reference to something that could never enter its nature because itself 
pure and incommunicable.
 Thus, against the 
dominance of essentialism, which would reduce that it is to an abstraction of the claim 
that it is a horse or that it is musical, how does the intellectus essentiae argument indicate 
a really distinct act of being and “think existence” apart from conceptual domination? 
57
                                                 
56 My own argument in this section runs counter to Lawrence Dewan’s. See Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Joseph 
Owens, and the Real Distinction Between Being and Essence,” The Modern Schoolman 41.3 (March 1984): 
145-156; “Etienne Gilson and the Actus Essendi,” Maritain Studies/Etudes Maritainnienes 15 (1999): 70-
96; and “St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse in Caused Things,” Gregorianum 80.2 
(1999): 353-370. Dewan’s argument for the sufficiency of intellectus essentiae in grounding the real 
distinction, simply rendered, is based on the following premise: If a thing has an efficient cause, it must 
have an act of being (actus essendi) which is distinct from its essence (Dewan, “Etienne Gilson” 82-83). 
Knowledge of the real distinction derived from “caused things” (i.e., effects) does not, he argues, require 
knowledge of their having-been-created. Each caused thing, he argues, requires the influence of “a higher 
and nobler essence” in whose being (esse) the effect, as dependent, must share. Dewan argues that this 
hierarchical relationship tends to be covered over by univocal causation in which “like begets like,” but that 
all univocal causation is ultimately derived from equivocal causation. Thus, even though the one informs 
something else according to its form, that form ultimately must be caused by something unlike itself (lest 
causa sui). See Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 84 and “St. Thomas and the Distinction between Form and 
Esse,” 361-362. Following this hierarchy of causal natures, based around orders of dependence (i.e., the 
effect depends upon the cause, and thus is lower), this hierarchy terminates in an uncaused cause, which as 
uncaused is identical with its esse. He states “…I do not think that one comes to the metaphysical 
conception of God as the subsistent act of being until one sees that the hierarchy of efficient causes cannot 
go to infinity. I say this because it seems to me that the distinction between a thing and its act of being is 
seen as soon as one sees the contribution of the efficient cause as cause. There must be, in the effect, both a 
nature of its own and a participation in what is proper to the nature of the cause as cause. These cannot be 
identical. But that there is some one being whose nature is esse is seen in seeing that there is a first cause, 
first by nature.” Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 94. Emphasis in Original. I will say more about Dewan’s 
argument and debate with Joseph Owens below. In general, I will agree with Owens against Dewan that 
“the contribution of efficient cause as cause” is not enough to secure a real distinction.  
 Merely to ignore, or be ignorant of, the fact that the essence 
57 Although on different grounds than Dewan, Walter Patt also defends the sufficiency of the intellectus 
essentiae argument. See Patt “Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” 1-29. Each argues that 
esse as really distinct from essence can be known by understanding essences. Thus, reference to a real 
identity subsisting in esse ipsum is unnecessary. They differ on whether essences can be understood in 
themselves (Patt); or should be treated merely as effects of a cause (Dewan). Joseph Owens and Etienne 
Gilson, on the other hand, have been notable defenders of the latter position (passim). Owens argues that 
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human or phoenix is instantiated in rerum natura (possum enim intelligere quid est homo 
uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura)58 does not entail a real 
distinction because, to invoke Siger of Brabant’s essentialist response to Aquinas, the an 
esse of the quid est merely signifies the temporal extantness or facticity of the essence. 
Thus, to apply Siger’s discussion to the case at hand, I can consider the essence of Caesar 
and yet ignore (or be ignorant, if I am a Roman citizen before learning about the Ides of 
March) whether he is (an esse). The occluded esse, however, is not really other than the 
essence because without it (i.e., once Caesar perishes) so too does his real essence.59
      To turn the tables on this essentialist position for a moment, what—if not esse—
distinguishes an understandable essence and an actual thing? What else explains this 
fundamental distinction between an existing and a non-existing thing? The intuitive 
appeal of Aquinas’s position is that it explains this difference through the contribution of 
esse: an actual thing has esse, whereas an essence by itself (i.e., conceived absolutely) 
lacks such existential import. The latter may be said to have esse in intellectu, but in such 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
without demonstrating God to be ipsum esse subsistens, “esse” lacks any positive content and thus cannot 
be shown to be necessarily really distinct from the essence of everything outside of God. Once God’s 
nature has been shown to be esse ipsum, then esse cannot enter into the quiddity of created beings lest all 
distinction collapse into a single being (i.e., Pantheism). Against fellow defenders of the real distinction, he 
maintains that Gilson, while also maintaining the necessity of esse ipsum subsistens to ground the real 
distinction, however, remains skeptical on whether we grasp God to be ipsum esse subsistens through 
demonstration or otherwise (e.g., revelation). The position of John Wippel mediates these two extremes by 
pointing to the insufficiency of intellectus essentiae while maintaining the necessity of only the second 
stage of the argument instead of a full-fledged demonstration.   
58 “…possum enim intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura; 
ergo patet quod esse est aliud ab essentia uel quiditate.” De Ente IV. 
59 I will refer primarily to his Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, of which there are four main “reports” 
differing little in content, but often in presentation. Thus, I will refer primarily to the “Munich Report,” but 
indicate which of the four reports is being cited or discussed. The Munich Report has been published in a 
critical edition along with the Vienna Report as: Siger De Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Édition 
revue de la reportation de Münich. Text inédit de la reportation de Vienne, (éd. W. Dunphy. Louvain-la-
Neuve, Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, coll. “Philosophes médiévaux, XXIV,” 1981). For 
the Cambridge and Paris Reports, see Siger De Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam. Text inédit de la 
reportation de Cambridge.  Édition revue de la reportation de Paris, (éd. A. Maurer. Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, coll. “Philosophes médiévaux, XXV,” 1983). Hereafter 
“MM,” “MV,” “MC,” and “MP” respectively. The book number will be given in Roman numerals and the 
question number in Arabic (e.g., MM V. q. 5). 
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a case its being is parasitic on the being of something else (i.e., the intellect conceiving 
it). Existence (esse), thus, is what distinguishes things in reality from mere ideas in our 
minds and allows something on its own accord to stand out of nothingness.  
      Essentialists such as Siger, however, who reject a really distinct contribution by esse, 
can nevertheless explain this difference in standard Aristotelian terms without appealing 
to esse. What the essence “phoenix” lacks, they would argue, is substantial completion: 
even though the formal requirements of phoenix meet the criterion of non-contradiction, 
and thus can be understood, the necessary material component to realize the hylomorphic 
essence is unavailable. There are no phoenixes, not because the substance or essence 
lacks existence, but because the form lacks substance. Matter, according to the current 
cosmological order, is unreceptive to such a form and thus no phoenixes “exist.” Matter 
resists the incorporation of the essence “phoenix.” As Siger states concerning the 
currently non-existing man “Caesar,” what this human lacks is not existence, but 
substance and substantial duration.60 When the substantial duration of an individual 
expires, or never takes place as in the case of the phoenix, what is removed is not esse, 
but the essential unity of matter and form necessary to determine this substance. The 
matter loses the form and takes on another—or resists its reception, as with phoenix—
even though the understanding (intellectus) does not perish.61 A distinct contribution of 
“esse” is thus redundant in the explanation and can be eliminated.62
                                                 
60 He argues that “Caesar” signifies a human only with qualification, that is, at a determinate time. When he 
does not “exist,” the term does not signify a man. What he lacks is substance, not existence.  
61 “Et quia quando cessat entitas rei non cessat intellectus eius, ideo nec unus intellectus nec una 
significatio: ex quo enim significatio non refertur immediate ad rem (sic enim cessaret cessante esse rei), 
sed refertur ad rem prout refertur ad intellectum, et cessante esse non cessat intellectus, ideo nec 
significatio. Et ideo, quamvis in re non sit unum recipiens praedicationem essendi et non essendi, tamen in 
ratione unum utrumque recipit.” MM IV, q. 21.  
62 How Siger explains the difference between immaterial intelligences and God will be treated in more 
detail below. 
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      Thus, for Siger, “An esse?” seeks an answer according to a determinate measure of 
time as relating to an essence. In the case of Caesar, he is “no longer being a man” (non 
est homo), insofar as the hylomorphic union of Caesar’s essence has expired.63 This does 
not prohibit us from considering the reality that was Caesar’s essence apart from his 
temporal determination, or the (never real) fictional essence of a phoenix, or the no 
longer real instantiation of stegosaurs, in order to understand Caesar to be a human, a 
phoenix to be a bird, or stegosaurs to be dinosaurs. But once we stop ignoring their esse, 
we realize that Caesar’s being human is not without qualification (simpliciter), but being 
only at a determinate time. What is brought to light in this realization concerns the 
positing of an essence, not the adding of an existential determination. That which receives 
the predication of being and not being (praedicationem essendi et non essendi) is not 
some real essence in re, because such an essence perishes with the individual. Thus, we 
posit the essence phoenix as an unreal, or fictional, essence—although not a logical 
impossibility—which is different than treating it as a real essence lacking esse.64
      In response to Aquinas’s treatment of esse as other than essence (quod esse est aliud 
ab essentia uel quiditate), as read by an Aristotelian of Siger’s ilk, the mere failure of 
 That 
which receives the predication of being and not being (e.g., Caesar, a phoenix, or a 
stegosaur) need only be something one in ratione.  
                                                 
63 “Et cum dicitur quod Caesar significat hominem, et tamen non est homo, dicendum quod Caesar non 
significat hominem simpliciter, sed temporis determinati: sic enim habuit substantiam et definitionem. 
Unde transmutabile est secundum substantiam et definitionem, quod secundum eam tempore mensuratur.” 
MM IV, q. 21.  
64 As Siger states in Quaestio Utrum Haec Sit Vera: Homo Est Animal, Nullo Homine Existente, “Socrates” 
is the name of an individual signifying human nature with an account (sub ratione) of determinacy and 
individuation. Thus, the nature as instantiated (e.g., in “Socrates” or “a phoenix”)—even if such 
instantiation no longer exists or never existed—is meaningful to the extent that when speech does more 
than predicate, but instead posits something in re, someone can meaningfully say “there is nothing in the 
world that is a phoenix.” Siger de Brabant, Écrits de Logique, de Morale et de Physique. ed. Bernardo 
Bazán (Louvain: Louvain Publications Universitaires, 1974), 58.  
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esse to appear in the inspection of essences should not treat “aliud” in any real sense. 
“Esse”—along with its convertible term “ens”—merely states the “fact” or “state” of 
being,65
      The second point concerns Siger’s presentation of Aquinas’s view. Although distinct 
from Avicenna—insofar as rejecting esse as an accident added to the essence—“Brother 
Thomas,” he argues, instead treats esse in caused things as something constituted through 
their essential principles (in entibus causatis esse est additum essentiae…sed tamquam 
ens aliquid per essentiae principia constitutum).
 what Siger calls the temporal determination of the essence. Such a fact, far from 
being a distinct existential act, is the condition of an essence, which abstraction can 
ignore although not really exclude. When treating the question of “esse and essentia” in 
his Metaphysics, Siger asks whether the esse in caused things pertains to the essence of 
such (caused) things. Two initial points should be noted: first, in discussing esse in 
caused things (in causatis), Siger is already discussing what I have called “real essences” 
as distinct from logical possibilities. Thus, the latter lack not a really distinct act of being, 
but causes which could posit them in re and establish them real essences.  
66 Siger responds, however, that that 
which pertains to a thing is either the thing itself (res ipsa), part of the essence of the 
thing (par essentiae rei), or an accident of the essence (accidens essentiae).67
                                                 
65 For the distinction between “act of being” and “fact/state of being,” see below Chapter V Section 5.  
66 MC Intro. q. 7. The editors note that Siger’s reference is to Aquinas’s Commentary on the Metaphysics. 
See S. Thomae Aquinatis In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M. R. Cathala, 
R.M. Spiazzi 2a  ed. (Taurini-Romae: Maietti, 1971) IV, lec. 2, n. 558. Hereafter “Expositio 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis.” 
67 “Etsi conclusio vera sit, modum tamen ponendi non intelligo, quia esse quod pertinet ad rem, aut est pars 
essentiae rei, ut materia vel forma, aut res ipsa composita ex his, aut accidens. Sed si sit accidens, tunc erit 
additum essentiae rei: quod est contra dictam opinionem proximam. Sed dicere quod esse sit aliquid 
additum essentiae rei, ita quod non sit res ipsa, neque pars essentiae, ut materia vel forma, et dicere non sit 
accidens, est ponere quartam naturam in entibus. Item, dicitur sic quod esse est aliquid additum, nec est res 
ipsa, nec principium rei, sed est aliquid constitutum per principia essentiae; sed constitutum per principia 
essentiae est ipsa res; quare non erit additum, nisi tu dicas mihi quod sit constitutum effective sicut 
accidentia, et tunc erit accidens. Hoc enim dicimus accidens, quod advenit alicui quod habet formam vel 
quod advenit essentiae rei.” MM Intro. q. 7. MC Intro. q. 7.  
 Clearly, an 
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extra-essential act of being, really other than the essence and yet not an accident, would 
posit some unwarranted fourth nature in beings.68 This leads Siger to reject “esse” as 
something really other than the essential structure of the thing (res) and its formal 
determinations. Although not stated explicitly, Siger’s attempt at an essential reduction of 
esse invokes the essentialist principle forma dat esse. To be a real essence, as opposed to 
a mere conception in mente, means to posit being (esse) in such a way that those things 
(or that thing) instantiating the form subsist. Esse, thus, marks the actuality following 
from something’s form: the instantiation of the human form in this skin and these bones 
gives human being (esse hominem) to Caesar. Caesar’s own act of being arises not from a 
really distinct existential perfection, but from the hylomorphic union that determines him 
to be during this temporal duration. Although the mind can abstract the nature, such has 
real being only through the subsistence of individuals (or an individual in the case of 
separate substances).69
      In order to show that there is not some fourth nature constituting the thing, a nature 
really other than that which is known by the understanding of the essence, Siger 
 Thus, if the essence has no reality apart from the subsistence of 
individuals, it remains unwarranted to speak of a really distinct act of existence added to 
the essence. 
                                                 
68 As Maurer states in reference to this argument: “We would not want a clearer proof that Siger lives in the 
philosophical world of Aristotle, where there is no room for a metaphysical principle that is not in the order 
of nature of essence. For Thomas, esse is not at all in that order. It is the actuality of form or essence, by 
which an essence exists and is called a being. With his existential understanding of esse he added a new 
dimension to metaphysics that was difficult for a mind like Siger’s to fathom, steeped as he was in the 
philosophy of Aristotle as interpreted by Averroes.” “Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of 
Brabant” in Being and Knowing: Studies in Thomas Aquinas and Later Medieval Philosophers (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990): 126-127. 
69 “Praeterea, ad essentiam hominis non pertinet aliquod individuorum, nec istae carnes, nec ista ossa, quia 
partes individuorum non sunt partes speciei; homo tamen non est sine istis carnibus et ossibus. Hoc enim 
fuit quod decepit PLATONEM: quia vidit quod natura humana erat aliquid ratione abstractum ab 
individuis, et ad cuius essentiam non pertinebat aliquod individuorum, nec materia propria eorum, credidit 
hominem posse subsistere sine individuis. Quod si hoc non est verum, videtur quod, si nullus homo 
particularium sit, quod <non> permanent essentia naturae humanae quae ponebatur manere” Quaestio 
Utrum Haec Vera Est, ll. 67-75.   
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concludes that the otherness between essence and esse concerns the distinct manners in 
which one and the same thing (res) is signified: either it can be statically signified as a 
“res” according to its sedimented essential habits or it can be dynamically signified as an 
“ens” according to the exercise of existential acts.70
      The first types of names are synonyms. For example, ‘Marcus’ and ‘Tullius’ name the 
same man, Cicero. The names themselves do not communicate or signify any distinct 
aspect of their supposit, Cicero, and thus are distinct ways of naming (but not conceiving 
or signifying) one and the same man. ‘Ens’ and ‘res,’ however, do not differ merely in 
terms of arbitrarily imposed signifiers because they are not absolutely interchangeable, as 
synonyms must be.
 The latter traces the unfolding 
temporal dimensions of something, whereas the former attempts to atemporally ask in 
regard to such temporal unfolding “And what was it being?” Caesar’s being human 
transpires over the course of a lifetime, but with a single essential gaze we can reduce the 
multitude of his activities to the essential “habit” of “having been human.” Note, 
however, that even though Siger invokes a distinction between essential habits and 
existential acts, such an act is always the act of an essence signified during its temporal 
duration (i.e., its period of extantness), and not Aquinas’s deeper existential actuality. To 
unpack the degree of distinction involved in these really identical names (i.e., ‘ens’ and 
‘res’), Siger considers three types of names, all convertible in a supposit.  
71 They instead capture some degree of difference surrounding one 
and the same thing.72
                                                 
70 “Primo pono quod in causatis ipsum esse pertinet ad essentiam causatorum et non est aliquid additum 
essentiae causatorum, ita quod res et ens non significant duas intentiones. Ad hoc intelligendum quod tria 
sunt genera nominum quae convertuntur in suppositis, tamen diversimode.” MM Intro. q. 7.   
  
71 This is because ‘ens’ names a mode of action and ‘res’ name a mode of habit. In Metaphysics Δ 20, 
Aristotle defines “habitus” (“hexis”) as an active having from which the action can follow. With such an 
active habit, the haver is disposed to a certain action immediately, unlike a passive disposition which must 
be developed. Thus, I have an active habit to speak German—even though I am currently not acting upon 
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      The second type of names signifies diverse concepts (intentiones), insofar as one 
intention signifies an essence and the other something added to the essence, such as 
‘human’ and ‘risible.’73 They are convertible, however, Siger argues, because they extend 
equally to the supposit. Any given human being can be equally named ‘human’ or 
‘risible,’ although the supposit is conceived according to distinct conceptions 
(intentiones). As applied to esse, such a distinction, however, would require one name to 
designate an essential addition (e.g., as the property ‘risible’ does in the case of the 
essence human).74 Siger is not entirely explicit on why ens does not give rise to its own 
diverse “formal understanding” (intellectus formales diversi) or concept but instead only 
distinctly signifies the same concept.75 His reason seems to reflect the ways in which 
something can be predicated essentially of its subject.76
                                                                                                                                                 
such a disposition, whereas I have a passive habit to learn and subsequently speak Spanish. Thus, we see 
the close and rationally distinct relation between actus and habitus. A res is disposed to the act of being.  
72 “Quaedam sunt nomina quae significant eandem essentiam et eodem modo, sicut nomina synonyma, ut 
Marcus, Tullius. Isto modo ens et res nec significant nec convertuntur, quia tunc unum non certificaret 
reliquum.” MM Intro q. 7.  
73 “Secundo, quando unum significat essentiam, aliud autem non significat essentiam, sed additum 
essentiae, convertuntur tamen in suppositis quia se extendunt ad aequalitatem suppositorum, ut homo et 
risibile, quorum intellectus formales diversi sunt.” MM Intro. q. 7.  
74 MM Intro. q. 7 46. This was the mistake of Avicenna, Siger argues following Averroes, insofar as he did 
not distinguish between names that signify diverse intentions and names that signify the same essence by 
different modes. He mistook a diversity in modes of signifying for a diversity between the essence and 
something added to it (i.e., esse). In addition, he mistook dispositions added to the essence of a thing (e.g., 
white and black) for dispositions pertaining to the essence (e.g., risible). He also failed to distinguish 
between essential dispositions and accidental ones. For an analysis of Siger’s relation to Avicenna and 
Averroes on this matter, see Maurer, “Esse and Essentia,” 131. 
75 See Maurer, “Esse and Essentia,” 130 fn. 46. 
76 His argument follows Aristotle’s Topics. See Aristotle, Topica. trans. E.S. Forster (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Loeb Classical Library, Number 391, 2004), I.5.  
 If the predication were merely 
accidental, a position that he already has rejected, then it would not fulfill the condition 
for this second type of names. Instead, it must be both essential and added. If ens vel esse 
were to function like such an added essential disposition, it would have to be essential to 
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the subject, like risible is essential to the subject human.77 “Ens vel esse” would signify 
“res” as a property, and thus it would signify its subject per aliud (i.e., not per se) and 
connotatively: per aliud because through something extrinsic to the essential nature and 
connotatively because only a part. The relation of the “extrinsic part” to its subject can be 
captured by following logical forms of predication: “Every thing (res) is able to be” or its 
equivalent, “Every thing (res) is possibly being (ens).”78 Thus, the property signifies only 
a possibility of its subject and does not signify the entire essence.79 But if ens were an 
existential property of res, through which it exists, then Siger asks what accounts for the 
existence of this property, a question extending ad infinitum.80
                                                 
77 “Circumscriptis enim omnibus esse accidentibus hominis, ut esse album et nigrum, et sic de aliis non 
remanet aliquod esse reale determinatum hominis nisi hoc quod est esse hominem. Esse autem hominem de 
homine est praedicatum essentiale, quia hoc est per se primo modo: homo est homo. Igitur esse de homine 
est praedicatum essentiale. Hoc idem efficaciter probat ratio COMMENTATORIS superius.” MC Intro. q. 
7 33. The argument by Averroes (Metaphysics V, com. 14), to which Siger refers, had been described 
above as follows: “Dicit enim quod dicendo <<homo est>> uno modo est problema de accidente, secundum 
quod li <<est>> praedicat esse diminutum in anima, quod idem est cum vero. Alio modo est problema de 
genere, secundum quod praedicat esse simpliciter extra animam. In problemate autem de genere 
praedicatum est essentiale subiecto, ut patet ex I° Topicorum. Quare esse essentiale est homini, et eadem 
ratione aliis entibus causatis.” MC Intro. q. 7 31. In discussing the ratio of “caused thing,” which he argues 
is identical to esse, Siger may be guilty of collapsing the logical order of predication into the physical (and 
metaphysical) order of causation. See Ernst A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, 105-106. 
Although Moody does not discuss Siger specifically, the Porphyrian conflation of the categories with the 
predicables, which he targets, seems to be at work in Siger’s discussion.  
78 Moody, in his discussion of the Porphyrian confusion of “categories” and “predicables,” follows Ockham 
in arguing the predication of a property as “every x is necessarily y-able” (where “y” represents the 
property) can be rendered in equivalent terms under the modality of possibility in predicating a logical 
accident determining of a subject. Thus, we can state “every x is possibly y-ing.” “Every human is risible” 
is equivalent to “Every human is possibly laughing” or “Every human is a potentiality of laughter.” See 
Ibid., 105. For the difference between “logical” and “physical” accidents, and Ockham’s generous 
interpretation of Porphyry’s equation of the two, see Ibid., 105-106.  
79 For a contemporary account of “existence as a property,” see Barry Miller, The Fullness of Being: A New 
Paradigm for Existence (South Bend: University of Notre Dame, 2002). His use of the term “existence,” as 
he admits, is synonymous with “actuality.” See Ibid. 82 fn. 1. He argues that instead of thinking of 
existence as “inherence in” (e.g., “Existence inheres in Caesar), we should say “bounded by” (e.g., “Caesar 
is bounded by existence”) as a more suitable metaphor (Ibid. 97).  
80 “Unde in IV°, substantia cuiuslibet rei est aliquod ens non secundum accidens. Si esse dispositio addita, 
procedetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.” MM Intro. q. 7 46. “Necessario ergo erit dicere quod 
dicendo: <<homo est>>, praedicetur esse substantiale ut homo est homo; erit ergo concedere quod esse sit 
de essential rei, vel quod homo accidat homini.” MM III, q. 2 91. 
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      Following Aristotle in Metaphysics Γ, Siger states that when we speak of something 
(e.g., a human) as opposed to that something is (i.e., an existing human), we do not 
introduce a new signification or any additional conceptual content; we reference a single 
signification (or “formal understanding”) differently.81 “A human,” “one human,” and 
“existing human,” Aristotle argues, are all expressions applicable to “a single human that 
comes to be and passes away.”82 Thus, by adding the term “existing,” we do not augment 
the conceptual utterance (i.e., a property) in the sense of an actualized possibility.83 Siger 
argues that the repetition of terms, however, between “res” and “ens” is not superfluous 
(inutiliter).84
                                                 
81 “Item, IV°Metaphysicae: idem est homo et ens homo, et non significat aliquid diversum apud dictionem 
repetitam: <<homo>> et <<est homo>>.” MM Intro. q. 7 43.  
82 Metaphysics IV.2.  
83 But what about cases of fictional things? Are “a phoenix” “one phoenix” and “existing phoenix” 
equivalent? Although discussing only esse in caused thing (causatis), Siger, it seems, would argue that to 
the extent that they are things (res in mente) to that extent they are existing (again in mente). Thus, the issue 
seems not to be what “existing” would add to res, but the extent to which either term can adequately signify 
a “res rationis” (e.g., a phoenix). Although we may speak of such expressions as having definitions, it 
would be a mistake to assume that any definable term expresses a real essence (e.g., “phoenix is a 
regenerable bird”). MM IV, qq. 20-21. Such res rationis seem to occupy a similar status as incidental being 
(i.e., ens per accidens) of which one can make inquiry, but whose “near non-being” offers little in the way 
of an real definition or subsequent demonstration. For Siger’s discussion of the definition of the accidental, 
see, for example: MV VII, q. 5.  In both cases, the si est of either “her being a carpenter and a musician” or 
of “a phoenix”—although not nothing—lack being in the full sense. Both are cases of what Siger calls 
“diminished being in the soul” (esse diminutum in anima”) as opposed to (“esse simpliciter extra 
animam”). And thus relating to such “beings,” insofar as all scientia is grounded on “si est,” subsequent 
questions of essence or demonstrations made on the basis of such esse diminuta seem without secure 
ground.  
84 “Ad aliud, cum dicitur: nugatio est <<res ens currit>>. COMMENTATOR solvit. Nam eadem essentia 
dicitur frequenter, nec tamen inutiliter. Aliquid enim vel ratio aliqua alia constituitur in audiente quando 
dicitur <<res ens>>, quam quando dicitur <<res per se>>. Non tamen sic cum dicitur <<Marcus 
Tullius>>.” MM Intro. q. 7. 
 Instead, the frequency of reiterating the same essential content by different 
names constitutes for the listener a difference in rationes surrounding the same essential 
content, without constituting an altogether new concept (intentio). Thus Siger appeals to 
the auditory response of a listener upon hearing the distinct terms “ens” and “res,” 
sensing a conceptual repetition amidst difference in emphasis. Such a differently 
emphasized concept, itself unified, provides us with Siger’s third type of names.  
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      The third type of names, and the one Siger favors, signifies the same essence with the 
same intention. And yet, the names are not merely synonymous for the following reason: 
“unum [significat] per modum actus, aliud per modum habitus, sicut currere et cursus, et 
animatum et vivere.”85 The two modes of act and of habit in the case at hand correspond 
to ens and res.86
      Insofar as ens vel esse signifies substance in the manner of act (per modum actus) 
really identical to the substance itself, such an act follows directly from its essence.
 Siger wants to argue that the infinitive “to run” and the perfect passive 
participle “that which has been run” say more than synonyms, but do not produce their 
own distinct concepts or conceptual content in the mind. Likewise, ‘ens’ and ‘res’ name 
nothing more than two such modes, or manners, of one and the same thing.  
87
                                                 
85 Tertium est genus nominum in quo quidem sunt quae ad aequalia se extendunt, significantia eandem 
essentiam, ita quod essentia quae primo apprehenditur eadem est, modo tamen diverso apud animam, unum 
per modum actus, aliud per modum habitus, sicut currere et cursus, et animatum et vivere.” MM Intro. 7.  
86 Maurer has argued that such a distinction in modes of signification was not unique to Siger but instead 
used by such contemporary logicians as Peter of Spain. “Esse and Essentia” 130. 
87 “Ad aliam rationem, quae fuit THOMAE, dicitur quod maior propositio famosa est, et habet forte suam 
probabilitatem, sed rationem a PHILOSOPHO ad eam non video. Dico ergo quod entia recedunt a Primo 
forte non per compositionem, sed per hoc quod accedunt ad naturam potentiae, quod patet ex actione eorum 
et etiam ipsius Primi. Agit enim unumquodque secundum quod ens in actu. Et ideo entia, secundum quod 
magis recedunt a Primo, minus habent naturam activam et magis naturam passivam. Primum enim solum 
naturam activam habet et non agitur ab alio.” MC Intro. q. 7.  
 
This is why, as Siger argues against Aquinas, caused things do not recede from the First 
in terms of composition (“…entia recedunt a Primo forte non per compositionem”). 
Instead, the hierarchy of beings is marked in terms of degrees of activity and passivity of 
their natures. The more formally active something is, the closer it is to the First. Each 
thing acts insofar as it is a being in act (Agit enim unumquodque secundum quod ens in 
actu), limited in such actuality only by its form. Although active/passive are correlative 
terms and refer to something’s interaction and exchange with others (i.e., to act upon and 
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be acted upon), such relationality does not require the introduction of “real composition” 
in the being itself between its essence and esse.  
      What distinguishes Sigerian onto-cosmology from its Thomistic counterpart stems 
from the deeper issue of subsistence: for Siger, each being subsists insofar as it is a 
substance. This does not mean that each substance is “pure act” unmixed with potency 
and unrelated to anything else.88
      For Siger, each substance is a case of subsisting being. This means that there is 
neither a concentration of this perfection in only one pure subsisting act nor a need for 
 Instead, subsistence comes along with being a 
substance, and yet being caused, whereas with Aquinas subsistence means being a pure 
and unmixed perfection. As we see with Aquinas’s examples of “subsisting heat” or 
“subsisting whiteness” from De Ente, if any thing were to subsist, it would have to be that 
(i.e., only heat or only human) and nothing else. But because they are received into matter 
and thereby divided, they lack the purity of subsistence. Thus, heat or humanity do not 
subsist, but are accidents or substantial forms of substances. The reason why subsistence 
must be reserved for only those pure cases, for Aquinas but not for Siger, is because once 
a perfection subsists (e.g., esse, heat, or human), all distribution of that perfection must 
occur through participation (i.e., the third of the three ways from De Ente), not through 
material or differential contraction. Thus, as participants having the perfection but not 
being the perfection (e.g., having heat, but not being heat), “composition” enters into the 
nature of the participant: there is the subject of participation and that which is 
participated, but they do not subsist.  
                                                 
88 “Solum autem in Primo Principio esse dicitur pertinere ad essentiam, quia essentia Primi actus purus est; 
in causatis autem nulla essentia actus est quin ad naturam potentialem accedat.” MP Intro. q. 2.  
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beings to participate something outside and composed with their essence.89
      Furthermore, he rejects the notion that beings (entia) participate in some common 
fund of being, ens commune, distinct from themselves. Because beings are beings 
through their own rationes, a separate fund of ens commune would be entirely 
superfluous.
 This is not to 
deny the passivity of all creatures nor their ultimate relation to the First. The universe is 
comprised of such a system of exchange (i.e., to act and be acted upon). However, Siger 
argues, all beings “participate” the mediated influence of the First through “imitation.” 
Such “participation by imitation,” however, does not introduce a separate existential 
perfection with which their essence is composed. It only means that each being other than 
the First is like the First in being in act through its essence, but is subject to the influence 
of other causes (i.e., making each a non-identical imitation).  
90
                                                 
89 “Ad aliud: non potest esse per se subsistens nisi unum tantum. Si negavero tibi illud, quomodo probares? 
Dico quod esse simpliciter actu non est nisi unius tantum, scilicet Dei. Esse tamen extendit se: accipiendo 
esse non pro actualissimo, sed secundum quod sumitur in aliis, potest esse in aliquo sine aliquo recipiente 
esse. Ad probationem: esse unum est, oportet ergo, si diversificetur, quod hoc sit per aliud, ut per illa in 
quae recipitur aut per differentias; non per differentias, cum non sit genus. Dico quod, si esse esset omnino 
univoce dictum, bene probares; sed esse ipsum multipliciter dicitur et plures habet rationes; non tunc potest 
multiplicari ex ratione essendi quae plures est, et non per aliquid cui additum est? Item, ratio essendi non 
potest esse ratio addita, quia omnis ratio est essendi ratio, ita quod ratio entis praedicatur de omnibus 
rationibus essendi univoce.” MM Intro. q. 8. On this matter, Maurer states: “Thomas’ proof of the oneness 
of esse per se subsistens is valid only if you grant him his notion of esse. Since the notion is unintelligible 
to Siger, so too is Thomas’ proof. Neither can Siger make any sense of Thomas’ distinction between a 
recipient of esse and the received esse, or the diversification of esse by a diversity of recipients. If being 
were a genus, Siger remarks, it could be diversified by the addition of differences, but Aristotle has shown 
that being cannot be a genus. So being cannot be diversified in this way but by the variety of its natures 
(rationes). It can be substance or quality or quantity or one of the other categories described by Aristotle. In 
any case, Siger concludes, nothing can be added to the nature of being, for every nature is a nature of being: 
ratio essendi non potest esse ratio addita, quia omnis ratio est essendi ratio.” “Esse and Essentia,” 128 
 Each ratio is a ratio essendi, and thus ens vel esse adds nothing to the 
90 “Dico quod ens participari duobus modis est: vel ens commune, vel ens quod est Ipsum Ens particulare. 
Sed illud est duplex. Unum est Ens Ipsum, hoc est Ens PLATONIS separatum; tale non participatur quia 
non est aliquod tale ens. Alio modo Ens Primum per se, non sicut ens quod nunc dictum est, et hoc Ens 
contingit participari duobus modis: vel per participationem esse vel essentiae, vel per participationem 
imitationis. Unde aliquid potest participare Ens Primum non per essentiam, sed per imitationem. Sed 
potestne aliquid esse ens per participationem entis communis? Dico quod non, quia tunc opertet quod illud 
esset compositum ex natura participantis et participate, quae inter se essent divera. Unde omne quod est 
ens, est ens per suam rationem: homo est animal per participationem animalitatis, quia est aliquid in ipso 
quod differt a natura animalitatis; non tamen est ens per participationem entis, quia nihil est in ipso quod sit 
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thing either conceptually or really. Once all beings become subsisting acts of being, or 
“substances,” inscribed within a causal matrix in which they act and are acted upon, the 
uniqueness of being as something radically other than them in which they must 
participate for existential composition (and completion/perfection) becomes an 
unnecessary requirement.  
       In response to the issue motivating the intellectus essentiae argument of De Ente, 
Siger can respond: the separation of everything from the First transpires around 
everything—save the First—having some degree of passivity (i.e., being caused).91
                                                                                                                                                 
differens ab ente vel a ratione entis, et sic patet ad illud.” MM III q. 21. On this marriage of modes of 
participation, Maurer states: “Siger here opens his metaphysics to the influence of Neoplatonism, but it 
must be admitted that it sits uneasily with his Arisotelianism, according to which every thing is a being by 
essence.” “Esse and Essentia in the Metaphysics of Siger of Brabant,” 129. 
91 MC Intro. q. 7; MM Intro. q. 3 48; MP Intro. q. 2.  
 Thus, 
the De Ente argument must somehow convince the essentialist that being subsists only in 
a unique and incommunicable instance: in all other cases, it is participated and thereby 
composed with the essences of the participants. What must be shown by Aquinas, and 
why an intellectus essentiae must appeal to God as the subsisting ipseity of being, is that 
esse is the very ground of essential perfection, the extra-essential actuality of all essential 
actuality. A mere inspection of essences occluding esse (i.e., the thing considered under 
the mode of act) does not by itself prompt the conclusion that esse is really other than the 
essence. This is why, as Joseph Owens argues against Lawrence Dewan, disputing the 
latter’s claim that a real distinction emerges before the completion of all three stages of 
the argument, people who deny the real distinction (e.g., Siger) do not need to make 
being subsist, or at least not in Aquinas’s sense of a subsisting pure perfection. Dewan 
presupposes, even before the completion of the argument, that esse retains an otherness to 
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all concrete things insofar as being itself (ipsum esse) is pure.92 Thus, if it were made 
identical to any thing, they too would have to subsist as “pure acts of being.” 93
We have to know that esse is some really common feature, rather than merely an abstract 
way of speaking about the concrete. Anyone who denies the distinction of esse from the 
subsisting thing will say there are as many instances of esse-subsisting as there are things: 
though ‘esse’ does not signify them as subsisting. If esse is something common in things, 
 
      Dewan, in arguing for the sufficiency of the first stage, presents the matter thusly: 
                                                 
92 “The general problem is: what if we take something which we experience as common to many and 
attempt to posit it as existing in its purity: will it still be envisageable as a multiplicity of individuals?” 
“Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real Distinction,” 154. 
93 An interesting debate ensues between Dewan and Owens over this point and the success of the argument 
in demonstrating the real distinction. Dewan maintains the sufficiency of intellectus essentiae (i.e., the first 
stage) in grounding the real distinction. His argument, simply rendered, is based on the following premise: 
If a thing has an efficient cause, it must have an act of being (actus essendi) which is distinct from its 
essence (Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 82-83). Each caused thing, he argues, requires the influence of “a 
higher and nobler essence” in whose being (esse) the effect, as dependent, must share. The crux of Dewan’s 
arguments is that every caused entity reveals a lack of “per se unity” in that it must be ordered to form by a 
higher cause (i.e., “higher” because independent of the effect). And because the effect required the cause to 
order it to form, it shares, albeit it to a lesser degree, in the being of its cause. As “sharing/participating in 
the being of another,” the effect is other than its being. Esse, even though distinct, really constitutes part of 
the nature. Esse is “already found” to some degree in material things, and although distinct from them, it is 
more than just a mere name, but instead an intrinsic perfection. Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 72. Otherwise, 
according to Dewan’s account of esse, how could the nature as effect come to be?  The argument for the 
“real distinction” can commence by observing as effects sensible things, which undergo generation and 
corruption. Dewan seems to agree with Masiello that the an sit of a sensible effect reveals a real 
distinctness with its quiddity. As “effect,” the immediacy of something’s existence requires the causal 
influence of another, which provides existence to the effect. From the basic fact of something’s being an 
effect, Dewan argues, its esse can be known as really distinct. To emphasize that “esse” refers to a real 
commonality in which every effect as effect must participate is crucial to the Dewan’s argument because if 
one subsequently were to deny the real distinction, then esse would have to be identical with and really 
indistinguishable from each thing. This would mean, Dewan concludes, that there are as many esse 
subsistens as there are things because in each esse is both real and indistinguishable. In each subsisting 
thing, from which esse is indistinguishable, there would be esse subsistens. Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Joseph 
Owens, and the Real Distinction,” 154-156. A number of problematic assumptions surround Dewan’s 
position, assumptions which come to light through Owens’ argument for the insufficiency of intellectus 
essentiae and his attempt to strengthen Aquinas’s argument for the real distinction. Against Dewan, Owens 
insists: “People who deny the [real] distinction [between esse and essence] need not make being subsist. 
But after the conclusion has been reached that being is a nature in God, the consequence emerges that it 
could not be a part of any other nature without absorption of that nature into itself. It has to remain really 
other than what it actuates. If it did not stay really distinct, then there would be indeed as many instances of 
subsistent existence as there are things—exactly one.” Owens, “Being and Natures in Aquinas,” 167. Owen 
correctly counters Dewan’s argument by stating that the position of those who reject the real distinction 
also reject such a thing as esse subsistens. Although he mentions only Aristotle and Suarez by name, one 
also might include Siger of Brabant, Godfrey of Fontaines, and William of Ockham. Those who altogether 
reject the real distinction need not make being subsist because being merely repeats, albeit with a slight 
conceptual variance, what already has been understood through thing (res) or entity (ens). Although Owens 
himself disagrees with this position, he uses it against Dewan to show that intellectus essentiae requires the 
prior demonstration for God alone as Ipsum Esse Subsistens.  
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then if it is isolated in itself it will be one only…‘Esse’ must be the name of something in 
the nature of things which, in its own nature, is simple and common. If it is simply a 
name for the concrete thing, then it is “pure” in every concrete thing, and is as many as 
they are.94
 
  
Siger, as we have shown, has no problem admitting that esse subsists with each thing: 
there are as many cases of subsisting esse as there are things (res) because “to subsist in 
being” means to be a substance. And yet, Dewan suggests that if esse is common in 
things and more than just an abstract signification of a concrete thing (res), as isolated in 
itself esse will be one. He makes this claim by presenting the consequence, which he 
deems as absurd, that each subsisting instance of esse also would have to be “pure.”  
      We must note, however, this aforementioned association of subsistence with purity, 
as such a move requires an implicit premise: subsistence cannot mean, or at least 
primarily mean, “individual substance” (as it does for Siger) but instead must entail a 
pure act of perfection. As I will argue in what follows, Aquinas does not invoke such a 
claim as a “hidden premise” in an argument for the real otherness between esse and 
essence. Instead, through his attempt in De Ente to solve the question at hand—i.e., How 
are separate substances in their essential simplicity diverse from God and yet God serves 
as cause of being for all things?—God’s causal firstness as esse tantum emerges as the 
result of the completed argument from which it follows that everything else remains 
really other to its esse. Such “real otherness,” as will be seen, signifies an abiding 
existential impotence on the part of all essences (i.e., they remain in potency to being 
even when they actually are and never appropriate esse as a real attribute belonging to 
their essences) rooted in the subsisting purity of God’s existential act.   
                                                 
94 Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the Real Distinction,” 155. 
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Section 4: Esse as Otherwise than Essence in De Ente IV—An Existential Response 
      Even if not fully realized in De Ente, Aquinas’s undertaking to seek a source for 
God’s diversity from the order of things launches what will be a continued endeavor 
throughout his metaphysics: insofar as God’s purity of act (i.e., being esse tantum) 
removes the first cause from the order of things through radical individuation—or 
“ipseity” as self-sameness through incommunicable purity—at the same time, as an act of 
being, the first is not without actuality (i.e., beyond being). Whenever, as in De Ente IV, 
confronted with the question of both God’s uniqueness (i.e., as distinct from even the 
most noble of creatures) and also his role as total causal source (i.e., as source of all 
being), Aquinas thus negotiates two sources of compromise: on the one hand, an 
Aristotelian essentialism that would rid the first of real otherness and transcendence from 
the world insofar as it would be merely the “first (individual) among many equal 
(substances)” (primum inter pares); and on the other, a Neoplatonism that would 
essentially distinguish the first in its transcendental Oneness beyond being from the 
Forms of intelligibility (i.e., nous as the ground of intelligibility) leading to two distinct 
hypostases.95
      The argument of De Ente IV operates against the backdrop of the Liber de causis, 
which provides Aquinas with insight regarding a form/esse composition in simple 
  
                                                 
95 As Gerson observes in terms of the Plotinian separation of the cause of existence from the cause of 
being: “In endowing things with existence, the One is unlimited. It does not run out of power of goodness. 
There is nothing that could exist that does not. Yet what could exist is not the One’s business. That bird and 
bees can and do exist, that griffins could exist, but do not, and that square circles cannot exist, are owing to 
facts about ούσία. Its causal power is a pure stream, flowing out over whatever it is that can receive it 
according to its own nature.” Lloyd P. Gerson, “Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?,” The 
Review of Metaphysics 46.3 (March 1993): 573.  
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substances (habens formam et esse).96 Insofar as such pure forms are caused to be by 
another, their forms are receptive of an act from their cause. Thus, receptivity marks the 
nature of all beings except the first which, Aquinas states, is “first and pure act” (actus 
primus et purus).97 The importance of identifying a (hypothetical) first cause as actus 
primus et purus, even before engaging in the intellectus essentiae argument, is to secure 
its purity of act (i.e., being only something and receptive of nothing else) as the condition 
for individual subsistence.98 As we see from his much later commentary on Proposition 9 
of the Liber, the proposition cited in De Ente IV, the first’s status as only being and 
receptive of nothing from outside its pure actuality does not make it common.99 One 
might think, Aquinas argues, that that which is unreceived must be common insofar as 
individuation requires reception in another. This would mean that the first has yliatim 
(i.e., a receptive subject) in order to receive and individuate its being, which otherwise 
would remain a common share.100
                                                 
96 De Ente IV ll. 36-45.Taylor argues that Aquinas’s perception of “existential composition” in the Liber is 
not entirely in keeping with the argument of the text. See Richard C. Taylor, “St. Thomas and the Liber de 
causis,” 506-513 
97 De Ente IV l. 54.  
98 The link between firstness and subsistence will be traced below in regard to “the fourth way.” See below 
Chapter III Section 1.  
99 “Deinde cum dicit: Quod si dixerit aliquis etc., excludit quamdam obiectionem. Posset enim aliquis 
dicere quod, si causa prima sit esse tantum, videtur quod sit esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur et 
quod non sit aliquid individualiter ens ab aliis distinctum; id enim quod est commune non individuatur nisi 
per hoc quod in aliquo recipitur. Causa autem prima est aliquid individuale distinctum ab omnibus aliis, 
alioquin non haberet operationem aliquam; universalium enim non est neque agere neque pati. Ergo videtur 
quod necesse sit dicere causam primam habere yliatim, id est aliquid recipiens esse. Sed ad hoc respondet 
quod ipsa infinitas divini esse, in quantum scilicet non est terminatum per aliquod recipiens, habet in causa 
prima vicem yliatim quod est in aliis rebus. Et hoc ideo quia, sicut in aliis rebus fit individuatio rei 
communis receptae per id quod est recipiens, ita divina bonitas et esse individuatur ex ipsa sui puritate per 
hoc scilicet quod ipsa non est recepta in aliquo; et ex hoc quod est sic individuata sui puritate, habet quod 
possit influere bonitates super intelligentiam et alias res.” Sancti Thomae de Aquino super Librum De 
Causis Expositio. Textum a H.-D. Saffrey (Friburgi Helvetiorum: Societe Philosophique, 1954) IX. 
Hereafter “Super lib. De cau.”  
100 On Aquinas’s misreading of the term “yliatim,” see Richard C. Taylor, “St. Thomas and the Liber de 
causis,” 506-513. 
 Against such, Aquinas argues that the first is in fact 
individuated, otherwise as common it would have no activity, but individuated by its own 
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purity. Such individuated purity entails that the first subsists as a pure act, and thus 
receives nothing outside itself, but as individuated and not common retains its 
incommunicable self-identity. Thus, as actus primus et purus, the first communicates to 
everything else without communicating itself, and they in turn, must receive an 
incommunicable perfection.101
      Regarding the first source of compromise, and the one philosophically immediate to 
the context of De Ente, how can the first communicate to all beings without them 
partaking of his actual being (i.e., God as the formal esse of creatures)? In other words, 
this concerns the aforementioned third mode of distribution (i.e., participation), which 
does not require either the addition of difference (i.e., specification) or matter (i.e., 
individuation). Thus, to think God’s subsistence as an individual substance, even primum 
inter pares, instead of subsistence individuated through purity, requires a certain 
principle of individuation. Anything that comes to be individuated by another principle 
both requires something other than itself to account for its “being other” (i.e., individual), 
but also requires it to share in a certain community from which it must be individuated. 
Thus, as Aquinas later argues in the Summa Theologiae, God can be called “substance” 
only if substance comes to mean self-subsistent existence (“Substantia vero convenit 
Deo, secundum quod significat existere per se”).
  
102
                                                 
101 The communication of a participated perfection by an unparticipated cause of such a perfection is 
discussed by Proclus in Proposition 23 of his Elements of Theology. He explains how the unparticipated 
monad generates that which is capable of being participated and yet itself transcends the participants. It 
gives them something without giving itself. That which is present and common has a prior unity apart from 
them: to be common and participated as identical for all, such perfection must be prior to all as 
unparticipated. Whether Aquinas can invoke such an account of participation remains to be seen. See 
Proclus, The Elements of Theology. trans. E.R. Dobbs. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 26-29. 
  
102 “Ad quartum dicendum quod Deus potest dici rationalis naturae, secundum quod ratio non importat 
discursum, sed communiter intellectualem naturam. Individuum autem Deo competere non potest quantum 
ad hoc quod individuationis principium est materia: sed solum secundum quod importat 
incommunicabilitatem. Substantia vero convenit Deo, secundum quod significat existere per se. Quidam 
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      Thus, to call God an individual substance is misleading on both accounts: 
individuation requires a process of differentiating from a common share, a process that 
must reach a stopping point in the individual in order that some subject receives 
everything else and yet the subject itself be received in nothing; the individual terminates 
the chain of communication (i.e., of genus, species, accidents, etc.), but itself is nothing 
apart from their determination.103
      The other (i.e., Neoplatonic) source of compromise concerns the evacuation of divine 
purity from actuality in order to protect divine oneness and simplicity from contact with 
the order of things that it must ground. This would be to mistake a pure ipseity with 
distinct divine personae, considered as hypostases, for distinct essential substances 
outside the first.
 Instead, God’s nature is incommunicable existence (est 
divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia) individuated through its purity. And 
likewise, to think God’s pure subsistence as substantial or essential would be to risk 
assigning distinct essential components to what is really a self-identical purity of 
personal distinctions, which brings us to the second compromise.  
104
                                                                                                                                                 
tamen dicunt quod definitio superius a Boetio data, non est definitio personae secundum quod personas in 
Deo dicimus. Propter quod Ricardus de sancto Victore, corrigere volens hanc definitionem, dixit quod 
persona, secundum quod de Deo dicitur, est divinae naturae incommunicabilis existentia.” ST I, q. 29, a. 3, 
ad 4. 
103 “Quod autem aliquid non sit natum esse in multis hoc potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo per hoc 
quod est determinatum ad aliquid unum in quo est, sicut albedo per rationem suae speciei nata est esse in 
multis, sed haec albedo quae est recepta in hoc subiecto, non potest esse nisi in hoc. Iste autem modus non 
potest procedere in infinitum, quia non est procedere in causis formalibus et materialibus in infinitum, ut 
probatur in II metaphysicae; unde oportet devenire ad aliquid quod non est natum recipi in aliquo et ex hoc 
habet individuationem, sicut materia prima in rebus corporalibus quae est principium singularitatis. Unde 
oportet quod omne illud quod non est natum esse in aliquo, ex hoc ipso sit individuum; et hic est secundus 
modus quo aliquid non est natum esse in multis, quia scilicet non est natum esse in aliquo, sicut, si albedo 
esset separata sine subiecto existens, esset per hunc modum individua. Et hoc modo est individuatio in 
substantiis separatis quae sunt formae habentes esse, et in ipsa causa prima quae est ipsum esse subsistens.” 
Super lib. De cau. IX.  
 As Aquinas argues in the Summa Theologiae against such a 
104 “Ad tertium dicendum quod nomen hypostasis non competit Deo quantum ad id a quo est impositum 
nomen, cum non substet accidentibus: competit autem ei quantum ad id, quod est impositum ad 
significandum rem subsistentem. Hieronymus autem dicit sub hoc nomine venenum latere, quia antequam 
significatio huius nominis esset plene nota apud Latinos, haeretici per hoc nomen simplices decipiebant, ut 
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“poisonous heresy,” the separation of subsistence from “being an individual substance” 
pays theological dividends for a Trinitarian apologist. This is because the “three-in-one” 
of Christian theology need not ally itself with the essentially distinct hypostases of 
Neoplatonic emanation with which it is so often aligned. The “Son” in his personal 
distinction from the “Father,” although resembling certain structural aspects of “nous” 
and the “One,” remains essentially identical with him. There is a certain expediency, 
Aquinas argues, even if not based in a literal reading of Scripture, to make these 
hermeneutical innovations concerning the term “persona” in the fight against heresy.105 
God communicates himself without distributing himself as actus primus et purus into 
separate essences. In a philosophical argument for creation, as will be treated below, 
Aquinas thus can argue that God (i.e., as an essentially identical ipse, although personally 
distinct) is “the cause and exemplar of essences through his nature and the cause and 
exemplar of esse through his esse.”106
      In emphasizing the first both as pure and as act, Aquinas avoids the extremes of 
making mundane what is pure or evacuating from being what is most act. This means, as 
he states continuing in his commentary on Proposition 9, the first can causally influence 
everything else without needing to be a real member of their community (unum inter 
 Although derived from distinct principles—or in a 
theological context persona—the unity of creation resides within a single subsisting ipse.  
                                                                                                                                                 
confiterentur plures essentias, sicut confitentur plures hypostases; propter hoc quod nomen substantiae, cui 
respondet in Graeco nomen hypostasis, communiter accipitur apud nos pro essentia.” ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3. 
105 “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet nomen personae in Scriptura veteris vel novi Testamenti non 
inveniatur dictum de Deo, tamen id quod nomen significat, multipliciter in sacra Scriptura invenitur 
assertum de Deo; scilicet quod est maxime per se ens, et perfectissime intelligens. Si autem oporteret de 
Deo dici solum illa, secundum vocem, quae sacra Scriptura de Deo tradit, sequeretur quod nunquam in alia 
lingua posset aliquis loqui de Deo, nisi in illa in qua primo tradita est Scriptura veteris vel novi Testamenti. 
Ad inveniendum autem nova nomina, antiquam fidem de Deo significantia, coegit necessitas disputandi 
cum haereticis. Nec haec novitas vitanda est, cum non sit profana, utpote a Scripturarum sensu non 
discordans: docet autem apostolus profanas vocum novitates vitare, I ad Tim. ult.” ST I, q. 29, a. 3, ad 1. 
106 Although discussed throughout this work, these represent the subject matter of Chapters IV and V, and 
their unity is discussed in Chapter VI. 
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pares).107 Thus, when read in the light of Aquinas’s commentary on this Proposition, a 
uniquely existential stategy can be gleaned from the complete argument of De Ente by 
which (contra Aristotelian essentialism) causal sharing does not require the giver to be 
among the given nor, however, (contra Neoplatonism) does such separation require a 
purity of complete annihilative transcendence. This unweakened resolve by which the 
first stands as arche to everything else and is able to influence them without becoming 
primum inter pares occurs through the mechanism of participation. “Everything that is 
participated must be derived from that which subsists purely [m.e.] through its essence” 
(oportet autem quod omne participatum derivetur ab eo quod pure subsistit per essentiam 
suam).108 Aquinas, in borrowing such a Platonic and Neoplatonic mode of causality, uses 
participation to retain the purity of the first act, while nevertheless enabling it to influence 
everything else. As Aquinas later explains in his Commentary, the pure self-identity of 
the first does not weaken through its influence and rule over others, but instead retains its 
pure concentration of actuality.109
      Aquinas first introduces the intellectus essentiae argument in returning after a brief 
discussion of composites to inquire about the essences of simple substances, which he 
  
                                                 
107 See above fn. 103.  
108 “Similiter etiam prosequitur quantum ad esse, ostendens quod causa prima habet altiori modo esse quam 
omnia alia. Nam intelligentia habet yliatim, id est aliquid materiale vel ad modum materiae se habens; 
dicitur enim yliatim ab yle, quod est materia. Et quomodo hoc sit, exponit subdens: Quoniam est esse et 
forma. Quidditas enim et substantia ipsius intelligentiae est quaedam forma subsistens immaterialis, sed 
quia ipsa non est suum esse, sed est subsistens in esse participato, comparatur ipsa forma subsistens ad esse 
participatum sicut potentia ad actum aut materia ad formam. Et similiter etiam anima est habens yliatim, 
non solum ipsam formam subsistentem sed etiam ipsum corpus cuius est forma. Similiter etiam natura est 
habens yliatim, quia corpus naturale est vere compositum ex materia et forma. Causa autem prima nullo 
modo habet yliatim, quia non habet esse participatum, sed ipsa est esse purum et per consequens bonitas 
pura quia unumquodque in quantum est ens est bonum; oportet autem quod omne participatum derivetur ab 
eo quod pure subsistit per essentiam suam; unde relinquitur quod essentia intelligentiae et omnium entium 
sit a bonitate pura causae primae. Sic igitur patet ratio quare supra dixit quod causa prima non est 
intelligentia neque anima neque natura, quia eius scientia excedit scientiam intelligentiae et animae, et eius 
virtus excedit omnem virtutem, et eius esse omne esse.” Super lib. De cau. IX. 
109 Super lib. De cau. XX.  
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reminds us are immaterial forms and yet not pure acts (actus purus) because they are 
composed.110 He argues that whatever is not from the intellectus essentiae arrives from 
outside (adveniens extra) because an essence cannot be known without its parts. But that 
which advenit extra through external causes, although not part of the essence and its 
essential content, does not provide anything more essentially, but operates efficiently. But 
Aquinas cannot yet conclude to real composition, because, as we have seen with Siger, to 
understand an essence without its efficient causes does not entail that once those causes 
have been added, any adveniens extra comes to be composed with the thing and its 
essence.111
                                                 
110 De Ente IV ll. 90-93. 
 A mere inspection of essences, thus, cannot counter those who would 
111 Again, Owens, taking up the position of the essentialist, argues: “…the intellectus essentiae argument if 
alleged to conclude immediately to a real distinction would be taking for granted that existence has a real 
positive content of its own over and above the content of the quiddity. But this is something very difficult 
to prove. Spontaneously, when the question is faced for the first time, a thing and its existing may appear to 
be really the same. The expression ‘existing’ would seem to add merely a reference to the duration between 
beginning and end, but imply no real content besides the thing itself. For a number of modern thinkers, in 
fact, existence has been an empty concept, a blank, a surd.” Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction at De Ente Et 
Essentia 4.119-123” Mediaeval Studies XLVIII (1986): 280. “Esse” as duration of time is exactly the 
manner in which Siger understands this concept. As Owens points out, it thus can be written off as an 
empty and abstract concept, which even when “added” to the essence, does not supply any additional 
quidditative content. A real lack of positive content can be seen only once esse has been demonstrated to be 
a real nature (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens) in which composite things must participate. Such a “need to 
participate” requires further proof, which Owens and Gilson have argued can be supplied only by tracing 
essences in terms of efficient causes, not merely an inspection of quidditative content. Owens puts forth the 
following: “In giving a metaphysical account of a thing, one cannot think of the essence as something 
already constituted by its form and matter and then having the act of being added to it. Rather, from a 
metaphysical viewpoint, one has to start with the act of being that the primary efficient cause gives by 
participation, and consider that in being participated it has to be limited and thereby gives rise to the 
essence that determines it.” See Owens, “The Accidental and Essential Character of Being,” 38. See also 
Gilson: “[...] the actual object of a concept always contains more than its abstract definition. What is 
contains over and above its formal definition is its act of existing, and, because such acts transcend both 
essence and representation, they can be reached only by means of judgment. The proper function of 
judgment is to say existence, this is why judgment is a type of cognition distinct from, and superior to pure 
and simple abstract conceptualization.” Being and Some Philosophers, 202. Likewise, Owens points out the 
innovation on the part of Aquinas: “Finally, in the immediate background of Aquinas, there was William of 
Auvergne’s clearly stated distinction, and his vigorous assertion of the superiority of existence in respect of 
anything in the thing’s nature. But the genetic leap to judgment as a distinct synthesizing cognition that 
apprehends an existential synthesizing in the thing appears for the first time in Aquinas. It ushers in a 
profoundly new metaphysical starting point.” Owens, An Interpretation of Existence, 30. Such a depth must 
be shown to counter those who reject the real distinction altogether. Gilson points to such a burden of proof 
as follows: “[...] but if an actually existing being has been produced by its cause, why should one attribute 
to it an ‘existence’ distinct from the fact that it exists? This is the very point that Thomas is anxious to 
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eliminate “esse” as a linguistic or conceptual redundancy, the position held by Aristotle, 
Siger of Brabant, Godfrey of Fontaines, William of Ockham, or Francisco Suarez, just to 
name a few.112 To refute the essentialist challenge and reveal esse as more than a 
“surd,”113 a voiceless consonant in the syntax of “thing,” Aquinas’s argument must show 
not only that esse adds a perfection irreducible to the essential determinations brought by 
the thing itself, but also that such a perfection when received cannot be a real part of the 
nature itself.114
                                                                                                                                                 
make us understand; but how can he make us see it if we don’t? One cannot abstract from reality a notion 
whose object one fails to perceive. What has divided the Thomist school from the other great schools of 
theology, ever since the thirteenth century, is a general reluctance to conceive the act of being (esse) as a 
distinct object of understanding. To tell the whole truth, even the so-called ‘Thomists’ have been and still 
are divided on this point. No such disagreement would take place if the presence, in things themselves, of 
an act in virtue of which they can be called ‘beings’ were a conclusion susceptible of demonstration. This 
impasse is an invitation to us to give up the philosophical way—from creatures to God—and to try the 
theological way—from God to creatures.” Elements of Christian Philosophy, 131.   
112 Taking up the position of the would-be defender of the real identity, Sweeney states the matter 
succinctly: “The second reason why Thomas’ fourth approach [i.e., intellectus essentiae argument] is not 
convincing by itself has, I would suggest, been clearly seen by all Suarezians. Let us grant, they would say, 
that essence can be understood without anything being known of its existence. Again, let us grant that 
essence-as-known is different than essence-as-existing. But in what does that difference consist? In its 
relationship to God as efficient cause: an essence-as-existing God has actualized by willing it to be. It does 
not arise from a component actually present within the existent. It is merely the effect of God’s efficiency; 
it is the extrinsic state of an essence as efficiently posited by God in the actual universe. Whether the 
essentialist’s interpretation of essence-as-existing is true, is open to question. But the cogency of their 
attack on Thomas’s text seems beyond question, unless it is complemented by the important realization that 
esse is an intrinsic and perfective factor within existents.” Leo Sweeney, A Metaphysics of Authentic 
Existentialism (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1965), 71-72. Thus, intellectus essentiae by itself 
does not show esse as a perfection in the thing, which can be known by inspecting the thing. Against the 
argument of Dewan, even though God efficiently causes the thing to be in the actual world, the thing as 
effect does not participate its esse.  
113 This is Owens’s term referenced above. See Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction,” 280 and fn. 111 above. 
What this means is that Gilson also notes this dynamism in “Chapter VI: Knowledge and Existence” of 
Being and Some Philosophers.  
114 In terms of the former requirement, Salas states: “The existence (esse) that actualizes a creature’s 
essence, bringing about the substantial being of the thing, is not only really distinct from or other than 
essence, but esse is related to essence as act to potency. In being other than and irreducible to essence, esse 
completely transcends the essential order as an act beyond form through which even forms themselves—
either substantial or accidental—are actualized and brought into being.” Victor Salas, “The Judgmental 
Character of Thomas Aquinas’s Analogy of Being,” The Modern Schoolman, LXXXV (January 2008): 
118. 
 Only once “esse” has been supplied with content through a demonstration 
for the existence of God as ipsum esse subsistens can the subsequent move be made to 
show esse as a perfection necessary to the constitution of every entity, not as part of its 
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quidditative content, but as the most fundamental act of its being (actus essendi).115
      Before attempting to frame an existential response to the essentialist challenge 
concerning the real otherness between esse and essence, the issue of intellectual 
apprehension must be noted. In keeping with the guiding thread of our inquiry, namely 
the essential imperialism of the concept in its forgetfulness of esse, it should come as no 
surprise that to think something according to its dynamic act of being, the static 
categories of the concept and conceptualization will not suffice. Thus, many existential 
Thomists, although not without controversy, have stressed “judgment” as the means by 
which Aquinas’s existential metaphysics thinks existence beyond the essential confines of 
the concept.
 The 
complete demonstration is necessary for two reasons: first, esse must be shown to be an 
act of being distinct from the essence itself and the latter’s state of existence or non-
existence; second, such an act must be pure and thereby fundamentally incommunicable 
to everything else. Thus, the intellectus essentiae argument requires both the second and 
third stages in order to secure a real distinction between esse and essence considered 
absolutely. 
116
      Thus, following from static conceptualization—what Aquinas calls “understanding of 
indivisibles”— judgment, as the second operation of the intellect, appears through the 
 Thus, in looking for the conceptual content of esse corresponding to some 
essential or accidental part in the substance, Siger necessarily comes up short and must 
reduce “esse” to a really identical iteration of “res.” 
                                                 
115 Owens—to whom my argument is greatly indebted, although ultimately it departs from his 
conclusions—makes this argument continually throughout his writings and is in agreement with the 
argument I put forth in this section. He argues that the conceptual distinction “[...] is the distinction 
observable in the failure of existence to appear in the conceptualization of the thing. The existences 
accordingly has to come from something other than the thing, and ultimately from subsistent existence” 
Owens, “’Ignorare’ and Existence,” 216.  
116 I will return to explore this issue of judgment in more depth below. See Chapter VI Part 2. 
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synthesis that unfolds from unpacking a simple concept, moving from an essential grasp 
to a propositional composition. Such a dynamic activity reveals the existential ground of 
the proposition covered over by the static and detemporalized image of a mere 
concept.117 Understanding gives rise to judgment, which sets in motion an “unfolding” of 
the conceptual grasp, reaching out beyond the frame of the simple concept to reestablish, 
albeit at a higher level of cognition, its connectivity to actuality from which it was 
intellectually abstracted.118
      Although Siger distinguished ens vel esse from res in terms of the former’s being 
understood in the “manner of act,” such an act merely expresses the power (i.e., the 
doings and undergoings) of an essence: the activity of a runner is to run, just as the 
activity of a thing is to be. This is what distinguishes Aquinas’s existential metaphysics 
from its essentialist counterparts: when faced with the “something extra” that judgment 
introduces beyond the categorial determinations of substance and accident, Aquinas is not 
 Esse as reflected in judgment is not another predicate, but the 
very ground of predication itself. Although not itself indicative of the real distinction 
between essence and esse—which is inferred after concluding that esse properly belongs 
to ipsum esse subsistens—such a dynamism reaches actuality and finds a voice for esse 
outside the essential syntax. Esse as a verbal act, as opposed to a static state, can be 
revealed only in the dynamic activity of judgment, but not through the adjectival 
vocabulary of things. 
                                                 
117 Owens cites Bergson’s treatment of a concept as a frozen photograph  deprived of the dynamism of 
temporality, captured by the “moving picture” of judgment. See Aquinas on Being and Thing, 7. See also 
Salas, “The Judgmental Character of Thomas Aquinas’s Analogy of Being,” 117-141. Cf. L.M. Régis, 
Epistemology. trans. Imelda Choquette Byrne. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959). 
118 Owens stresses the existentiality of this synthesis: “Furthermore, in Aquinas, what the judgment grasps 
is always existential in character, even when a predicate other than existence is asserted. In every case an 
assertion expresses an existential synthesis [...] For Aquinas everything originally known through 
conceptualization finds its actuality in the object that is attained through judgment, that is, in existence. 
While any substantial or accidental nature is grasped through conceptualization, the actuality of the nature 
is in every case existential, and is known through judgment.” An Interpretation of Existence, 32.  
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so quick to reduce the adveniens extra to a mere repetition of essential content.119
      Even though the second operation of the intellect, or “judgment,” moves thought 
beyond the whatness grasped by intellectus, the move to a real distinction is not yet 
complete. What judgment uncovers is that there is something more underlying the 
concept than that captured in the essential determination alone: actual existence in the 
case of this or that human, intellectual existence in the case of phoenixes. Although 
opponents of the real distinction may agree with Aquinas that all forms (even simple 
substances) must have an efficient cause other than themselves, lest they be causa sui, 
and that this chain terminates in some first efficient cause, they need not agree that the 
extra-essential actuality contributed by esse is composed with all natures until it has been 
shown that esse incommunicably belongs to the first as actus purus (essendi).
 
Instead, beginning with the complete argument from De Ente, Aquinas allows esse to 
remain outside the essential domain of the first activity of the intellect. Judgment thinks 
esse not as a “fourth nature” but as the “incidental” (i.e., per accidens) ground of 
something’s essence. Incidental in the sense of “being a carpenter and a musician,” esse 
stands as the perfection of all perfections and the act of all actuality. For Aquinas, unlike 
for Siger, the question of an esse occluded by intellectus can only fully be appreciated 
once referred back to its existential ground in divine being.  
120 In other 
words, they need not agree until esse has been instituted as a perfection. 121
                                                 
119 “Ad secundum dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei: et sic Deus per suum 
esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.” ST I, q. 14, 
a. 14, ad 2.  
120 See also Owens, “Stages and Distinction in ‘De Ente,’” 118-120.   
  
121Again, Owens makes a similar claim in his debate with Wippel. See Owens, “Being and Natures in 
Aquinas,” 167. Esse, as Owens argues, remains the most impoverished of concepts and not a content-rich 
subsistence. In order to move from an impoverished notion of being to a rich a content filled one, the 
existence of God as esse ipsum subsistens must be demonstrated. Only once esse has been shown to be a 
nature (i.e., God’s nature), then the impossibility of its being part of another nature (lest Parmenides) 
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     What Aquinas must show contra Siger is that the mysterious “fourth nature” has been 
confused because it is not a nature at all, or at least not a finite nature. Aquinas begins 
such a response with his oft-cited metaphor of light’s reception in otherwise 
unilluminated air, which is meant to show that esse cannot be a principle intrinsic to form 
(i.e., a risible to human) lest the essence be the cause of itself (causa sui). But, merely to 
argue that something comes to a nature from an extrinsic principle does not convince 
such an opponent, who would retort in the spirit of essentialism that this means only that 
“the essence is efficiently caused,” not that esse signifies a really distinct perfection of 
such an essence.122
      For Aquinas, however, the reception of esse in any nature other than the first requires 
a real otherness not only because they are efficiently caused and this causal chain 
terminates in a first, but also because Aquinas’s requirements of “being first” (contra 
  What is involved in the metaphor of “light received in air” is more 
than merely an issue of the causal status of essences. Remember, Siger had no problem 
granting that essences are caused by an efficient cause other than themselves. Instead, 
what he refused to grant was that once received, esse must be composed with and really 
other than the recipient. This is because a substance can both be caused and subsist.   
                                                                                                                                                 
becomes apparent. Until that point, esse can be treated in the manner of a genus, which through differentiae 
can enter into composition with other natures. Joseph Owens, “Being and Natures in Aquinas,” 165-167. 
Further: “Outside the mind what the creature is is not existence. Yet that does not immediately imply that 
there is a real distinction between a creature and its real existence. Nor does this immediately follow from 
the demonstration that ‘it is not possible for there to be more than one entity in which essence and esse are 
identical’, as Wippel seems to maintain. Until existence has been shown to have a positive content of its 
own over and above the quidditative content of the finite thing, a conceptual distinction suffices as it did 
with Aristotle and Suarez to explain the fact that in the extramental world every finite thing’s nature is 
something other than its own existing, yet in a way that would leave the two really identical” Owens, 
“Aquinas’ Distinction,” 283. 
122 See Francisco Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae I-II (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 
1965), XXXI. Hereafter “DM.” Fabro expresses this difference as such: “But since the essence of a creature 
has also its own participated act of being (actus essendi), its actualization is not merely a relation of 
extrinsic dependence; rather it is based on the act of esse in which it participates and which it preserves 
within itself and is the proper terminus of divine causality.” Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics of Thomistic 
Philosophy,” 482. 
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both essentialism and Neoplatonism) requires purity of act (actus primus et purus). And 
following from esse’s pure subsistence, as that which can ground the entire chain of 
efficient causes, when received by anything else, they must participate esse as other than 
their nature. For this reason, even the second stage of the De Ente argument, which 
operates in the register of the possible, lacks the ontological force to necessitate a real 
distinction. Recall that, at this stage, Aquinas had not yet shown there to be an actual 
ipsum esse subsistens, but merely considered the possibility of something (aliqua res) 
whose quiddity could be its own existence (ipsum suum esse). This possible identification 
of something with ipsum esse without an actual demonstration for the subsistence of such 
a nature remains insufficient to show that such (i.e., esse) cannot be divided and thus 
must remain one (esse tantum).123 If we take Aquinas’s stock example of “if something 
were only heat, it would be subsisting heat”—and thus could not be multiplied into 
individuals by the addition of matter or into species by the addition of differentiae—we 
can see why.124 Just as there is no subsisting heat, animality, or humanity, but a 
multiplicity of hot things, animals, and humans, nothing prevents the addition of 
differentiae to the genus (e.g., animal) or matter to the species (e.g., human or heat) in 
order to multiply the genus and species.125
                                                 
123 John Wippel agrees with the claim for the insufficiency of the first stage, but argues that only the second 
stage, and not the actual demonstration of the third stage, is required to establish the real distinction. The 
second stage had argued that even the possible identity of essence and esse is restricted to a single being. 
Like with the possible, yet non-existing, subsisting heat, subsisting esse can be realized in no more than one 
being because it cannot be divided. Whether such a singular being exists is a matter for further 
demonstration. The further demonstration, however, does not diminish the exclusion of multiplicity from a 
possible esse ipsum subsistens. Wippel, “Aquinas’s Route to the Real Distinction,” 279-295. Also: The 
Metaphysics Thought of Thomas Aquinas,” 137-150.  
124 See also Owens, “Stages and Distinction in ‘De Ente,’”108-109. 
 Siger had no problem granting that esse 
125 Such additions are problematic if and only if any of these genera or species was itself subsisting, that is 
if it were some indivisible plenitude over and above the individuals “partaking” of such. The language of 
“participation” in this case is only logical, not ontological, participation. In his Expositio, Aquinas speaks 
of three forms of participation. The first, which does not seem to involve metaphysical participation, is 
when a species participates in a genus or an individual in a species. This is a form of participation because 
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subsists with each res and thus is not composed with the thing, but really identical to the 
thing itself (res ipsa). Once one equates subsistence with purity, being only heat or 
human, that is, once the requirement for subsistence is to be something completely, “that 
and nothing else,” then subsistence becomes a matter of per-fection. Only because of the 
actual subsistence of such a pure act does it follow that, due to the incommunicability of 
the first’s nature, being must be received as other in everything after the first.126
                                                                                                                                                 
the former in each case does not possess the ratio according to its total commonality and in the same way, 
but grasps only “a part.” The second is when a subject participates in an accident or matter participates in 
form. The third type is when an effect participates its cause, especially when the patient is not equal to the 
power of its cause. The example he gives is when air participates the light of the sun. He states: “Est autem 
participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet, 
uniuersaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem 
animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. Similiter etiam 
subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substancialis uel accidentalis, que de sui 
ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc uel ad illud subiectum. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur 
participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue cause, puta si dicamus quod aer 
participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole.” Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera 
Omnia, Tomus L; Expositio libri Boetii De ebdomadibus, ed. L.-J. Bataillon, C.A. Grassi, pp. 267-282. 
(Rome: Commissio Leonina, Paris: Editions du cerf, 1992) L.2, ll. 70-85. Hereafter: “Exp. de Hebd.” But 
in such cases, no such subsistence is found according to Aquinas. Likewise, until esse has been 
demonstrated to be the really subsisting and indivisible nature of God (i.e., Stage 3), esse remains the most 
common, indeterminate, and empty category, which says nothing more than “res” and does not appear as a 
really distinct perfection of each thing. Just as a possible subsisting heat has no force to preclude the 
multiplication of the species heat into hot things, or a possible subsisting animality the multiplication of the 
genus animal into species of animals, so too a possible ipsum esse subsistens has no force to preclude the 
identification of esse with individuals beings (entia). Even though the transcendental “ens” qua 
transcendental cannot be divided through matter or differentiae, and thus cannot be a genus or species, 
calling anything “ens” remains the most abstract, indeterminate, and common way of identifying that thing, 
not of indicating a distinct perfection. In any thing, “ens” is not really distinguishable from “res,” but as 
transcendentals, they are convertible. “Ens” needs not be divided because everything is “ens.” Such is the 
fate of esse unless infused with an existential dimension. 
  
126 “Animality” adds nothing over and above individual animals, as though a real cause of dogs, cats, lions, 
and Socrates having animality.  So too, unless Aquinas demonstrates subsisting being to actually exist, a 
possible subsisting being would not introduce the need for a real otherness between a thing and its being 
because “its being” signifies nothing more than the thing itself. If there is a subsisting x, any multiplication 
of x requires the multiple instantiations to participate in x (i.e., have x) but not be x. X thus remains other 
than the nature of the participant. This is not the case for a genus or species—or even a transcendental—
such as, for example, the genus “animal”: dogs, cats, lions, and Socrates are animals. Because “animality” 
is not actually subsisting, to say they participate animality is a rationally distinct (but not really distinct) 
variation of the statement that “they are animals.” The “animality” indicated by the former is not really 
distinct from their “being animals” of the latter. If there were a subsisting heat, then heat in everything else 
(e.g., the heat of fire; the heat of my coffee; the heat of the sun; etc.) would be really distinct from the 
participating subjects, lest the oneness of subsisting heat be made divisible. It would also be a real cause of 
all hot things having heat. The need of participation and composition between esse and essence follows 
from the fact that there is a subsisting being itself.  Once, as demonstrated by the third stage, “being” 
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      The revolutionary moment in Aquinas’s thought, inchoately present in De Ente, is not 
only to equate subsistence with perfection, which had already been done by Plato: only 
the Forms truly exist/subsist because, unlike particulars, Forms themselves by themselves 
are unmixed with otherness, a position he later needed to rethink in the Parmenides. 
Instead, Aquinas’s unique achievement is to remove the condition of perfectibility from 
the essential realm altogether. As he elsewhere states, even if there were Platonic Forms, 
they too would need to participate esse.127
                                                                                                                                                 
belongs to an actually existing nature, in whose indivisible perfection all else must participate but cannot 
share, the real distinction follows. 
127 Exp. de Hebd. ll. 230-240.  
 Thus, despite their essential purity, even 
separate substances (i.e., the subject of De Ente IV) do not subsist by themselves because 
they are existentially impure; their lack of subsistence, however, is not because they are 
caused, but because they depend on a perfection that—in itself pure—cannot be 
communicated to them. By making esse a pure perfection in the Platonic and Neoplatonic 
sense, Aquinas accomplishes two things: first, he links something’s “being caused” with 
its participation of esse. Thus, every essence that does not include esse, but has an 
efficient cause of its being, thereby stands in potency to an existential act, which it 
receives and which remains other than it. Note the emphasis is placed not merely on 
being caused, but having a cause of some perfection that cannot be fully received. 
Second, like Neoplatonism, Aquinas demonstrates the necessity of “all being” to 
participate in the superabundance of a first, but unlike Neoplatonism, he maintains this 
“pure cause of all being” to be, not “beyond being” or “without being,” but as most being, 
a superlative—as will be seen in Chapter III below—that establishes an analogical 
referent for all other diminished modes of being.  
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      The treatment of esse as exceeding the actuality brought by essence opens up a new 
metaphysical dimension for Aquinas. Even the essence of most noble separate substance 
(i.e., the highest archangel)—complete with the entirety of its perfections and formal 
determinations—nevertheless stands in potency to its act of being (actus essendi) which it 
must receive from outside itself and which remains really other than it. The actuality 
contributed by even the most perfect form—standing in need of no matter—completely 
determines something to be this, not does not determined it to be. Here we see the work 
of intellectus essentiae, but not in isolation from the second and third stages of the 
argument. As Aquinas concludes, bringing the three stages of the De Ente argument 
together: 
Omne autem quod recipit aliquid ab alio est in potentia respectu illius, et hoc 
quod receptum est in eo est actus eius; ergo oportet quod ipsa quiditas uel forma 
que est intelligentia sit in potentia respectu esse quod a Deo recepit, et illud esse 
receptum est per modum actus.128
      This is what distinguishes Aquinas’s use of the metaphor “light as received in air” 
from a seemingly parallel example “heat as received in water”: both are cases in which a 
received perfection (light/heat) is “accidental to” its subject (air/water). The difference, 
 
With this move to ascribe a deeper level actuality to esse, Aquinas has reconfigured the 
notion of a first cause in such a way that the first remains pure in its causal distribution, 
but as an act is not itself beyond being. By “real otherness” Aquinas means that the 
potency of any nature, no matter how perfect, remains non-identical to its being: i.e., 
even once “actualized,” or brought into being by its cause, the actualized perfection is 
never really received into the recipient.  
                                                 
128 De Ente Cap. IV. ll. 147-152. This resembles the argument from act and potency discussed below. See 
below Chapter II Section 2. 
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however, is that in the former case (i.e., illuminated air, existing beings) that which is 
received, the quasi-accident, remains other. Even though water returns to its natural 
condition, for a time it retains heat without the influence of its cause because it enjoys the 
same ratio as its cause.129 It only defects from complete substantial transformation (e.g., 
fire only causes the accident of heat in water, but does not generate a new fiery supposit) 
because of the weakness of its matter. Light, however, altogether lacks a “root in air,” 
and cannot sustain illumination without it the continual influx of its source, but receives it 
according to a different ratio. Thus unlike others who also embrace God’s giving being 
through creation, Aquinas has more radically separated the actuality of being (actus 
essendi) from the essential determinations of any being (ens). Even the most fully 
actualized form stands in need of existential actuality, and because such existential 
actuality is actus primus et purus, there must be a real distinction between such a nature 
and the being it receives, but is not.130
      The importance of a “pure act of being” containing all perfections and able to 
distribute such perfections cannot be understated: the first causes all being without 
causing its own being. To foreshadow a metaphor from Summa Contra Gentiles, like a 
king who gives governance to his entire realm, the first cause can totalize without either 
being made part of the totality that it causes in its entirety or removing itself entirely from 
the realm.
 
131
                                                 
129 ST I, q. 104, a. 1, resp. I will return to this issue in reference to divine conservation below. See Chapter 
V. The issue here concerns “analogical” vs. “univocal” causation, to which I will return below. See Chapter 
III.  
130 On this issue, see also James F. Anderson, Cause of Being: The Philosophy of Creation in St. Thomas. 
(St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co., 1952), 1-30. 
131 See Chapter II Section 3.  
 Its purity remains intact, when even more radically it distributes such 
perfections to itself (i.e., the Trinity). Thus, through the second and third stages of the De 
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Ente argument, Aquinas existentially reinscribes the Neoplatonic signature of 
participation around the extra-essential influx of esse, which actualizes even the highest 
formal perfections. God as universal cause does not give merely a particular act (e.g., this 
or that form) to everything that follows, but he gives actuality as such.132
                                                 
132 Dewan seems to reject the existential reading of esse in favor of an argument that focuses on the relation 
of a form to its efficient cause(s). “Esse” refers to something’s higher sustaining causes without which it 
would not continue to exist. Thus, although nothing besides God subsists in its own right, “esse” does not 
mark a distinct existential perfection in addition to anything’s form. The issue for Dewan seems to be that 
the univocal series of efficient causes must be essentially ordered to some (higher) equivocal cause, 
otherwise the series would run to infinity. In the effect, Dewan explains, there is the ordering principle of 
form, a nature of the effect’s own. The form or nature of the effect is the principle of its being, but only as 
presupposing the contribution of the higher thing as efficient cause. Without the cause as cause, there 
would be no ordering influence. That which is ordered (i.e., the effect) receives a share of the being from its 
principle of ordering, but ultimately remains lower than it and must participate it. Hence, the non-identity 
between that which must participate and that which is participated. Dewan’s argument requires that the 
effect continually participate (i.e., be caused by) its cause, as opposed to esse being something given to the 
effect along with its nature. For the effect to be, its cause must remain in act. The following passage best 
captures his overall argument: “The form of the caused thing is an inferior form. Since it is a form, it is a 
principle of being (esse); but only as presupposing the contribution of a higher thing, the efficient cause. In 
the case of our letters making a word, it is the presence of order (the FORM) which makes of the letters a 
being, a word: thus, we can say that with the coming of the order there comes also an act of being (esse); 
being accompanies form. However, order is present in the letter only ‘under the influence’ of the man who 
holds up the letters. The man (having a higher, more active form) is a being more fully established in being 
than are the words made out of wooden letters. The words have being only by receiving a share 
(“participating in”) the wealth of being of the man. This is why we must distinguish between the form of 
the lower thing and the esse of the lower thing. The esse, i.e. the being actually, of the caused (or lower) 
thing pertains to the caused thing’s participation in the perfection proper to the nature of the higher thing, 
the nature of the efficient cause as such. The form of the lower thing, on the other hand, pertains to the 
nature proper to the lower thing. The two natures being different, so also the esse and the form of the 
caused thing must be different from each other, the esse being the actuality even of the form.” Dewan, “St. 
Thomas and the Distinction between Form and Esse,” 366.  If esse can be translated as “the having been 
ordered of a form,” which indicates its having been caused, then everything besides the first cause must be 
other than its esse. The actual being of any effect requires participation in the perfection of its cause, but 
this participated perfection remains other than it. “It is only when the thing is seen as caused, and thus as 
dependent on a higher and more noble essence, that one must conceive of a distinction, within the caused 
thing, between its essence and its act of being. The act of being is a perfection, pertaining to the being as a 
being, which surpasses the causal power of the essence of the caused thing.” Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 84. 
Lower modes must participate in the actuality of being of higher modes, which are other than them, until 
we reach esse subsistens. Two issues are noteworthy in Dewan’s account: first, that the composition of esse 
and form diminishes as one ascends the hierarchy of causes; second, that esse participated by each effect is 
something really distinct, and not merely another way of naming the same reality (i.e., a conceptual 
distinction). The second issue relates directly to the matter of concern: whether the real distinction between 
esse and essence presupposes an entity in which there is an identity between the two: esse ipsum subsistens. 
On the first issue, to the causal hierarchy of natures there corresponds a hierarchy of acts of being. Higher 
natures are more able to exercise being, and therefore are less distinct from their esse than lower natures. 
Such diminished distinction converges in a point of identity with the first cause. Dewan clearly states: 
“…one might say that form becomes closer to, i.e., more like, esse as one mounts the metaphysical 
hierarchy, and coincides with it ‘at infinity’, i.e. at God.” Dewan, “St. Thomas and the Distinction between 
Form and Esse,” 364. Higher natures are more active because more effects depend upon them, and they 
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Section 5: A Real Distinction? Terminological Clarification 
      To return to the earlier question, what would it mean to say esse and essence are 
really distinct in created beings? According to the handbook definition of this distinction, 
it would require God to be able to create—and/or subsequently destroy—something’s 
esse and not its essence, and vice versa. Such is the charge ad absurdum that later 
opponents of the real distinction will lodge against the real distinction between esse and 
essence: what would a being be without being, or being apart from any being?133 The 
otherness of which Aquinas often speaks between esse and essence—but of which he 
seldom, if ever, explicitly considers in terms of types of distinction—cannot be between 
res et res. What would it mean to create something’s esse without the thing itself, or 
likewise to create (i.e., really create, not just conceive) something without its esse? 
Likewise, esse cannot be an accident of a thing, because insofar as accidents happen to 
the subjects of which they are accidents, esse would have to be added to a non-existing 
thing (i.e., to nothing). If esse is called upon to explain the difference between “existing 
and non-existing things,” which do not include such a specification through themselves, 
then we also ask of this addition: what accounts for its existence or non-existence?134
      Unlike later thinkers who identify their arguments along the spectrum of distinctions, 
ranging from real to rational and many varieties in between, Aquinas does not seem 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
themselves (as effects) depend upon fewer causes (i.e., they can cause more, both univocally and 
equivocally). The more the form can order (i.e., the more active and less passive the form) the more being it 
has. Grades of composition of form and esse follow according to the rubric: inasmuch as an entity has 
above it a higher cause, to that degree it is composed.  
133 See, for example, Ockham: “Si essent duae res, non esset contradictio, quin Deus conservaret entitatem 
rei in rerum natura sine existentia, vel econverso existentiam sine entitate, quorum utrumque est 
impossibile.” Opera Philosophica I: Summa logicae, ed. Philotheus Boehner, et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: 
The Franciscan Institute, 1974), III, II, c. xxvii. If Aquinas is committed to some form of a “real 
distinction” between esse and essence, he most certainly does not mean this as outlined by Ockham.  
134 The argument that if existence were an accident added to an essence, then another existence would have 
to be added to it (i.e., the accident) is a commonly stated argument against the treatment of esse as an 
accident. “Si esse est dispositio addita, procedetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.” Siger of Brabant, 
MM Intro. q. 7. He derives this argument from Averroes’s response to Avicenna. See Metaphysics IV.2.  
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committed to a single term. He says of esse that it is “other than,”135 “composed with,”136 
“outside (praeter)”137 “really differs from,”138 and “happens to”139 essence.140 
“Distingere” occurs at least once in his corpus, although in no way is highlighted as a 
technical term.141 His fluid terminology, however, seems to reflect the state of the 
problematic, and where he stands in the range of positions on this issue cannot be clearly 
located because such a range only fully emerges through and in response to his work. 
One almost could argue that Scotus’s “formal distinction,” which is a distinction in a 
single entity between two formalities each with its own account (ratio) and which Scotus 
often applies in cases of real composition that do not warrant a full-fledged real 
distinction, best describes what Aquinas has in mind.142
                                                 
135 In I Sent. d. 24, q. 1. art. 1 resp.: “Aliquid enim est quod, quamvis sit indivisum in actu, est tamen 
divisibile potentia, vel divisione quantitatis, vel divisione essentiali, vel secundum utrumque[...] divisione 
essentiali, sicut in compositis ex forma et materia, vel ex esse et quod est.”  
136 SCG II.56.  
137 In II Sent. d. 3 q. 1. a. 1. resp.  
138 Exp. de Hebd.  
139 In I Sent. d. 8, expositio primae partis textus.  
140 Wippel, for example, states: “[Aquinas] speaks more frequently about the composition of essence and 
esse than about their real distinction. Nonetheless, at times he does refer to them as being really distinct, 
presumably because he realizes that if they are to enter into real composition with one another, they must to 
that degree be distinct from one another.” “Metaphysics,” The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. 
Norman Kreutzmann and Elenore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 99. On the same 
matter concerning the “early texts” of Aquinas (c. 1254-c. 1260), Sweeney states: “Those texts disclose that 
Thomas has at least six ways of expressing the otherness between esse/essence: distinquere, accidere, 
differre, est aluid, non est and compenere. The last four are used most frequently, with almost equal 
frequency and, seemingly, with little or no change in meaning.” Sweeney, “Existence/Essence,” 104-105.  
141 De veritate, q. 1, a. 1, ad s.c. 3. “...diversum est esse, et quod est, distinguitur [m.e.] actus essendi ab eo 
cui ille actus convenit.”  
142 “In eodem igitur quod est unum numero, est aliqua entitas, quam consequitur minor unitas quam sit 
unitas numeralis, et est realis; et illud cuius et talis, unitas, formaliter est ‘de se unum’ unitate numerali. 
Concedo igitur quod unitas realis non est alicuius exsistentis in duobus individuis, sed in uno.” Ordinatio II 
d. 3, Pars I q. 6, 172. Scotus applies such a distinction, for example, to a thing’s quidditas and haecceitas.  
 Although esse is not a formality, 
but an extra-formal actuality, nevertheless, such a distinction captures the real otherness 
in any created being between esse and essence without requiring the consequence (i.e., of 
the real distinction) that one could persist while the other were destroyed. A further 
advantage would be that esse does not merely modify essences (i.e., as is the case with 
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Scotus’s modal distinction), but makes its own “existential” contribution, which cannot 
be reduced any essential account, but requires its own extra-essential (i.e., non-
definitional) account. Because calling Aquinas’s distinction a “formal distinction” is both 
speculative and anachronistic, and because the formal distinction is a type of real 
distinction, I will avoid this appellation, but instead continue to use the term “real 
distinction” bearing in mind the qualifications addressed here.  
     Instead, we must focus on the real otherness between the essential determinations 
specifying what any given thing is and its non-identical existential act. This is what was 
first considered by the understanding of essences (i.e., the first stage of the intellectus 
essentiae argument) which occluded an understanding of their an esse (“possum enim 
intelligere quid est homo uel fenix et tamen ignorare an esse habeat in rerum natura”). 
As will come to be seen in what follows, the incommensurability of these orders and the 
otherness between a being and its act of being can be traced back to the distinct ways by 
which any given thing relates to God as exemplar. As Aquinas states:      
Similiter etiam in ipso Deo est considerare naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua 
est causa et exemplar omnis naturae, ita etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis 
esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit omnem rem; ita cognoscendo 
esse suum, congoscit esse cujuslibet rei [...]143
Thus, although not two distinct things (res), as issued from two distinct causal grounds 
(i.e., causa et exemplar omnis naturae and causa et exemplar omnis esse), a real 
otherness, which Aquinas does not define as this or that type of distinction, must pertain 
in created beings between esse and essence.
 
144
                                                 
143 In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, art. 3, resp. 
 The distinction between esse and essence 
144 A distinction between two things (res) should more properly, but perhaps anachronistically, be called a 
“numerical distinction.” Giles of Rome will defend such a distinction between res et res. For Giles, esse is 
something really distinct from essences or natures. What is so radical about this response is not merely that 
it posits a real distinctness between esse and essences. Even more is the fact that Giles treats esse as itself 
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is not a mere product of the intellect—as is the case of understanding an essence apart 
from individual instantiations of that essence, and would be the case for esse and essence 
if relying on intellectus essentiae alone, as I have argued145
                                                                                                                                                 
something (i.e., a res). In Theorem XVI, he claims: “Nam ipsa humanitas, cum sit tota essentia hominis et 
tota quidditas eius, dicta est forma totius, quia dicit totum per modum formae. Esse autem quod causatur a 
forma totius ut in decima nonna propositione patebit, est res differens [m.e.] ab ipsa forma.” (XVI, L.14-
18). In this passage, Giles has outlined the key elements of his real distinction: the total form (i.e., whole 
essence of matter and form as opposed to the partial substantial form) causes a different thing (i.e., esse as 
“res differens”) than the form itself. To fully explain his formulation of this distinction, he has directed his 
reader to Theorem XIX in which he takes on contrary opinions in order to argue that esse and essence are 
different things. The title of this Theorem is: “Omne esse quod fluit in compositis a forma totius vel quod 
in simplicibus causatur a quidditate non esset coniunctio essentialium partium, nec respectus ad agens, nec 
determinatio materiae, vel subiecti, sed est actualitas quaedam realiter differens et superaddita quidditati ex 
quo esse et essentia componitur quodlibet citra primum.” Two issues should be noted in discussing this 
Theorem as they reflect Giles’ overall position on esse: why esse must be really distinct from essence, and 
what Giles means by calling esse a distinct thing (res). “Verum quia in propositione quinta et etiam in 
duodecima multis rationibus probabatur et etiam hic ostendetur quod esse et essentia sunt duae res [m.e.], 
ita quod esse nihil est aliud quam quaedam actualitas realiter superaddita essentiae ex quo esse et essentia 
realiter componitur [m.e.] omne creatum…” (XIX). Murray in his introduction to his translation of 
Theoremata states: “Giles of Rome had been the pupil of St. Thomas, most probably between the years 
1269-1273, he had been considered for some years, the interpreter of St. Thomas, but he has undoubtedly 
created the monster which has frightened Duns Scotus and Francis Suarez and has motivated their reaction 
to the real distinction. He has in fact prepared the way for the Scotistic and Suarezian conception of the real 
distinction. With such a conception of the real distinction we can certainly pardon these great 
metaphysicians, Duns Scotus and Francis Suarez” (21-22). 
145 Sweeney maintains that the “essence:individual::essence:esse” pairing is based on a misguided analogy: 
the former is a relation between act and potency, the latter between potency and act. This means that even 
though the former gives rise to a mere conceptual distinction, the latter must give rise to a real distinction 
because to understand essence as not including existence is not merely an indeterminacy in conception (as 
is the case with the former). He does acknowledge that the intellectus essentiae argument needs to be 
supplemented, but not necessarily by a prior demonstration for the existence of God. See Leo Sweeney, 
“Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” 107, 129-130. Owens, however, argues that 
even if in one case the essence is participated by individual, and in the other participates existence, this 
does not necessitate a real distinction in the case of the latter. He states: “If there is a reason why existence 
when received into a subject has to remain really distinct from the subject, the reason will lie in the 
existence itself, and not in anything learned from the simple inspection of a sensible thing’s essence.” 
Owens, “Quiddity and Real Distinction,” 12. 
—but a distinction pertaining 
even in the absence of any mind to conceive of it. The deeper meaning of the “otherness 
between an essence and its esse” thus concerns the fact that even when brought into being 
by its cause, such a bringing into being is not merely the actualization of a potency, 
because of the continued non-identity between something and its being. Thus, more than 
anything else “real otherness” signifies that a being never truly receives esse because of 
its purity as esse tantum, a purity which grounds its reception in everything else.   
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      Conclusion 
      As has been argued, the full argument of De Ente IV is necessary in order to show a 
“real otherness” between things (i.e., other than God) and their being. Only with the final 
stage of the argument does the necessity for really distinguishing esse from essence in 
things (res) become apparent.146 Stage 3’s demonstration of esse as a real nature enables 
the subsequent move to show that the reception of such into any other essence is a real 
positive content, which nevertheless remains really distinct from the nature into which it 
is received for the very reason that esse can be identical only to a single nature (i.e., 
ipsum esse subsistens). Thus, in everything else, it must be received as really distinct 
from the nature, otherwise ipsum esse also would be part of such natures (and thus 
God/esse would be a real part of such things).147
      So what is this “reception of esse?” As Aquinas outlined in Stage 3 of the De Ente 
argument, a move must be made from the order of essential inspection (i.e., intellectus 
essentiae) to the order of efficient causality.
 
148
                                                 
146 In Chapter V, I will argue that Aquinas leaves his argument open to a deeper problem, namely that the 
“really distinct” esse received by creatures turns out to be nothing more than their participation in divine 
esse. As such, the original impetus for the real distinction (i.e., to distinguish God from creatures) 
collapses.  
147 The real distinctness is necessitated by the consequences that would follow if esse (now shown to be a 
subsisting nature) became part of any created natures. Owens states:  “The reason is that the being so 
established [Ipsum Esse Subsistens] cannot, when participated, be really identical with any quidditative 
characteristics. Where it is participated as an act, it has to remain really other than the quiddity it makes 
be.” Owens, “Quiddity and Real Distinction,” 17. The otherness established through understanding God’s 
nature as ipsum esse subsistens surrounds the subsequent impossibility of esse as something entering the 
essential or quidditative continuation of any other entity. If esse is God’s nature alone, then if esse were to 
be part of other entities’s natures—that is, if esse were not really distinct from their quiddity—then they 
would be indistinguishable. Either everything would be God (i.e., pantheism) or everything would be being 
(i.e., Parmenideanism), each an equally pernicious outcome. Thus, the establishment of the real distinction 
requires a prior demonstration for the existence of God.  
148 “Non autem potest esse quod ipsum esse sit causatum ab ipsa forma uel quiditate rei, dico sicut a causa 
efficiente, quia sic aliqua res esset sui ipsius causa et aliqua res se ipsam in esse produceret: quod est 
impossibile. Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse ab alio.” 
(De Ente, Cap IV ll. 131-137).  
 A ground must be sought not for the 
whatness of any given thing, but for its being anything whatsoever, the actuality of all 
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actuality, exceeding essential perfection alone. Ultimately, we arrive at the ground of all 
being, a being whose essence is to be. Aquinas argues that something’s quiddity cannot 
produce its own existence (esse), otherwise it would be the efficient cause of itself (causa 
sui). Something would have to give to itself what it previously had lacked (i.e., esse).  
      Against an essentialist challenge, Aquinas’s argument in De Ente begins to dislodge 
the actuality brought by esse from formal actuality. This he does by grounding the being 
of beings in ipsum esse subsistens and showing that their composition with esse makes 
possible any essential determination, instead of thinking being as nothing more than the 
appearance of the essence in re through the union of form and matter. In showing God to 
be ipsum esse subsistens, an understanding of all other beings (intellectus essentiae) 
subsequently can reveal the non-implication or absence of esse as a genuine lack—a lack 
that can only be supplemented through God’s efficient causality (i.e., participation in 
ipsum esse subsistens).149
      Because intellectus essentiae, which by itself only establishes a rational distinction, 
cannot placate those who would altogether reject the real distinction, ipsum esse 
subsistens must be shown to be a real nature in order to ground the real distinction. As 
Owens has argued: “If [esse] is really distinct in point of fact, the reason will have to be 
sought in what is peculiar to existence itself, not in the accidental connection established 
 
                                                 
149 Creation, as will become clear, enables Aquinas to radicalize the actuality brought by God’s inaugural 
act of effectivity and underlying all “standard” efficient causality. It seems that Heidegger in the Beiträge 
misreads Scholastic metaphysics—and especially Aquinas—on this point. He states: “Abandonment of 
being is strongest at that place where it is most decidedly hidden. That happens where beings have—and 
had to—become most ordinary and familiar. That happened first in Christianity and its dogma, which 
explains all beings in their origin as ens creatum, where the creator is the most certain and all beings are the 
effect of this most extant cause. But cause-effect relationship is the most ordinary, most crude, most 
immediate, what is employed by all human calculation and lostness to being in order to explain something, 
i.e., to push it into the clarity of the ordinary and familiar.” Heidegger, Contributions, 77. Instead of 
familiarizing and making ordinary the createdness of beings (entia/seiendes), Aquinas attempts to dislodge 
from ordinary efficient causality the deeper givenness of being at the center of creation and at the core of all 
ens creatum. Whether he avoids the Heideggerian charge of onto-theo-logy is a matter of some dispute. Cf. 
Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy.” 
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through inspection of the thing’s quidditative content.”150 The reason must be sought 
from the side of esse, not from the side of quidditas. This is because a transition must be 
made outside the order of quidditative content and formal causality altogether. The focus 
instead becomes the exercise of efficient causality, which accounts for the being of such 
quiddities, but which itself cannot be a quidditive determination. Esse cannot be 
considered just another essential determination because it itself as a nature (i.e., ipsum 
esse subsistens) cannot be divided or multiplied as can other natures (e.g., human, 
whiteness, etc.) and thereby cannot be just another essential determination, but is that 
which (in the order of efficiency, not formality) causes any such nature to be. Esse, thus, 
becomes a perfection required by all natures in order to enact their essential actuality 
(i.e., esse is the act of all formal actuality) and without which—due to their lack of 
subsistence—they would not be. This means that actus primus et purus serves as the 
cause of all being and yet as the causal ground of being in its totality, it need not be 
beyond being.  As most perfect act, its purity does not require it to not-be in order that it 
be able to give (i.e., cause) all being by reason of “analogical causation” as will be 
explored below.151
                                                 
150 Owens, “Quiddity and Real Distinction,” 12. 
151 See below Chapter III.  
 Before turning to this issue of an “analogic of being,” we must trace 
Aquinas’s other arguments for the real otherness between esse and essence insofar as 
they help to frame his enshrinement of esse as a “really other” existential perfection of all 
essential perfections.  
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Chapter II. Esse Beyond De Ente 
     As was argued above, the discussion of esse and its real otherness from essence in De 
Ente et Essentia presents an inchoate version of a metaphysical argument that resonates 
throughout the entirety of Aquinas’s corpus: esse is the act of all actuality and the 
perfection of all perfections.1
      This chapter will consider two other types of argument that Aquinas presents for the 
real distinction—the argument from participation and the argument from act and 
potency—in addition to looking at the treatment of the real distinction in the two 
Summas.
 Such a claim provides a focal point for the entirety of 
Aquinas’s existential metaphysics in its overcoming of conceptual imperialism. Before 
turning to the constellation of issues surrounding the real otherness between esse and 
essence (e.g., analogy, participation, the divine ideas, creation ex nihilo), a broader 
survey of other types of argument offered by Aquinas for his “real distinction” will help 
to unpack the full meaning of this claim and also to round out our understanding of how 
such a distinction emerges.  
2
                                                 
1 Sweeney divides the texts of Aquinas into early (ca. 1254-1260), middle (ca. 1260-1267) and late (ca. 
1267 sq.) and catalogues, classifies, and analyzes esse in the early group. See Sweeney, “Existence/Essence 
in Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” 99. 
2 One argument I do not raise is the so-called “genus argument.” See Sweeney “Existence/Essence in 
Thomas Aquinas’s Early Writings,” 109-112 and Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas 
157-161. The gist of the argument, as summarized by Wippel, is “[…] if something belongs to a genus, 
essence and esse (act of being) differ in that thing.” Ibid. 159. Otherwise, something would not differ from 
other members of the genus insofar as they share quidditative content. The problem, to which I will return 
below, is that this argument invokes esse as “that by which things differ.” Insofar as I think such a 
treatment of esse is problematic, not only in itself, but also for Aquinas’s own project, I will pass over such 
an argument in this Chapter in order to return to the issue of esse as individuating below. See below 
Chapter V.   
 Although his arguments for this distinction vary in terms of context, and he 
never treats the question as such (i.e., “What type of difference pertains between esse and 
essence in creatures?”) but always addresses the issue in terms of some other problem, 
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the fundamental insights of the De Ente argument persist throughout his corpus.3
      Aquinas’s explication of Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus argument has been a central 
source for the latter’s own purported commitment to the real distinction.
 In what 
follows, I will show the broader range of Aquinas’s existential insights.  
 
Section 1: The Argument from Participation 
4 Interpreters of 
the real distinction, who argue for knowledge of real distinction in creatures prior to 
knowledge of real identity (or “purity”) in God, often appeal to this account in his 
Expositio contemporaneous with De Ente.5 Even though this account does not offer an 
intellectus essentiae argument, but instead “an argument from participation,” keeping in 
mind the essentialist challenge, the question posed to this text must be whether an 
inspection of created beings reveals esse as a really distinct perfection in creatures 
without reference to a subsisting esse.6
      On the nature of the reasoning invoked in the argument at hand, Wippel succinctly 
states the argument thusly: “The heart of this reasoning, in these texts and in others, is 
 
                                                 
3 Sweeney argues: “His endeavors to establish the real distinction are not completely successful in his early 
writings. He does succeed, though, in subsequent treatises. Setting aside reflection upon the concept of 
essence as an approach to the real distinction, he turns instead to actual existents themselves. There he 
concentrates upon the fact that they do actually exist and upon what that fact does to those existents: it 
contributes all their perfections to them. The result is that esse, the component to which that fact leads and 
of which it is the evidence, is clearly seen to be a perfection and act within the existent and really other than 
what the existent is.” A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism, 72. 
4 See fn. 10 below. 
5 Patt states: “Neither the difference between an entity and esse itself, nor the real distinction between esse 
and essence is, of course, an otherness between two things (“res and res”). In this passage of his 
commentary on the De hebdomadibus, Thomas does not treat of the difference between esse subsistens 
(which itself is an entity) and the entities which participate in esse. Rather the difference between an entity 
and esse itself is the difference between a thing and a perfection, and the real distinction between esse and 
essence indicates an otherness within one and the same entity” “Aquinas’s Real Distinction,” 25-26. 
Sweeney and Wippel refer to this as a “participation argument” or “argument based on participation.” 
Sweeney, “Existence/Essence,” 120-126 and Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 161-
170. Wippel also argues that such an argument need not presuppose that God exists. Sweeney argues that 
the “participation argument” in general...even though in this particular case...With the latter, nevertheless... 
6 Cf. Patt, Aquinas’s Real Distinction, 24-29. He here lays out the contribution of the Expositio for De Ente 
IV.  
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this: if something participates in a perfection, existence (esse) in the case at hand, it must 
be distinct from and enter into composition with the perfection in which it participates.”7
      This is exactly the issue confronted for Aquinas and for us in understanding the first 
of seven rules in Boethius’s De Hebdomadibus.
 
Around such an argument from participation, I will argue that knowledge of esse as a 
really distinct perfection in things (i.e., a perfection in which they must participate) 
requires first establishing the subsistence of ipsum esse. Thus, ipsum esse serves in a 
grounding function beyond just that of the conceptual order (intentiones), because, as 
signified by Wippel’s use of “perfection,” it brings a completion of act to any nature in 
terms of an actus essendi. In attempting to test the strength of Aquinas’s argument, we 
must keep in mind the Sigerian challenge: a thing is not composed with its being (esse) 
because its “participation” in its cause (i.e., participation by imitation) does not add any 
additional perfection to the thing outside its nature, but it does not really (but only 
logically) participates in esse commune. Thus, what sense does it make to speak of “real 
composition” or “real difference” between the thing and its esse?  
8 Here he introduces a distinction that will 
orient the subsequent rules and the remainder of the treatise: “Being and that which is are 
diverse” (“Diversum est esse et id quod est”).9
                                                 
7 Wippel, “Metaphysics,” 106. 
8 I will follow King and others (e.g., Schutz and Synan) with the organization of the rules into 7. See Peter 
King, Treatise On the Hebdomads: How substances are good in that they are, although they are not 
substantial goods, trans. Peter King (N.p: n.p., 2004). Also Janet L. Schultz and Edward A. Synan, 
introduction, An Exposition of the “On the Hebdomads” of Boethius, by Thomas Aquinas (Washington 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2001). All citations will be from Boethius, The Theological 
Tractates. The Consolation of Philosophy. trans. H.F. Stewart, et al. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press, 1973). OSI and OSIII respectively refer to De Trinitate and De Hebdomadibus. 
9 OSIII l. 28.  
 The meaning of such terms, as well as the 
“diversity” between them, has not been without interpretive controversy. Setting aside 
hermeneutical concerns regarding Boethius’s own intentions, the pertinent issue 
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surrounds Aquinas’s use of the argument from participation to secure a real difference 
between esse and id quod est.10
                                                 
10 There has been a wealth of secondary literature attempting to settle the precise meaning of the terms 
“esse” and “id quod est” in the Opuscula Sacra (especially De Trinitate and De Hebdomadibus). My own 
interpretation generally follows what Schultz and Synan call the “traditional interpretation,” a group of 
interpretations that read the distinction in terms of essence/form and concrete informed particular 
substance. See Schultz and Synan, xxxix; and: LaZella, “Creation, Esse, and Id Quod Est in Boethius’s 
Opuscula Sacra,” Carmina Philosophiae 16 (2007)-17 (2008). This view is also held by John Marenbon, 
Boethius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 76-95, who reads it as a distinction between immanent 
form and concrete whole. Gilson also offers such a reading of the distinction in terms of substance (id quod 
est) and the principle of such substance (esse), which does not admit the further distinction between essence 
and existence. See Gilson, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 105. Peter W. Nash, in discussing 
medieval readings of Boethius, calls this interpretation of “the philosophers.” Such a position reads esse as 
substantial form, esse aliquid as accidental form, and quod est as subsistent individual. See Nash, “Giles of 
Rome,” 59-63. This has also been dubbed the “Aristotelian” reading in the sense that I would make 
Boethius a consistent Aristotelian. The Aristotelian reading maintains a reading of “id quod est” as the 
concrete primary substance and “esse” as its embodied essence, neither separable from the concrete 
particular nor reducible to it. For a general overview of contemporary “Aristotelian” readings, see Ralph 
McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas; Chapter 6, in particular, provides important discussions of Duhem, 
Roland-Gosselin, Brosch, Obertello, and Maioli, who hold this view. Nash-Marshall offers a similar survey 
of interpretations, which she generally groups into four: two groups divided around their reading of “esse” 
as essence or existence further subdivided. The former is subdivided around the issue of whether or not 
essences are the cause of things’ existences. The latter group is divided around the issue of 
“consubstantiality” of contingent things with God. See Siobhan Nash-Marshall, Participation and the 
Good: A Study in Boethian Metaphysics (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2000), 230-246. 
The “Aristotelian” readings distinguishes itself from both Thomas’s reading and the Neoplatonic reading.  
Both  McInerny and Nash-Marshall attribute the latter reading to Pierre Hadot. One can find this threefold 
distinction both with medieval and contemporary interpretations of Boethius: Nash (“Giles of Rome on 
Boethius’” 58-70.) following Jean Paulus, discusses the threefold interpretation of Boethius in the Middle 
Ages: the interpretation of the philosophers; the interpretation of the theologians; and the Avicennian 
interpretation of St. Thomas and Giles. The interpretation of the theologians reads esse as divine Esse, esse 
aliquid as substantial form, and quod est, as the subsistent created being. For a contemporary version of this 
breakdown, c.f. McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 161-198. For a similar breakdown, see Nash-Marshall, 
Participation and the Good, 230-246. Medieval and contemporary interpretations of Boethian esse and id 
quod est fall into three general groupings (I am following McInerny’s grouping, Nash-Marshall divides into 
two groups of four): Thomas’s, which we must refrain from calling “Thomistic” as most Thomists (e.g., 
Roland-Gosselin, Gilson, etc.) regard it as a favorable imparting, not an accurate interpretation, by the 
Angelic Doctor (McInerny is the exception to this rule); the Aristotelian, also called the “traditional 
interpretation” because a majority of scholars now hold some form of this view; and the Neoplatonic 
readings, which, as we shall see, makes up a roughly unified group of medieval and contemporary 
interpretations. Concerning his unique position, McInerny identifies the issue of Thomists’s rejection of 
Thomas’s reading of Boethius as follows: “Because Thomists came to insist on the originality and the 
centrality of esse in the thought of Thomas, though they gave different accounts of that claim, as Fabro 
noted, there was a disposition to oppose Thomas’s thought to that of his predecessors—and indeed to most 
of his followers. Such Thomists were susceptible to and relatively untroubled by the claim of Duhem that 
there exists a chasm between what Boethius meant and what Thomas took him to mean” (249). Schultz and 
Synan refer to this as the “Traditional Interpretation,” which encompasses a number of different 
interpretations, including the authors’ own position. What they all have in common is that they disagree 
with Thomas’s reading of “esse” as “existence” and “id quod est” as “essence” and that they agree on a 
more Aristotelian rendering of the terms. For a (now dated) list of various thinkers attachments to these 
readings, see James Collins. “Progress and Problems in the Reassessment of Boethius.” The Modern 
Schoolman 23.1 (November 1945), 1-23. Although the terms “esse” and “id quod est” seem to be used 
 In a transitional argument late in his exposition of the 
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rules, he explains what he regards as the grounds for moving from conceptual difference 
to real difference:  
Est ergo primo considerandum quod sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum 
intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter [m.e.]. Quod quidem manifestum est ex 
premissis. Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse neque participat aliquid ut eius ratio 
constituatur ex multis, neque habet aliquid extrinsecum admixtum ut sit in eo compositio 
accidentalis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum; res ergo composita non est suum 
esse; et ideo dicit quod in omni composito aliud est esse ens et aliud ipsum compositum 
quod est participando ipsum esse.11
      The success of the argument lies in establishing the simplicity of ipsum esse such that 
it is not a composite. This means that it neither participates anything nor has anything 
added to it. The underlying question surrounding this argument is: must Aquinas 
presuppose that the ipsum esse repugnant to all composition subsists, or can he show esse 
 
Aquinas has set forth the following argument: If ipsum esse can be shown to be 
absolutely simple and non-composed, then anything that presents itself as composite 
cannot be ipsum esse. Ipsum esse neither participates in anything, nor receives something 
extrinsic to it, therefore it is not composed; composite things are not their own esse; 
therefore, in such composite things, the thing itself and its esse really differ such that the 
thing itself is by participating ipsum esse.  
                                                                                                                                                 
equivocally throughout De Hebdomadibus and De Trinitate, and more so in the entirety of the Boethian 
corpus, the Aristotelian tenor of the terms can be shown as most plausible of all the competing 
interpretations. In putting forth such a position, Brosch in one of the few, however, who argue Boethius 
uses the terms consistently in various contexts. Brosch’s extreme position can be seen. Here he 
categorically rejects a reading of “esse” as “Dasein”: “Mir scheint, kein einziger Anhaltspunkt ist dafür aus 
dem Text selbst noch aus dem Zusammenhang zu gewinnen” Hermann Josef Brosch, Der Seinsbegriff bei 
Boethius: Mit besonderer Berüsichtigung von Sosein und Dasein (Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1931), 27. 
Aquinas’s interprets the distinction as a predecessor of his own distinction between esse and essence. The 
foremost contemporary defense of this view is McInerny’s Boethius and Aquinas, in which he reviews and 
rejects multiple versions of the Aristotelian interpretation  along with the Neoplatonic reading of Hadot. In 
his epilogue, McInerny unequivocally voices his support of this view against its detractors: “The thesis of 
this book is that Boethius taught what Thomas said he taught and the Thomistic commentaries on Boethius 
are without question the best commentaries ever written on the tractates.” McInerny, Boethius and Aquinas, 
249.  
11 Exp. De Hebd II. ll. 204-215. 
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to be a really distinct perfection in composite things prior to knowledge of the subsistence 
of ipsum esse (i.e., God)? To understand how he arrives at this conclusion, it will be 
beneficial to review those arguments from which the premises derive their support.  
      Aquinas maintains the simplicity of ipsum esse by appeal to the “rules” offered by 
Boethius at the beginning of De Hebdomadibus. Boethius presents such rules as common 
conceptions of the mind (communis animi conceptio) which the learned, at the very least, 
approve upon hearing. Aquinas refers to such rules as per se nota foundational principles 
from which the subsequent demonstration can commence. In expositing the famous first 
rule “diuersum est esse et id quod est,” Aquinas states: 
Sicut autem dictum est, ille propositiones sunt maxime note que utuntur terminis quos 
omnes intelligunt; ea autem que in intellectu omnium cadunt sunt maxime communia, 
que sunt ens, unum et bonum; et ideo primo ponit hic Boetius quasdam conceptiones 
pertinentes ad ens, secundo quasdam pertinentes ad unum ex quo sumitur ratio simplicis 
et compositi, ibi: Omni composito etc.; tercio ponit quasdam conceptiones pertinentes ad 
bonum […]12
The Boetian rule under discussion had treated “esse” in its distinction from that which is, 
which Aquinas takes up as pertaining to “ens,” the first of three “transcendentals” (i.e., 
“ens, unum, et bonum”) as the most common understandings.
 
13
                                                 
12 Exp. De Hebd. II. ll. 9-18.  
 Convertible with each 
13 In their translation of the text, Schultz and Synan take note of this of this move: “Note that although 
Boethius uses esse, Aquinas uses ens here.” Schultz and Synan, introduction, 60, n.4. For Boethius, 
according to my (but not Aquinas’s) interpretation of “esse” in De Hebdomadibus, such an interpretation of 
“esse” under the rubric of the transcendental “ens” would not be problematic. For Aquinas’s own 
existential project, however, the matter becomes more complicated because the Thomistic actus essendi 
operates on a different register than the transcendental ens. This confusion at hand echoes the problem 
raised above with the intellectus essentiae argument: what necessitates that “esse” must signify some non-
essential actus essendi, instead of merely repeating “ens” or “res”? If “esse” remains indistinguishable 
from the transcendental “ens,” as the gloss on the first rule seems to suggest, then something and its 
“esse/ens” would only ever be rationally distinct. What would it even mean to understand some essence 
and yet really exclude a more common and empty conception of it as “a being” (ens)? Even a phoenix as 
understood essentially can be called an “ens rationis.” Therefore, more must be said about why a real 
distinction occurs. Aquinas seems to think that the conceptual distinction established by the rule can be 
translated as a real distinction in reference to composite beings: “Est ergo primo considerandum quod sicut 
esse et quod est differunt secundum intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter.” Thus, to establish the 
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other, these transcendental concepts stand outside the categories such that any categorical 
predication presupposes an understanding of the most common concepts of being, one, 
and good. Thus, Boethius’s axioms or common conceptions of the mind pertain to such 
transcendental concepts, each dealt with in turn throughout the Rules. Although Boethius 
uses the transcendentals to solve the questions “how substances can be good without 
being substantially good,” and Aquinas seeks a faithful exposition of such an argument, 
our focus here must be limited to Aquinas’s discussions of “ens” and “esse.”  
      As the exposition continues, concerning “ens” Aquinas states: 
Circa ens [m.e.] autem consideratur ipsum esse [m.e.] quasi quiddam commune et 
indeterminatum, quod quidem dupliciter determinatur, uno modo ex parte subiecti quod 
esse habet [m.e.], alio modo ex parte predicati utpote cum dicimus de homine uel de 
quacumque alia re, non quidem quod sit simpliciter, set quod sit aliquid puta album uel 
nigrum.14
      The characterization of ipsum esse as “common and indeterminate” here concerns the 
abstract manner in which beings (entia) can be signified. Beginning with “esse” as an 
  
In one way (ex parte subiecti), being is said of a subject having being. In the other (ex 
parte predicati), being is not said simply, but in regard to being something: we do not say 
simply that “Socrates is,” but that “Socrates is white.” Ipsum esse relates to ens as a 
common and indeterminate consideration, determinable in either of these two ways (i.e., 
having being or being something). As Aquinas will make clear, this “esse habet” on the 
part of the subject is that by which any being (ens) is, and yet—as will be seen when 
Aquinas later applies these considerations to composite things (res)—must remain really 
distinct from all composite things.  
                                                                                                                                                 
real distinction, esse must be shown to mean more than just the transcendental “ens,” but instead a 
participated perfection in all composite beings. 
14 Exp. De Hebd. II. ll.19-26. 
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abstract signification of beings, Aquinas is clear to point out, however, that the distinction 
under consideration concerns only conceptions at this point, and not yet realities. He 
states:  
[…] diuersitas non est hic referenda ad res de quibus adhuc non loquitur, set ad ipsas 
rationes seu intentiones. Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse et aliud per 
id quod dicimus id quod est, sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere et aliud per 
hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significatur in abstracto sicut et albedo; set 
quod est, id est ens et currens, significatur in concreto uelud album.15
The rational distinction at hand concerns the distinct manners by which “ens” and “esse” 
signify. Just as “one running” (currens) and “to run” (currere) signify rationally distinct 
manners of considering one and the same thing, so too with the case of “one being” (ens) 
and “to be” (esse). At this point, Aquinas merely has stated a position that accords with a 
rational distinction, outlined above with Siger of Brabant.
 
16
      The character of Aquinas’s subsequent argument will slowly execute the transition 
from a rational distinction to a real distinction such that these distinct considerations can 
be applied to things. In the following passage, we witness Aquinas’s first move toward a 
real distinction. He states: “et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue de 
currente quod currat in quantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere 
quod ens siue id quod est sit in quantum participat actum essendi.”
 Something can be signified 
either in abstraction, as in the case of “to run,” or in concretion, as in the case of “one 
running,” and yet two distinct realities are not being signified, but instead a single reality 
as distinctly (i.e., more or less abstractly) conceived.   
17
                                                 
15 Exp. De Hebd. II. ll. 37-45. 
16 See above Chapter I Section 3.  
17 Exp. De Hebd. II. ll.54-59 
 We must take note 
of the issue of participation discussed in this passage as it anticipates the issue of real 
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composition introduced later in the argument. “To x” (in the infinitive) is not the subject 
of x-ing (here the participle). One might speak of “the one running” (currens) as distinct 
from her activity “to run” (currere). This distinction follows because “to run” is not the 
subject of “running” (currendi), just as “to be” (esse) is not the subject of “being” 
(essendi). Thus, just as we do not say “to run runs,” but “the runner runs,” so too it is 
incorrect to say “being is,” but instead “that which is,” as the subject of being, “is.”   
      Despite the obviousness of Aquinas’s point, both in Latin and in English, we must 
note the conclusion he draws from this; namely, the one running (currens) runs 
“inasmuch as she is the subject of running and participates in it.” What he is trying to 
determine with this discussion is whether “ipsum esse” can participate in anything, from 
which he concludes that only id quod est can participate, but not ipsum esse. Remember 
to run does not run. But what does it mean to be the subject of something (in the 
gerundive) such that one participates in it (in the infinitive)?  Aquinas defines 
participation quite literally as “to grasp a part” (partem capere) of something and goes on 
to discuss three distinct forms of participation in which the participant must “grasp a 
part” or “take part in” the participated.  
      In terms of his three ways of participation, the first is when a species participates in a 
genus or an individual in a species. This is a form of participation because the former in 
each case does not possess the ratio according to its total commonality and in the same 
way, but grasps only “a part.” The second is when a subject participates in an accident or 
matter participates in form. Either an essential or accidental form, “common according to 
its ratio” (de sui ratione communis est), is determined to a particular subject and thus the 
subject participates the form. Such determinate qualification of a subject (i.e., esse 
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aliquid) from its participation in an essential or accidental form, as Aquinas later will 
explain, presupposes that the subject (i.e., without qualification) participate ipsum esse. 
The third type of participation, and the one most relevant to our discussion, is when an 
effect participates its cause, especially when the patient is not equal to the power of its 
cause. The example he gives is when air participates the light of the sun. He states: “[...] 
effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue 
cause, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate 
qua est in sole.”18
      For the exposition at hand, Aquinas has introduced participation in order to show that 
ipsum esse does not participate anything, and subsequently he will argue that nothing can 
be added or admixed with the ratio of ipsum esse. Before turning to the issue of ipsum 
esse’s lack of admixture, we must note the following: in this passage, Aquinas has 
interpreted Boethius’s “forma essendi” in terms of his own existentialized “actus 
 The air is inadequate to the power (virtutem) of its cause and thus must 
participate light, but is unable to receive it “with the clarity” (in claritate) as it is in the 
sun. It grasps a part of light, but fails to receive it completely. As explained above, air is 
not merely a deficient medium for the reception of light—as water is for heat—but 
instead, the perfection itself (i.e., light) enjoys a “clarity”—a physical description that 
resonates metaphysically as “purity”—that is fundamentally incommunicable to any 
subject.  
                                                 
18 “Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad 
alterum pertinet, uniuersaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet 
rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. Similiter 
etiam subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substancialis uel accidentalis, que de sui 
ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc uel ad illud subiectum. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur 
participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue cause, puta si dicamus quod aer 
participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole.” Exp. De Hebd. II. ll. 70-85. 
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essendi.”19 Thus, “id quod est” participates in an act—not a form—of being (actus 
essendi) so that it is, a matter to resurface below.20
      In discussing the lack of admixture to ipsum esse, Aquinas begins by explaining how, 
according to abstract signification, that which is signified abstractly (e.g., humanity, 
whiteness, to run) contains nothing outside its essence.
 Given both considerations, we must 
ask how Aquinas makes the final move to leverage a real distinction through application 
of such conceptual consideration to things (res).  
21
      The pertinent issue at this point, once again, is that only intentiones are under 
consideration.
 Such an abstract signification of 
a human, for example, contains only an account of human (ratio hominis) with nothing 
else admixed to it. When signified concretely, however, such (e.g., a human) is capable of 
partaking of extra-essential additions. A human, something white, or a runner can possess 
determinations other than humanity, whiteness, or to run. There can be, for example, “a 
pale, human, runner.” The consequences for esse and id quod est are obvious: being itself 
(ipsum esse) cannot partake of any determinations outside itself, whereas the concretized 
id quod est (i.e., that which is, or a being) can receive further determinations. A being is 
always something more than the fact that it is. Its to be (esse), however, can receive 
nothing extraneous to itself.     
22
                                                 
19 This issue has been noted, for example by Schultz and Synan, n.5, 60. 
20 Although Aquinas often relates actus directly to forma, here the actus in which id quod est must 
participate so that it is exceeds the formal determinations alone.  
21 “Humanity” might be better rendered “to be human” and “whiteness” “to be white.”  
22 The relation between intentiones and rationes seems almost interchangeable in this text. See Exp. De 
Hebd. II. l. 39, where Aquinas speaks of “rationes seu intentiones.”  
 The ratio hominis, ratio currendi, ratio albendi, and most importantly 
ratio essendi as the abstract signification of individual humans, white things, runners, and 
beings (entia) do not—qua ratio—foreclose the possibility of multiplicity. When 
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considered by themselves, they are naked of any further determination, but this does not 
afford them any real separation from their actual partakers (e.g., beings, humans, white 
things, and runners), as if there were a currere tantum apart from currentia. To state the 
matter in Siger’s terms, our concept of any individual runner really includes “to run” not 
because of some separate fund of “currere tantum” in which each must participate, but 
because each concept of a runner iterates the same conceptual content as “to run,” albeit 
with a difference in emphasis. Even more, Siger states, every ratio is a ratio essendi.  
      Thus, “ipsum esse,” at this point in the argument, need only be conceptually other 
than composite thing (res composita) because the ratio of each composite expresses a 
ratio essendi. Thus, the unity such a concept (i.e., “ipsum esse”) enjoys in mente, due to 
its lack of admixture, fails to exclude multiplicity in re: nothing alien can divide the 
concept and disrupt its unity because it extends to everything. This is not because some 
nature other than esse must divide it. 23
                                                 
23 Cf. “If esse (the act of being) is to be multiplied, this can only be owing to diversity on the part of that 
which participates in it. Therefore, because different natures or entities participate in it, it is realized in 
different fashion in each of them. Not only does this requires real diversity between one participating nature 
and entity and another; it also requires real diversity within every such being between something which 
receives and diversifies esse (the act of being) and the received and diversified act of being itself. One may 
ask why. This follows because esse as such is not self-dividing or self-diversifying. As Thomas has 
explained in a number of other contexts, esse insofar as it is esse is not divided. It can only be divided by 
something that is different from itself, that is, by a nature or essence which receives and diversifies it. If the 
esse (act of being) of this human being is different from the esse (act of being) of that human being or that 
stone, that is because in each of them the nature or essence which receives and diversifies esse is distinct 
form the esse which it receives and diversifies.” The Metaphysics Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 167. 
Wippel’s claim that “esse is not self-dividing” mistakes an abstract ratio essendi, applicable to everything, 
for a perfection. According to Siger, esse is not “received” in anything because it already accompanies 
everything. 
 Instead, it remains “undivided” only because it 
fails to exclude anything and thus is presupposed by every ratio. The Sigerian thorn in 
the side of the argument is that an analysis of any thing (res) in terms of its conceptual 
content (ratio) already includes a ratio essendi; therefore to drive a wedge between one 
region of being (e.g., composite things) and another (e.g., ipsum esse) fails to really 
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distinguish the two. Being says too much because it says everything; but because it says 
everything without determination, it says nothing at all.  
      Aquinas builds his argument for real difference around an implicit dichotomy, 
mentioned earlier in reference to the intellectus essentiae argument, that “either 
composite things are not their own being (suum esse) or all beings are ipsum esse.”24 The 
reason why one must reject the claim “all beings are ipsum esse,” Aquinas assumes, is 
because ipsum esse can participate nothing nor have anything extrinsic mixed with it.25 
And composites are, at the very least, mixtures of spatially differentiated parts. The 
problem, however, is that Siger would agree that ipsum esse neither participates anything 
(what could being participate beyond itself?) nor has anything admixed to it (what could 
be admixed to being itself that is ‘not-being’?). But for Siger, “being a composite,” 
although this entails being caused by another, does not necessitate that the composite 
thing (res compositum) is non-identical to its being. Instead, he argues, everything that is 
a being is a being through its own account (ens per suam rationem).26
                                                 
24 For an unpacking of this dichotomy, see, for example, Dewan, “Saint Thomas, Joseph Owens, and the 
Real Distinction Between Being and Essence.” See also, Owen’s response: “Being and Natures in 
Aquinas,” 167.  
25 “ipsum esse neque participat aliquid ut eius ratio constituatur ex multis, neque habet aliquid extrinsecum 
admixtum ut sit in eo compositio accidentalis; et ideo ipsum esse non est compositum; res ergo composita 
non est suum esse…” Exp. De Hebd. II ll. 208-213. 
26 “Sed potestne aliquid esse ens per participationem entis communis? Dico quod non, quia tunc opertet 
quod illud esset compositum ex natura participantis et participate, quae inter se essent divera. Unde omne 
quod est ens, est ens per suam rationem: homo est animal per participationem animalitatis, quia est aliquid 
in ipso quod differt a natura animalitatis; non tamen est ens per participationem entis, quia nihil est in ipso 
quod sit differens ab ente vel a ratione entis, et sic patet ad illud.” MM III q. 21. 
 There is nothing in 
it that differs from being or from an account of being (differens ab ente vel a ratione 
entis), which thus would be the subject of participation in ipsum esse: the ratio of such a 
subject (e.g., res compositum) is a ratio essendi. One may speak along the orders of 
logical participation, but this would remain insufficient grounds for concluding that that 
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which is (id quod est) is not its own esse. For Siger, participation in being by the subject 
does not really differ from its subsequent participation in other perfections (e.g., 
humanity or whiteness) because there is nothing in it that differs from being. To be 
something (aliquid) (i.e., to participate essential and accidental qualifications) and to be 
simply (i.e., to participate ipso esse) are not distinct.  
      For Aquinas, however, participation in ipsum esse takes a certain priority over 
subsequent participation.27 By participating in being itself, the subject of participation is a 
subject without qualification (simpliciter subiectum), which subsequently can partake of 
qualification through further participation (e.g., as a human or something white).28 
Obviously, Aquinas does not think of this as a temporal process by which the subject 
without qualification first participates ipsum esse, and then participates everything else. 
Nor, however, does he treat such modes of participation as merely logical forms of 
participation. The subject without qualification really differs from its being (esse suum) 
insofar as it is only by participating ipsum esse. But in order to reach his conclusion, 
namely that insofar as esse and id quod est really differ in composites (different realiter), 
the composite is by participating ipsum esse (est participando ipsum esse),29
                                                 
27 Exp. De Hebd. II ll 186-195.  
28 “Dicit quod ad hoc quod aliquid sit simpliciter subiectum participat ipsum esse, set ad hoc quod sit 
aliquid, oportet quod participet aliquo alio, sicut homo ad hoc quod sit albus participat non solum esse 
substanciale set etiam albedinem.” Exp. De Hebd.  II. ll. 180-185. 
29 “…et ideo dicit quod in omni composito aliud est esse ens et aliud ipsum compositum quod est 
participando ipsum esse.” Exp. De Hebd. II. ll. 213-215.  
 Aquinas 
must seek a determinate negation for “ipsum esse.” In other words, with nothing 
“differens ab ente,” everything says being unless the being of which Aquinas speaks, and 
which Sigerian essentialism would argue is repeated by every concept, is somehow other 
than that conceived by mere conceptual analysis. Thus, the being (ipsum esse) that 
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remains other to the natures of composite things (res composita) does not appear other 
from a conceptual inspection of the rationes of composites for the very reason that such 
is not a static essential or accidental qualification, but an “actus essendi” reached through 
judgment.30
      For Boethius, a discussion of “forma essendi” arises following his initial distinction 
between esse and id quod est, in order to provide clarification on why such a distinction 
must be posited. He states: “ipsum enim esse nondum est, at vero quod est accepta 
essendi forma est atque consistit.”
 A conceptual analysis of terms alone (i.e., “ipsum esse” means “esse pure 
and simple,” whereas “composite” means “non-simple,” therefore the two are different) 
does not suffice, but instead requires an appeal to an extra-conceptual actus. Here is 
where the interpolation of “actus essendi” plays in Aquinas’s favor.   
31
                                                 
30 For a discussion of the role of judgment in moving outside the conceptual order, see Owens, “Being and 
Nature in Aquinas,” 166. Wippel’s second argument presupposes that esse is an act (i.e., more than 
conceptual content): “The second reason is more directly suggested by our text and will be developed in the 
following section of this chapter. It follows from Thomas’s oft-repeated claim that act, especially the act of 
being (esse), is not self-limiting. But if esse is participated in by a subject or participant, it is present in that 
subject only in partial or limited fashion. This follows from the very nature of participation, as Thomas 
understands it. If one is to account for the limitation of that which is not self-limiting, one must postulate 
within such a participant an intrinsic principle which receives and limits esse (the act of being), and  a 
really distinct act of being which is received and limited. Hence for both of these reasons, appeal to a 
merely logical or conceptual distinction between essence and act of being will not be sufficient o account 
for the fact that given beings actually and really do participate in esse.”  Ibid. Wippel assumes, however, 
that “given beings actually and really participate esse,” as opposed to merely being identical to such esse. 
The assumption is that “the act of being (esse) is not self-limiting.” But to designate esse as an act is 
already to provide it with an ontological status outside the register of conceptual content. For Siger, nothing 
needs to “limit” esse because there is nothing to limit such ubiquitous conceptual content. 
31 OSIII ll.28-30. 
 It comes to be only through that which takes it on (id 
quod est) as its form of being (forma essendi). This means that, as forma essendi, esse is 
taken on so that something is and exists. The subsequent rule helps to clarify the matter, 
while also illuminating the role of esse as forma essendi: “Quod est participare aliquo 
potest, sed ipsum esse nullo modo aliquo participat. Fit enim participatio cum aliquid 
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iam est; est autem aliquid, cum esse susceperit.”32
                                                 
32 OSIII ll.31-34. 
 Here we see the parallel language 
between Rule 1 and 2, where both “forma essendi” and “esse” are used to characterize 
that which makes something be once it (i.e., esse) is “taken on.” Esse is not itself 
something, and thereby cannot participate, but is that by which something is and can 
participate. Something is when it has received esse, that is, when it has taken on forma 
essendi.     
      Aquinas’s “actus essendi,” which interprets Boethius’s “forma essendi,” may not be 
entirely metaphysically neutral as it at first seems, especially if Aquinas is attempting to 
relocate a deeper metaphysical actuality (i.e., esse) outside the formal determinations of 
the essence. The forma essendi, like the forma currendi, signifies the rational structure 
shared by all entia, or all currentia, without considering their particularizing differences 
in concreto. It concerns a difference of signifying (i.e., abstractly or concretely). 
Discussions of the formal structure of being or of running can be metaphysically 
neutralized in a way that discussions of an actus essendi cannot because it is not an 
essential or accidental qualification, but the ground of such qualifications: “the act of all 
actuality and the perfection of all perfections.” With this move to actus, Aquinas has 
gone beyond the mere formal abstractions of signification, where esse stands as the most 
abstract, indeterminate, and empty category. Instead, an esse that implies not only forma 
essendi but also actus essendi brings with it a deeper actuality underlying a subject’s (i.e., 
a subject without qualification) subsequent essential and accidental qualification. 
“Human” or “whiteness” or any other participated quality presupposes a subject without 
qualification and its act of being.  
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      Although Aquinas seems to ground such a priority of the subject without qualification 
“as understood” (ut intelligatur) in the order of understanding, he reasons that what is 
understood is that when the subject is (i.e., through participation in ipso esse) only then 
does something remain (restat) to be anything (aliquid) else (e.g., human or pale).33 In 
sum, under consideration is not merely subject terms with or without qualification, but 
instead a more dynamic attempt to think the order between the fundamental act of 
participation (i.e., actus essendi) by which a subject is at all (simpliciter) and its 
grounding of further formal qualification (i.e., essential and accidental participation). 
Thus to think when the subject is is to reach the very constitution of the subject term in its 
synthesis with an existential act, an act underlying all further formal qualification. The 
result of Aquinas’s reading of Boethius’s “forma essendi” as “actus essendi”34 is that, 
contra Sigerian essentialism, not every ratio is a ratio essendi because “of being” 
primarily expresses an act by which something is, remaining distinct from both the 
subject it constitutes and the further formal qualifications it makes possible. It is in this 
disengagement of esse as act from the formal determinations of the thing and their 
corresponding conceptual content wherein, according to Fabro, “…lies the nerve of 
Thomistic metaphysics in its antithesis to the Vergessenheit des Seins of scholastic and 
immanentistic philosophy.”35
                                                 
33 “Est autem hec differencia quod primo oportet ut intelligatur aliquid esse simpliciter, et postea quod sit 
aliquid, et hoc patet ex praemissis. Nam aliquid est simpliciter per hoc quod participat ipso esse; set quando 
iam est, scilicet per participationem ipsius esse, restat ut participet quocumque alio, ad hoc scilicet quod sit 
aliquid.” Exp. De Hebd. II ll. 188-195.  
34 Thomas’s “actus essendi,” when participated by “id quod est,” accounts for the existential actuality of the 
being, namely the fact that it is. He states: “[…] et ideo sicut possumus dicere de eo quod currit siue de 
currente quod currat in quantum subicitur cursui et participat ipsum, ita possumus dicere quod ens siue id 
quod est sit in quantum participat actum essendi” Aquinas, Exp. De Hebd. II. ll. 54-59. See also, De Ente 
IV, ll. 159-166.  
35 Fabro, “The Transcendentality of ‘Ens-Esse’ and the Ground of Metaphysics,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 6.3 (September 1966): 411. 
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      Following this discussion of the “subject without qualification” and its participation 
in ipsum esse, Aquinas marks what he perceives to a shift in Boethius’s argument from 
mere conceptions (intentiones) to actual things. In interpreting the penultimate rule,36 in 
which Boethius discusses how the foregoing applies to everything simple and everything 
composite,37
Deinde cum dicit: Omni composito etc., ponit conceptiones de composito et simplici, que 
pertinent ad rationem unius, et est considerandum quod ea que supra dicta sunt de 
diuersitate ipsius esse et eius quod est, est secundum ipsas intentiones. Hic ostendit 
quomodo applicetur ad res; et primo ostendit hoc in compositis, secundo in simplicibus 
[...]
 Aquinas notes how Boethius has applied his conceptual (secundum 
intentiones) to things (ad res). Aquinas states: 
38
      Such a passage begins the transition to a real distinction, but requires a final 
discussion of simple and composite substances. This discussion both will identify ipsum 
esse as a subsisting nature, and based on esse’s subsistence, that is once esse is 
concentrated in a single referent, the discussion will also show that everything, even 
  
This application of the conceptual considerations to things (res), which Aquinas heralds 
in this passage, begins the transitional argument cited above, in which he argues for real 
difference between esse and quod est in composite things. Remember the argument 
states: ipsum esse is not composite; therefore, composite things cannot be their own esse, 
and thus must be really distinct from such. A cursory observation of the world reveals 
any number of composite substances, which qua composite are not simple, thus must be 
other than esse. Not being its own being, the composite thing has being by participating 
ipsum esse.  
                                                 
36 Depending on the numbering of the rules, this is either Rule 6, or Rules 7 and 8. 
37 Boethius himself does not mark such a transition in the rules, such that only now res are under 
consideration.  
38 Exp. De Hebd. II ll. 196-203. 
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simple substances (e.g., Platonic immaterial forms), are really different than their actus 
essendi. Even though Aquinas begins with a discussion of real composites, and then 
moves to a discussion of simples and finally ipse Deus as subsisting esse, only upon a 
complete exposition of the Boetian Rules (i.e., one that considers both composite and 
simple realities) can real difference emerge between composites (and everything besides 
God for that matter) and their esse or actus essendi.39
      The use of counterfactual hypotheticals (i.e., immaterial Platonic forms such as Heat 
or Humanity) in the final stage of the argument seems to serve two purposes: first, their 
hypothetical status, which provides a unified intelligible content (i.e., ratio) for a 
multiplicity of “logical” participants, reveals that their non-subsistence (i.e., they are 
always instantiated) prohibits any real otherness between the subject and the participated 
perfection. If there were a subsisting “to run,” a subsisting heat, or a subsisting humanity, 
then they would be really distinct from runners, hot objects, and humans and themselves 
really indivisible. But in the absence of their pure subsistence, e.g., that there is nothing 
that is only running (currere tantum), nothing prohibits its division through the addition 
of differentiae or accidents. In the case of ipsum esse, Siger would agree with Aquinas 
that it neither participates anything nor receives anything extrinsic to it; nothing can 
divide ipsum esse. But this is because each ratio is a ratio essendi. In terms of a 
composite substance like Caesar, that he is a being (ens) signifies nothing really distinct 
from him. Thus, in order to show how the “having esse” on the part of all beings 
contributes a really distinct actuality by which Caesar is, the move to subsisting ipsum 
esse must be made. Otherwise, nothing necessitates that being (esse) cannot be a really 
 
                                                 
39 Note: this is not a demonstration for the existence of God, either by Aquinas or by Boethius. The rules 
are supposed to be per se nota, and used to solve the question at hand (i.e., quomodo substantiae…).  
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identical part of Caesar, as is his animality or humanity, both of which also could not be a 
real part of him were they subsisting as Platonic immaterial forms. That by which Caesar 
is human or animal can be really identical with Caesar himself in the absence of 
subsisting humanity or animality. “Humanity” and “animality” repeat what has already 
been said with “Caesar,” albeit with a greater degree of abstraction. They help to unpack 
Caesar’s nature, but apart from Caesar they do not signify a really distinct that by which 
in which he must participate. Likewise, without the subsistence of esse, the opponents of 
the real distinction could point to the common and indeterminate nature of esse as a 
really identical iteration of each concretized ens. Esse would be no more a really distinct 
perfection of each subsisting ens than currere would be of each currens, or humanity of 
each human.  
      The second purpose served by this reference to simples is to show even if they did 
exist, their subsistence would be incomplete because they would need to participate their 
actus essendi. And although Aquinas does not do so in this context, one may extrapolate 
such to really existing separate substances (i.e., the soul and intelligences). Thus, such 
“higher forms” are not truly simple because even though hypothetical Platonic Forms 
would serve as the basis for the formal participation of participating subjects, such Forms 
themselves would still need to participate in a higher actus. They could not subsist on 
their own (per se) because they would need to participate their esse. The reason for such 
a needed participation, however, is that esse belongs only that which is truly its own 
actus essendi, namely ipsum esse subsistens. Thus, through its subsistence as “being 
itself,” ipsum esse subsistens demands an otherness between itself and all participants. 
Aquinas states:  
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Id autem solum erit uere simplex quod non participat esse, non quidem inherens set 
subsistens. Hoc autem non potest esse nisi unum, quia, si ipsum esse nichil aliud habet 
admixtum preter id quod est esse, ut dictum est, impossibile est id quod est ipsum esse 
multiplicari per aliquid diuersificans, et, quia nichil aliud preter se habet adiunctum, 
consequens est quod nullius accidentis sit susceptiuum. Hoc autem simplex, unum et 
sublime est ipse Deus. 40
      Thus, unlike participation in essential or accidental qualities, which serve as formal 
acts received by a subject, participation in ipsum esse is the prior enactment of such 
secondary, or “formal,” participation—it is the act, or enacting, of such actualities. To 
understand the more fundamental role of the actus essendi—and the reasons that it cannot 
be a mere forma essendi for Aquinas—take a familiar example: a subject (e.g., this mug 
of coffee on my desk) has received both an essential quality “water plus the differentia of 
coffee” and also certain accidental qualities such as heat. The subject through a process 
of generation (i.e., the addition of water to ground coffee beans) has become identical to 
 
It is true that only after discussing the real distinction does Aquinas name ipsum esse 
“God.” And yet, the actual subsistence of being as a real and indivisible nature stands as a 
necessary precondition to leverage the need for beings to participate in a perfection really 
distinct from themselves. Without such an appeal to ipsum esse subsistens, the argument 
fails to reveal to the defender of the rational distinction that esse is a really distinct act by 
which each being is, the “actus essendi” that cannot be accounted for by a mere formal 
analysis of any being in terms of essential and accidental qualities. 
                                                 
40 Exp. De Hebd.  II. ll. 249-258. True simplicity belongs only to that which does not participate esse, but is 
itself subsisting esse. The issue at hand, however, is on what grounds Aquinas posits esse as subsisting: 
does a real distinction in things demonstrate a subsisting esse, or does a subsisting esse demonstrate a real 
distinction in things? This passage does not demonstrate the existence of God, but merely identifies that 
which has been presupposed to be ipsum esse subsistens with God. Such a presupposition needs to show 
that there is such a nature, which as entirely simple, cannot enter into created natures as a mere quidditative 
determination. Otherwise, it remains like subsisting heat, whiteness, or animality, which if they were really 
to exist, they could not be divided through differentiae and accidents and would be entirely one. See also 
ST I, q. 44, a. 1.  
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its essence in a manner that it cannot (i.e., qua water) to its accidental quality of heat. 
Heat requires violent induction so long as the patient essentially remains water. And yet 
this non-identity between water and heat results from a material deficiency on the part of 
the water and not the failure of the cause (e.g., the flame on the stove) to perfectly educe 
its effect. That very same flame, when confronted with a different patient such as paper, 
could communicate the quality of heat according to an equal formal ratio as itself. Thus, 
the otherness between water and heat is not a fundamental otherness, but what we might 
call a material otherness. With ipsum esse, a fundamental otherness necessarily results 
due to the nature of esse itself, and not a mere failure on the part of the recipients: esse is 
not merely a formal (i.e., essential or accidental) quality that can be actualized in a 
subject, but, as a complete discussion of the Rules show, is by nature a pure and 
incommunicable act that, once distributed, remains fundamentally other than any 
receiving subject. The non-identity between id quod est and ipsum esse stems from an 
understanding of the latter as an existential act, but only once such an act has been fully 
explicated, its status as unreceivable ground emerges.  
      Much like the intellectus essentiae argument, which must draw on the third stage to 
deploy the full force of the argument, the argument here also must appeal to the 
subsistence of ipsum esse to thus indicate both the lack of such an act of being in every 
other being and also the reception of such perfection as really distinct from the thing 
itself. Patt, however, has argued that the second and third stages of the argument from De 
Ente are unnecessary in establishing the real distinction. In comparing the intellectus 
essentiae argument to Aquinas’s account from De hebdomadibus, he states both 
arguments sufficiently demonstrate the distinction without esse subsistens. Patt argues:  
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Neither the difference between an entity and esse itself, nor the real distinction between 
esse and essence is, of course, an otherness between two things (“res and res”). In this 
passage of his commentary on the De hebdomadibus [II. ll. 204-215], Thomas does not 
treat of the difference between esse subsistens (which itself is an entity) and the entities 
which participate in esse. Rather the difference between an entity and esse itself is the 
difference between a thing and a perfection, and the real distinction between esse and 
essence indicates an otherness within one and the same entity.41
Patt is right that the otherness between esse and essence is not between “two things” (res 
et res), but between a thing and a perfection. Existence is a perfection because it is that 
by which something is made actual, which even forms require in order to be.
  
42
                                                 
41 Patt, “Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” 25-26. The passage to which Patt refers 
argues that esse cannot be composed because it neither participates in anything nor can receive an 
extraneous admixture (e.g., a differentia). Esse’s simplicity thereby entails that anything composed cannot 
be esse and must be really distinct from esse. In reference to De Ente, this argument reveals that the 
understood essences of composite things must be really non-identical to esse in its simplicity. Without 
invoking esse ipsum subsistens from the second and third stage of the De Ente argument, understanding the 
essence of a composed entity suffices to show the difference between its essence and esse, the latter which 
cannot be part of its essence because esse itself is simple yet contributes some real perfection to the 
essence. Inspecting the essences of composed entities, however, indicates that the perfection of being (esse) 
does not follow from such essences themselves. The perfection of esse does not follow quidditatively from 
something because its essence can be understood independent of understanding whether it exists or not. 
Patt argues: “[t]his difference consists in that the knowledge of a thing’s essence is not dependent upon 
what is the case. A thing’s essence can be signified by a definition even if the thing does not exist.” 
(“Aquinas’s Real Distinction and Some Interpretations,” 27). Thus, Patt would disagree with Masiello’s 
insistence upon the need to relate quidditative content to existing particulars. The independence of 
understanding quiddities seems to allow one to be “ignorant of” existing particulars, as the case of actual 
phoenixes suggests. Concerning the intellectus essentiae argument, Patt concludes: “the purpose of the 
argument, in my opinion, is to establish a fundamental difference between the order of quidditative 
knowledge and the existential order.” (Ibid.). The emphasis in this passage must be placed upon the claim 
for a fundamental difference between the two orders. Otherwise, Patt has merely aligned intellectus 
essentiae with the Posterior Analytics, which does not establish a real distinction between essential and 
existential orders. Patt asks: What besides esse as perfection can explain the “fundamental difference” 
between the quidditative order, of which the essence phoenix as intelligible is a part, and the existential 
order, in which there are no phoenixes? Does not this difference by itself and apart from knowledge of 
subsisting esse reveal the distinct orders? Such an argument, however, is forgetful of De Ente III: that the 
nature can be considered absolutely or secundum esse. Thus, when considering absolutely even the nature 
of “phoenix,” it is only being considered apart from its esse in intellectu. If one must withhold reference to 
esse subsistens and still focus on esse as a perfection in the thing, as Patt suggests, then nothing necessitates 
that the thing as non-identical to its esse lacks any positive content. 
42 See, for example, ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.  
 But the 
reason why such an otherness must hold between a thing and its existential perfection is 
not because of some weakness on the part of res composita (i.e., as water cannot become 
fire, no matter how powerful the cause), but because of the pure subsistence of that which 
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is received. Insofar as the First is pure being (esse tantum) and incommunicable, nothing 
else can have a “root in being.” By establishing ipsum esse as a subsisting nature, which 
brings with it the singularity and uniqueness of such subsistence (i.e., through purity of 
act), the argument can show that the esse complementing the transcendental ens at the 
beginning of the exposition, signifying a subject having esse, is more than the most 
indeterminate way of identifying each thing.  
      Patt, however, seems to suggest that this really distinct existential perfection precedes 
reference to esse subsistens, and occupies a role similar to what Aquinas discusses under 
the heading of “ipsum esse commune.”43
                                                 
43 Before introducing Deus ipse, he invokes such term in reference to such hypothetical forms. “[P]uta 
secundum opinionem Platonis, ponamus formam immaterialem subsistere que sit ydea et ratio hominum 
materialium, et aliam formam que sit ydea et ratio equorum, manifestum erit quod ipsa forma immaterialis 
subsistens, cum sit quiddam determinatum ad speciem, non est ipsum esse commune, [m.e.] sed participat 
illud. Et nichil differt quantum ad hoc si ponamus illas formas immateriales altioris gradus quam sint 
rationes horum sensibilium ut Aristoteles uoluit; unaqueque enim illarum, in quantum distinguitur ab alia, 
quedam specialis forma est participans ipsum esse, et sic nulla earum erit uere simplex.” Exp. De Hebd.  II. 
ll. 236-249. 
 The problem with understanding the really 
distinct perfection of being in creatures through such an existential fund (i.e., distinct 
from either creatures or God) is that even if Aquinas went so far as it treat it as the “first 
creature”—as does the Liber de causis— such ipsum esse commune lacks subsistence. 
Thus, by itself (i.e., without further reference to ipsum esse subsistens), due to its own 
lack of existential subsistence, it no more explains the actus essendi of things as really 
distinct than do their generative causes. Even if given thing X had ipsum esse commune 
as the (intermediary) cause of its being, nothing on the part of either the recipient or the 
cause prohibits that a univocal sharing transpire between the two. They may be unequal 
(e.g., as the heat in water remains unequal to the heat of fire), but such existential 
inequality is not measured by the same yardstick as the existential otherness (of real 
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difference) that persists between a pure subsisting act of being and even the most perfect 
of its participating subjects.  
      Only by making ipsum esse, or the actus essendi, as something in which composite 
things must participate, lest they remain in potency to act, can Aquinas execute the 
transition real difference. The nature of such “potency to be,” however, remains 
insatiable insofar as even when something is, it really differs from its act of being. Once 
thought synthesizes a subject with its “being,” and “being” has taken on the dynamism of 
an act (i.e., actus essendi) as opposed to a mere repetition and reiteration of the 
conceptual content of the thing, concerning such an act, the question becomes: does the 
thing have such an act by itself or through another?  Thus whereas before the dichotomy 
stated “either composite things are not their own being (suum esse) or all beings are 
ipsum esse,” now the issue becomes “either a composite being has its act of being (actus 
essendi) from itself or from another.” To interpret Boethius’s forma essendi as an actus 
essendi, an act by which something is, Aquinas’s has introduced a ground of actuality 
beyond formal actuality. And insofar as this enactment is from another, it is by 
participating ipsum esse. But what it means “to have an act of being from another” is not 
simply equivalent to “to have heat from fire” because ipsum esse, once identified as 
proper to a single nature, cannot be received by any other subject except as really other 
than it.44
                                                 
44 It may seem that if heat were a pure subsisting act, it too would enjoy such an incommunicable 
subsistence and otherness to all subjects of heat, but—and herein we find the distinctly existential moment 
in Aquinas’s argument, which will be explored more thoroughly in the following chapter—even if such 
essential forms did not need to participate in higher forms (e.g., whiteness in color), they still would need to 
participate in esse. See Chapter III below.   
 Thus, real difference emerges as the result of a determinate negation by which 
the concentration of esse in a single nature requires a “real otherness” for all remaining 
referents.  
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      All of this is not to say that the exposition begs the question, but instead that the 
identification of God with that ipsum esse in which esse and id quod est are identical 
stands as a necessary condition to ground the real distinction in everything else. 
Aquinas’s expositive argument began with an abstract and indeterminate conception of 
being, which extends equally to everything that is. Such a conception, however, fails to 
indicate much more than a semantic variance between concrete and abstract conceptions. 
Mere logical abstractions such as “humanity” include nothing alien to the intelligible 
structure of human (ratio hominis), even though the multiplicity of real concrete humans 
include more than their “to be human.”45
                                                 
45 Exp. De Hebd. II ll. 114-146. 
 This means that logically we can form an 
abstract concept of humanity without the addition of anything else, even though there is 
no “really distinct” humanity or human form in which all humans really participate. The 
case with being (esse), however, is different. Given the actual subsistence of being itself 
(ipsum esse subsistens), being (both as a concept and as a reality) can include nothing 
alien to itself and thus must really exclude multiplication or addition. Only once this 
proper concept of being has been reached (i.e., through an identification of the proper 
referent of “ipsum esse”) can Aquinas “reapply” the concept to everything else in a 
secondary or derivative sense as “participants.” The real distinctness of each being’s 
being (esse) thus only fully emerges when illuminated by their need to participate being 
in order to be. They must participate a cause because it and it alone can be being (as 
opposed to everything else that has being), but because unable to equal the power (virtus) 
of their cause, that in which they participate (i.e., esse) and which belongs to God alone 
remains really other to them. This allows the proper ratio to remain undivided and 
unmultiplied amidst its diffusion to a multiplicity of effects. By excluding all beings save 
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one from the true sense of being, ipsum esse thus remains an uncontaminated ipseity of 
being, or “being itself” without anything alien. 
       
Section 2: An Argument from Act and Potency 
      With both intellectus essentiae and the argument from participation, Aquinas needed 
to show esse to be something more than just another name or conceptual iteration, albeit 
more abstract and indeterminate, for the thing itself. In both arguments, he attempts to 
indicate a deeper-level actuality at the core of all beings, and actuality necessary for them 
to be. As I have argued, such an actuality becomes manifest only when presented in 
reference to that subsistence which is being itself. Aquinas presents yet another type of 
argument for the real distinction, the review of which will further highlight the existential 
actuality underpinning his argument for the real distinction. An act/potency argument, as 
it has been dubbed by some commentators, argues for a real distinction on the basis of 
created quiddities standing only in potency with respect to their esse.46
      In his Commentary on the Sentences, around the question of “whether the soul is 
simple” (“utrum anima sit simplex”) Aquinas makes one such act/potency argument. This 
question furthers the investigation of the previous article concerning whether some 
creature was simple,
 Esse is that by 
which such a nature is, but must be participated as a really distinct perfection from that 
nature. 
47
                                                 
46 Concerning such a manner of argumentation (i.e., act/potency), Sweeney states: “None of them 
underwrites the practice of some contemporary Thomistic textbooks of beginning with act/potency to 
establish the real distinction between esse/essence (for example, “Act and potency are really distinct; but 
esse/essence are act/potency; therefore...).” Sweeny, “Existence/Essence,” 127.  
 both questions responding to the problem of distinguishing the 
47 See In I Sent. d.8, q.5, a.1, resp. Here, he asks “utrum aliqua creatura sit simplex.” The introduction of 
the real distinction arises in response to the problem of how everything other than God is in some sense 
composite. Here, the language of “creature” has already been established within a context of creation, and 
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simplicity of any creature from divine simplicity. After rejecting the composition of 
matter and form in the soul, Aquinas takes up the solution of unnamed others (“alii 
dicunt”) who maintain a composition between “quo est” and “quod est,” which thus 
explains both the composition of immaterial entities and the dual composition of material 
entities.48
      The argument for the real distinction between quo est and quod est, that is esse and 
quiddity, runs as follows: some immaterial quiddity would either be its own esse or not.
   
49
                                                                                                                                                 
thus in correlation to the uncreated creator. He states: “Cum enim in solo Deo esse suum sit sua quidditas, 
oportet quod in qualibet creatura, vel in corporali vel in spirituali, inveniatur quidditas vel natural sua, et 
esse suum, quod est sibi acquisitum a Deo, cujus essentia est suum esse; et ita componitur ex esse, vel quo 
est, et quod est.”   
48 See also ST I q. 75 a. 5, resp. This article concludes: “Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis 
intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae [m.e.].” In 
response to Objection 4 (that which does not have matter, but is form alone, is pure and infinite act; this is 
only God; therefore, the soul has matter), Aquinas introduces the composition of “forma et esse participato” 
and goes on to define esse as “that by which (quo) something is.”  
49 “Cum autem de ratione quidditatis, vel essentiae, non sit quod sit composita vel compositum; consequens 
poterit inveniri et intelligi aliqua quidditas simplex, non consequens compositionem formae et materiae. Si 
autem inveniamus aliquam quidditatem quae non sit composita ex materia et forma, illa quidditas aut est 
esse suum, aut non. Si illa quidditas sit esse suum, sic erit essentia ipsius Dei, quae est suum esse, et erit 
omnino simplex. Si vero non sit ipsum esse, oportet quod habeat esse acquisitum ab alio, sicut est omnis 
quidditas creata. Et quia haec quidditas posita est non subsistere in materia, non acquiretur sibi esse in 
altero, sicut quidditatibus compositis, immo acquiretur sibi esse in se; et ita ipsa quidditas erit hoc <<quod 
est>>, et ipsum esse suum erit <<quo est>>. Et quia omne quod non habet aliquid a se, est possibile 
respectu illius; hujusmodi quidditas cum habeat esse ab alio, erit possibilis respectu illius esse, et respectu 
ejus a quo esse habet, in quo nulla cadit potentia; et ita in tali quidditate invenietur potentia et actus, 
secundum quod ipsa quidditas est possibilis, et esse suum est actus ejus. Et hoc modo intelligo in angelis 
compositionem potentiae et actus, et de <<quo est>> et <<quod est>>, et similiter in anima. Unde angelus 
vel anima potest dici quidditas vel natura vel forma simplex, inquantum eorum quidditas non componitur 
ex diversis; sed tamen advenit ibi compositio horum duorum, scilicet quidditatis et esse.” In I Sent. d.8, q.5, 
a. 2, resp. 
 
If it were, then it will be the very essence of God, which is suum esse. If not, then it is 
necessary to have esse acquired from another (ab alio) and not per se. Everything that 
does not have something from itself (a se) is possible with respect to that something. 
Both material and immaterial created quiddities have esse from another (ab alio) and thus 
are possible with respect to their esse. However, with respect to that by which they have 
esse, there is no potentiality (“...in quo nulla cadit potentia”). In such quiddities that have 
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their esse from another (ab alio), there is found a composition between actuality and 
potentiality. Such a composition of quidditative potentiality and existential actuality 
upholds the immateriality of both the soul and angels while at the same time maintaining 
their compositeness (i.e., of quiddity and esse). They can be called “simple quiddities” 
insofar as they are not composed from diverse parts, even though a “composition arrives 
there” (“advenit ibi compositio…”). This seems to mean that the esse which arrives there 
(i.e., to the potency of the essence) and with which the essence is composed is not some 
thing or predicamental accident, either of which would make the quiddity “non-simple,” 
but instead an extra-essential actus essendi.    
      The language of quidditative possibility (or potentiality) and existential actuality 
around which Aquinas bases the argument from act/potency stems from God’s identity 
ipsum esse subsistens from which all other essential perfections must be differentiated 
(“Cum enim in solo Deo esse suum sit sua quidditas, oportet quod in qualibet 
creatura…”). When this perfection is received in anything outside of God, it remains 
really distinct because ipsum esse subsistens remains indivisible. In regard to this 
argument, we must further explore the nature of this composition between essential 
potency and existential actuality and the otherness that remains between the two even 
upon the latter’s reception by the former.  
      As Aquinas explains in De spiritualibus creaturis, God as first being (primum ens), 
who is infinite act and the plenitude of being (essendi plenitudinem), does not contract 
into some nature of genus or species.50
                                                 
50 See De Spiritualibus Creaturis a. 1, resp. ll. 313-330. “A primo autem actu perfecto simpliciter, qui habet 
in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis, causatur esse actu in omnibus, set tamen secundum quendam 
ordinem: nullus enim actus causatus habet omnem perfectionis plenitudinem, set respectu primi actus 
omnis actus causatus est imperfectus; quanto tamen aliquis actus est perfectior, tanto est Deo propinquior. 
 This is the same issue of “esse tantum” discussed 
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above with both De Ente and the Expositio. Recall that this “non-contraction” of esse 
shelters being itself (ipsum esse) from entering into the nature of any single being (ens). 
Given the first being’s uncontracted plenitude of being, embracing within itself all other 
perfections of being, esse cannot be received into any other nature lest the nature finitize 
esse’s plenitude and restrict it to a single nature (“…unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius 
non sit esse quasi inditum alicui nature que non sit suum esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam 
naturam”). Although neither received nor limited by any nature, by which it could either 
be specified or individuated, nevertheless this does not entail that such a plenitude of 
perfection is common. Instead, as discussed above, the first is individuated through its 
purity of act.   
      Because the first cannot be contracted, and thereby shared with everything else, and 
yet as a first absolutely perfect act containing within itself a fullness of all perfections 
(“habet omnem perfectionis plenitudinem”) it must cause actual existence in everything 
else (“…causatur esse actu in omnibus”) in some way that neither comprises its purity 
nor diminishes its causal actuality. Everything after the first being (post primum ens), not 
being ipsum esse, must participate esse as really distinct from its nature. Such 
participation (i.e., of an effect in its cause) allows esse “to contract” in a way that does 
not allow it to be shared, which means esse as the highest perfection of any created being 
remains other: “cum non sit suum esse, habet esse in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum 
esse contrahitur [m.e.]”. Without an actual division of esse, whereby its parts can be 
received into the nature itself, esse remains really other. Thus, Aquinas concludes: “et sic 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inter omnes autem creaturas Deo maxime appropinquant spirituales substantie, ut patet per Dyonisium IV 
cap. Celestis ierarchie: unde maxime accedunt ad perfectionem primi actus, cum comparentur ad inferiores 
creaturas sicut perfectum ad imperfectum et sicut actuas ad potentiam. Nullo ergo modo hoc ratio ordinis 
rerum habet, quod substantie spirituales ad esse suum requirant materiam primam, que est 
incompletissimum inter ominia entia, set sunt longe supra totam materiam et omnia materialia eleuate.”  
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in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que participat esse et aliud ipsum esse 
participatum.”51
      To indicate this lack lurking at the core of every being—a lack measured only against 
the abyss of nothingness or rootlessness—Aquinas’s argument can only but appeal to 
ipsum esse subsistens. Such an appeal serves to illuminate esse to be not an abstract and 
indeterminate signification (i.e., the most extensive of all signifiers), but instead a 
necessary fund of actuality without which every other essential determination remains 
impotent. The addition of being (esse) does not pile on just another perfection amongst 
 That which participates (i.e., natura rei) is only possible with respect to 
that act which it participates (i.e., esse). Thus, even the most noble and perfect (i.e., 
complete) essences of spiritual creatures stand in potency with respect to the existential 
actuality which they fundamentally lack because such a perfection is proper only to God 
(i.e., plenitudinem essendi) and cannot be partitioned or divided amongst other natures.  
                                                 
51 In the following passage, Aquinas brings the act/potency distinction to bear on the real distinction 
between esse and essence. He states: “Si tamen quecumque duo se habent ad inuicem ut potentia et actus 
nominentur materia et forma, nichil obstat dicere, ut non fiat uis in uerbis, quod in substantiis spiritualibus 
est materia et forma: oportet enim in substantia spirituali creata esse duo, quorum unum comparatur ad 
alterum ut potentia ad actum. Quod sic patet. Manifestum est enim quod primum ens, quod Deus est, est 
actus infinitus utpote habens in se totam essendi plenitudinem, non contractam ad aliquam naturam generis 
uel speciei; unde oportet quod ipsum esse eius non sit esse quasi inditum alicui nature que non sit suum 
esse, quia sic finiretur ad illam naturam: unde dicimus quod Deus est ipsum suum esse. Hoc autem non 
potest dici de aliquo alio: sicut enim impossibile est intelligere quod sint plures albedines separate—set si 
esset albedo separate ab omni subiecto et recipiente, esset una tantum—, ita impossibile est quod sit ipsum 
esse subsistens nisi unum tantum. Omne igitur quod est post primum ens, cum non sit suum esse, habet esse 
in aliquo receptum, per quod ipsum esse contrahitur [m.e.]: et sic in quolibet creato aliud est natura rei que 
participat esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. Et cum quelibet res participet per assimilationem primum 
actum in quantum habet esse, necesse est quod esse participatum in unoquoque comparetur ad naturam 
participantem ipsum sicut actus ad potentiam. In natura igitur rerum corporearum materia non per se 
participat ipsum esse, set per formam: forma enim adueniens materie facit ipsam esse actu sicut anima 
corpori. Vnde in rebus compositis est considerare duplicem actum et duplicem potentiam: nam primo 
quidem materia est ut potentia respectu forme, et forma est actus eius; et iterum natura constituta ex materia 
et forma est ut potentia respectu ipsius esse in quantum est susceptiua eius. Remoto igitur fundamento 
materie, si remaneat aliqua forma determinate nature per se subsistens—non in materia—, adhuc 
comparabitur ad suum esse ut potentia ad actum: non dico autem ‘ut potentia separabilis ab actu’, set quam 
semper suus actus comitetur. Et hoc modo natura spiritualis substantie, non est composita ex materia et 
forma, est ut potentia respectu sui esse; et sic in substantia spirituali est compositio potentie et actus, et per 
consequens forme et materie, si tamen omnis potentia nominetur materia et omnis actus nominetur forma. 
Set tamen hoc non est proprie dictum secundum communem usum nominum.” De spiritualibus creaturis. a. 
1, resp. 357.  
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perfections, but donates a perfection of a different order altogether. As a “plenitude of 
perfection,” to borrow O’Rourke’s apt characterization,52 or an “intensification” to 
borrow Fabro’s,53 esse thus indicates a fundamental lack at the core of every being (ens) 
such that participation in something outside itself can supplement the lack. But because 
the finite essences from which we begin cannot account for the very ground of their 
being, thus requiring an extrinsic cause, they themselves cannot make intelligible the lack 
of being at their core.54
      Without the endowment of being (esse), every being (ens) despite its essential rank 
and perfection stands in equal measure against the threshold of nothingness, each essence 
 Such a multiplicity of finite beings can only be understood to 
possess the perfection of being when gathered as imperfect similitudes of subsisting 
being itself. The unified ratio essendi, belonging properly to God and attributable to 
created beings by a different ratio, explains their having being through participation and 
yet not sharing in God’s incommunicable being. Only by knowing the source of being in 
ipsum esse subsistens, and not merely by inspecting finite essences, does the real 
contribution of esse become apparent.  
                                                 
52 “In his unique and original vision of being, Aquinas brings together the Aristotelian primacy of 
actuality—carrying this doctrine to a profound level not glimpsed by Aristotle—and the Platonist principle 
of perfect plenitude. For St. Thomas, esse is the actualising and emergent plenitude of perfection to which 
all entitative determinations stand as potency towards act, as participant to perfect and pre-eminent 
fullness.” Fran O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2005), 174.  
53 See, for example Fabro, “The Transcendentality of ‘Ens-Esse.’” 
54 In the following passage, O’Rourke expresses a similar sentiment to the argument that I have been 
making; namely, that created being cannot render an account of its itself, and thus points back to subsisting 
being itself. He states: “The Platonist motif, however, illustrates the fundamental principle that what is 
caused as an effect participates in its cause and that its perfection is preserved in it virtually according to a 
superior mode. A perfection which is received into a subject does not accrue or belong essentially to it of 
its own power. The key to Plato’s affirmation of transcendent perfection is the recognition of the limited 
nature of the objects within our experience. A limited or incomplete measure of any perfection is unable it 
explain itself, to render reason for its existence. It is intelligible only through the indwelling presence of 
that fullness upon which, of its nature as finite, it places limitation. A perfection embodied within an 
individual is measured to the capacity of that being. But such a limited measure is ultimately meaningful 
only in the light of a plenitude which, free from all restrictions, is sufficient to itself and which is the source 
of its limited participations.” O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 156.  
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equally determines (or equally fails to determine) such a being to be. This is the meaning 
of “possibility” that Aquinas sets against the extra-essential order of existential actuality; 
this incidental actuality, which as will be seen, arrives only through the gratuitous act of 
creation and the sustaining act of conservation insofar as actus primus et purus can in no 
way be supplemented by any derivation of being.55
      In both the Summas, perhaps the most mature expressions of the Aquinas’s views, 
Aquinas demonstrates the existence and nature of God before attempting to establish a 
real distinction between essence and esse in beings other than ipsum esse subsistens. 
Despite the profound differences between the two Summas, they follow a similar track in 
presenting an argument for the real distinction. With both Summas, previously having 
demonstrated the existence of God and shown him to be ipsum esse subsistens, Aquinas 
can proceed to argue that in everything else apart from God, its esse is other than it, and 
thus must be participated. This issue of participation will serve as the mechanism of 
existential distribution whereby the primus et purus actus essendi can distribute the 
perfection of being without in any way rendering itself communicable and thereby 
exposing its subsistence as an ipseity. As will be seen in the following chapters, not only 
does this issue of “communication of a perfection according to a different ratio” serve as 
the basis of Aquinas’s theory of analogy—which provides a compromise between the 
aforementioned “making mundane” of God’s being through a univocal sharing and the 
 With the arguments for existential 
otherness in the two Summas, we will begin to see even more clearly the metaphysical 
constellations of “the real distinction.”  
 
Section 3: Real Otherness in the Summas 
                                                 
55 See below Chapter III.  
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“transcendental release” whereby nothing connects the order of creation to its 
unknowable cause beyond being thereby nullifying any sustainable attempt at 
demonstration—but also, participation serves as the backbone of Aquinas’s metaphysics 
of creation. 
      In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas asks whether it is necessary that everything that is 
be from God.56
      When the discussion turns to intelligences in Question 50, and in what way their 
natures can be limited without matter, Aquinas need only refer to the necessity of their 
participation in subsisting being. Through the subsistence of their form, they are 
 He answers that anything discovered in something by way of 
participation must causally correspond to an essential concentration of such a discovered 
“quodlibet.” Having shown both that God is and that God is essentially his esse, both 
arguments to which we shall return below, Aquinas now is in a position to state that 
anything else must not be being (non sint suum esse), but participates such. It should be 
observed that the argument here for the unnamed real distinction requires ipsum esse 
subsistens as a unique nature that cannot be divided up and shared amongst other natures. 
Thus, the nature of anything other than this subsisting esse must participate such esse as 
an act really distinct from and non-constitutive of its nature. The purification of esse in a 
concentrated plenitude repels any communication of esse to another, lest some mode of 
communication be found which would divide esse and disrupt the ipseity of ipsum esse 
per se subsistens.  
                                                 
56“Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse. Si enim 
aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter 
convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, 
quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse 
nisi unum: sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur 
secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. 
Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius 
vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est.” ST I, q. 44, a. 1, resp.  
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unlimited in their own ratio; but secundum esse, even the noblest angelic nature exhibits 
an otherness, which thus finitizes it and distinguishes it from the pure actuality of ipsum 
esse. The essences of created substances can reach the height of perfection and be infinite 
according to their form, nevertheless lacking the single perfection of being. Aquinas 
states: “Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt finitae secundum suum esse, sed 
infinitae secundum quod eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio.”57 It remains to be seen 
what status essences lacking esse hold in Aquinas’s ontological scheme, a topic 
addressed below. 58
                                                 
57 “Ad quartum dicendum quod omnis creatura est finita simpliciter, inquantum esse eius non est absolutum 
subsistens, sed limitatur ad naturam aliquam cui advenit. Sed nihil prohibet aliquam creaturam esse 
secundum quid infinitam. Creaturae autem materiales habent infinitatem ex parte materiae, sed finitatem ex 
parte formae, quae limitatur per materiam in qua recipitur. Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt 
finitae secundum suum esse, sed infinitae secundum quod eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio. Sicut si 
diceremus albedinem separatam existentem esse infinitam quantum ad rationem albedinis, quia non 
contrahitur ad aliquod subiectum; esse tamen eius esset finitum, quia determinatur ad aliquam naturam 
specialem.” ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 4.  
58 See below Chapter IV.  
 But like with the argument from act and potency, here Aquinas 
clearly has instituted a real separation between something’s essential determinations and 
whether or not it actually is. But the question of “whether or not an essence actually is” is 
not merely one more formal determination added on to the essence, but its very act of 
being that must arrive to the nature (ad naturam aliquam cui advenit) from outside it. To 
avoid any complication in the future, we must not think of either the nature or its actus 
essendi in temporal terms “one before the other.” Instead, what Aquinas’s language 
suggests (e.g., “advenit”) is that something’s actus essendi arrives to the essence from a 
separate “ground;” both the essence and the actus essendi come together (i.e., as a 
“compositio”), not as an essence with a part, but through a more fundamental synthesis of 
grounds.    
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      The import of separating these two grounds (i.e., the essential and the existential), 
even though finding unity in a single causal source, is that it allows Aquinas to 
immobilize any existential necessity for essences, and thereby to counter any appeal to 
Avicennian “derived” necessity; but also, it allows Aquinas to make each thing’s 
participation in being direct and immediate.59
      Further in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas’s argument culminates around the 
existential contribution and how esse thereby serves as the perfection of all perfection 
and the act of all acts. It is here in asking the same question addressed above with Summa 
Theologiae (i.e., whether God is the cause of all being) that he reflects upon the role of a 
grounding principle in that which it grounds. Ipsum esse subsistens’s principative role in 
giving being, he argues, is like that of a king giving governance to all particular 
 Thus, instead of receiving being through a 
series of intermediaries (i.e., separate substances responsible for mediating the causal 
chain), each existing thing participates directly in its existential ground, whereas it has 
received its essential determination from another equiprimordial ground with both 
grounds united in the self-same first act. Such a move allows Aquinas to render all 
essential perfection existentially impotent, and yet enable the divine intellect (and 
subsequently the human intellect) to confront a range of essential possibilities apart from 
their existential enactment. God thus confronts individual essential possibilities, in 
addition to their various compossibilities, in order to decide on a separate basis which of 
the various orders and essences (or none at all) will come to be.  
                                                 
59 In comparing Aquinas’s understanding of God as ipsum esse subsistens in reference to the Plotinian One 
beyond being, Taylor states the matter as follows: “This participation of being is brought about by Divine 
activity which is direct and without mediation in the giving of being. For Aquinas it is the esse as 
participated which gives actual existence to the nature which receives it in such a way that this limiting 
form quidditatively and formally determines what it receives, with these two forming the entitative 
composition that is the existing being or creature.” Richard C. Taylor. “Aquinas, the ‘Plotinian Arabica’,” 
221-222.  
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governors in his realm. The king transcends their particular governance—and thus we 
might say does not share the same ratio of governance—and, as a plenitude of 
governance, is the cause of all governance. Such a plenitude of governance by which the 
king universally accounts for all particular governing in his realm, nevertheless does not 
nullify the king himself from being a governor. Instead, we might say, he is the actus 
primus et purus of governance in his kingdom.  
       Likewise, as we shall see, the giving of esse as the perfective act of all other 
perfections does not require an existential evacuation whereby the giver of being is itself 
“beyond being.” Although removed from the realm opened up by his causality, and not 
made into a mundane primum inter pares, God’s existential influence retains enough 
traces of similitude to transcendently ground the mundane order of particular beings, and 
yet sharing a common name with such an order (i.e., “esse”), nevertheless exceeds such 
according to his ratio. God’s eminent possession of esse, even when considered with the 
most noble of creatures, enjoys a separation and purity, thereby requiring all particular 
beings to be really other than their being.    
      In Contra Gentiles II.52, Aquinas raises the now familiar question of how immaterial 
substances are composed without being composed of form and matter.60
                                                 
60 Sweeney: “When he came to write the Summa Contra Gentiles and other late treaties, then, Aquinas was 
not only aware that the act of existence is really distinct from essence (this awareness he seems to have had 
from the first moment he took up his pen), but he also realized that the way in which to establish their real 
distinction is to turn to the actual universe [as opposed to an inspection of essences].” Sweeney, A 
Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism, 73.  
 The discussion 
here reflects the others treatments of the real distinction with the aforementioned 
difference that the former raises the problem already having shown God to exist (I.13); to 
be simple (I.18); and to be ipsum esse subsistens (I.22). Given this demonstration 
regarding God, the problem naturally emerges of how everything else is in some way 
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composed. Without composition, immaterial created beings (entia) would adequate 
divine simplicity and there would be no account for the radical diversity between the two 
orders. In II.52, Aquinas thus states:  
Non est autem opinandum quod, quamvis substantiae intellectuales non sint corporeae, 
nec ex materia et forma compositae, nec in materia existentes sicut formae materiales, 
quod propter hoc divinae simplicitati adaequentur. Invenitur enim in eis aliqua 
compositio ex eo quod non est idem in eis esse et quod est.61
      In the very next sentence Aquinas states: “Si enim esse est subsistens [m.e.], nihil 
praeter ipsum esse adiungitur.” In a manner similar to the arguments reviewed above, 
Aquinas begins with a broad and indeterminate conception of being, and attempts to 
purify (or intensify) it so as to include only God and exclude creatures. Such distillation 
of the concept of being (ratio essendi) follows from the actual and exclusive subsistence 
of being, which thereby requires all other beings to participate being according to a 
separate account.
 
 On account of some composition, even the most noble of creatures (i.e., intellectual 
substances) are inadequate to divine simplicity. This minimal composition of all 
creatures whether material or immaterial stems from that which is not the same in them, 
namely esse and whatness. 
62 The apodosis “if esse is subsisting” does not operate merely in the 
register of the possible, along the lines of the second stage of the De Ente argument, 
where Aquinas merely speculates on the force that such possibility has in excluding 
multiplicity.63
                                                 
61 SCG II.52. 
62 In the following chapter, I will show how Aquinas maintains such an account must be analogical to the 
true or proper ratio essendi, which belongs to God alone as “ipsum esse subsistens.”  
 Instead, the argument draws on the established fact (quia) of such a nature, 
63 Wippel disagrees with this assessment: “Even though Aquinas can and does assume in this argument that 
God exists (he has already offered philosophical argumentation for this in SCG I.13), the assumption is not 
required for the argument to be valid. The argument rests on the impossibility of there being more than on 
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which as actual must exclude multiplicity lest it not remain esse tantum. Thus, everything 
else receiving esse must receive it as really distinct from its own nature. We witness here 
once again the use of ipsum esse subsistens both to illuminate the need for everything 
else to have being, but also to distinguish those beings having being (entia habentia esse) 
from being itself (ipsum esse), which alone retains the true sense of being. Thus, to 
restate the conclusion from above, even immaterial entities lack esse per se and remain 
existentially imperfect in terms of their being.  
      As principium et causa essendi, Aquinas has allocated a role for God that is not 
merely primum inter pares (“first amongst equals”) but the very cause of being, and 
therefore of causality itself.64
[...] sicut supra particulares causas generationis huius vel illius est sol universalis causa 
generationis; et rex est universalis causa regiminis in regno, supra praepositos regni et 
etiam urbium singularium. Omnibus autem commune est esse. Oportet igitur quod supra 
omnes causas sit aliqua causa cuius sit dare esse. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut supra 
ostensum est. Oportet igitur omnia quae sunt a Deo esse.
 To return to the passage referenced above, he states: 
65
Just as the king stands as universal cause of government in his whole realm, whose 
imperium transcends but makes possible particular governors in his kingdom, so too God 
stands as the universal cause of being, whose giving of being (dare esse) transcends but 
makes possible all particular causes and beings (entia). God’s firstness transcends the 
very order to which it gives rise.
 
66
                                                                                                                                                 
self-subsisting esse. If many other beings do exist, in all of them, with this single possible exception, 
essence and esse must differ.” “Metaphysics,” 104.  
64 If God is being itself and the cause of being, does this not make God causa sui? As will be seen below, 
Aquinas addresses this problem through analogical causation. The being caused by God is of a different 
order than his own being. See below Chapter III.  
65 SCG II.15. 
 The cause above all causes (supra omnes causes) 
66 And yet, as I will argue in the next chapter, Aquinas doubles back on this radical transcendence by 
making beings (entia) nothing more than participants in divine esse. Thus, each being (ens) becomes 
nothing more than a mere repetition of this first. Creation turns out to be a serialization of God’s esse, and 
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causally grounds the rest. It will be important to keep in mind that although above “all 
causes” (i.e., the totality of causes), Aquinas does not state that God’s dans esse is extra-
causal or “non-causal.” Instead, it bears some relationship to the totality of causes 
without itself being reduced to their order. Thus, it can be both causal (i.e., not without 
causality), otherwise it would be ineffectual; and yet, it is not merely one cause amongst 
many (unum inter pares) otherwise, as “a cause” it would need to ground itself. As will 
be seen, “the non-reciprocal relationship” between the universal ground of all causes 
dans esse and those particular causes and beings that it grounds requires a “bond of 
analogy” in order to protect the purity of the first cause and yet sustain traces of it (i.e., as 
cause) in its effects such that one can demonstratively move from the grounded to its 
ground. 
 
Conclusion: The Two Grounds of Beings   
      Demonstrating the essence of God as such uniquely “subsisting being” enables the 
inference that because all else lacks the subsistence of being (esse), being must be given 
from another. This lack is metaphysically relevant in pointing to the fact that there are 
creatures, which must have been given their being from another.67 This explains why, 
Aquinas takes note of the fact that there are entities other than God, unlike Aristotelian 
essentialism, which can pass off the an sit of such sensible things as a given.68
                                                                                                                                                 
not a radical diversification of the first from all that follows, a diversification for which esse was introduced 
in the first place!  
67 This fact cannot be demonstrated from within the order of essences, and thus is not knowledge (scientia) 
as such. The initial act of intellectus essentiae, upon which scientia is derived, only reveals that the essence 
of every created being does not imply esse. Such a “non-implication,” however, only becomes a 
metaphysically significant existential problem in lieu of the fact that without the efficient endowment of 
esse through which creatures participate, God alone would exist. 
 For 
68 Even for Augustine, as Gilson notes, “the fact that there are creatures” needs to be parsed out in 
existential terms. For Augustine, this fact of being (esse) reflects only the essential degree of being for 
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Aquinas, “whether there are entities” becomes more than the mere starting point from 
which intellectus/nous can ask “and what was it to be such a thing” and scientia/episteme 
can proceed with its demonstrations. Instead his questioning probes a deeper, extra-
essential, incidental fact of “whether there are entities at all.”  Rendering an account of 
why there are entities requires a different type of explanation.69 As will be discussed 
below,70 only efficient causality can explain the fact that there are beings, but not 
efficient causality in a sense reducible to essence (e.g., omne agens agit sibi simile).71
      The revolutionary move by Aquinas toward a real distinction between esse and 
essence, as traced over the course of the last two chapters, has been to radically and 
fundamentally separate the conditions for the possibility of any given thing from the 
conditions for its actuality. As most clearly expressed in the passage from the 
 
Unlike with Avicenna’s derived or emanated necessity, the causal act of giving being, for 
Aquinas, can appeal only to the givenness of being, which cannot be reduced to an 
essence, and thus remains extra-intelligible and unscientific. The fact of being (esse), just 
as the fact of someone’s being a carpenter and a musician, exceeds the range of 
essential/categorial accountability and must be treated as an existential problem. 
                                                                                                                                                 
creatures. God as supreme essence is immutable; for all beings contains greater or lesser degrees of 
(essential) being, and thus of mutability. See Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 60-63. 
69 Both Owens and Gilson make this point clear throughout their writings. It is not enough to begin with the 
fact that there are things about which the mind can form conceptions and subsequently make 
demonstrations. This is the procedure outlined by the Posterior Analytics. What instead must be 
recognized—this happens only through the activity of judgment, according to Owens—is that all the 
substantial and accidental features of something is grounded in the more fundamental fact that it exists. 
This is the insight to which Aristotle did not return. See, for example, Owens, An Interpretation of 
Existence. In particular, “Chapter II: Grasp of Existence.” See also Gilson: “The proper function of 
judgment is to say existence, and this is why judgment is a type of cognition distinct from, and superior to, 
pure and simple abstract conceptualization” Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers 202.  
70 See below Chapter V. 
71 Such a distinction corresponds to what Gilson calls the distinction between “state of existence” versus the 
“act of being.” The latter goes beyond the mere actual existence of the essence. The si est of Aristotelian 
metaphysics and epistemology, Gilson might say, asks if it is a rose, not if it exists.  
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Commentary on the Sentences discussed above,72
      At this point, we can conclude about esse as the “perfection of all perfections” and the 
“act of all actuality” that its arrival to anything stands outside that thing’s essence and 
even when participated by the thing, esse retains an otherness. This means that 
something’s actus essendi cannot, at least not primarily, be transcribed as one more fact 
about the essence or a part of something’s essential content. Instead, esse arrives from a 
separate ground and thus enters into to a composition with the thing through a non-
reductive synthesis. In order to think such a synthesis underlying every mundane thing, 
however, one must first treat “esse” as something fundamentally other than a more 
abstract and indeterminate repetition of every other concept. Thus, unlike with the 
ubiquitous and confused meaning of ens vel esse in the hands of such thinkers as Duns 
Scotus, who admittedly maintains ens vel esse to be the most extensive and common of 
 the real otherness between something 
and its being (i.e., its actus essendi) does not correspond to a distinction between two 
things (res) comprising a single unity, nor does it consist of something (i.e., an essence) 
and the addition of an accident. Instead, such real otherness reflects the fundamental 
incommensurability between something (i.e., as determined by its formal qualities) and 
its act of being, each of which emerge from separate grounds. Thus, even when a nature 
comes to be, it retains the same existential impotence as it had before its emergence. This 
means that no nature, no matter how essentially perfect, can find existential ground 
within the essential order. Once translated into a metaphysics of creation, such a 
separation between essence and esse preserves the novelty of coming to be, sheltering its 
radical inceptuality against its reinscription into an essential order, and requiring a 
continual influx of esse through conservation.  
                                                 
72 See In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, art. 3, sol. and above Chapter I, Section 5.  
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all concepts and opposed only to nothingness, esse as perfection requires positive content. 
Such a forgetful confusion, which Fabro following Heidegger deems the “Vergessenheit 
des Seins,” has led to the treatment of “esse” as the most extensive and thereby the most 
meaningless conceptual iteration.73 With such an extension (i.e., to everything 
indiscriminately and without determinate negation) “esse” as Hegel teaches in the 
Science of Logic, becomes indistinguishable from nothingness: “Being (Sein), the 
indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.”74
      Although Scotus will argue such confused extensity is a necessary requirement for the 
concept of being, such that will allow for us to know something as a being and yet be 
uncertain of its finitude or infinitude, a matter to which we will return below, its lack of 
determinate negation prohibits it from being a perfection.
  
75  For Aquinas, however, esse 
emerges as a perfection needed by all beings once it has been enshrined with “real 
positive content,” which occurs through establishing it as a “permanent referent,” 76 
removing any impurities that would infringe upon its being “that and nothing else,” and 
making it incommunicable insofar as any univocal distribution would require the addition 
of something else.77
                                                 
73 Fabro, “The Transcendentality of ‘Ens-Esse’ and the Ground of Metaphysics” 411. Martin Heidegger, 
passim.  
74 Hegel, Science of Logic. trans A.V. Miller (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1969), 82 
75 See below Chapter VI Section 1.  
76 As Gilson states concerning esse: “Its wealth consists, first, of all the judgments of existence it virtually 
comprises and connotes, but much more of its permanent reference to the infinitely rich reality of the pure 
act of existing.” Ibid. 44. 
77 See also ST I, q. 3, a. 4, ad 3. Here Aquinas argues that esse commune by itself is most common, not most 
perfect. Thus, the esse that is the really distinct perfection of each thing must include reference to ipsum 
esse subsistens (otherwise the concept of esse would be the empty esse commune). Only once Aquinas has 
identified esse with God can he show the necessity of such as a really distinct perfection.  
 Such a move operates by locating a self-identity of being, or 
“ipseity,” as something that is actus primus et purus of “only being.” Thus, we might say, 
Aquinas’s move beyond Neoplatonism is to think the “subsistence through purity of act” 
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clause in terms that do not require the cause of all being to itself be “without being.”78 Its 
purity does not require it to not-be in order that it be able to give (i.e., cause) all being.79 
Instead, what Aquinas’s existential metaphysics negotiates (against essentialism) is that 
all beings need being because such a perfection contains the very source of their 
perfections (i.e., esse is the act of all formal actuality); and yet (against Neoplatonism) 
the purity of the source can sustain a referent (i.e., the type knowable through 
demonstration) through its effective diffusion. By sustaining a reference to a “pure act of 
being,” there emerges a perfection required by all natures (i.e., esse), yet necessarily and 
really other to such natures given the determinate negation that results in identifying such 
a pure perfection.80
                                                 
78 This argument becomes clear in Aquinas’s response to the disputed question of whether there can be 
anything not created by God; he states: “Tertia ratio est, quia illud quod est per alterum, reducitur sicut in 
causam ad illud quod est per se. Unde si esset unus calor per se existens, oporteret ipsum esse causam 
omnium calidorum, quae per modum participationis calorem habent. Est autem ponere aliquod ens quod est 
ipsum suum esse: quod ex hoc probatur, quia oportet esse aliquod primum ens quod sit actus purus, in quo 
nulla sit compositio. Unde oportet quod ab uno illo ente omnia alia sint, quaecumque non sunt suum esse, 
sed habent esse per modum participationis. Haec est ratio Avicennae. Sic ergo ratione demonstratur et fide 
tenetur quod omnia sint a Deo creata.” De Pot., q. 3, a. 5, resp.  In later works he will come to define this 
giving of esse more explicitly in terms of creation ex nihilo. See De Pot. q. 3, a. 1, resp and Chapter V 
below. To this question of whether God creates every being, he responds that every thing that in any way is 
is from God. If some perfection is found in something through participation, it is necessary that it was 
caused by that thing to which the perfection is found essentially. Through this link between perfection and 
participative causality, which Aquinas highlights through the example of heat in iron (i.e., participative) 
and heat in fire (i.e., essential). At this point, Aquinas deploys many of the same issues surrounding the 
fourth way: everything other than God is not its own esse, but participates in esse; creatures participate in 
esse more and less perfectly; God as the first being, who is most perfect, causes being in everything else. 
See ST I, q. 44, a. 1. resp. and Chapter V below. See also In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, art. 3, sol. 
79 Gilson states this matter quite clearly as follows: “In a metaphysics of being, such as a Christian 
metaphysics, for instance, each and every lower grade of reality owes its being to the fact that the first 
principle is. In a metaphysics of the One, however, it is a general rule that the lower grades of reality are 
only because their first principle itself is not. In order to give something, a cause is bound to be above it, for 
if the superior already had that which it causes, it could not cause it, it would be it.” Being and Some 
Philosophers, 23.  
 
80 Gilson has been one of the most vociferous defenders of the novelty of this move on the part of Aquinas. 
In addition, he has shown the ways in which other Christian philosophers failed to think being as esse, even 
while embracing creation ex nihilo. The Gilsonian, and more broadly existentialist, “actus essendi” 
measures being solely against “nothingness” and categorically precludes “degrees of being.” Every creature 
is equally set against nothingness: existence no more belongs to the essence of the highest archangel than it 
does to a pebble of sand. In both cases, existence is donated to the entity, and by rejecting “degrees of 
being,” Gilson stresses the “givenness” of such (esse). The Gilsonian position sees such a tempered ascent 
from nothingness, as one finds with Dewan’s reading of Aquinas, as the byproduct of Neoplatonic and 
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      Given what has been said about a cause of being that gives being (dare esse) without 
either being the recipient of that which it gives nor transcending that which it gives in 
such a way that we are left with but a negation (i.e., the cause of being is “not-being”), in 
what follows a number of issues require more sustained development: first, we must view 
how Aquinas uses effects as traces of some first, whose essence is to be. Having 
established God alone as such subsisting being and pure simplicity thereby necessitating 
an element of composition in everything else, a second question comes to the fore: 
namely, how does the transcendent source of all esse share in that which is given, if the 
former by its nature remains incommunicable? This will prompt a discussion of 
Aquinas’s understanding of analogical causation, which cuts between a mundane 
reduction of a cause to the order of its effects (i.e., univocity) and an abandonment of the 
cause altogether as something exceeding the established order altogether and thereby 
beyond any discernable contact with its effects (i.e., equivocity). This will be followed by 
                                                                                                                                                 
Augustinian metaphysics, which treat esse as the outcome measurable in degrees of an entity’s essential 
determination. According to Gilson, such a reduction of actus essendi to an essential outcome 
fundamentally misreads the existential move of Aquinas’s real distinction. Gilson like Owens, casts doubt 
upon intellectus essentiae as sufficient for grounding the real distinction, even though questioning the 
“demonstrability” of God as ipsum esse subsistens. Without the positive content of ipsum esse subsistens, 
which moves our conception of being from the most abstract and empty to the most concrete, the non-
implication of “esse” in our understanding of essences (intellectus essentiae) does not point to a lack. 
Gilson’s concern perpetually seems to be that the extra-essential actuality brought by esse gets lost in the 
shuffle of parsing out something’s essential determinations. One could simply remain on Augustinian or 
Neoplatonic grounds and assert that “esse” is not understood through essences (i.e., intellectus essentiae 
argument) because “esse” signifies nothing other than essence and only God is most truly essence (i.e., 
being). Everything other than God is not truly essence because it is mutable, even angels who are composed 
of form and “spiritual matter.” Gilson, Christian Philosophy, 60-63. Furthermore, Gilson states, “…all the 
arguments one can use to establish the distinction between being and essence in Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine 
presuppose the prior recognition of the ‘act of being’ (esse).” In answering how one achieves this prior 
recognition, which even most philosophers have not accomplished, Gilson notes an impasse around this 
real distinction as such does not give rise to a philosophical demonstration. He goes on to state: “This 
impasse is an invitation to us to give up the philosophical way—from creatures to God—and try the 
theological way—from God to creatures. Thomas Aquinas may well have first conceived the notion of an 
act of being (esse) in connection with God and then, starting from God, made use of it in his analysis of the 
metaphysical structure of composite substances. Gilson, Elements of Christian Philosophy, 131. See also, 
from the same year: Gilson, Christian Philosophy, Chapter 6. Christian Philosophy 56. The theological 
way that Gilson recommends in this passage means that a philosophical path, either from knowledge of 
creatures or from demonstrative knowledge of God, cannot be reached—a concession untroubling to 
Gilson’s Metaphysics of Exodus.  
 138 
larger discussion of how Aquinas introduces “creation ex nihilo” as the causal ground of 
giving being.  
      In what follows, our task will be to constellate the various points that comprise 
Aquinas’s existential metaphysics: such include his theory of analogical causation and 
predication; his notion of participation as the mechanism of causal distribution; and 
finally his (two-pronged) argument for the separation between the divine preconception 
of essential possibilities (and what this entails) from their existential enactment and 
sustainability through creation and conservation (and what these add to such 
possibilities). In separating something’s essential determination from whether or not it 
actually is, we must remember contra-Sigerian essentialism that the latter cannot 
adequately be represented in terms of conceptual content and thereby as something (i.e., a 
fourth nature) to be included or occluded as an essential determination. Although 
Aquinas already had grasped such otherness in intellectus essentiae argument of De Ente 
IV, the full weight of this distinction could only be unleashed—and fully secured—when 
set in reference to the “plenitude of perfection” that is the actus primus et purus essendi 
per se subsistens, and even more, through the aforementioned “constellation” of points 
surrounding the existential problematic. As the next three chapters will argue, such a 
perfection is inextricably linked to the non-reciprocal bond of reference that allows 
creatures to attest to the perfection of their creator without in any way supplementing its 
plenitude, a plenitude distributed to creatures through participation and because 
fundamentally incommensurable with any essence—no matter how perfectly it is per 
se—only created and sustained through the continual influx of existential otherness.  
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Chapter III. The Non-Reciprocal Communion: Analogy as the Bond of Being 
Between Ipsum Esse Subsistens and Esse Commune  
 
      The previous two chapters argued that the real distinction between essence and esse 
in material and immaterial substances cannot fully emerge from an inspection of their 
order alone. Such a distinction requires reference to ipsum esse subsistens in order both to 
reveal the perfective actuality brought by esse, irreducible to essence, and also to 
mandate such actuality remain other to any being other than God. This chapter will show 
that God as ipsum esse subsistens and maxime ens serves as the primary and principal 
significatum or analogue of esse and through the identity of being with God himself, the 
otherness of being to everything else emerges. With God’s radical self-identity (i.e., 
ipseity)1
      The problem at hand can be unpacked in terms of a two-sided threat surrounding the 
need for creatures to participate esse.
 preventing any distribution of his being to creatures, how can there be a bond of 
being uniting all beings and grounding them in a single referential principle? How can 
esse commune be said to be in any meaningful sense if ipsum esse subsistens shares none 
of its own being? And finally, how can creatures attest to their cause in demonstrations 
for the existence of God if cause and effect share nothing in common? These will be the 
problems confronted by analogy. 
2
                                                 
1 In the previous chapters, I had discussed how God as subsisting existence itself (ipsum esse subsistens) 
cannot be divided or shared in any way. Thus, unlike a genus or species, his self-identity of being, or 
“ipseity,” cannot be communicated to many nor reducible to a higher commonality. Such an identity is 
radical because God’s nature is not merely different from creatures (i.e., according to a common unity), but 
diverse. As I shall argue in this chapter, analogy is meant to keep that diversity in play while allowing 
creatures to be like God to such an extent that demonstrations for the existence of God can be made 
beginning with creatures. And despite this likeness of creatures to God, God is in no way like creatures.  
 Either, on the one hand, God becomes just one 
2 This is similar to the one addressed above, but adds another degree of complexity. For the statement of 
the earlier two extremes, see above, for example Chapter I Section 4. The primary difference is that instead 
of God being “first among many beings,” now his being (esse) is actually shared by such beings. Thus, it is 
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more member—albeit primus—in the “growing empire of the univocal and intelligible 
concept of ens”3
      On the other hand, however, and this brings us to the second threat, distancing the 
first act from the rest threatens to withdraw God’s transcendence of being to the point 
where the being locatable only on this side of creation (i.e., esse commune) no longer 
signifies the same thing as ipsum esse subsistens and any attestation on the part of 
recipient to the giver’s perfective plenitude falls silent.
 due to his sharing being (esse) with all other beings (entia). Causal 
firstness does nothing to protect “purity of act” if a univocal community results between 
beings (i.e., the first and everything else); this is because somehow they must 
reciprocally communicate—a reciprocity in terms of a shared third, non-identical to 
either and thereby able to be composed with both. If, however, actus primus et purus 
were to communicate through a non-identical third (e.g., a genus of being, or even only a 
transcendental concept), it would receive its portion or share of such non-identical 
content as a recipient, an impure subject receptive of something other than itself.  
4
                                                                                                                                                 
the difference between a mere univocity of being and pantheism. The way in which the threat of univocity 
“borders” that of pantheism will be made apparent throughout this chapter.  
3 Marion states: “The analogy of being—about which it makes sense to emphasize once again that Thomas 
Aquinas scarcely uses the term analogia entis—has no other function than to dig the chasm that separates 
the two understandings of esse (and not to bridge it). It is even more necessary to underline that, coming 
from Dun Scotus unto Suarez by means of Cajetan, the inflation of this doctrine has had no other aim than 
to submit it to the growing empire of the univocal and intelligible concept of ens” Jean-Luc Marion, 
“Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” 48-49. 
4 The latter is the solution of Jean-Luc Marion. In God Without Being, he states: “[Aquinas] does not chain 
God to Being because divine esse immeasurably surpasses (and hardly maintains an analogia with) the ens 
commune of creatures, which are characterized by the real distinction between esse and their essence, 
whereas God and He alone, absolutely merges essence with esse: God is expressed as esse, but this esse is 
expressed only of God, not of the beings of metaphysics. In this sense, Being does not erect an idol before 
God, but saves his distance.” Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1991), xxiii.  
  The esse of entia creata no 
longer reflects or attests to the existential perfection of ipsum esse subsistens, and “esse” 
holds together the two, not through a shared account, but by an empty word. The extreme 
diversity of this solution, which as Marion argues “saves God’s distance” and prevents 
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idolatry, may be the only way out of the bind of onto-theology.5 According to such a 
solution, however, ipsum esse subsistens gives to beings the same perfection possessed 
by itself only in the most extremely equivocal sense, incurring the cost of existential 
evacuation: “esse” becomes meaningless as a shared term because the primary 
significatum—“esse’s” transcendental signifier—stands outside the realm of possible 
meaning.6
                                                 
5 To recap the discussion from above, onto-theo-logy, as defined by Marion following Heidegger, is the 
systematic grounding by a metaphysics of all beings and their being. For Heidegger’s account of onto-theo-
logy, see “The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics” from Identity and Difference (1957) and p. 
14 fn. 21 above. Although Marion seems more willing to loosen the ties that bind God to creation in order 
to escape onto-theo-logy and preserve divine transcendence, I will argue that Aquinas’s demonstration for 
the existence of God (the fourth way, in particular) and his theory of analogy do not attempt such a radical 
evacuation of the existential field. 
6 See In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 1. Here Aquinas demonstrates how “esse” is properly said of God, who is “qui 
est” and that such is the maximally proper name amongst all the divine names. 
  
      In addition to these two “threats,” we must identify a third, which is more of a hybrid 
of the two than its own species; such a “monster,” however, is most dangerous of all 
because it incorporates elements of the others and can be reached by too far a 
transgression on either path. This is the “threat” of monism, either in the guise of 
pantheism or Parmenideanism, which results from a failure to negotiate the distance 
between the first and all else that follows because it collapses everything into divine 
being (or divine being into everything). It fails to order multiplicity around a common 
principle and referent in such a way that the one orders the many into a unity while 
remaining distinct from such an order. This failure to remain distinct occurs by making 
itself either so immanent to the unity that it becomes the unity itself (and thereby one) or 
so radically transcendent that the unity itself becomes nothing: all is one because either 
the many are identical to the one or they are nothing at all.  
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      Either monistic extreme signifies a failure to think a unified existential field grounded 
in an actus primus et purus irreducible to the field itself. The problem for Aquinas’s 
existential metaphysics will be to find enough commonality amidst a multiplicity of 
applications for “esse” to justify a common name. Such metaphysics becomes most 
vulnerable, I will argue, when it must parse the meaning of “esse” in its secondary 
application and avoid saying God is being itself and creatures are only by extrinsic 
denomination. This would mean “existence” is not an intrinsic property of creatures, but 
their relation to something else (i.e., God) as medicine is not intrinsically healthy, but 
healthy in reference to the health it produces in a body. Defining created esse as relation 
to God, however, does not seem to sufficiently emphasize what separates an actual being 
from a mere possibility, as both a human and a phoenix can be characterized by a relation 
to God.7
      Aquinas’s attempted way out of this bind derives from his theory of analogy, which 
institutes ipsum esse subsistens as the existential ground of every being and all being (ens 
and esse commune) without making such an eminent principle part of or subject to the 
existential community. Thus, everything that is derives its being from the principle of 
being (principium essendi) and reflects the plenitude and the perfection of its power, even 
 Although such relations are different, the extrinsicism of both fails capture what 
“esse” was meant to introduce: the ultimate actuality of any being, which as 
fundamentally extra-conceptual, can be withheld in essential contemplation. The problem 
with an “extrinsic attribution” of “being” is that it minimizes the existential difference 
between a mere conceptual possibility and something actually in re: both in intellectu and 
in re become extrinsic modes of relation accidentally attached to an essence, but not 
some act or power of the being itself.  
                                                 
7 See below, Chapter V Sections 3-5.   
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though the eminence of the transcendental signifier can never be reflected in any—or 
every—single mode of finite being. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, only 
through the coronation of the existential field with its primary and perfect analogue (i.e., 
ipsum esse subsistens) can there be any significant connection between esse commune 
and its ground in divine esse. Analogy, for Aquinas, functions as an indispensable 
principle of unity that maintains difference and distinction between beings according to 
the mode of dissimilarity. His solution to the above-stated problem rests on analogy’s 
unification of everything that “is” insofar as it is a similitude of the first, but as similitude, 
does not share in an essential community with the first.8
      Although revisiting familiar themes from the previous chapters, this chapter will 
pursue such under the guise of the connections or bonds which demonstratively, causally, 
and predicatively link the unrepeatable and incommunicable ipsum esse subsistens to that 
which repeats esse and to which esse is communicated. Thus, by discussing the issues of 
demonstration, participation, and analogy in this chapter, we will be in a position to 
explore creative dimensions of the “real otherness” between esse and essence in the 
following chapters. Section 1 will address the fourth way of the Summa Theologiae and 
   
                                                 
8 See SCG I.29, ST I, q. 4, a. 3, and De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad 2. In such cases, he uses the example of the sun. I 
will take up Aquinas’s extended discussion of analogy throughout this work and explain the various 
possibilities and the different ways he explains this relationship. Although analogy encompasses a broader 
range than likeness and similitude, I will explain below how Aquinas’s primary means of explaining the 
analogy between creatures and God is as a “non-reciprocal” similitude wherein they are likened to his esse, 
but he in no way is like or similar to them. God has being perfectly, whereas the creature “has what belongs 
to God,” and thereby is said to be “like” God. Aquinas explains that this is a “non-univocal likeness” 
because one form is not shared between two agents, but the form belongs to the one essentially and the 
others through participation. Turning to a stock example, he invokes the sun and sublunary heat: the sun 
has heat essentially, whereas sublunary bodies participate heat, and thereby fall short of the primary 
significatum of heat. Like the sun, ipsum esse subsistens, as the primary and principal significatum of 
being, provides the ratio essendi which all beings approximate and against which they are measured, and 
yet ultimately falls short because whenever being is said of any being other than God, it is not according to 
the same ratio. Aquinas thereby does not flatten the field of being, but maintains its continuous verticality 
crowned by the universal cause of being ipsum esse subsistens, which alone is being (esse tantum) thus 
necessitating a similitude (i.e., participatory having, but not being) for everything else. 
 144 
connect this demonstration to Aquinas’s argument in De Ente IV. Section 2 will show 
how Aquinas moves from the “maxime ens” (i.e., God) reached by the fourth way to the 
remotional characterization of God as an identity of esse and essence. Sections 3-4 will 
bring together the previous two sections around Aquinas’s use of analogy to explain 
God’s communication of being to beings without entering into an existential community 
with such beings. Section 3 will focus on the issue of eminent causation, which Aquinas 
invokes to explain how God is a non-univocal, but not entirely equivocal, cause of the 
being of creatures. Section 4 will consider the analogical predication of being, which 
ensues from this non-univocal and non-equivocal distribution of being.9
      Aquinas introduces the so-called “Five Ways” of Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a. 3 in 
response to the question of whether God’s necessary existence is self-evident (per se 
nota).
 As these two 
sections show, analogy works both to preserve the incommunicability of God’s being to 
creatures (i.e., ipsum esse to esse commune) and to enable creatures to reflect God in such 
a way that demonstration of an effect from its cause remains possible. The subsequent 
chapters will determine whether analogy as cast within the constellation of creation ex 
nihilo can sustain a meaning for esse attributable to created beings that does not collapse 
their actuality into their causal ground.  
 
Section 1: Maxime Ens and Ipsum Esse Subsistens  
10
                                                 
9 I agree with Montagnes that Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy encompasses both predication and causality 
and that it cannot be isolated solely to the former as a logical or linguistic doctrine. “Being” is said of 
creatures analogically because their being does not share the same ratio as their cause, but bears a 
similitude or trace (i.e., of proportion) to the cause. See Bernard Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy 
of Being according to Thomas Aquinas. trans. E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
2004). 
10 See also SCG I.10. 
 Distinguishing between what is self-evident in itself versus self-evident to us, 
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Aquinas maintains, counter to the Anselmian proof, that to us in this life, we cannot know 
the divine quiddity and thus cannot self-evidently know God to be (Deum esse). Without 
knowledge of God’s essence, it seems that we cannot make demonstrations concerning 
God following the Aristotelian model of demonstration: In a proper demonstration, 
essence serves as the middle term of the premises. For example: All animals are mortal; 
Humans are animals; Therefore, humans are mortal. “Animal” is the middle term in this 
demonstration and, as the essence of humans, is that on account of which some property 
(e.g., mortality) can be demonstratively attributed to them. In the case of God, however, 
the divine essence cannot serve as the middle term, which seems to prohibit 
demonstrations for the existence of God or any of the divine attributes. Thus, if reason 
fails to secure knowledge of God, faith and revelation remain our only access to him in 
this life.  
      Aquinas confronts this seeming roadblock by appealing to Aristotle’s distinction from 
the Posterior Analytics between demonstration quia and demonstration propter quid. 
Whereas demonstrations propter quid account for a property belonging to something 
based on what it is, demonstrations quia show that something is so based on its effects. 
As Aquinas argues in Summa Contra Gentiles, an effect takes the place of quiddity in 
demonstrations quia.11
                                                 
11 “In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet assumi pro medio divinam essentiam 
sive quidditatem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut 
accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam omnia 
divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua habitudine Dei ad 
suos effectus.” SCG I.12. 
 This means that given our inability to know God’s essence in this 
life, nevertheless, based on observable effects, we can make demonstrations that he is the 
cause of such effects. The five ways, briefly stated, are demonstrations quia. Each begins 
with some observable fact, and reasons from this fact to its cause. Thus, from motion, 
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efficient causality, possibility, perfection, and government, Aquinas concludes that God 
is the cause of such effects. The five ways show that God is based on observable effects 
without attempting to utilize what he is.12
                                                 
12 The other four ways argue the following: The first way begins with the fact of motion and reasons to the 
first cause of motion, an unmoved mover. The observable effect of motion substitutes for a quiddity. Thus, 
given the fact that everything is moved by another, we can reason to an unmoved source of motion. 
Likewise, with the following four ways. The second way begins from the world of sensible things and the 
order of efficient causes observable therein: the cause of an effect must be prior to that effect. Nothing can 
be prior to itself, and thus an effect cannot be cause of itself. The cause as prior is that without which there 
would be no effect, a relation of priority which cannot run to infinity lest there be no causal sequence at all. 
Thus, there must be a first efficient cause. The third way begins from the possibility either to be or not to be 
of things that are generated and corrupted. They cannot always exist since, given their previous generation 
(i.e., coming into being), they are capable of not-being and at some time were not. Such things have being, 
but only from a cause and only after not-being. This is what it means to be possible in regard to existence: 
per se they do not determine themselves to be, but only able to be. Thus, if everything were capable of such 
non-being (i.e., only possible with regard to existence), then everything at some point would not have been. 
Everything would have being after non-being and only through a cause. The equal need of everything for a 
cause to be would equally eliminate anything from being the cause of anything else, as it too required a 
cause in order to be a cause. But given the fact there is something, there must be something necessary in 
regard to its being, otherwise nothing would have been or could ever come to be. Aquinas further argues 
that this necessary thing has necessity from itself or from another cause. If the latter, then that cause of 
necessity also would be a necessary being and have its necessity either from itself or another. Once again, 
this chain cannot run into infinity, lest there be no first to give necessity to anything else. Thus, there must 
be a first necessary being that has its necessity per se. This, Aquinas maintains, we call God. Before turning 
to this characterization, a word must be said about the fifth way. The fifth way argues from the purposive 
action in both natural bodies and rational agents to a governor of such action. The continual striving to 
achieve some end by natural bodies, which lack rational deliberation, indicates design, and thus cannot be 
by blind chance alone. Given the design of such action, an intelligent designer must be posited to account 
for such design. From the observed effect of ordered action in the world, we can conclude the existence of a 
governor of such order. This governor is God. 
   
      The fourth way must be discussed in detail because it, in particular, most explicitly 
appeals to being in demonstrating the existence of God. Whereas the other ways appeal to 
being qua some determinate manner of being (i.e., qua moving, caused, possible, or 
purposiveness), the fourth way treats being in relation to the other transcendental 
perfections. Like all of the ways, it begins from some observable effect, and from this 
effect concludes to its cause. In this case, from the degrees of perfection observable in 
things, we can conclude to some most perfect measure by which their varying degrees are 
judged. Aquinas states: 
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Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid 
magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile: et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus 
dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime 
est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid 
quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens: nam 
quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur 
maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis: sicut ignis, qui 
est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est 
aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis: et hoc 
dicimus Deum.13
According to this argument, various grades are discovered in things. Something can be 
more or less good, true, noble, etc. than another. Calling something “more or less,” 
however, indicates their approximation to a maximum. Aquinas provides the example of 
something being hotter than another insofar as it approximates maximal heat. 
Furthermore, the maximal in any such genus is the cause of everything in that genus.
 
14 
The perfection of the genus heat is realized in the species fire, and the species fire as the 
maximum of heat, is the cause of everything hot (i.e., all other species of hot objects).15
                                                 
13 ST I. q. 2, a. 3, resp. For a similar presentation of this argument, see SCG I.13. 
14 What does Aquinas mean by “cause of” in this context? For a discussion of this issue, see Wippel, The 
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 473-475. The example Aquinas provides is limited in answering 
this question as it relates only to an accidental kind (e.g., heat) and one that obviously admits of degrees. 
E.g., white, as the most perfect color, measures all other colors. Does this mean that white is the efficient 
cause of all other colors? See SCG I.62. Also, cf. Boethius’s argument for the identity of God as the 
princeps omnium with the perfect good and true happiness. See Consolations III.10.  Here Boethius begins 
from the intuitively obvious point that we can judge more and less in terms of happiness, which indicates 
(the not-so intuitively obvious) conclusion that there must be a most happiness by which we can judge 
comparative grades. This real standard is the perfect instantiation of the ratio, namely the maximum of the 
kind. 
15 Maximally x equals a perfect or “complete” x. Remember, in the argument from act and potency, 
Aquinas had stated the possibility of an essential perfection for creatures while maintaining their existential 
imperfection, and thus potency. Over the course of this chapter, I will show how Aquinas utilizes God’s 
existential perfection and firstness in any order to explain him as the cause of “whatever (essential) 
perfection” in creatures. Thus, even though subsisting fire (i.e., absolutely maximal heat) would be hotter 
than the sun (i.e., relatively maximal heat), through eminent causation, God takes over the role as “first 
cause of heat” even without actually containing heat.  
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      Thus, Aquinas begins the argument for God from the observation of grades of things 
being more or less true, good, and noble.16 Focusing on the first of these, he musters 
support for this observation in part from Aristotle’s claim that not everything is equally 
true/mistaken, but can be more or less true/mistaken.17 For example, he argues, “four is 
five” is less mistaken than “four is a thousand” and therefore more true than the latter.18 
In order to account for its being more true, there must be something to which it 
approximates to a greater degree than something less true. Otherwise, such an account of 
truth would be ungrounded and everything would be equally true.19 The measure of true, 
which is most true (verissimum), institutes the ground upon which all other truths can be 
derived, just as fire establishes the ground upon which all other things can be said to be 
hot. Because being and truth follow one another, as true speaks to what is and false to 
what is not,20 such that those things that are most true are most beings,21 there must be 
something that is most being (maxime ens). Furthermore, Aquinas argues,22
                                                 
16 In Metaphysics II.1, Aristotle states: “To explain a thing it is necessary to know which among a number 
of things that have some trait in common give that trait to others. So fire, being hottest, is the reason why 
other things are hot. So, too, what is most true is the reason why other things are derivatively true. Hence, 
the principles of eternal things are necessarily most true; for they are true always and not merely 
sometimes; and there is nothing which explains their being what they are, for it is they that explain the 
being of other things. Consequently, status in being governs status in truth” (993b.25-31). 
17 Even though the choice of example would suggest otherwise, Wippel holds that Aquinas has in mind 
ontological truth, not logical truth (i.e., the truth of a proposition). Thus something has more or less truth 
according to its degree of intelligibility: the elements are less formed and less intelligible than “the 
organized” structure of an animal, and thus is less true. See Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas 
Aquinas, 471. 
18 In the Contra Gentiles presentation of this argument, Aquinas emphasizes this statement of Aristotle such 
that of two false things, one can be less false—and therefore more true—than the other. See SCG.I.13.  
19 See Metaphysics IV.4 (1008b.32-1009a.6). 
20 See Metaphysics IV.7 (1011b.26-30). 
21 “[...] nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys.” Here Aristotle argues that 
eternal principles are truer than others. By extension, Aquinas states that there must be that which is most 
true (verissimum) and this is God.  
 just as the 
22 On this furtherance of the argument, Gilson notes: “The Contra Gentiles concludes the proof with an 
affirmation of the existence of a maxime ens, which is at once identified with God. The Summa Theologiae 
demonstrates further that what is maxime ens is also the universal cause of being and, consequently, can be 
nothing but God. Why this addition to the demonstration?” The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas 
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maximal in any genus is the cause of everything in that kind (i.e., the cause of being 
under the ratio of that kind), so too there must be a cause of being (esse) in all beings 
(entibus). This cause, Aquinas concludes, we call God.  
      Through the language of causality, Aquinas has moved from a mere discussion of the 
transcendental concepts (i.e., ens, verum, bonum, etc.) to the register of actuality, rerum 
natura. “Maxime ens” is more than just a conceivable measure (i.e., if I recognize more 
or less, I can imagine a maximal), but causally operative in relation to all beings.23 That 
is, God as the maximal being (maxime ens) causes to be for all beings (“Ergo est aliquid 
quod omnibus entibus est causa esse...hoc dicimus Deum”). The importance of 
introducing causality, I would argue, is that it highlights that not only must there be a 
conceivable measure of the maximal in any kind (i.e., a perfect x), but, as cause, there 
must be such a thing in re and this thing must be first.24 Otherwise, in keeping with his 
mode of demonstration quia, nothing would explain the actual effect of more and less x-
ness, the middle term of this demonstration.25
                                                                                                                                                 
Aquinas, 72. The addition, he argues, stems from the fact that “maxime ens” may signify only “a very high 
degree of being” and thus a relative (not an absolute) sense of “maximal.”  
23 See below fn. 35. 
24 Causality seems to free the argument from getting trapped in the conceptual sphere alone. I.e., that the 
maxime x is merely the maximally conceivable, but not the maximal in re. Take the example of maximal 
blackness. A definition of maximal blackness can be posited (i.e., reflecting 0% of light) against which this 
or that black object can be measured as more or less black. Such a definition of perfect blackness can serve 
as a measure for everything black, and yet nothing in re is maximally black. The problem with the 
argument nevertheless remains: whether Aquinas’s empirical example supports the claims that there must 
be a maximal in any genus and this maximal is the cause of everything in that genus. Little argues that the 
fourth way operates along lines of exemplary causality alone, without introducing (or smuggling in) 
efficient causality. See Arthur Little, The Platonic Heritage of Thomism (Dublin: Golden Eagle Books 
Limited Standard House, 1949), Chapter VI. 
  
25 “Thomas Aquinas’ Fourth Way of proving the existence of God, with the analogy it introduces, 
demonstrates the degrees of being which demand a maxime ens as compared to those things which are 
magis et minus entia. Even if the causality exerted by this maxime ens is the efficient causality which is 
proper to being, there is yet a real continuity of being moving from the lesser to the greater and eventually 
to the maxime ens. The descending hierarchy of perfection culminating in a universe which contains the 
deficient and the evil within it, may be impossible of explanation but we would like to suggest that the laws 
of metaphysical causality whereby no effect can equal its cause makes it impossible for God in His 
Goodness to communicate Himself totally. But this decreasing series of perfections approaches the 
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      The crucial link in the argument of the fourth way is thus between being imperfect 
with respect to x and having x from another.26
      To explain this link in more detail, Aquinas’s example may be helpful. Any 
recognizable imperfect instantiation of a perfection, such as “heat,” requires an 
immediate cause no less perfect than itself with respect to the given perfection. The first 
cause must be “most” (i.e., no less than its effects) otherwise it could not cause the degree 
of perfection in its effects, and it must have the perfection through itself (per se), 
 In those cases where something does not 
take on the complete ratio of a perfection—whether it be an accidental perfection such as 
heat or a transcendental perfection such as goodness, unity, or truth—but remains an 
imperfect instantiation, then it must have received this perfection from another in order to 
explain its imperfect having of this perfection. This means that the degrees of 
imperfection (i.e., “more or less”) approximating a maximum indicate a causal account 
whereby they have such a perfection, an account that must terminate in a first cause 
having the perfection from itself (i.e., essentially). Thus, at stake in the fourth way is not 
only recognition of degrees, but accounting for how such things come to have a degree of 
perfection if not from itself. It is this latter move that allows the argument to conclude 
that not only a maximal being can be conceived, but that God actually exists.  
                                                                                                                                                 
indefiniteness of material goods to the diminishing point between the infinite and the indefinite” Carlo, The 
Ultimate Reducibility, 99. Carlo does not seem to differentiate univocal from eminent causation.  
26 Wippel notes the controversial introduction of such a link to make sense of the fourth way: “In doing this 
[utilizing an argument based on participation], however, I must acknowledge that we have reinterpreted the 
fourth way seriously, and even in its substance. It will no longer be based solely on exemplar causality in 
its first stage, as its text indicates that it was originally intended to be. It will now be equivalent to the 
argument offered in the Lectura on St. John’s Gospel. But unless some such reinterpretation or substitution 
is introduced, it seems unlikely that the argument’s first stage can be regarded as successful in its attempt to 
prove that a maximum actually exists” 478. In regard to our further inquiry, what must be noted concerning 
the fourth way is the bond forged by Aquinas between the formal completeness of something (i.e., more or 
less perfection with regard to some form) and its causal status (i.e., having that perfection from a cause). 
Following from this, the more complete something is with regard to a perfection, the fewer intermediaries 
stand between it and the most perfect in its kind. In addition, as will be discussed below, the closer in 
proximity it is to the most perfect in its kind, or that which has the perfection from itself (i.e., essentially) 
and not from another, the more powerful it is.  
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otherwise it too would require a cause, running the causal chain indefinitely backwards. 
Thus, the heat in my cup of coffee requires a cause of equal or greater heat by which it 
has heat. The immediate cause of such hot coffee may be of the same species as itself, for 
example boiling water can impart heat to tepid water, or it may be of another species, as 
the fire that boils the water and previous fire that ignites the wood. Even the heat of fire 
(e.g., of a burning log) requires a cause of its heat: heat does not belong to the substance 
by its nature, even though its matter is receptive to the accidental form, even to the point 
of undergoing substantial change (i.e., wood is flammable and changes to ash). As none 
of these bodies are hot by themselves, and although receptive to heat in various degrees 
depending upon their matter, each must have as its original cause the maximal heat of 
something that is hot by its nature (i.e., fire).27
      It should be noted that although “participation” can be introduced at this point of the 
argument, it seem that participation follows an argument for God’s essential identity with 
his esse and thus can only shed light on the fourth way post de facto. This accords with 
what has been argued above concerning the real otherness between esse and essence, 
namely, it is only after the subsisting act of being has been reached that the 
communication of esse to anything other than God becomes precluded except through 
participation. As Owens has argued regarding De Ente, the need for beings to participate 
 Without such a first cause of heat, degrees 
of heat (i.e., the middle term of the demonstration) would lack an explanatory principle 
whereby they could be explained as observable effects. 
                                                 
27 Aquinas’s analogy between accidental perfections such as heat and transcendental perfections such as 
goodness, truth, and most of all being must be called into question around the use of “maximum” in each 
case. With regard to the former, the maximum (i.e., the sun) is not an absolute maximum, but a relative 
maximum. The heat of the sun does not exhaust the perfection of heat. We could imagine, as Aquinas often 
does, a “subsisting heat,” which, as heat alone, would be even hotter than the sun. In regard to the latter 
perfection, there is such an absolute maximum.  
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esse remains hypothetical until the argument has reached a subsisting nature whose 
nature is to be because until that point esse could be causally “shared” in other ways.28 
The same goes for the argument of the fourth way: only once “most being” has been 
shown to be being essentially and also identical with ipsum esse does it become necessary 
for all else “to have being” through participation.29
      As we have seen, by participation Aquinas means to take a part of something, instead 
of grasping it in its entirety and according to its complete ratio.
 A scale of eminence grounded in “the 
most” does not by itself require the lesser degrees to participate: hot coffee is really hot; 
that is, it shares in the same ratio of heat as fire, even though due to its material substrate 
(i.e., qua water), it will return to its natural state of coolness. With this precautionary note 
in place, we can presuppose the lens of participation to further unpack the argument.  
30
                                                 
28 Joseph Owens, “The Causal Proposition—Principle or Conclusion?” The Modern Schoolman XXXII 
(March 1955): 269. 
29 Aquinas does, however, introduce this link in the following question after identifying God with his esse. 
For his third argument for the identity between essence and esse in God, he states: “Tertio, quia sicut illud 
quod habet ignem et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, 
est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit 
ens per participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens: quod absurdum est dicere. Est 
igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.” ST I q. 3, a. 4. resp. For the full citation of this article, 
see fn 51 below. 
30 See above Chapter II Section 1. For a larger study of Platonism in Aquinas, see Little, The Platonic 
Heritage of Thomism. On the Platonic principles at work in this argument, see Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Though of Thomas Aquinas 475-476. See also Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in 
Thomas Aquinas. In his Expositio de ebdomadibus, Aquinas speaks of three forms of participation. See 
above: Chapter II Section 1. The first, which does not seem to involve metaphysical participation, is when a 
species participates in a genus or an individual in a species. This is a form of participation because the 
former in each case does not possess the ratio according to its total commonality and in the same way, but 
grasps only “a part.” The second is when a subject participates in an accident or matter participates in form. 
The third type is when an effect participates its cause, especially when the patient is not equal to the power 
of its cause. The example he gives is when air participates the light of the sun. He states: “Est autem 
participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet, 
uniuersaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur participare animal quia non habet rationem 
animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione Sortes participat hominem. Similiter etiam 
subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma substancialis uel accidentalis, que de sui 
ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc uel ad illud subiectum. Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur 
participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue cause, puta si dicamus quod aer 
participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole.” Expositio L.2, ll. 70-85.  
 In terms of the fourth 
way, an effect participates in its cause when it is unable to receive the full measure of its 
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power. Thus, those things that are more or less take part in a cause that is most: just as 
illuminated air participates in the power of the sun (i.e., as cause of light), so too 
beings—none of which are “maximally being”—must participate in their cause, the first 
cause of being. What participation offers to the demonstration of the fourth way is an 
explanatory model whereby a first cause possesses a perfection completely and according 
to itself and yet is able to share such with its effects in a diminished manner.31
                                                 
31 See ST I, q. 44, a. 1, resp. The question asks whether omne ens is created by God. Aquinas responds: 
“Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse. Si enim 
aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in ipso ab eo cui essentialiter 
convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, 
quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse 
nisi unum: sicut si albedo esset subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur 
secundum recipientia. Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. 
Necesse est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint perfectius 
vel minus perfecte [m.e.], causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est. Unde et Plato dixit quod 
necesse est ante omnem multitudinem ponere unitatem. Et Arisoteles dicit, in II Meta., quod id quod est 
maxime ens et maxime verum, est causa omnis entis et omnis veri, sicut id quod maxime calidum est, est 
causa omnis caliditatis.” Note that he again refers to Metaphysics II. Also, ST I, q. 50, a. 2, ad 4.: “Ad 
quartum dicendum quod omnis creatura est finita simpliciter, inquantum esse eius non est absolutum 
subsistens, sed limitatur ad naturam aliquam cui advenit. Sed nihil prohibet aliquam creaturam esse 
secundum quid infinitam. Creaturae autem materiales habent infinitatem ex parte materiae, sed finitatem ex 
parte formae, quae limitatur per materiam in qua recipitur. Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt 
finitae secundum suum esse, sed infinitae secundum quod eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio. Sicut si 
diceremus albedinem separatam existentem esse infinitam quantum ad rationem albedinis, quia non 
contrahitur ad aliquod subiectum; esse tamen eius esset finitum, quia determinatur ad aliquam naturam 
specialem.”  
 And in 
communicating this perfection to its effects according to various degrees (i.e., more or 
less), such multiplication does not disrupt or lessen the original unity of the perfection. 
Nor does communication of the perfection to the effect supplement the original ratio of 
the perfection. The perfection’s dissemination retains unity in the cause, the referential 
measure for everything having that perfection. Participation thus subsequently ties 
together for the fourth way an argument of “more or less referencing a most” with an 
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argument for the causal relationship between these various degrees based on a first cause 
that has the perfection from itself.32
      Even before introducing participation, the fourth way can assume that for perfections 
admitting of degrees, there must be something that has the perfection most perfectly in 
order to explain the less perfect having in all other members.
 
33 As it contains the most 
complete instantiation of the ratio, the perfection of any kind gives such perfection to all 
other members, which have it imperfectly.34
                                                 
32 On whether “participation” is introduced to supply the missing argumentation for an actually subsisting 
maximum, Wippel states: “One way of supplying the missing justification is to appeal to Thomas’s 
metaphysics of participation and to regard the fourth way as an argument based on participation […] 
Everything which is (such) by participation is reduced to something which is such of its essence as to 
something first and supreme. (Thus all things which participate in fire are reduced to fire which is such of 
its essence.) But since all things which exist participate in esse and are beings through participation, there 
must be something at the summit of all things which is esse of its essence in that its essence is its esse. This 
is God, the most sufficient and noblest and most perfect cause of all esse, from whom all things which exist 
participate in esse. This is an interesting approach and it rest on a principle frequently employed by Thomas 
in other contexts. That which participates in something must be traced back to something which is that 
perfection of its essence.” Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 475-476. He goes on to argue that if 
something participates x (more than in a merely logical sense), then there must be an efficient cause of that 
which it participates. 
33 Gilson states: “Now, for a thing to be more perfect simply is to be in a higher degree than a less perfect 
one. And since to be in act is the same as to be perfect and to be, the more a thing is, the more in act and the 
more perfect it is. On the other hand, it is of the nature of that which is act that it should act, and it can act 
only upon other beings less perfect than itself, that is, upon being in potency with respect to the very 
perfection which, because it itself has it, it can impart to them. The central point of this doctrine is that, in 
virtue of the very nature of being, the very inequality created by God in beings demands that the more 
perfect ones should act upon less perfect ones. Both physics and ethics hinge upon this literally ‘cardinal’ 
truth, for indeed just as, in the world of nature, causality is for the higher beings a sort of duty, so also, in 
human affairs, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors because it is of the very nature of higher beings to 
act upon lower ones. This social and political relationship of authority and of obedience therefore is rooted 
in the law of nature and, since nature is the creatures of God, it is primarily rooted in the divine law […]” 
Elements of Christian Philosophy, 194-195.  
34 The more imperfect something is, the more it depends upon its cause to have that perfection. A burning 
log retains heat more perfectly than does a cup of hot coffee. “Quanto alicuius actionis principium est 
perfectius, tanto actionem suam potest in plura extendere et magis remota: ignis enim, si sit debilis, solum 
propinqua calefacit; si autem sit fortis, etiam remota. Actus autem purus, qui Deus est, perfectior est quam 
actus potentiae permixtus, sicut in nobis est. Actus autem actionis principium est. Cum igitur per actum qui 
in nobis est possumus non solum in actiones in nobis manentes, sicut sunt intelligere et velle, sed etiam in 
actiones quae in exteriora tendunt, per quas aliqua facta producimus; multo magis Deus potest, per hoc 
quod actu est, non solum intelligere et velle, sed etiam producere effectum. Et sic potest aliis esse causa 
essendi.” SCG II.6. 
 This link between degrees of perfection and 
causal dependency raises the question of how well Aquinas’s empirical example supports 
his demonstration: if the cause of all heat is the hottest actual thing (i.e., fire), and yet 
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there remains an exemplar of the greatest possible heat (i.e., the hypothetical subsisting 
heat), does this not cause problems for necessarily identifying the exemplar with the 
efficient cause? In other words, could not the maximally perfect possible being serve as 
the exemplar of all degrees of being, and yet the most perfect actual being—albeit less 
perfect than the most perfect yet non-existent possible being—serve as the cause of all 
being?35
      Whatever may be the case physically with heat, whiteness, etc.—that is, whether a 
subsisting heat would be hotter than that which is actually maximally hot (i.e., fire)— 
being must subsist in the maximally perfect measure because a most being that is possible 
cannot exceed the most being that is actual. Aquinas is not, however, passing from the 
conceptual register of possibility to the existential register of actuality, attempting to 
deduce a fact about actual existence from a mere concept. Instead, he starts with actual 
degrees of more or less being and shows how their actual measure and cause (i.e., most 
being) cannot be surpassed, even by something conceivably “more.” “Most being” is 
instead an absolute, and not merely a relative, measure because something conceivably 
more and yet non-existent is a self-refutation: the very content of being itself measures 
existential actuality. Unlike the content of formal essences, whose conceptual content can 
be increased beyond the actual maximum to an absolute maximum (e.g., an absolute 
blackness is conceptually greater than any existing blackness), the content of being is 
 
                                                 
35 On this argument, Kenny asks: “Is the maximum (of heat, or of goodness) supposed to be something 
ideal (the hottest possible thing, the best possible thing) or something actual (the hottest actual thing, the 
best actual thing)? If the former, then it seems plausible to identify the best possible thing with God; but the 
degrees of goodness in no way seem to show the actual existence of any best possible thing, any more than 
degrees of size show that there existence a largest possible thing. If the latter, then the existence of things of 
varying degrees of goodness will show that there exists a de facto best thing (at least in the sense of a thing 
than which there is no better): but why should this be God rather than, say a good man?” Anthony Kenny. 
The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas’ Proofs of God’s Existence. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 
1969), 81. 
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actuality itself. The cause of all being cannot be conceptually exceeded by an exemplar 
(i.e., the greatest possible being) because existential exemplarity measures actuality. To 
increase its content in terms of non-existent possibility would be to diminish its 
existential actuality. Thus, the most being (i.e., highest actual and highest possible degree 
of being) serves as both the exemplar and as the cause of other beings, themselves more 
or less.36
      This seems to be the great insight of the third stage of the De Ente argument in regard 
to esse: any subsisting essential perfection, were it to exist, would be one and separate 
from all non-subsisting instantiations of that perfection (e.g., separate versus received 
heat).
  
37 So too with being. However, as stage three shows, we must posit a first subsisting 
causa essendi, but not a first subsisting causa caloris, because maximal heat unlike 
maximal being can be marked by some degree of potency with respect to a higher order 
(i.e., it remains existentially imperfect and secondary).38 There need not be an absolutely 
perfect heat in re for there to be recognizable degrees of heat because even if there were 
subsisting forms for each essential perfection, nevertheless, they too would be relatively 
perfect and in potency to the extra-essential actuality which eminently contains them and 
by which they exist. This is because as most perfect in its kind (e.g., heat, human, etc.), 
but as a relative perfection nevertheless, it can have this essential perfection from a more 
eminent cause.39
                                                 
36 This interpretation of the argument seems to vaguely resemble Gilson’s. See Gilson, The Christian 
Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 70-74. 
37 See De Ente IV and above Chapter I Section 4.  
38 Firstness is necessary in the order of being, but not in the order of other perfections because existential 
actuality can serve as the eminent cause of all other perfections.  
39 “Substantiae autem immateriales creatae sunt finitae secundum suum esse, sed infinitae secundum quod 
eorum formae non sunt receptae in alio.” ST I, q. 50, a. 2 
 Thus what connects the early De Ente with the mature fourth way, and 
distinguishes both arguments from an Anselmian conceptual analysis, is the grounding of 
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essences and essential content (i.e., the concept’s imperium) upon an existential firstness. 
The first is a plenitude of being because it causes and contains all perfections eminently, 
and instantiated degrees of heat, for example, can emerge immediately from it as a cause 
without the mediation of a subsisting heat. The exemplar of heat and the efficient cause 
of heat may diverge because, whereas the latter measures the actual cause of all heat, the 
former measures a conceptual content abstracted or ignoring of reference to actuality 
(i.e., an intellectus essentiae), which would be impossible for being insofar as its content 
is actuality.40
      Esse is unique as a perfection (i.e., the perfection of all perfections) because of the 
causal actuality it provides to all other perfections and formal acts. Unlike other formal 
perfections (e.g., heat or animality), which need not subsist and can be instantiated, the 
highest in being, however, must be only being (esse tantum) and subsisting because it 
cannot have being from any higher cause. This is because esse is not a perfection of 
essential order, but an existential perfection. The highest actual being (i.e., that than 
which nothing is more being) cannot receive this existential perfection from a more 
eminent cause because such a cause would not exist.
     
41 Thus, unlike an eminent cause that 
is not something but virtually contains such a perfection (e.g., the sun as the cause of all 
life or heat), nothing can not exist and yet virtually contain existence.42
                                                 
40 In the language of Edmund Husserl, we might say that an eidetic variation of heat (e.g., how hot) can 
occlude reference to actuality in a way that being cannot. Being’s eidetic variation is already bound up with 
actuality.  
41 If it did exist, then it would be a univocal cause and it, not God, would be the highest in being. This is 
also why Aquinas needs causality for his argument as otherwise he replicates a type of ontological 
argument: the highest in being equals only the highest conceivable measure and not the most actual cause.  
42 That is, unless of course, Aquinas would divorce God from being altogether (i.e., God without being) as 
discussed above.  
 Thus, the highest 
in being (maxime ens), which is most perfect and the cause of all beings, also must be 
subsisting being itself (ipsum esse subsistens) otherwise it would need to receive its being 
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(i.e., have being) from something that is non-being.43 Aquinas, as we have seen, 
continually rejects any move whereby the first would transcend or exceed being in such a 
way that it would be evacuated of actuality. Instead, the first is a concentration of 
actuality because, as the cause above all causes, its province is to give to be wherein all 
particular causes can operate and beings can emerge (“…supra omnes causas sit aliqua 
causa cuius sit dare esse”).44 As the eminent ground of being, God can cause whatever 
(quodlibet) perfection (e.g., human, plant, angel, mineral, heat, etc.). But, this is because 
as first principle God contains such perfection eminently. As Gilson aptly points out, this 
is what distinguishes Neoplatonic doctrine of the One beyond being from an existential 
metaphysics: for the former, if the One had that which it caused (e.g., being) then it 
would not cause such but be such and thus could not be its cause.45 For existentialism, 
the first cause gives what it most has because this is what it is. Thus, as the fourth way 
concludes, a most being is the cause to all beings of their being.46
      Insofar as the fourth way argues that the “maximum” (i.e., most perfect and most 
actual) in any kind is the cause of everything in that kind (maxime tale in aliquo genere, 
est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis), the “most being” (maxime ens) is the 
 It is not itself without 
being or beyond being, but a first and pure act of being (primus et purus actus essendi).        
                                                 
43 If this other were not a non-being, then it would be more being than the first and the first would neither 
be maxime ens nor first.  
44 See, for example, in SCG II where Aquinas states the following: “Omnibus autem commune est esse. 
Oportet igitur quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua causa cuius sit dare esse. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut 
supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur omnia quae sunt a Deo esse” SCG II.15. This esse commune, given by 
the cause above all causes—as a king’s universal cause of government makes possible particular governors 
in his realm—is that by which more or less imperfect instantiations of the ratio are made possible. In this 
context we clearly know “dare esse” to pertain to efficient causality—as creation is under discussion. See 
also Chapter II Section 3 above.  
45 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 20-22. Gilson goes on to state, in language reminiscent of 
disqualification of thinking as an Averroist and believing as a Christian (e.g., Siger of Brabant), that one 
cannot think at one and the same time as a Neoplatonist and a Christian. Ibid., 31.  
46 “Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis, et hoc 
dicimus Deum.” ST I, q. 2, a. 3, resp.  
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universal cause of all beings. But, and perhaps more importantly as will be seen below, 
such a universal mode of causing all beings (causa entium) is more fundamentally a 
causing of being itself (i.e., ipsum esse commune).47
      Given what has been shown above in terms of the link between perfection and 
causality—namely, that God as most perfect being (maxime ens) is the cause of all esse in 
beings—it will be necessary for Aquinas to argue for an identity of esse and essence in 
God. Otherwise, if such an identity were lacking, God would need to have esse from 
another, and thus God—previously defined as maxime ens—would become the causal 
recipient of something prior to himself.
 Such a totalized causing (i.e., of 
everything in its kind) can only occur because of the non-univocal eminence between 
most and every other degree of being. 
48
      Once this move has been secured to the first as a pure act of only and 
incommunicable being, the utter rootlessness of being in everything else—and thereby 
the real otherness by which esse arrives to their essences adveniens extra—becomes 
apparent. The move to participation can be made, but only after Aquinas has leveraged 
God’s firstness to subsequently secure his identity with esse and remove any composition 
 This something prior either would be another 
being, and it, not God, would be maxime ens. Or it would be a non-being, and thus non-
being would be the cause of being and the highest of all actualities. Neither alternative 
can provide a sufficient account of how all beings have being.  
                                                 
47 See below Section 3. Analogical causation is what allows something to be the total cause of x and yet not 
cause of itself. Also, we see the importance of this move when later in the Summa, Aquinas argues that God 
is the cause of prime matter: “Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam 
rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt talia per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt haec per 
formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et 
sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium.” ST I, q. 44, a. 2, resp. 
48 As argued above, any being whose essence does not include existence (i.e., for which there is a real 
composition between esse and essentia) must have existence from another. See above, Chapter I Section 3.  
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(in Argument 1 of Question 3 following the five ways).49 Furthermore, he can use God’s 
firstness in the order of efficient causes to show that he is most perfect.50 Something is 
perfect, Aquinas argues, in proportion to its actuality. As first (as has been established by 
the five ways), nothing is more actual than God and thus, through the actuality/perfection 
conversion, God is most perfect. Later and on this basis, Aquinas can argue that all things 
must participate in this first most perfect being because of its self-subsistence, which in 
its absolute simplicity and identity cannot be multiplied except through participation.51
      Therefore, we need to trace how utilizing the bond between perfection and causality 
of the fourth way, Aquinas shows the maxime ens to be ipsum esse subsistens in which 
there is an identity of esse and essence; that such subsisting being, as cause of being, 
remains proper to God and is not shared with creatures; but that there must be an 
analogical communion between subsisting being and “common being” (esse commune). 
Maxime ens as the perfection and cause of all being and whatever perfection is not 
altogether without or beyond being, but possesses being from itself (per se) and has its 
being in a manner unlike (i.e., analogous to) the derivative manner of creatures. Thus, 
when it causes being for all beings, it eminently contains the being which it gives, but it 
does not give its own being. Such common being (esse commune), however, resembles 
the being proper to God and thus can render an account of its creator (e.g., the fourth 
way) who, once again, is not beyond being but is in no way is supplemented by these 
derivative modes of being.  
 
Aquinas’s later return to participation in being relies on having shown God’s identity to 
his esse, an identity that can be demonstrated once God’s firstness has been established.  
                                                 
49 See below Section 2.  
50 See ST I, q. 4, a. 1.  
51 See, for example ST I, q. 44, a. 1, resp.  
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Section 2: The Identity of Esse and Essence in Ipsum Esse Subsistens 
     Following the five ways, in which Aquinas proves the existence of God, he 
acknowledges that we are unable to know what God is (scire non possumus non quid sit) 
and thus must proceed by way of remotion, or “removing” from God what He is not.52 
The hope is that by removing any impurities from our concepts, we can retain a pure—
albeit imperfect—concept applicable to God. Thus, after having shown God not to be a 
body, not composed of matter and form, and not composed of nature or quiddity and 
subject, with the fourth remotion, Aquinas asks whether God can be composed from 
essence and esse. Here he will argue that no reason for composition between esse and 
essence in God can be found in God, and thereby they cannot be really distinguished.53
      Aquinas begins this article with the opinion that would deny an identity of esse and 
essence in God on the grounds that if they were the same, then divine esse would have 
nothing added to it.
 
God is essentially being. This identity of esse and essence will serve as the fundamental 
point of difference between God and creatures, the latter not only instantiate it 
imperfectly, as has been shown above, but also who must receive their esse through 
participation in another.   
54
                                                 
52 See also SCG I.14. 
53 See also De Pot. q. 7, a. 2, resp. and SCG I.22.  
54 “Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. 
Sed esse cui nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur: sequitur ergo quod Deus sit 
ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, incommunicabile 
nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt. Ergo esse Dei non est eius essentia.” ST I. q. 3, a. 4. arg. 1.  
  Esse without addition, the opinion maintains, is esse commune, that 
common being predicated of everything. Thus, the absurdity of maintaining that God is 
esse commune, and thereby predicable of everything, necessitates denying that God’s 
esse and his essence are the same. The attempt to address this question and to identify 
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esse and essence in God and yet distinguish him from esse commune, will form a central 
point in Aquinas’s analogical metaphysics of being: although esse commune resembles 
ipsum esse, the two do not equally share in a common third, a genus to their species, or 
even a transcendental to their mode. All assimilation and approximation occurs on the 
side of created being and in no way supplements the already perfect ratio of ipsum esse 
subsistens, to which nothing can be added.  
      To this position, Aquinas responds that not only is God his own essence, but also his 
own esse. This he show in three ways.55
                                                 
55 “Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam suum esse. 
Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter 
essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia 
speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo 
exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est 
quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus eiusdem rei. 
Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit 
quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia 
sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, quia Deum dicimus esse primam 
causam efficientem. Impossibile est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, quia 
esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout 
significamus eam esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, 
sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit 
aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet 
ignem et non est ignis, est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per 
participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per 
participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens: quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus 
suum esse, et non solum sua essentia.” ST I q. 3, a. 4, resp. In De Potentia, he offers another argument: 
“Respondeo. Dicendum quod in Deo non est aliud esse et sua substantia. Ad cuius evidentiam 
considerandum est quod, cum aliquae causae effectus diversos producentes communicant in uno effectu, 
praeter diversos effectus, oportet quod illud commune producant ex virtute alicuius superioris causae cuius 
illud est proprius effectus. Et hoc ideo quia, cum proprius effectus producatur ab aliqua causa secundum 
suam propriam naturam vel formam, diversae causae habentes diversas naturas et formas oportet quod 
habeant proprios effectus diversos. Unde si in aliquo uno effectu conveniunt, ille non est proprius alicuius 
earum, sed alicuius superioris, in cuius virtute agunt; sicut patet quod diversa complexionata conveniunt in 
calefaciendo, ut piper, et zinziber, et similia, quamvis unumquodque eorum habeat suum proprium 
effectum diversum ab effectu alterius. Unde effectum communem oportet reducere in priorem causam 
cuius sit proprius, scilicet in ignem. Similiter in motibus caelestibus, sphaerae planetarum singulae habent 
proprios motus, et cum hoc habent unum communem, quem oportet esse proprium alicuius sphaerae 
superioris omnes revolventis secundum motum diurnum. Omnes autem causae creatae communicant in uno 
effectu qui est esse, licet singulae proprios effectus habeant, in quibus distinguuntur. Calor enim facit 
calidum esse, et aedificator facit domum esse. Conveniunt ergo in hoc quod causant esse, sed differunt in 
hoc quod ignis causat ignem, et aedificator causat domum. Oportet ergo esse aliquam causam superiorem 
omnibus cuius virtute omnia causent esse, et eius esse sit proprius effectus. Et haec causa est Deus. 
Proprius autem effectus cuiuslibet causae procedit ab ipsa secundum similitudinem suae naturae. Oportet 
  First, he argues, if God were not his own esse, 
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esse would be outside God’s essence (praeter essentiam eius) and would be caused either 
by principles of his essence (e.g., as risible in humans) or by something exterior (e.g., as 
heat in water by fire).56 Unlike essential principles that cause some essential property to 
follow the essence (e.g., a power), esse cannot be caused by an essence that is other to its 
esse. On this matter, Aquinas states: “Impossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum 
tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si 
habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat 
esse causatum ab alio.”57
      At this point, Aquinas has brought to light the fundamental difference between esse 
and any other addition. In a manner similar to Siger’s argument addressed above, and yet 
maintaining a radically different intepretation of esse, Aquinas rejects any treatment of 
esse as a property of the first cause.
 Aquinas argues that nothing can be the sufficient cause of being 
for itself (causa essendi sibi), if it must have its esse through causes. But why, for 
example, can the essence human be the sufficient cause of risibility for itself but not 
essendi? To state the matter in parallel terms, why can something (i.e., its essence) be the 
sufficient cause of its own risibility if its risibility is caused? In what way does esse differ 
from risibility, or any other property for that matter?  
58
                                                                                                                                                 
ergo quod hoc quod est esse, sit substantia vel natura Dei. Et propter hoc dicitur in Lib. de causis, quod 
intelligentia non dat esse nisi in quantum est divina, et quod primus effectus est esse, et non est ante ipsum 
creatum aliquid.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 2, resp. Aquinas’s use of Liber de Causis here, which argues that esse is 
the first emanation, will invite trouble for Aquinas’s own attempt to account for esse commune. See 
Chapter II Section 1 above; and Chapter 5 Section 3 below.  
56 See also De Ente et Essentia IV and Chapter I Section 2 above.  
57 ST I q. 3, a. 4, resp.  
58 See above Chapter I Section 3.  
 If something’s esse is caused, even by its own 
essence, this means that without that cause there is no thing; there is no essence and 
accompanying essential principles which could bestow being onto the non-existent thing. 
A sufficient causa essendi thereby would have to be cause of itself (causa sui) and not 
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just of one of its properties. Given an existing thing, however, its essential principles can 
serve as the sufficient cause of a property because there is in fact an essence, which 
brings with it certain determinations. As Porphyry states concerning the difference 
between species and property: “[...] species has its reality prior to property, while 
property follows after species. First man must exist in order to be risible.”59 Man must 
also exist in order to be man. And by not-existing such a being through its essence cannot 
supply to itself either properties or esse. Were such an essence to actually exist, then the 
accompanying properies would follow. The insuffiency is not on the side of the essence 
in its essential determination: the essence brings with it the full array of essential 
properties. The insufficiency, instead, results on a different register altogether. The 
insufficiency of a possible, that is non-existing, being (ens) to give being (esse) to itself is 
not merely that it lacks some property or accident; it lacks being altogether.60
                                                 
59 Isagoge §110. 
60  Owens also expresses a similar claim in reference to the intellectus essentiae argument, and why it fails 
to grasp a real distinction through the first stage alone. He states: “If essence in the real world is regarded as 
something finished in itself instead of as an object abstracted non-precisively and thereby left open for 
completion by its metaphysically prior existence, it can hardly help but be looked upon as rounded off in 
the distinct contours of a fully constituted recipient of existences (cf. above, n.29). It will be regarded as 
possessing some kind of essential being of its own, like an Avicennian common nature, and as having its 
essential predicates in independence of any efficient causality [m.e.]…Correspondingly, without keen and 
continued awareness that existing is first grasped through judgment and only later conceptualized as an 
actuality, it can hardly escape being viewed in the manner of a quality or other incomplex object. It will 
then tend to be looked upon as something having of itself the finitude of an object originally known 
through conceptualization and marked off as in itself a distinct unit” Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction,” 284. 
This issue of esse as “rounding off” (i.e., completing) an essence is the common charge leveled by 
existential Thomists against the essentialism of Aristotle, which would reduce esse to some moment in the 
order of essential completion. Esse, instead, as Owens argues here, and Gilson also argues (passim), cannot 
be treated as such a moment in essential unfolding. The essential predicates of any being (ens) cannot be 
separated from the existential order of creation whereby “it” receives the entirety of its being (esse) and 
“is” anything at all.  
 According 
to the very basic rule of any causal economy, something cannot give what it does not 
have. A possible essence has all of its essential determinations. What it lacks, and thus 
cannot give, is esse. This is the significance of the link in the fourth way, discussed 
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above, between perfection and causality: anything imperfect with regard to x, cannot 
cause such a perfection in itself, but must have it from another (i.e., a cause).  
      Esse as the actuality of every form points ahead to Aquinas’s second argument 
against a composition of esse and essence in God, as well as reminding us of his 
arguments against universal hylomorphism, which employs such existential actuality to 
explain composition (and thus imperfection) in immaterial substances. Before turning to 
his second argument, a word must be said, however, about why God’s esse cannot be 
caused by an external efficient cause. Having already shown God to be first efficient 
cause, the introduction of another cause for divine esse would undermine the firstness of 
God. Thus, Aquinas has shown that God’s esse must be identical to his essence because 
the composition of two non-identical things (e.g., form and matter) requires a cause. 
Composition indicates the having been caused of the composite, as something outside the 
composition itself must account for its unity. There must be an account of otherness if 
such is to be introduced into God. Without a reason, composition cannot be introduced.61
      For his second argument against composition between esse and essence in God, 
Aquinas invokes the sense of actuality as brought by esse and irreducible to formal 
actuality alone. He argues that esse is the actuality of every form or nature. Any essence 
which is other than esse—even subsisting forms were there to be such—thus, must be 
compared to esse as potency to act. Humanity or goodness, for example, are only said to 
be in act in so far as they exist (“non enim bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi 
          
                                                 
61 Aquinas discusses how composition requires a cause: “Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, 
quae enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi per aliquam causam adunantem 
ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens.” ST I, q. 3. a. 7. 
resp.  
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prout significamus eam esse”). Thus, if God’s essence were to admit an otherness with 
his esse, then the divine essence would stand in potency to his act of being.  
      Aquinas has already shown, however, that there can be no potency in God, lest his 
firstness be undermined.62
      The significance of being first in being once again comes to the fore: no order of 
being (e.g., heat, humanity, goodness, etc.) is more actual than and prior to being itself, 
and thus a distinction between esse and essence in God would require the cause of all 
being in beings to have being from another to which God would stand in potency. This 
other either would need to eminently contain being, and thus be beyond being, a non-
being altogether unknowable (even by analogical predication), or would need to have 
being more perfectly than God, and be more being than the most being, a contradiction of 
terms.
 If he were in potency in any way, then something else would 
be more actual and thus prior to God (i.e., first). For hypothetical subsisting perfections, 
such as goodness, heat, or humanity, their being in potency could be explained as their 
essential perfection and existential imperfection: they are perfect in regard to being this 
but still lack the perfection of being anything at all and thus require a cause. For God as 
most being and first cause, however—unlike a mere subsisting essential perfection which 
is most being as this and first cause in such an order—there can be nothing more actual 
otherwise he would not be the first being and cause of all being. Therefore, there can be 
no otherness between his essence and his esse.  
63
                                                 
62 See ST I, q. 3, a. 1, resp. In his second argument of the response to the question of whether God is a 
body, Aquinas argues that the first being (primum ens) must be in act and no way in potency. Anything in 
potency requires something prior, and as first, nothing can be prior to God. His use of the “God as first 
being” conclusion derives from the five ways of the previous question.  
63 Below, I take up the possibility of such a non-being (i.e., God without or beyond being) and whether 
remotion leaves any reason for calling this cause of all being itself “subsisting being.” See below Chapter 
VI Section 1.  
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      For his third argument, Aquinas appeals to the difference between having something 
through participation and being something through itself. Having heat is not being heat, 
but instead participating in heat. This is why hot coffee imperfectly instantiates the ratio 
of heat. So too with esse; something which only has being, but is not itself being, is only 
a being by participation (“...ita illud quod habet esse et non est esse, est ens per 
participationem”). If God, who has been shown to be his own essence, is not also his own 
esse, then he is a being (ens) through participation and not essentially. Therefore, he 
could not be the first being, from which all other being derives because he too would 
need to participate being in something more principal than himself (“Non ergo erit 
primum ens, quod absurdum est dicere”). Given the link discussed above between 
causality and perfection—having a perfection from another and having it imperfectly—if 
God were to have esse from something more principal, then he would have being 
imperfectly and would not be maxime ens and the cause of all esse (as demonstrated in 
the fourth way). Thus, we once again witness the importance of the link between degrees 
of perfection (i.e., the formal completeness of something) and causation (i.e., tracing a 
sequence of causes which give the perfection until we reach a first cause that has the 
perfection from itself).64
                                                 
64 I agree with Owen’s assessment that Aquinas uses God as first efficient cause and subsistent being to 
introduce participation. In moving to a discussion of the article under consideration, he states: “In point of 
fact, the article cited from the Summa Theologiae [I, q. 44, a. 1] seems to presuppose that the doctrine of 
participated being is ultimately based upon efficient causality. True, it reasons that God alone is essentially 
being, and so all other things participate being from God and are therefore caused by God. But for the proof 
that God is subsistent being, it refers back to a previous article which shows that if God is not His own 
being He would be being by participation and so would not be the primary being. The first way in which 
the argument is expressed in that article proceeds from the doctrine that God is the first efficient cause and 
so cannot be other than His being. The reasoning is that anything which is outside the essence of a thing 
must be caused either by the principles of the essence or by something extrinsic; and ‘to be’ cannot be 
caused by the principles of the essence. Therefore the being (esse) of anything for which to be is other than 
its essence must be caused by another.” Owens, “The Causal Proposition—Principle or Conclusion?,” 264-
265.  
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      With Aquinas’s response to the objections for the identity of esse and essence in God, 
we reach an important stage in the argument. This will be noteworthy in what follows 
because only ipsum esse as God’s “proper” (i.e., non-communicable) essence institutes 
the primary ratio essendi, from which esse commune can derive its analogical similitude 
and approximation to the first. Due to God’s identity with his being, if creatures took part 
in the same esse as God, they would partake of God; thus to avoid this “heretical” 
conclusion, a radical rupture between divine and created being is necessary.65 
Nevertheless, common being (esse commune) can establish its imperfect claim to be only 
through a non-reciprocal reference to a first.66 This analogical architechtonic, wherein all 
being imperfectly assimilates itself to and resembles its perfect model, ipsum esse 
subsistens, will be traced below.67
      To uphold this non-univocity of being, Aquinas must respond to the argument that if 
esse and essence were identical in God, then God would be esse commune and thereby 
predicable of everything. He begins by distinguishing the different ways in which esse 
commune and divine esse, or ipsum esse subsistens, are esse without addition.
  
68
                                                 
65 On this matter, see, for example, SCG I.29. The former states the following: “Secundum tamen hanc 
similitudinem convenientius dicitur Deo creatura similis quam e converso. Simile enim alicui dicitur quod 
eius possidet qualitatem vel formam. Quia igitur id quod in Deo perfecte est, in rebus aliis per quandam 
deficientem participationem invenitur, illud secundum quod similitudo attenditur, Dei quidem simpliciter 
est, non autem creaturae. Et sic creatura habet quod Dei est: unde et Deo recte similis dicitur. Non autem 
sic potest dici Deum habere quod creaturae est. Unde nec convenienter dicitur Deum creaturae similem 
esse: sicut nec hominem dicimus suae imagini esse similem, cui tamen sua imago recte similis enuntiatur.” 
66 What this phrase intends is that created being refers (and must refer) to uncreated being in order to be 
intelligible according to the ratio of being (and also to exist), but that uncreated being need not reciprocally 
refer to created being.  
67 See Section 3 below.  
68 “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de 
ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine ratione. Alio 
modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia non est de ratione animalis communis ut habeat rationem; 
sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. Primo igitur mode, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, 
secundo modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune” ST I q.3, a. 4, ad. 1. An important step in 
dissociating God as ipsum esse subistens from esse commune will be in showing God not to be the formal 
esse of creatures. See Section 3 below and Chapter V Section 3.  
 Divine 
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esse precludes (non fiat) any addition, whereas esse commune does not have addition, but 
neither does it lack such. Such a distinction, he argues, can be illustrated by the following 
example: the genus animal does not have the addition rational, but it does not preclude 
such—otherwise there could be no rational animals. Animal would repel any such 
division. The same goes for esse commune. It does not have any addition, but neither 
does it preclude such otherwise there could not be a multiplicity of beings. On the other 
hand, much like the essence irrational animal precludes rationality from itself, as such an 
addition could not come to it without disrupting its very core—divine esse bars any 
addition by its very nature. This is because, as Aquinas shows throughout this question, 
nothing—not matter, accidents, esse, or anything else—can possibly be added to it. Thus, 
God as identical to his esse cannot have anything added to him, thus retaining the 
absolute purity of his incommunicable nature, his ipseity. As will be seen below, this 
entails that he cannot enter into a univocal community of being with any other being.  
      Together these arguments for the identity of esse and essence in God have unpacked 
what was entailed by the maxime ens of the fourth way. As maximum, any non-identity 
between essence and esse in God would require a cause to account for his having (but not 
per se being) his esse, a cause which would either eminently contain being as a non-being 
or have being and thus be more being than the most being. From the problems 
surrounding each alternative, Aquinas mobilizes the conclusion of the fourth way to show 
that a non-identity cannot be accounted for, and thus there must be an identity. As we 
shall see, this identity coupled with the real otherness in creatures, as discussed in the 
previous chapters, converge around the unifying principle of an analogy of being. Being 
as analogical removes God from common being (esse commune) and retains the purity of 
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the proper concept without evacuating esse commune’s  reference to its cause and ground 
of perfection. Thus, through the principle of resemblance—the specific type of analogy at 
work in Aquinas’s argument—finitized by their essential modes of expressing being, 
creatures assimilate themselves to the perfection of being without ever attaining its 
perfect expression. 
      Having shown God not to be composed of essence and esse, and thus to be an identity 
of esse and essence, Aquinas goes on to further refute a composition of genus and 
differentiae, subject and accidents, or, for that matter, any composition whatsoever, 
thereby concluding God to be absolutely simple. The final, and perhaps culminating, 
consideration addresses the question of whether God is composed with other things. In 
both Summas, Aquinas takes up this question against those who would risk too closely 
identifying God with creation. An extended discussion of this issue must be reserved for 
below, when the larger question participation in esse emerges.69
      As the previous chapters have argued, esse commune must be more than just the most 
abstract way of signifying a thing (i.e., the most extensive of all concepts), but instead 
must capture the existential actuality of something’s to be or actus essendi, which 
 For now, it can be noted 
that Aquinas needs to maintain God’s esse as proper to God alone, and not as common to 
all creation. However, a deeper problem surrounds his philosophical vision: how to 
preserve God’s esse as proper to God alone and yet not radically sever divine esse from 
esse commune such that the latter would be rendered demonstratively silent in attesting to 
its cause, the former. Thus, how can Aquinas’s existential metaphysics think the 
multiplicity of entia as united in their esse commune as ordered in reference to the pure 
actuality of ipsum esse subsistens? 
                                                 
69 See below Chapter 5.  
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remains really other than the thing itself. Thus, esse commune must in some sense be 
infused with the plenitude of existential perfection that is proper to only God, and yet 
such perfection cannot be the same in creatures as in God. Aquinas must navigate the 
Scylla of not too closely identifying God with creatures—lest divine esse become one 
with created esse, or both subsumable to a common third—and the Charybdis of not 
evacuating creation of all ties to the existential perfection that sustains it—lest the real 
otherness between esse and essence in created being become a meaningless position and 
any attempt to demonstrate the existence of God beyond being, at least being in the sense 
predicable of creatures, futile. Thus, a delicate balance must be struck for the non-
reciprocal reference of esse commune to esse divinum. This will require Aquinas to show 
that esse divinum is not most common, but instead most perfect and most eminent, but 
nevertheless there can be a real similitude or trace—and not just a nominal tie—between 
God and creatures. Such a real similitude wherein God alone is the full ratio essendi and 
every other being has being according to an imperfect ratio, and thus merely resembles 
ipsum esse subsistens, is sustained by Aquinas’s theory of analogy.  
      In the following Question, Aquinas takes up the aforementioned issue, namely that 
God’s being is not the most common, and thereby imperfect, but instead proper and most 
perfect.70
                                                 
70 “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui philosophi, 
scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio 
est, quia philosophi antiqui consideraverunt principium materiale tantum: primum autem principium 
materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet quod 
primum principium materiale sit maxime in potentia; et ita maxime imperfectum. Deus autem ponitur 
primum principium, non materiale, sed in genere causae efficientis: et hoc oportet esse perfectissimum. 
Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est in potentia; ita agens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu. 
Unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens maxime esse perfectum. 
Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui 
nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.” ST I, q. 4, a. 1, resp. 
 As discussed above, Aquinas had addressed this problem of identifying the 
divine essence with esse in that it would become most common (esse commune) and 
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thereby predicable of everything.71
[...] dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia 
ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas 
omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens 
ad receptum: sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel 
equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum: non 
autem ut illud cui competit esse.
 At this point, he raises a similiar objection to the 
identification of perfectissimum with esse, as the latter seems to indicate 
communissimum. He states: “Praeterea, ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum 
esse. Sed ipsum esse videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et 
recipiens omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.” The problem is how to 
distinguish ipsum esse subsistens, as the highest perfection in any class of being, from 
esse commune, which is most common and receives all additions (as additions cannot be 
added to that which is not). Otherwise, if God is identified with esse, this would make 
God imperfect.   
      To this charge, Aquinas responds with what has been for us a familiar refrain: 
72
Aquinas here has argued that esse must be understood as the actuality of all actuality. 
More than signifying a concept in intellectu divested of all concretization, a concept that 
is most common to anything and merely repeats that it is something, esse instead captures 
the most perfect actuality of any thing, a perfection which completes even their forms—
the Aristotelian ground of actuality. Esse is that very actuality that enables there to be any 
further actuality (“nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est...”), that without 
which there would be no actuality whatsoever. As the ground of actuality as such, esse is 
 
                                                 
71 ST I q. 3, a. 4 ad. 1. 
72 ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.  In Chapter V below, I unpack how even though God is the actuality of all beings, 
nevertheless, he is not their formal esse. Aquinas attempts to explain this in terms of “analogical causation” 
such that God is causally the esse of all things—and thus the ground of their actuality—but is not formally 
the esse of all things. See below, Chapter V Section 3. 
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said to be most perfect because it opens the conditions by which there can be anything at 
all. Herein, we witness the emergence of esse as a concept, or quasi-concept, that elevates 
thought from the mere vacuousness of esse commune, which merely repeats what has 
been said in the concepts of determinate being (e.g., being as substance, being as 
quantity, being as motion, etc.), to the level of existential perfection.  
      To this point, we have seen how esse stands as the ground of all essential perfections 
insofar as being something perfectly (i.e., in this particular mode of being) does not entail 
being perfectly overall (i.e., being universally), whereas being as such eminently contains 
being in this or that way. The link between causality and perfection forged in the fourth 
way moreover serves to make the most perfect being the cause of all being. The cause of 
all being must be essentially identical to its being, lest it receive being from another, 
which is either a being (and thus more being than it) or a non-being (and thus being 
derives from non-being).73
      As is common to much of Aquinas’s writings, here in the Summa, the issue of a cause 
of all being prompts a discussion of non-univocal causality. Remember that the fourth 
way had concluded with the statement a maxime ens is the cause of all being and of 
whatever perfection. But it seems that certain formal perfections (e.g., heat, color, 
animality) would be altogether repugnant to God, who without body, cannot partake of 
 To avoid such a regress, esse subsistens must stand as the 
crowning perfection of all actuality. We now must show how such a perfection of being 
can be the cause of being in everything else and they can attest to their cause without 
joining into an essential community with their cause.  
  
Section 3: Eminent Causation  
                                                 
73 This begs the question of why God must have being (or be being) at all, as opposed to be beyond being.  
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such, even in their most perfect form. What might it even mean to call God the most 
perfect heat, or the most perfect animal, or the most perfect color? Such perfections, 
when predicated of God, seem altogether absurd and yet God has been shown to be a first 
absolutely perfect act having a plenitude of perfections, in other words, as a plenitude, he 
has the power to cause all perfections of being immediately and without plenipotentiaries 
of subsisting forms (e.g., the form of heat or whiteness itself) or other intermediary 
causes.74
      Thus, as the cause of all being (totius esse), Aquinas concludes that all created 
perfections are included in the perfection of being (“quod Deus est ipsum esse per se 
subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat”).
       
75
      The first step in answering the question of how God contains certain perfections thus 
can be answered in terms of his power: although God himself does not possess such 
perfections actually, he can fund them virtually. As most perfect and first cause of 
 This 
means that ipsum esse subsistens as the total perfection of being need not actually be 
every perfection it contains, such that God would be perfectly hot, white, human, and so 
on. Instead, as cause of such perfections, God virtually contains them in a more eminent 
manner than they actually exist. The forms human or heat exist more eminently as 
virtually contained in God than as substantial or accidental forms of material bodies, just 
as, for example, sugar is not itself sweet, but contains sweetness such that it is able to 
cause sweetness when it interacts with the tongue. Thus, all formal perfections find 
ground in the perfection of esse and esse (i.e., actus essendi primus et purus) as the 
“plenitude” of such perfections grounds them immediately. 
                                                 
74 See, for example De Spir. Creat. a. 1, resp.  
75 ST I, q. 4, a. 2, resp.  
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everything in its kind, such a cause has the total power (totus virtus) of that kind. 
Whiteness, as the most perfect species of color, contains the entire power of being 
colorful. Thus, God as the most perfect being is the cause of whatever perfection of 
being. Aquinas clarifies this connection between perfection and power (virtus), and 
subsequently shows how with esse it extends not only to the power of a certain kind, but 
the power of everything that is. He states: 
Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se 
subsistens, ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum 
est enim quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, 
quid calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem, sed si calor esset per se 
subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse 
subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones 
pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo 
modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit.76
                                                 
76 The surrounding passage reads: “Respondeo dicendum quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. 
Unde et dicitur universaliter perfectus: quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae inveniatur in aliquo genere, 
ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et hoc quidem ex duobus considerari potest. Primo quidem, per hoc 
quod quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa effectiva: vel secundum eandem 
rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut homo generat hominem; vel eminentiori modo, si sit, agens 
aequivocum, sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur per virtutem solis [m.e.] Manifestum est 
enim quod effectus praeexistit virtute in causa agente, praeexistere autem in virtute causae agentis, non est 
praeexistere imperfectiori modo, sed perfectiori [m.e.]; licet praeexistere in potentia causae materialis, sit 
praeexistere imperfectiori modo: eo quod materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est imperfecta; agens vero, 
inquantum huiusmodi, est perfectum. Cum ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium 
rerum perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum. Et hanc rationem tangit 
Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens de Deo quod non hoc quidem est, hoc autem non est, sed omnia 
est, ut omnium causa. [...] Et hanc etiam rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod Deus 
non quodammodo est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso uniformiter esse 
praeaccipit, et postea subdit quod ipse est esse subsistentibus.” ST I, q. 4, a. 2, resp. Aquinas’s reading of 
“God is the esse for subsisting things” as not implying that ipsum esse subsistens serves as the formal esse 
of anything else is treated in SCG I.26 and Chapter V below.  
  
Thus, God as ipsum esse subsistens is not absent from any of the perfections of being 
(nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse). Instead, all perfections must reach 
(pertinent) existential perfection in some way (aliquo modo).  
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      Again, we see this logic play out in the commentary On The Divine Names of Pseudo-
Dionysius, Aquinas states:  
Omnia autem alia, sicut superius dictum est, habent esse receptum et participatum et ideo 
non habent esse secundum totam virtutem essendi, sed solus Deus, qui ipsum esse 
subsistens [m.e.], secundum totam virtutem essendi, esse habet; et hoc est quod dicit, 
quod Deus potest esse causa essendi omnibus, quia Ipse non est existens quodam modo, 
idest secundum aliquem modum finitum et limitatum, sed Ipse universaliter et infinite 
accepit in seipso totum esse et praeaccepit, quia in Eo praeexistit sicut in causa et ab Eo 
ad alia derivatur.77
These passages together reveal the relation between perfection (i.e., completeness), 
power (virtus), and causality: God, who is ipsum esse subsistens, has esse according to 
the total “power of being.” God lacks nothing of the power of being (virtus essendi) 
because through his subsistence as being itself (ipsum esse)—limited to no single mode 
of being and not having being from another—he contains the total perfection of being. 
From his causality, operating according to the full (i.e., perfect) ratio of being, which 
prescinds from no power, the being (esse) of everything derives.
 
78
      To merely call God “the fund of being,” however, seems to relinguish our 
understanding and naming of God to the form “God is the cause of...,” the sort of 
 Because divine esse is 
neither receive nor limited by any nature, but instead subsists a pure esse, he contains a 
complete virtus essendi by which he is able to be the cause of being in all other things 
(potest esse causa essendi omnibus). The range of being exceeds the entirety of essential 
perfections, which express finite modes of being, but being itself, as eminently containing 
the whole power of being, funds their limited expressions. 
                                                 
77 S. Thomae Aquinatis, In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio. ed. C Pera, P. Caramello, 
C. Mazzantini (Marietti: Taurini-Romae, 1950) cap. 5, 1.1. 629. Hereafter: “In div. nom.”  
78 So too subsisting heat as perfect heat would have the total “power of heating” and thus cause every other 
kind of “hot thing.”  
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negative theologizing of which Aquinas accuses Maimonides.79  According to such 
naming, the divine names reference God’s causal power without indicating anything of 
the divine substance. Thus, Aquinas’s first step will be to negotiate the issue of “non-
univocal” causality. If God stands as the equivocal cause of all beings, containing yet 
surpassing all their perfections, do we not risk complete separation in our attempt to save 
the distance? 80 In what sense can esse creatum be said to exemplify divine esse, and 
maxime “ens” be the cause of all “entibus” without equivocation, that is using merely an 
empty set of names (i.e., esse and ens) to stand in common between God and creatures?81
      In regard to these questions, Aquinas must address the likeness or similitude that non-
reciprocally links God and creatures (“creatura possit esse similis Deo”).
  
82
                                                 
79 Dobbs-Weinstein’s warning at this point should be noted concerning any over-simplified comparison 
between Maimonides and Aquinas on equivocation and analogy. After outlining several points of 
difference between their respective theories of naming, she notes: “Whereas Maimonides’ major concern is 
to eradicate any trace of belief in divine corporeality, a belief that, for him, renders impossible ‘a portion in 
the world to come’ and of which the prohibition is manifest in radical Jewish iconoclasm, for Aquinas the 
very fact of the incarnation, the Roman permission of iconography, and the Mass do not necessitate such 
austerity. Aquinas’ concern, then, is not primarily to deny the efficacy of all language in relation to God, 
but rather to determine what language would escape the boundaries of logical predication and how, without 
thereby undermining the significance of logic and of language.” See Dobbs-Weinstein, Maimonides and St. 
Thomas on the Limits of Reason (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 187. Further on, she 
states: “…his use of the term remotion for negation, properly speaking, removes God from the order of esse 
commune in order to signify esse tantum, which exceeds being. This is why in the orders of cognition and 
of language remotion succeeds common negation and precedes the modes of excellence, whereas in the 
order of being the perfection clearly precedes rather than succeeds the predication.” Ibid., 195-196. 
80 There is some ambiguity on whether in eminently containing such perfections God would be an 
equivocal or an analogical cause. Aquinas addresses this issue as follows: “Causa igitur universalis totius 
speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, 
licet non sit univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum [m.e.], quia sic non faceret sibi simile; sed potest 
dici agens analogicum, sicut in praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non 
univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.” ST I, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1. In what follows, I will show how he 
argues for this role of God as “analogical agent.”  
81 “Goodness” says nothing more about God than “locomotion” as he is equally the cause of both. 
According to such a “negative theology,” created esse no more reflects and imitates divine esse than does 
(created) locomotion because in either case there is absolutely no similitude of form between cause and 
effect. See also De Pot. q. 7, a. 7. Aquinas considers one such argument against the univocal predication of 
names in common between God and creatures: “Sed contra. Est quod philosophus dicit, quod aeterno et 
temporali nihil est commune nisi nomen. Sed Deus est aeternus, et creaturae temporales. Ergo Deo et 
creaturis nihil potest esse commune nisi nomen; et sic praedicantur aequivoce pure nomina de De et 
creaturis.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, s.c. 1.  
82 On the non-reciprocity, see ST I, q. 4, a. 3. For the citation and analysis of this article, see fn. 115 below. 
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while requiring a certain removal or withdrawal from the limited phenomena of creation, 
is not altogether negation or denial. Instead, there is an elevation of that which withdraws 
(remotus), but one which leaves behind a trace.83 Thus between univocity’s collapse of 
terms into an identical ratio and equivocity’s evacuation of the meaningful bonds holding 
them together, Aquinas locates analogy as a point of negotiation. This link cannot unify 
being as a common ratio because, as has been shown, esse cannot be a genus divided by 
the differentiae “causatum” and “uncausatum.”84
      It is here that we are reintroduced the Aquinas’s analogical theory of predication, 
whose seeds were sown as early as De Ente et Essentia.
 The being of God is proper and 
incommunicable; it withdraws (removet) from common affirmation. The consequence 
seems be that between esse causatum and esse uncausatum, the shared term “esse” 
provides common ground nominally. And yet, without a real common measure to hold 
together divine and created esse, a measure that at the same time does not compromise 
God’s unique and proper esse, any argument that proceeds from caused being to 
uncaused being would risk the fallacy of equivocation, and thus be unable to substain 
such a demonstrative link between an effect and its causal ground (e.g., the five ways).  
85
                                                 
83 See fn. 79 above.  
84 Such a formulation on my part is somewhat misleading, as we shall see below with Duns Scotus. “Being” 
(ens) is not a genus divided by differentiae, but a transcendental concept which can be conceived 
confusedly without its intensive modifications (i.e., finite and infinite). Because such a “modal distinction” 
is thoroughly Scotistic, I will leave this issue aside until below. See Chapter VI Section 1.  
85 See also SCG I.32-34 and De Pot. q. 7 a. 7 resp.  
 Because God contains every 
perfection in a way surpassing that of creatures, there cannot be a univocal predication in 
regard to them. This is clear. Nor, however, can a mere name stand in common (i.e., 
equivocal predication) lest Aquinas sever the tie that binds an effect to its cause. As he 
repeatedly argues when regarding this question, it is not by mere chance that certain 
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names happen to obtain between God and creatures.86
      The problem with a univocity of being between God and creatures is the following: If 
the universal cause of esse must cause being for all beings (causa esse omnibus entibus), 
as argued in the fourth way, it itself as subsisting being cannot be part of that being which 
it causes. It cannot be part of any class that would have it as a member and as its cause. 
Otherwise, it would have to be cause of itself. Thus, the esse commune which it causes 
and its own proper and incommunicable nature whatever it may be do not fall under a 
common genus or species, and thereby must differ in their respective accounts 
(rationes).
 The commonality of name instead 
indicates a real causal relation of likeness between the two even though the relation 
persists not between two members of the same species or genus, but between an eminent 
cause and its effects. In the community of being, God stands as both transcendental 
signifier and causal ground by which all others beings can be said “to be” analogously to 
that being which is itself being (ipsum esse) and which institutes the common ground of 
being for everything that is. In what follows, I will discuss Aquinas’s arguments against 
both univocity and equivocity in favor of an analogy of being through which he will 
forge the mediating link of his existential metaphysics between univocity’s reduction of 
God to a mundane primum inter pares and equivocity’s evacuation of the first from the 
field of causality and signification altogether.  
87
                                                 
86 See, for example: “Nam in his quae sunt a casu aequivoca, nullus ordo aut respectus attenditur unius ad 
alterum, sed omnino per accidens est quod unum nomen diversis rebus attribuitur: non enim nomen 
impositum uni significat ipsum habere ordinem ad aliud. Sic autem non est de nominibus quae de Deo 
dicuntur et creaturis. Consideratur enim in huiusmodi nominum communitate ordo causae et causati, ut ex 
dictis patet. Non igitur secundum puram aequivocationem aliquid de Deo et rebus aliis praedicatur.” SCG 
I.33.  
87 In SCG I.32, Aquinas argues that univocal predication of many requires genus, species, accident, 
difference, or property, none of which can apply to God.  
 However, on this same note, if a similarity is to be retained between the two 
senses of being and one is not reduced to the category of non-being, they cannot be 
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altogether dissimilar.88
      An analogical theory of being, Aquinas’s response to this problem, thus cuts between 
either pure univocity or pure equivocity.
 Otherwise, the effect of more and less being could not stand in as 
the middle term of the fourth way, because nothing except the empty communion of word 
would be syllogized. Based on such equivocation, Aquinas might as well conclude that 
“God is most rock” (maximus petrus) because nothing of his nature is retained after 
negating all creaturely content from the terms being syllogized.  
89
                                                 
88 SCG I.33 argues that equivocation bars likeness between the equivocal things themselves. The only unity 
is a nominal unity that does include any ontological import.  
89 “Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis 
effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem 
rationem, sed deficienter [m.e.]: ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter 
et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus 
producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et 
multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de 
creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis: puta 
cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia 
hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non 
intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen 
sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum 
dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. 
Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et 
eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur. Sed nec etiam pure 
aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec 
demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa 
demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae 
facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur. Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et 
creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel 
quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque 
habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel 
ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum 
medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, 
et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra 
dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad 
Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus 
communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his 
quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed 
nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de 
urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem 
sanitatis.” ST I. q. 13, a. 5, resp.   
 Because the effect is inadequate to the power 
of the cause, it receives the similitude of its agent according to a different ratio, and thus 
deficiently. The cause cannot be multiplied in its effects according to the same power by 
 181 
which it exists in itself uniformly, but becomes diffuse and manifold. For example, the 
sun’s unified power (unam virtutem) has a “brilliance” or “clarity” (in claritate)—to 
invoke the phrase from the De Hebdomadibus Exposition—that cannot be communicated 
to the effects. Likewise, the first cannot communicate its purity of being to many without 
such a pure act becoming otherwise than it is according to itself, and thereby 
communicated according to another ratio. This means, Aquinas clarifies, a univocal tie 
cannot be sustained between a first cause and its effects. On the other hand, pure 
equivocity confronts its own pitfalls insofar as it threatens the demonstrative link between 
the first and all else that follows. Equivocity removes the first from the order which it 
grounds in such a matter that nothing is left to bear the name of that which binds a 
diverse multiplicity to a single referent. Instead, the unity of such multiplicity must be 
established in proportion to their shared reference (i.e., both conceptually and causally) 
to a single unifying ground; a ground, however, that stands analogically separated by its 
eminence.90
      Despite the insistence of some such as Marion that analogy merely digs a chasm 
between rationes of esse without bridging the two, thereby avoiding the inflation of 
analogical doctrine in the service of the growing empire of univocity, analogy instead 
provides the very backbone of Aquinas’s existential metaphysics through its ability to 
   
                                                 
90 I will say more on the difference between “analogy of attribution (proportion)” and “analogy of 
proportionality” below. For the present, we might note Fabro’s representation of their difference: “In 
contrast to static analogy of proportionality, there is the dynamic analogy of intrinsic attribution. While the 
former expresses in its own way a relation of similarity, the latter expresses mainly a relation of foundation 
and dependence of beings on esse. The analogy of proportionality emphasizes, as it were, the Aristotelian 
aspect of the immanence of esse in beings; the analogy of attribution, on the other hand, stresses the 
Platonic aspect of radical dependence of participant beings on the pure perfection that is separate from 
them.” Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 483. He goes on to state: “Thus analogy of attribution 
accomplishes the ultimate ‘resolution’ of metaphysical discourse by relating the many to the One, the 
diverse to the Identical, and the composed to the Simple. It is at the same time the answer to the problem of 
the Parmenidean One within the creationist theory.” Ibid., 483-484.  
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sustain an abiding reference.91 A multiplicity’s analogical proportion to one thus finds a 
unifying ground that does not absorb all diversity into itself, but as a common referent 
outside the order it unifies it preserves such distinct proportions.92
[...] licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus 
agens non univocum ex necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non 
univocum est causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis omnium 
hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis totius speciei (alioquin 
esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie contineatur): sed est causa particularis respectu 
huius individui, quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis totius 
speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est prior particulari. –Hoc 
autem agens universale, licet non sit univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia 
sic non faceret sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum: sicut in praedicationibus 
 Common names can 
be transferred analogically between God and creatures insofar as he is the cause and 
principle of such perfections, yet contains them in a higher fashion (“…aliquis ordo 
creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes 
rerum perfectiones”).  
      Such a higher preexistence of perfections entails that the cause and principle can 
cause an entire species without either being part of the species itself (i.e., which it causes 
in its totality) or itself having anything in common with that which it causes. On such 
analogical causation as the cause of everything in its kind (i.e., of being), Aquinas states:  
                                                 
91 See Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” 48-49 and above fn. 3. 
92 “If difference and diversity are real, as we have seen Saint Thomas insist that they be, then what is 
common in the analogy of being can only be the order that binds them together. ‘Being’ is not an 
abstraction but a concrete order in creation. Analogy thus brings out the idea that reality in creation is not 
just a flat, lowest common denominator of widely diverse things in the concrete, but rather a diversity of 
things interrelated in their original and originating integrity, the first perfection of the world, and in their 
interaction as they move toward their second and final perfect. This analogy of being in its diversity calls 
for a similar analogy in the order of efficient causes that produce this order of the universe through motion 
and change.” Oliva Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe According to Aquinas: A Teleological 
Cosmology (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 172. 
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omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non univocum, sed analogicum, quod est 
ens.93
As the universal cause of its kind, the agent cannot itself be part of that which it causes, 
lest it be causa sui. For example, the universal cause of human generation cannot be 
human otherwise it would have to cause its own humanity and give to itself what it does 
not have, or have what it does not give. As the particular cause of human generation, one 
human can be the univocal cause of another, but ultimately this causal line terminates in a 
non-univocal cause, which stands as the universal cause of the entire species. Likewise, if 
the cause of being in all beings were a univocal cause, then the universal cause of being 
would need to be the cause of its own being, because “being” would be the same in both 
cases. Although the cause of being cannot be a univocal cause, Aquinas argues that 
nevertheless, some bond must hold between the universal cause and that which it causes. 
Otherwise, there could be no likeness (faceret sibi simile) between the perfect causa 
essendi and its more or less imperfect effects of being, and therefore no demonstration.
  
94
                                                 
93 ST I. q. 13, a. 5, ad 1. 
94 See, for example: “Aequivocatio nominis processum argumentationis impedit. Si igitur nihil diceretur de 
Deo et creaturis nisi pure aequivoce, nulla argumentatio fieri posset procedendo de creaturis ad Deum. 
Cuius contrarium patet ex omnibus loquentibus de divinis.” SCG I.33. Also, De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, resp.  
  
      A word of clarification should be offered regarding univocal causality as it relates to 
the argument from the fourth way that the most perfect in its kind is cause of everything 
in its kind. For example, the most perfect in the kind of heat (i.e., fire) can be the 
univocal cause of everything hot, that is of all hot individuals. But it could not be the 
cause of heat as such, otherwise it would be causa sui: as something hot, and as the cause 
of heat, it would be the cause of itself. Aquinas lays out this distinction clearly in De 
Potentia:  
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[...] quod agens aequivocum oportet esse prius quam agens univocum, quia agens 
univocum non habet causalitatem super totam speciem, alias esset causa sui ipsius, sed 
solum super aliquod individuum speciei; agens autem aequivocum habet causalitatem 
super totam speciem; unde oportet primum agens esse aequivocum.95
What he here calls “equivocal cause,” but elsewhere refines to mean “eminent cause” 
such that it sustains some likeness to its effects, must be of a different order than the 
perfection itself (i.e., as opposed to merely the individuals embodying the perfection) 
which it universally causes. Fire can cause the individuals of the genus heat, but even a 
most perfect original fire must have an account of its being hot other than itself. Thus, as 
hot it cannot itself be the cause of heat as such. It must derive from something of a higher 
order, which is not hot, but which eminently contains heat, and thus can cause the total 
species (super totam speciem) of fire, along with the total genus of heat (e.g, the sun).
  
96
      But at the risk of idolatry (pace Marion), we must uncover the nature of that 
analogical bond that non-reciprocally links entia creata in their esse commune to ipsum 
esse subsistens, a bond that must allow the dissemination of being in creation in no way 
  
      Furthermore, this is why the “most being” of the fourth way, even though not stated 
in the argument itself, cannot be the superlative of being on a scale of contiguous points. 
The being given by it to all beings, which is the very scale of being itself, is not of the 
same order as itself; otherwise in constituting the order, it would constitute itself. By 
opting for a “non-univocal” cause of being, a cause that does not constitute its own being 
(ipsum esse) in grounding the being of everything else (esse commune), Aquinas holds 
open an escape route from onto-theology: “most being” is not merely a pinnacle on a 
scale of entitativeness, but an excess grounding the economy of entity altogether.  
                                                 
95 De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad. 7. 
96 This means that at some point this accidental order of causes needs to be grounded in an essential order, 
otherwise it would run to infinity and the entire sequence could never be generated.  
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to compromise the self-identity (i.e., ipseity) of the creative source. In short, Aquinas 
must remove God from esse commune in order to preserve the integrity of ipsum esse 
subsistens (and thus the “proper” application of the ratio essendi) as “only being” without 
any trace of the otherness of creation and yet retain enough of a similitude to move from 
the being of creatures to their cause.97 Beings bear a trace of that which is most being 
because insofar as each agent acts according to its being in act, the nature of action is to 
produce its like.98 Thus, no matter how removed from the first and imperfect, all beings 
attest to its activity. There must be some non-reciprocal bond that sustains the unequal 
distribution of this shared perfection (i.e., esse) throughout the entirety of creation. 
Without such, the universal cause of being would not produce effects similar to itself. 
Thus, the bond must be analogical.99 But what does Aquinas mean by “analogy”?100
                                                 
97As referenced above: “[...] non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret sibi simile [...]” ST I q. 
13, a. 5, ad 1.  
98 See, for example, SCG I.29. “Within the Commentary on the Sentences and De Veritate, formal or 
exemplar causality—in which the relationship between cause and effect is one of imitation—operates with 
a particular dominance in Thomas’s thought. In an effect’s sharing in its cause’s form—a sharing which 
never attains the same degree of formal similitude as the cause itself—the effect imitates its cause. As 
Montagnes points out though, beginning with the Summa contra gentiles and carried throughout the rest of 
the later works, for example, the De potentia Dei and Summa theologiae, Thomas approaches the issue of 
analogy in terms of efficient causality; for now in the later works the relationship between a cause and its 
effect is rendered, more often than not, in terms of the communication of act […] In those early texts, 
God’s causal activity is understood in terms of a formal communication of His own being to creation. 
Beginning with the Summa contra gentiles, however, there is a marked movement away from the formalist-
exemplarist direction of the early works—which, again, is not to say that there is radical reorienting with 
respect to Aquinas’s understanding the nature of being—toward a more existential perspective.” Salas, 
“The Judgmental Character,” 131. I will focus on the later texts (i.e., the two Summas and De Potentia), 
while drawing out both the existential and the imitative aspects of analogy. 
99 Wippel clearly explicates this link between a metaphysics of participation and analogical causality: “…it 
will not be amiss here for us to note that he draws a close connection between his theory of analogy and his 
metaphysics of participation. This we have already mentioned in passing. And while this connection is 
much more evident at the transcendental level in conjunction with Thomas’s account of analogical 
predication of divine names, to some extent it enters into his theory of analogy even at the predicamental 
level. Thus analogy by reference to a first implies a priority and posteriority on the part of the primary 
analogate and the secondary analogate(s). This also means that a secondary analogate such as an accident 
may be regarded as sharing in or participating in being from its primary analogate, its substantial subject. 
Hence even at this level it is the ontological situation, the fact that an accident depends for its being on its 
substantial subject, that justifies analogical predication of the name being both of it and its substantial 
subject.” The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 86.  
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Section 4: Analogical Predication 
      Much has been written about Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy, perhaps more than any 
other area of his metaphysics. Without fully immersing ourselves in this historical debate, 
let it be noted that many commentators have sought to excavate Aquinas’s own thoughts 
on the matter from beneath the topsoil of Cajetanian exegesis. The great commentator’s 
influence has been particularly important in emphasizing the primacy of “analogy of 
proportionality,” which many have since argued plays only a secondary role in the 
thinking of Aquinas, over “analogy of attribution (proportion).”101
                                                                                                                                                 
100 A word of clarification is in order concerning the link between “similitude” and “analogy.” “Analogy,” 
for Aquinas, contains a larger extension than “similitude” “likeness” or “resemblance,” the latter which 
constitute a subtype of analogy. Thus, in what follows, it will be necessary to show that Aquinas uses not 
only analogy, but an analogy of similitude to describe the relation between God and creatures: this 
similitude is non-reciprocal insofar as the esse of creatures is likened to ipsum esse subsistens, but it is in 
no way like them.  
 According to an 
101 I will use “attribution” and “proportion” synonymously and distinguish them from “proportionality.” 
Commentators disagree over the division employed by Aquinas regarding analogy. In a chapter entitled 
“Where Cajetan Went Wrong,” McInerny argues that Cajetan’s threefold division of analogy (i.e., of 
inequality; of attribution; and of proportionality) not only is based on a misreading of Thomas, but 
ultimately denies an analogical nature for the first or second division (i.e., inequality and attribution), 
leaving only his ill-defined analogy of “proper” proportionality. See McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy 
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 3-29. Lyttkens states: “[…] we find 
that St. Thomas only uses the analogy of proportionality as a logical aid in stating of God certain properties 
taken from creation, viz. in De Ver. 2.11. The analogy of proportionality must accordingly be said not to 
play that central parts in St. Thomas, which is ascribed to him in Thomistic quarters” Hampus Lyttkens, 
The Analogy Between God and the World: An Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use 
by Thomas of Aquino (Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1952), 475. Further, Klubertanz 
explains: “For a period of some months around the year 1256, St. Thomas either held or considered holding 
proper proportionality as the intrinsic analogy explaining the ontological similarity between God and 
creatures. This position he had not held previously and would never develop again in subsequent writings. 
Proper proportionality is therefore a Thomistic analogy in the sense that it as a doctrine taught by St. 
Thomas for a brief period early in his career” George P. Klubertanz, St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy: A 
Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1960), 94. Marion, referring 
to the etymology of analogy as “proportion,” offers a stance on the debate concerning Aquinas’s exact 
position on analogy. He states: “Thomas Aquinas ensures this [i.e., the being of creatures will not be taken 
for the esse of God], further, through two characteristics given to analogy. (a) First, it is a matter of 
proportio and not of proportionalitas: ‘analogiam idest proprotionem [sic].’ Whereas proportionalitas 
translates and thus recalls a proportion of four terms, which entails a defined, commensurable, and 
intelligible relation between them, proportio, by contrast, has no further ambition than to refer several 
terms to a focal point without the necessity of any common measure between them.” “Thomas Aquinas and 
Onto-Theo-Logy,” 49-50. For yet another defense of this position, see also Wippel, The Metaphysical 
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 550-555. On proportionality in De Veritate, Wippel surmises: “His overriding 
concern throughout much of this discussion seems to be to protect divine transcendence. His theory of 
analogical proportionality is not equally successful, however, in protecting him against the kind of 
 187 
analogy of proportionality, a is analogous to b insofar as a is to c as b is to d, a four term 
analogy that can be formalized as follows: a:c :: b:d (e.g., fawn:deer::kid:goat). A does 
not relate directly to b, but their relationship is mediated by an analogy between their 
distinct relationships to something else, and the relationship of each to something else 
then brings them into communion. Aquinas provides the example of the “sight” of vision 
being analogous to the “sight” of intellect.102 The two sights are related analogously 
insofar as each operates in a similiar fashion with respect to the functioning of vision or 
the intellect: there is an analogy between the relation of each act (i.e., intellectual and 
corporeal vision) to its respective faculty (i.e., the intellect or the eyes). Thus in terms of 
esse, the relation of creatures to their being is analogous to the relation of God to his 
being.103
                                                                                                                                                 
agnosticism on our part which he associates with a theory of purely equivocal predication of the divine 
names.” Ibid., 554. See also Montagnes, The Doctrine of Analogy. Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being: An 
Essay on Analogy and Existence (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Book Co. 1949). Here he argues that Thomas 
opts for “analogy of proper proportionality” for the very reason that it avoids the covert univocity of 
“analogy of proportion/attribution.” Only this type of analogy, he maintains, allows created beings to have 
esse in any meaningful sense, which is indicated by the adjective “proper.” Otherwise, their esse is referred 
to something outside them (i.e., subsisting being) either by extrinsic or intrinsic attribution. Both modes of 
attribution, he argues, are reducible to univocity and thus fail to sustain the real difference between God 
and creatures. He argues: “For, while attribution is in the order of extrinsic relation, metaphor is in the 
order of operation; and operation is certainly ‘closer’ to being than relation. Nevertheless metaphor is an 
improper mode of analogy precisely because it has to do with a concept that is univocal in itself, since it is 
realized formally and properly in only one of the terms of the proportionality. In analogy of proper 
proportionality, on the other hand, the common concept is intrinsically analogical because it is realized 
formally and properly in each and every one of the terms of the proportionality” The Bond of Being, 229-
230. For our purposes at present, a division between analogy of proportion/attribution and analogy of 
proportionality will suffice.  
102 “Quandoque vero dicitur aliquid analogice secundo modo convenientiae; sicut nomen visus dicitur de 
visu corporali et intellectu, eo quod sicut visus est in oculo, ita intellectus in mente.” De Veritate, q. 2, a. 
11, resp.  
103 Salas has stressed the way in which such an analogy accounts for the judgmental basis of analogy 
insofar as an analogy holds between the dynamic relation of both beings to their respective actus essendi. 
See Salas, “The Judgmental Character,” 125-130. He goes on to claim, however, that analogy of attribution 
is also realized in judgmental terms, and thus is no less existential. Ibid., 130.  
 This type of analogical relationship has the advantage that no direct analogy 
links divine to created esse such that esse would be common to both. The “esse” of each 
is not analogous; only their respective relations. Thus, we ascend from an undestanding 
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of the relation between creatures and their being to a knowledge of God and his being. A 
further advantage is that it awards creatures their own intrinsic or “proper” perfections 
(e.g., being), which can be known apart from and prior to the other dyad of the analogy 
(i.e., a:c apart from b:d).104
      The noteworthy issue here concerns the inability to draw an analogy of proper 
proportionality from creatures, whose esse as a really distinct perfection only fully 
emerges when held in reference to their efficient creative cause. As argued above, an 
understanding of “a” (e.g., the essence of phoenix or human) which does not include “c” 
  
      Given the wide range of skepticism concerning Aquinas’s adherence to the analogy of 
proportionality, I will bypass a comparative review of the textual basis for the different 
types of analogy and instead focus on what seems to be the pressing philosophical issue 
concerning its use. The problem with an analogy of proportionality is that it requires prior 
knowledge of both proportions (e.g., “God to God’s esse” and “a creature to a creature’s 
esse”) from which the comparison can be derived. But as we have argued, only through 
reference to the primum analogatum essendi (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens) does the true 
role of esse for creatures manifest. Reinvoking the argument from above that a real 
distinction between esse and essence in creatures requires knowledge of their identity in 
ipsum esse subsistens, below I will argue that neither esse commune nor a creature’s own 
actus essendi satisfies the demands of such knowledge when withholding reference to (a 
creature’s) participation in ipsum esse subsistens.   
                                                 
104 Anderson states: “The metaphysical necessity of this analogy [proper proportionality] may be brought 
home to us by the reflection that, apart from it, even the univocal predication of a common term of several 
actually distinct things would be impossible. For were there no analogy of beings in being, there would not 
be several things distinct in the act of being, but only on Thing, One Essence; and we should be back with 
old Parmenides. Univocal predication itself clearly presupposes simple diversity of act of existing of 
diverse existents. This act, which is the root and flower of every perfection, since it proceeds from Him 
alone who is Pure Act, St. Thomas calls esse—‘to be.’” The Bond of Being, 284.  
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(e.g., their existence) does not provide adequate grounds for uncovering the perfective 
contribution of c—what I have been calling “extra-formal existential actuality”—before 
referencing the efficient cause of such perfection, a cause that has the perfection of itself 
and not from another. Thus, the being of creatures is indelibly linked to the being of God: 
we only discover the true meaning of being when we reflect on the insufficiency of 
beings to ground their own being, which leads back to subsisting being. Likewise, our 
knowledge that God is arises from such reflection on the ground of beings, and not from 
an independent intuition into the nature of God, which we then can compare to the nature 
of beings and derive an analogy of proper proportionality.105
      In addition, as pointed out by Suarez, proportionality itself does not preclude 
univocity.
  
106
                                                 
105 See, for example, Klubertanz, 109. Klubertanz argues that analogy of proper proportionality either 
requires previous knowledge of both analogates, which can subsequently be compared; or agnosticism 
about one of the analogates involved because the knowledge remains figurative.   
106 DM 28.3.10-11. 
 Proportionality by itself (e.g., a human is related to its senses as a horse is 
related to its) does not entail an analogy of proportionality. Thus, merely to relate the 
distinct proportions of being does not necessitate that they be analogical. Instead, what 
makes a being’s esse unlike that of God’s requires a deeper understanding of the primum 
analogatum of esse itself (i.e., as a pure subsisting act) and the way in which it comes to 
be received in caused beings through participation. Such an understanding cannot 
transpire from an inquiry concerning caused things themselves, but must make some 
appeal to the nature of esse as such. Suarez explains that only by referencing the absolute 
status of one member (i.e., primum analogatum) does the derivative nature of the others 
becomes apparent. Thus, only by a remotional understanding of the radical identity 
between God and his esse do we come to witness the analogical manner in which 
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everything else must participate being.107 From the insufficient and imperfect likeness of 
creatures to God, a non-reciprocal reference is made to God based on proportion, not 
proportionality.108
      As Aquinas often explains in his discussions of analogy of attribution (i.e., or 
“proportion”), two things are said to be analogous in one of two ways: either as they both 
relate to a common third (i.e., many to one), or as one of them relates to the other and 
receives the ratio from the first (i.e., one to another).
 The likeness of creatures to God is direct (i.e., proportion) and, as will 
be presently unpacked, Aquinas’s prominent mode of understanding the distinction. 
109 An example of the first kind of 
analogous predication is predicating ‘ens’ of both quality and quantity in reference to 
substance, as accidents are said “to be” only in relation to substance; or, another example, 
as medicine and urine are both called “healthy” in relation to the end of health in the 
body.110
                                                 
107 Cf. Anderson, The Bond of Being, 105-107. Despite Anderson’s persistence that Suarez misreads 
proportionality, and treats only analogy of improper proportionality (i.e., metaphor) and not proper 
proportionality, nevertheless in order to draw out the analogical character of the relationship, there must be 
a primary analogate, which all others reference but which itself does not include inferior. Although 
Anderson denies such a primary analogate, as will be seen, Aquinas always speaks in terms of many 
referencing the one in such a way that the one itself does not include reference to the many.  
108 An analogy of proportionality could not attest to the nature of God—we would need to already have 
knowledge of the relation of God to God’s esse and could not utilize the similitude of creatures to God for 
the basis of a demonstration.) Even though there is an attestation on the part of creature, which makes 
demonstration possible, their very being inherently refers to subsisting being itself. Thus, there can be a 
demonstration of the existence of God beginning with creatures (e.g., the De Ente presentation or the fourth 
way of the Summas) even though the real distinction between esse and essence in creatures only fully 
emerges after God’s nature as ipsum esse subsistens has been secured. The “not-included esse” of the first 
stage comes to be specified as (esse) “efficiently caused by another” and must be really distinct because it 
belongs only to a single being. Given the incommunicably self-identical subsistence of esse, all else must 
defect from this perfection in some way. Only once we realize the limitation of these beings and their 
essences (i.e., they require an efficient cause) does the composition of their essence and esse manifest based 
on what their efficient cause necessarily turns out to be (i.e., subsisting being).  
109 “[...] quod Creator et creatura reducuntur in unum, non communitate univocationis sed analogiae. Talis 
autem communitas potest esse duplex. Aut ex eo quod aliqua participant aliquid unum secundum prius et 
posterius, sicut potentia et actus rationem entis, et similiter substantia et accidens; aut ex eo quod unum 
esse et rationem ab altero recipit; et talis est analogia creaturae ad Creatorem: creatura enim non habet esse 
nisi secundum quod a primo ente descendit, nec nominatur ens nisi inquantum ens primum imitatur; et 
similiter est de sapientia et de omnibus aliis quae de creatura dicuntur.” In I Sent. Prolog., q. 1, a. 2, ad. 2. 
 This type of predication of two things to a third cannot be what holds for 
110 See, for example, SCG I. 34 and De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, resp. The latter states: “Respondeo. Dicendum quod 
impossibile est aliquid univoce praedicari de Deo et creatura; quod ex hoc patet: Nam omnis effectus 
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creatures and God, although it can be what holds between creatures themselves in 
reference to God. Otherwise this bond of analogy would be prior to both God and 
creatures and this common third would constitute the ratio of both finite and infinite 
being. Thus, the analogy between God and creatures must be of the latter sort, insofar as 
creatures reference God, but God in no way references them. This means that only one 
side constitutes the ratio under which a multiplicity is linked, but the multiplicity in no 
way co-constitutes the ratio. The proper ratio remains purfied of any traces of that which 
it grounds.  
                                                                                                                                                 
agentis univoci adaequat virtutem agentis. Nulla autem creatura, cum sit finita, potest adaequare virtutem 
primi agentis, cum sit infinita. Unde impossibile est quod similitudo Dei univoce in creatura recipiatur. 
Item patet quod, etsi una sit ratio formae existentis in agente et in effectu, diversus tamen modus existendi 
impedit univocam praedicationem; licet enim eadem sit ratio domus quae sit in materia et domus quae est 
in mente artificis,- quia unum est ratio alterius,- non tamen domus univoce de utraque praedicatur, propter 
hoc quod species domus in materia habet esse materiale, in mente vero artificis immateriale. Dato ergo per 
impossibile quod eiusdem rationis sit bonitas in Deo et creatura, non tamen bonum univoce de Deo 
praedicaretur; cum quod in Deo est immaterialiter et simpliciter, in creatura sit materialiter et multipliciter. 
Et praeterea ens non dicitur univoce de substantia et accidente, propter hoc quod substantia est ens 
tamquam per se habens esse, accidens vero tamquam cuius esse est inesse. Ex quo patet quod diversa 
habitudo ad esse impedit univocam praedicationem entis. Deus autem alio modo se habet ad esse quam 
aliqua alia creatura; nam ipse est suum esse, quod nulli alii creaturae competit. Unde nullo modo univoce 
de Deo creatura dicitur; et per consequens nec aliquid aliorum praedicabilium inter quae est ipsum primum 
ens. Existente enim diversitate in primo, oportet in aliis diversitatem inveniri; unde de substantia et 
accidente nihil univoce praedicatur. Quidam autem aliter dixerunt, quod de Deo et creatura nihil 
praedicatur analogice, sed aequivoce pure. Et huius opinionis est Rabbi Moyses, ut ex suis dictis patet. Ista 
autem opinio non potest esse vera: quia in pure aequivocis, quae philosophus nominat a casu aequivoca, 
non dicitur aliquid de uno per respectum ad alterum. Omnia autem quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, 
dicuntur de Deo secundum aliquem respectum ad creaturas, vel e contrario, sicut patet per omnes opiniones 
positas de expositione divinorum nominum. Unde impossibile est quod sit pura aequivocatio. Item, cum 
omnis cognitio nostra de Deo ex creaturis sumatur, si non erit convenientia nisi in nomine tantum, nihil de 
Deo sciremus nisi nomina tantum vana, quibus res non subesset. Sequeretur etiam quod omnes 
demonstrationes a philosophis datae de Deo, essent sophisticae; verbi gratia, si dicatur, quod omne quod est 
in potentia, reducitur ad actum per ens actu,- et ex hoc concluderetur quod Deus esset ens actu, cum per 
ipsum omnia in esse educantur,- erit fallacia aequivocationis; et sic de omnibus aliis. Et praeterea oportet 
causatum esse aliqualiter simile causae; unde oportet de causato et causa nihil pure aequivoce praedicari, 
sicut sanum de medicina et animali. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod de Deo et creatura nihil praedicetur 
univoce; non tamen ea quae communiter praedicantur, pure aequivoce praedicantur, sed analogice. Huius 
autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod 
tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid 
praedicatur de duobus per respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate. In primo autem 
modo praedicationis oportet esse aliquid prius duobus, ad quod ambo respectum habent, sicut substantia ad 
quantitatem et qualitatem; in secundo autem non, sed necesse est unum esse prius altero. Et ideo cum Deo 
nihil sit prius, sed ipse sit prior creatura, competit in divina praedicatione secundus modus analogiae, et non 
primus.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, resp. 
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      In both the case of “the being of accidents” or the “health of medicine or excerise,” 
there is an “extrinsic attribution” of the term, which is defined by the intrinsic or proper 
attribution of such in the primary analogate (i.e., the being of substance; the health of 
bodies). These examples are illuminating insofar as they show how the unified ratio can 
be applied to a multiplicity and yet retain its proper and complete attribution according 
the primary analogate. The original definition remains unsupplemented by its 
communication to many.111 The examples may be misleading, however, in that created 
beings would have being only by extrinsic denomination and thus their being would be 
nothing more than their relation to God (i.e., as efficient cause). At this point, the 
difference between a human and a phoenix would be negligible. A phoenix also can be 
said “to be” by extrinsic denomination, that is, it has being in relation to its status in the 
intellect. Although the relation that defines a real being would be different than the 
relation whereby an intellect gives being to an idea, in both cases, nevertheless, “being” 
would be nothing more than a mere relation to God.112
                                                 
111  In an early text, Aquinas gives a clear statement of analogy in reference to univocity and equivocity as 
the three modes of predicating a concept (ratio) of many. He states:  “[…] intelligentiam sciendum est quod 
tripliciter aliquid praedicatur de pluribus: uniuoce, aequiuoce et analogice. Vniuoce praedicatur quod 
praedicatur secundum idem nomen et secundum rationem eamdem, id est definitionem, sicut animal 
praedicatur de homine et de asino: utrumque enim dicitur animal, et utrumque est substantia animata 
sensibilis, quod est diffinitio animalis. Equiuoce praedicatur, quod praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem 
nomen, et secundum diuersam rationem, sicut canis dicitur de latrabili et de caelesti, que conveniunt solum 
in nomine, et non in diffinitione siue significatione; id enim quod significatur per nomen, est diffinitio, 
sicut dicitur in IV Metaphisice. Analogice dicitur praedicari quod praedicatur de pluribus quorum rationes 
diuersae sunt sed attribuuntur uni alicui eidem, sicut sanum dicitur de corpore animalis et de urina et de 
potione, sed non ex toto idem significat in omnibus.” Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis XIII P.M. Edita, t. 43: De 
principiis naturae ad fratrem Sylvestrum. (Roma: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976),VI. Hereafter: “De 
principiis naturae.” See also: “Tamen sciendum, quod paternitas non est ejusdem rationis secundum 
univocationem in Deo et in creaturis, quamvis sit eadem ratio secundum analogiam, quae quidem aliquid 
habet de identitate rationis, et aliquid de diversitate.” In I Sent. d. 21 q. 1 a. 1 qc. 2 resp.  
  
112 See Chapter VI below. Also: “The diminished, parasitic esse of creatures consists in their being 
somehow related to God; but, likewise, the diminished, parasitic esse of a fictive being, say a goatstag, 
consists in its being somehow related to creatures (to a goat and a stag, or to the mind the imagines it). 
What is remarkable about God, though, is that he can give real esse to the objects he creates, where a 
human mind only fictive esse to the objects it imagines.” Menn, “Metaphysics: God and Being,” in The 
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      Such an account would fail to explain the tangible difference between a being in re 
(i.e., its real being) and a being in intellectu. “Esse,” however, is meant to explain what 
more this “in re” signifies. Because, however, God “faceret sibi simile,” the being of 
creatures attests to their causa essendi in a more causally robust manner than a mere 
being of reason, such as a phoenix, which has a causa essendi in only a limited sense: i.e.,  
prior to creation, it has no being of its own apart from the divine intellect and, following 
creation, it makes gains only in intellectu through the number of intellects which can 
conceive it.113 It will be necessary to see how around the issue of assimilative 
participation Aquinas seeks a more proper attribution of esse to beings in re without 
allowing their being to co-constitute the ratio essendi. The problem will be to show how 
beings can be like God in their existential actuality; that is, that “esse” actually explains a 
thing’s own act of being as more than extrinsic dependence upon a cause (i.e., being 
through external relation) and yet due to the essential nature of God’s being, which all 
other beings must participate, even when received, esse remains fundamentally other than 
the nature of any other being.114
                                                                                                                                                 
Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A.S. McGrade (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 163. 
113 I will say more about this below. See Chapters IV and V below.  
114 In the following passage, Aquinas states the problem in terms of goodness and attempts to explain how 
being and good can be said of creatures more than in terms of extrinsic denomination. He states: “Sed 
contra est quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia per esse divinum, sed per 
esse proprium [m.e.]. Ergo non omnia sunt bona bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.” ST I, q. 6, a. 4, s.c. 
In what follows, Aquinas explains how from its participation in the first being, which itself is essentially 
good and being, everything else can be called good and a being. What belongs to each thing formally is a 
similitude or trace of divine goodness. Thus, on account of such an inhering similitude, each creature both 
possesses its own goodness, but also reflects its cause, which alone is essentially good. On this matter, 
Aquinas states: “A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, 
inquantum participat ipsum per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut ex 
superioribus patet. [m.e.] Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate divina, sicut primo principio 
exemplari, effectivo et finali totius bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine 
divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas denominans ipsum [m.e.].  Et sic est 
bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae bonitates.” ST I, q. 6, a. 4, resp. 
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      In discussing the perfection of God, Aquinas asks whether other things can be like 
God.115
                                                 
115 In the following passage, Aquinas discusses the ways in which likeness (similitudo) is based on 
communication of a form. The first way communicates the same form according to the same ratio, and 
according to the same mode. He provides the example of two equal whitenesses. The second manner 
concerns the communication of the same form according to the same ratio, but in different modes. He gives 
the example of greater and lesser whitenesses. The third way, which is between non-univocal agents, 
concerns the communication of the same form, but not according to the same ratio. God’s communication 
of his same form to creatures cannot be a specific or generic similitude, as God is outside all genera. Thus, 
creatures are similitudes of God’s form according to analogy. He states: “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum 
similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, 
secundum multos modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae communicant in 
eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum eundem modum: et haec non solum dicuntur 
similia, sed aequalia in sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in albedine. Et haec est 
perfectissima similitudo. Alio modo dicuntur similia, quae communicant in forma secundum eandem 
rationem, et non secundum eundem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album dicitur simile 
magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta. Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in 
eadem forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem; ut patet in agentibus non univocis. Cum enim omne 
agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens, agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est 
quod in effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum in eadem specie cum suo effectu, 
erit similitudo inter faciens et factum in forma, secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut homo generat 
hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem 
rationem speciei, sicut ea quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam similitudinem solis, 
non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis. 
Si igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad 
similitudinem formae agentis: non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis secundum 
eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune 
omnibus. Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali 
principio totius esse.” ST I, q. 4, a. 3, resp.  
 He maintains that God communicates his form to them, not according to generic 
or specific formality, but analogy, more specifically, according to likeness and similitude. 
They in turn are assimilated to him as imperfect similitudes insofar as they are beings and 
he the first and universal principle of the totality of being (Et hoc modo illa quae sunt a 
Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut primo et universali principio totius esse). In 
differentiating the procession of creatures from God from the procession of the divine 
persons, Aquinas helps to clarify the nature of analogy at work. The divine essence itself 
(ipsa) is not communicated to creatures emanating from God, but remains 
uncommunicated. A similitude of this essence, which is not the essence itself, however, is 
spread through creation, thus preserving the ipseity of the divine essence while at the 
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same time providing a unified ground for the diffused multiplicity. In his Commentary on 
the Divine Names, he states: 
Nam in processione divinarum Personarum ipsa eadem divina Essentia communicatur 
Personae procedenti et sic sunt plures Personae habentes divinam Essentiam, sed in 
processione creaturarum, ipsa divina essentia non communicatur creaturis procedentibus, 
sed remanet incommunicata seu imparticipata; sed similitudo eius, per ea quae dat 
creaturis, in creaturis propagatur et multiplicatur et sic quodammodo Divinitas per sui 
similitudinem non per essentiam, in creaturas procedit et in eis quodammodo 
multiplicatur, ut sic ipsa creaturarum processio possit dici divina discretio, si respectus ad 
divinam similitudinem habeatur, non autem si respiciatur divina Essentia.116
Creatures do not join in an essential (i.e., generic or specific) community with God, but 
as imperfect similitudes of divine esse, in whom esse and essence are really distinct, they 
remain analogically linked to him. God’s essence remains uncommunicated and 
unparticipated.
  
117
      This issue of how God hands-down and diffuses being to creatures, while still 
remaining himself unparticipated, will be important in determining whether “created 
beings” are by their own actus essendi, or whether “esse” as the having being of such 
beings only can be attributed to them as they relate to their cause. At this point, all that 
can be affirmed is that relation to a first and universal principle of all being, however, 
provides creatures with the adveniens extra as something other than and uncontained by 
 Instead, God generates a similitude of himself to be participated, 
thereby not multiplying himself or giving himself over to the participants. We are not yet 
in a position to fully understand the mechanisms by which being is given (dare esse), all 
of which will be treated below in relation to essential possibility in terms of divine ideas 
and the act of giving esse through creation.              
                                                 
116 In div. nom., cap. 2 lect. 3. 158. 
117 This language of the “unparticipated” perfection generating something of itself that is participated seems 
to derive from the Neo-Platonism of Proclus. See Elements of Theology, Prop. XXIII.  
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their essential determinations. Although only God is a being essentially, whereas 
everything else is a being through participation, a difference that would prohibit 
creatures from agreeing with God in form, analogy provides the bond between a cause 
transcending all genera and its effects that bear his likeness as participants in being. This 
does not, however, mean that God is like creatures.118 His transcendence cannot be 
perfected through an analogical communication of his form, but instead remains 
untouched by creaturely assimilation.119
      Again, in his Sentences Commentary, we see how Aquinas specifically thinks through 
the analogical relation between God and creatures in terms of similitude. On the question 
of whether God is the formal esse of creatures, he states: “Unde est tertius modus causae 
agentis analogice. Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse creaturae in similitudine 
sui imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse creatum 
effective et exemplariter manat.”
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118 And further on the non-reciprocity, he states: “Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet aliquo modo 
concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis 
creaturae: quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., in his quae unius ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua 
similitudo, non autem in causa et causato: dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e converso. 
Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit similis Deo: non tamen quod Deus sit similis 
creaturae.” ST I q. 4, a. 3, ad 4. See also SCG I.29. 
119 In response to the objection that there could be no similitude since esse and essence are not identical in 
creatures, but are so in God, Aquinas states: “Ad tertium dicendum quod non dicitur esse similitudo 
creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei: sed 
secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem.” ST I, q. 
4, a. 3, ad 3. Here again we see the connection between analogy and participation.  
120 In I Sent. d. 8, q.1. a 2, resp. This question addresses whether God is the esse of all things, which 
Aquinas obviously rejects. I will discuss this latter passage in more detail below in reference to his 
arguments against God being the formal esse of all things. See Chapter V Section 3 below. See also, for 
example, SCG I.29 and De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad. 2. In both cases, Aquinas distinguishes between possession 
according to essence and possession according to diminished participation. The likeness of creatures to God 
stems from their possession of what belongs to God. 
 God as efficient and exemplary cause (i.e., most 
being) produces an imperfect similitude of himself, which is the esse creaturae. Divine 
esse is said to be the esse of all things because it is that by which all created esse 
efficiently and exemplarily diffuses (manat). Thus, as created being is diffused from God, 
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the effect imperfectly exemplifies its exemplar to whose perfection the former can 
attest.121 God thus cannot be made univocal with any creature because of his purity of act 
by which he subsists. His being cannot be diffused according to itself (i.e., its own ratio), 
as nothing could be added to such pure subsistence by which it could be rendered 
communicable. And yet his purity of act, by which esse diffuses to all beings, leaves a 
trace, although of a different ratio, such that an account can be rendered. Although 
analogy cuts between the extremes of univocal collapse and equivocal evacuation, it 
seems to invite a deeper problem. How to avoid the conclusion that the analogical having 
of esse by creatures, which results from the spreading of divine esse, does not make God 
the formal esse of all things.122
      To make God the formal esse of all things, a conclusion which Aquinas constantly 
resists, would be to deprive creatures of their own proper being (i.e., their own intrinsic 
actus essendi). This is the danger of too closely assimilating participants into that which 
they participate, leaving no room between the causal expanse of esse and those things to 
which it expands. It is clear that each thing has esse insofar as it participates the first and 
pure act (primum et purum actum) through assimilation, as Aquinas often states: “[...] 
quaelibet res participet per assimilationem primum actum in quantum habet esse.”
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121 Cf. Jean-Luc Marion: “The foundation for entities and for their being (esse commune) in God depends 
without doubt on causality, but it has nothing that is reciprocal, so that being certainly does not ground 
(conceptually) God, whose actus essendi escapes all concepts, to the strict extent that an act determines 
being in Him [...] This is confirmed in the fact that, free from any causality or ground (not even His proper 
essence, directly identified with his act of being, God denies from Himself the metaphysical figure of self-
foundation, for which the causa sui designates the paradigm. ” Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-
logy,” 65.  
122 See below Chapter V, Section 2.  
 But 
123 De spir. creaturis, a. 1 resp.  Also, In I Sent. d. 8, q.1. a 2, resp. I will discuss this latter passage in more 
detail below. See Chapter V Section 3 below. Elsewhere, on the question of whether the esse of an angel is 
an accident of it, Aquinas states: “Sciendum ergo quod unumquodque quod est in potentia et in actu, fit 
actu per hoc quod participat actum superiorem, per hoc autem aliquid maxime fit actu, quod participat per 
similitudinem primum et purum actum; primus autem actus est esse subsistens per se; unde completionem 
unumquodque recipit per hoc quod participat esse. Unde esse est complementum omnis forme, quia per hoc 
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does such assimilation (per assimilationem) risk collapsing created beings into their 
creative ground and thereby undermining esse as an existential perfection properly 
attributable to them? Thus, what does “esse” mean in reference to creatures besides their 
relation to another, an existential actuality proper to another? Does the diffusion of the 
unparticipated ipsum esse subsistens to its partipants really give them anything of their 
own or, to borrow Sweeney’s language, is this merely a “deployment” of esse on a lower 
level, as created effects remaining in and identical with their cause?124
      If this perfection of all perfections and act of all actuality comes to mean only 
“relation to a causal ground,” “esse” as the mark of the real, or that which irreducibly 
distinguishes “that which is” from its mere conception, is guilty of existential evacuation: 
not an evacuation of God from being this time, but of being from creatures. Being 
becomes too closely related to ipsum esse per se subsistens to serve as an act properly 
belonging to anything else. Although both resisting any real and univocal sharing 
between God and creatures, which would make created beings beings according to the 
proper ratio essendi and not just imperfect similitudes of being, and at the same time 
retaining a unifying bond grounded in assimilation to a primary and pure ground of 
actuality, analogy must defend itself on another front: namely, one where the existing 
individual, whose actual existence “esse” is meant to explain, becomes little more than a 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
completur quod habet esse, et habet esse cum est actu; et sic nulla forma est nisi per esse [m.e.]. Et sic dico 
quod esse substanciale rei non est accidens, sed actualitas cuiuslibet forme existentis, siue sine materia siue 
cum materia. Et quia esse est complementum omnium, inde est quod proprius effectus Dei est esse, et nulla 
causa dat esse nisi in quantum participat operationem diuinam. Et sic proprie loquendo, non est accidens. Et 
quod Hylarius dicit, dico quod accidens dicitur large omne quod non est pars essentiae, et sic est esse in 
rebus creatis, quia in solo Deo esse est eius essencia.” Thomae De Aquino Opera omnia jussu Leonis XIII 
P.M. edita, t. 25/2: Quaestiones de quolibet. Quodlibet I, II, III, VI, IV, V, XII (Commossio Leonina-
Éditions du Cerf, Roma-Paris, 1996) XII, q. 4, a. 1, arg. Hereafter “Quodlibet.”  
124 He raises this question in reference to Proclus’ theory of emanation, but the same problem holds for 
Aquinas. See Sweeney, “Participation and the Structure of Being in Proclus’ Elements of Theology,” The 
Structure of Being: A Neoplatonic Approach. ed. R. Baine Harris (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1982): 154. 
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divine refraction of being. As opposed to restoring actual existence to its primary role in 
the thinking of being, metaphysics would thus becomes theology insofar as their objects 
coincide. Aquinas’s thinking the real (i.e., as beyond merely conceiving the formally 
intelligibile as stated by existential Thomism) would be concentrated only to the fullness 
of esse as actus essendi primus et purus against which the communal field of being (i.e., 
esse commune) becomes a pale and spectral refraction of being, hardly more worthy of 
the name of “being” than mere intellectual fictions (e.g., phoenixes) that are but only in 
relation to their causal ground (i.e., the intellect’s act of understanding).   
      If we are to locate a more fundamental actuality imparted by actus essendi primus et 
purus to its effects and to show how such existential actuality, although radically other 
than such beings in their essential natures, differs from the actuality imparted by the 
intellect to its objects (even if fictional), we must determine how the “dare esse” of the 
former does not mean that beings inhere in divine esse but exist on their own and yet not 
through themselves (per se).125 How analogy explains the proper attribution of being to 
creatures without making God the formal esse of creatures and thereby undermining their 
real existence nor making them self-sufficient and able to subsist apart from God’s 
influence introduces a further inquiry; it will require us to assess what esse adds 
adveniens extra to a creature’s essential possibility prior to creation and what Aquinas 
means specifically by “participation in being”: what participates (i.e., a precreated subject 
or essence) and what is participated (i.e., esse commune, actus essendi suum, ipsum esse 
commune, all three)?126
                                                 
125 See also Stephen Menn, “Metaphysics: God and Being,” 163. 
126 These will compose the respective topics of the following two chapters.  
 In short, a final answer to this question requires an understanding 
of Aquinas’s doctrine of creation ex nihilo. 
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Conclusion  
      As we have seen, analogy forges a common bond of being (i.e., a non-reciprocal 
likeness to a primary referent) without collapsing the hierarchical diversity between the 
unequal members. Beings that are more or less true, good, and noble partake of the ratio 
essendi from God, whose essence is to be and to whom they imperfectly liken 
themselves. As a plenitude of existential perfection, ipsum esse subsistens cannot be 
supplemented by anything outside of itself otherwise it would depend upon something 
extrinsic to itself. As the self-contained ratio essendi, containing the entire virtus essendi, 
divine esse both makes possible the bond of being by which creatures are able to be 
beings through the spread of being and yet transcends such a communal field of being 
(esse commune) in such a way that the latter derivation can only be linked to the former, 
its cause, through analogy.  
      And yet the perfect ipseity of subsisting esse bars a true communication of being to 
beings—as such is proper only to God—and thus creatures must imitate being (i.e., be 
like being by participating being itself), but not be being. With an analogic of being, 
which both retains God’s transcendent ipseity while also preserving the link between the 
two orders of being, Aquinas attempts to remove any trace of creation and finitude from 
the proper ratio essendi while preserving traces in creation of divine perfection sufficient 
to ground demonstration and remotion. Thus, even though all concepts attributed to God 
originate in our sensory experience of creatures and retain this primary mode of 
signification, certain concepts (e.g., being or good) belong properly to God and thus must 
be stripped of any impurities (i.e., through remotion). The purified concept can be 
reapplied to the field of created being, but only according to a secondary, or “analogical,” 
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sense (ratio) as a derivation of the true sense of being (ratio essendi). Thus, the derivative 
ratio is excluded from constituting in any way its proper archetype, lest its purity be 
tainted by supplements, although the proper ratio originates for us from within the 
derivative and provides us with “traces” by which it can be reached.  
      With analogy, Aquinas mobilizes the principle of similitude in order to unite a 
multiplicity of diverse beings around a common principle to which they refer and under 
which they form a unified field. Beings thus are measured through their likeness to and 
imitation of their referent (ipsum esse subsistens), a measure (i.e., resemblance) that 
inherently implies at least some degree of dissimilarity and thus distance from God. 
Analogy thus brings univocity’s community of being together with equivocity’s distance 
between created and uncreated being, without the former’s flattening of the community 
into equal members or the latter’s radical distance and diversity between created and 
uncreated being. With analogy, there is communication between esse commune and 
ipsum esse subsistens insofar as the very being of the former inherently references and 
attests to the perfection of the latter to whose perfection and plenitude it imperfectly 
testifies. With divine esse as its primary referent (primum analogatum), created esse 
shares in a non-reciprocal communion of being, such that the giver of communion in no 
way partakes of that which is given.  
      We find Aquinas holding together the two orders by a fragile thread: neither can the 
names shared by God and creatures reduce both to a common third (i.e., univocity) nor 
can difference in meaning (i.e., equivocity) open too great a chasm. Only through 
analogical predication grounded in analogical causation can the eminence of divine 
perfection fortify against collapse into univocity, while maintaining a link to the very 
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order of being of which it serves as the first principle and as the unifying ground.127 God 
as the universal principle of all being, thus, subsists as the crown of “perfective 
elevation”—to borrow Pickstock’s language128—wherein the concept of esse proper to 
him does not empty being of all content, but completes an analogical field of likenesses. 
Created beings, however, do not co-constitute or enhance the meaning of esse in any 
way.129 They do not share in determining the meaning, or filling out the perfection, of 
being. This is why, as has been argued in this chapter and the previous ones, the true 
meaning of the real distinction only comes into focus when “esse” is properly referred to 
its primary analogue (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). Because creatures need being to be, but 
are not such being through themselves; and because God is the plenitude of such 
existential perfection through himself (per se) without any supplement on the part of 
creation; around the always inadequate and unreciprocal likening of them to him, a space 
of participation is opened. And they, in turn, render an account of their creator, for 
example, the fourth way.130
      Whatever can be said of esse commune prior to a reflection upon ipsum esse 
subsistens and its “dans esse”—and I do not doubt that something can be said, even by 
those who deny the real distinction—there remains an inadequate foundation for the real 
distinction in created being before establishing that being whose being is proper to it 
  
                                                 
127 SCG I.36. 
128 Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus: His Historical and Contemporary Significance,” Modern Theology 
21:4 (October 2005): 546, 550.  
129 The example Aquinas often uses to display this type of analogy (often called “analogy of attribution”) is 
the predication of “health” of an animal, a diet, and urine. Predicating such of an animal is the primary 
mode of predication, from which the others derive. Without this primary mode, they would not be healthy. 
In addition, the true meaning of health is fully constituted by an animal and thus lacks nothing without 
these secondary modes (analogues) of signification.  
130 “The participating analogue cannot exhibit a full rational account of its cause (cannot furnish us with a 
syllogistic proof of its cause) but only a partial one, by way of its concreteness as an effect, its very 
factuality which declares its cause by exhibiting more clearly its own concrete character. And yet this fact, 
in pointing towards it more excellent cause, embodies a kind of reason.” Pickstock, “Duns Scotus,” 554-
555.  
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alone. Only by arguing for esse as the most perfect of all actualities—that to which even 
the most perfect forms remain in potency—can Aquinas maintain that esse says 
something more than ens when referring to created beings. What it says, and why the 
third stage of the De Ente argument and an appeal to causality in the fourth way are 
necessary, is that no matter how perfect an essential perfection may be, it stands in need 
of a deeper existential actuality. Otherwise, both arguments remain trapped in the 
conceptual realm, unable to translate claims to a maximal perfection of a kind into rerum 
natura. Causality forces every measure of a perfection to be accountable by some cause 
in re because this cause contains the perfection more eminently.  
      Despite certain successes in mediating the aforementioned pitfalls of univocity and 
equivocity, analogy confronts the deeper problem of what esse means when applied to 
creatures. As we have seen, such a theory risks existential deprivation insofar as that 
which was introduced to explain a created being’s extra-conceptual, extra-formal, 
actuality (i.e., the actus essendi) comes to imply an extrinsic relation of creatures to the 
plenitude of another. The need to secure the borders of a pure act, even one that cannot be 
fully known to us such as “esse,” may leave creatures more ontologically impoverished 
than they had been under essentialism’s conceptual imperialism. Under the essentialist 
regime of Aristotelian ousiology (i.e., being qua substance), finite beings, or “creatures” 
if you will, were considered imperfect to that degree that their formal actuality required 
another to causally enable it to be (i.e., a substance). In the case of some creatures, this 
meant only a cause of movement (i.e., in the case of intelligences) whereas in other less 
perfect beings (i.e., sublunary beings) more causal influences, including matter, needed to 
align. For Thomistic existentialism, however, even caused substances of the highest 
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pedigree lack the purity of act (i.e., esse) and so cannot subsist, but remain specters 
basking in the borrowed radiance of another. If this interpretation is right, which I am not 
yet convinced it need be, then “esse” would be the most imperious of all perfections, 
even if not a concept.   
      I am not yet convinced because the meaning of esse in relation to creatures seems 
indelibly tied to an account of creation ex nihilo, that is, the mechanism of distribution by 
which the cause of all being for beings “dat esse.” By undertaking a more extensive 
examination of such a matter, the meaning of esse in relation to creatures (i.e., as more 
than an extrinsic attribution of their relation to a cause) can be filled out. Thus, we must 
unpack that which is given in the giving of being, the “adveniens extra” that meets the 
essence of each existing thing without merging with such. By understanding the causality 
of dans esse in the light of creation ex nihilo, what “esse” says even more than the 
relation of something to a cause is the existential happening by which the first cause 
provides a dispensation to be. Because essential possibility, whose ultimate ground will 
be discussed in the following chapter, is not and never becomes identical with its 
existential actuality, the event of creation remains incidental (per accidens) to any and 
every essential order. The (existential) fact that the first cause chose to dispense this order 
as opposed to another or not to create at all, signifies a divine preconception and 
understanding of possibilities, whose status qua intelligible possibilities and 
compossibilities contain no internal necessity to actually be, unlike Avicennian 
emanation. What must be noted, however, around Aquinas’s use of the term “plenitude” 
is that even though he often, perhaps most often, uses it in Neoplatonic contexts, such 
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does not function as what some might call a “principle of plenitude.”131 A principle of 
plenitude requires there to be a deterministic realization of the possibilities implied by a 
concept or idea, thus eradicating any true sense of contingency. We shall witnessed this 
below with Avicenna’s definition of necessity as “vehemence of being” (vehementia 
essendi), whereby given the existence of the first necessary existent, all else follows with 
a certain “derived vehemence.” Thus, Avicennian emanation bridges any gap between 
something’s possibility and its actual existence.132
      For Gilson, the Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas problematizes this 
incidentality of actual existence, which philosophy has ignored or at least minimized in 
its concern with an abstract interpretation of objective reality. Whenever such actual 
existence did enter the domain of philosophy, it came under the guise of concrete 
  
      With Aquinas, however, the subsequent chapters will show how he parses “plenitude” 
in primarily existential terms such that God’s plenitude of being enables him to 
immediately cause anything that is possible (i.e., any conceivable essence), and as an 
intelligent being to understand the full range of his power in terms of such possibilities 
and compossibilities. The wisdom and practical intelligence of God provide him insight 
into the ordered unity of the universe as a whole, if he decides there is to be a universe. 
And yet the decision to create remains fundamentally incidental (per accidens) with 
respect to such essential determinations; no essence exercises any more vehemence of 
being than any other. The fact of being remains incidental with respect to the intelligible 
structure of the universe as a whole insofar as it happens to essences completely outside 
the plenitude of essential possibility.  
                                                 
131 See Arthur Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1960). Cf. Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe, 128-140. 
132 See below Chapter IV Section 1.  
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facticity, philosophically unintelligible and thus secondary to essential considerations. 
Although the traditions of essentialist metaphysics have recognized a certain what more 
in regard to the concrete facticity of actual existence, a what more requiring some 
explanatory force outside the essential domain itself, such actuality could be relegated to 
the realm of concrete happenings with no real intelligibility or scientia, therefore handled 
within chronographs of actual events (e.g., histories or cosmogonies). As Gilson states:  
This is why, in Plato’s philosophy, the gods are always there to account for existential 
events. Ideas alone cannot account for any existence, because they themselves are, but do 
not exist, whereas the gods, whatever they may be, do at least exist. In the Timaeus, not 
an Idea, but a god, makes the world, and, though Ideas account for the intelligibility of 
what the god makes, they themselves do not make it. It takes something that is to cause 
an existential happening.133
With Aquinas’s existential metaphysics, however, there is a certain reversal of the usual 
essential priority: that is, Aquinas recognizes the philosophical importance of such an 
existential happening, but not merely as a matter of additional (theological) facticity. 
Instead, for Aquinas, the existential actuality of “giving being” (dans esse) serves as a 
fundamentally irreducible “fact” or “existential happening” without which the entire 
essential domain lacks not only a vehemence of being, but also real essential actuality.
 
134
      Thus, in what follows, we must address what esse adds (adveniens extra) to 
something’s mere essential possibility and whether such an account of this “giving being” 
(dare esse) as understood through creation ex nihilo can provide an adequate foundation 
of the existential actuality of real creatures apart from the abundance of divine esse as its 
   
                                                 
133 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 51. 
134 “Being itself is enacted, therefore, at least for the created and the finite, according to the figure of the 
incident. An extraordinary conclusion! First, because the incident, which had on principle been pushed to 
the margins of the ontic domain by degrading all its essential dignity, rediscovers its license to be, though 
without ousia. […] Being should henceforth be thought according to the determinations of the incident, far 
from the incident being ontically devalued into a marginal accident. The exception becomes the rule—no 
one understood this better than Thomas Aquinas.” Marion, Being Given, 156.  
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causal fund: in other words, does “esse” designate a real perfection in creatures apart 
from their essence or does it merely designate their participative relation to their cause of 
being (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens)? Before turning to the incident of creation, however, a 
preliminary issue must be treated: to what does God give esse? In other words, what is 
the status of an essential core of possibility preexisting creation to which esse can be 
given and which determine the possible creation of a human as opposed to the 
impossibility of a squared circle? These two issues, taken up in the following chapters, 
will address both essential possibility and existential actuality in Aquinas’s account of 
creation ex nihilo in attempt to understand what “esse” means when applied to a created 
being. 
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Chapter IV. The Essential Ground of the Universe: The Divine Intellect and the 
Ordered Totality of the Universe 
 
      The previous chapter outlined the manner in which God who is maxime ens (i.e., as 
concluded by the fourth way) subsists as a self-identity of being whose nature is 
incommunicable to creatures according to the same ratio essendi. As participants of esse, 
such that they lack being through their essences, creatures resemble divine esse in an 
analogical manner and yet insofar as they receive their being from another, they are 
unlike the self-subsistence of being that is their cause. Based upon such analogical union 
of beings, a union sealed by their common referent in ipsum esse subsistens, we must ask 
both how such distinct manners of being (modus essendi), forming the diverse manifold 
that is the world, come to be distinguished, but also how such diversity could reflect and 
imitate the perfect ipseity that is ipsum esse subsistens. This will allow us to answer the 
question of how “esse” can meaningfully apply to creatures and reference their extra-
essential actuality, even though belonging properly to God.  
      The nature of our investigation in what follows will be how God serves both as the 
cause of all beings insofar as they are (i.e., have esse, and in this they agree), but also 
insofar as they exhibit distinct manners of being (i.e., no creature is being as such, but 
only being this or that). Aquinas clearly illustrates this dual grounding of beings both in 
terms of formal exemplarity and efficiency: “Similiter etiam in ipso Deo est considerare 
naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et exemplar omnis naturae, ita 
etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse.”1
                                                 
1 In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, art. 3, sol. 
 As the formal exemplar and cause of 
everything’s nature, and also as the exemplar and cause of their being, God serves both as 
the principle of their unity and also of their multiplicity. The common participation of 
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creatures in being unites them as beings. However, as participants according to a distinct 
mode of being, they differ from one another and ultimately from God (i.e., being itself 
without modification or limitation). 
      In order to fully understand the nature of such existential participation, we must begin 
by asking: what participates esse? Or, to phrase it differently: in creation, to what is esse 
given? Such a question requires understanding the possibility of creatures prior to 
creation, and how such possibility relates to their essences. Thus, after taking up in 
Section One Avicenna’s account of emanation against which Aquinas’s argument is 
largely directed, Section Two deals with the role of divine rationes, which after creation 
serve as exemplars of created essences.2 The question of what status creatures have 
before creation means asking if there is anything like an essential being (esse essentiae) 
according to Aquinas, and if not, how he deals with the conditions of essential possibility, 
as well as the pre-created possibility of individual beings.3
                                                 
2 In ST I, q. 15, a. 3, resp., Aquinas distinguishes between “rationes” and “exemplares.”  
3 On the relation between divine ideas of essential possibilities in relation to individuals, see De Veritate, q. 
3, a. 8, ad 2. “Ad secundum dicendum, quod si loquamur de idea proprie secundum quod est rei eo modo 
quo est in esse producibilis, sic una idea respondet singulari, speciei et generi, individuatis in ipso singulari, 
eo quod Socrates, homo et animal non distinguuntur secundum esse; si autem accipiamus ideam 
communiter pro similitudine vel ratione, sic cum diversa sit consideratio Socratis ut Socrates est et ut homo 
est, et ut est animal, respondebunt ei secundum hoc plures ideae vel similitudines.” In this article, Aquinas 
argues against Plato that divine ideas of singulars are necessary to uphold an account of providence. He 
states: “[E]t eadem ratione Plato non ponebat ideas generum, quia intentio naturae non terminatur ad 
productionem formae generis, sed solum formae speciei. Nos autem ponimus Deum causam esse singularis 
et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, ponimus etiam quod per divinam providentiam definiuntur 
omnia singularia, et ideo oportet nos etiam singularium ponere ideas.” De Veritate, q. 3, a. 8, resp. We will 
return to this issue below. See Chapter VI Section 3. 
 Following from this inquiry, 
Section Three asks how such a multiplicity of creatable beings in their essential diversity 
could reflect the perfect simplicity of their cause. How could that which is manifold and 
diverse serve as a trace of its creator, which is simple and one, and form any sort of 
ordered unity analogically reflecting the perfect ipseity of its divine cause? 
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       Such an inquiry will be followed in the next chapter by an attempt to further 
understand what Aquinas means by “participation in being,” and whether creatures 
actually participate in the incommunicable divine esse subsistens itself or in some other 
fund of esse (e.g., esse commune). In discussing the reception of esse through creation, a 
central question will be what perfection is added to the already “existing” (here the 
trouble arises) possibility of such a creatable being: remember, esse, for Aquinas, is the 
“act of all acts and the perfection of all perfections.” Thus, to understand this real 
distinction in creatures, we must return to the beginning: their having been created. Such 
participation can be understood through the lens of the divine act of creation, or that act 
inaugurating existential participation beyond something’s mere status in the divine 
intellect. Over the course of the next two chapters, we will trace these interwoven threads 
concerning God’s grounding of created being both in its essential multiplicity and also in 
its existential unity by attempting to unpack the status of any created being in relation to 
its essential determinations (i.e., as ratio before creation, and archetype after creation) on 
the one hand, and the “what more” creation adds by existential actualization on the other.        
 
Section 1: Emanation and Derived Necessity   
      Our discussion of Aquinas and his problematization of esse began with his claim in 
De Ente that we can understand the essence of something without understanding whether 
or not it exists (i.e., the intellectus essentiae argument). He provides the example of 
human or phoenix, the former exemplified in re, the latter only in intellectu, both of 
which can be understood according to essential determinations without accounting for 
whether or not such essential kinds are actually instantiated. Now it is time to return to 
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this lingering issue and ask: what is the status of essences for Aquinas, both before 
creation and subsequent to it? 4 How does he understand essential possibility apart from 
existential actuality; that is, how can the essence “phoenix” or “unicorn” or any other 
member of the mythic bestiary not be a contradiction—and thus is not a mere nonsensical 
utterance such as “squared circle”—and yet there be no such actual thing in re? 5
      We have made much mention of Aquinas’s real distinction between esse and essence 
in creatures. And yet, in order to uphold the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, Aquinas will 
have to do more than merely separate and distinguish esse and essence. Like Aquinas, 
Avicenna seems poised to make the existential turn insofar as he begins by separating the 
conditions of something’s possibility from its actual existence. And yet, as Aquinas 
recognizes, the latter’s doctrine of emanation leads to an inflation of necessity, thus 
undermining the radical incidentality of all creation. Unlike Aquinas, Avicenna grounds 
the existential remainder, or that something’s essence does not necessarily imply the fact 
that it is, in a derived or emanated necessity: in other words, even though something is 
not necessary per se, given the being of the first per se necessary existent, the being of all 
else is grounded in the necessary emanation from this source. Thus, each actual effect 
 In short, 
what receives the actus essendi given in creation?  
                                                 
4 For a detailed examination of the subject, and a spectrum of readings, see Ross’s article on the subject and 
counter-response to Mauer’s and Dewan’s responses: James Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism, Aquinas’s 
Voluntarism,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 44 (Spring 1990): 171-198 and “Response to 
Maurer and Dewan,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 45 (Spring 1991): 235-243. Also: 
Armand Maurer, “James Ross on the Divine Ideas: A Reply,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 
45 (Spring 1991): 213-220. Dewan, “St. Thomas, James Ross, and Exemplarism: A Reply,” American 
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 45 (Spring 1991): 221-234. In addition, see Timothy B. Noone, “Aquinas 
on Divine Ideas: Scotus’s Evaluation,” Franciscan Studies 56 (1998): 307-324.  
5 The case of “chimera” is difficult to assess because sometimes it is used as a synonym (or proper name 
of) logical impossibility almost in the same manner as “squared circle.” As the case of the latter suggests, 
mere names are being thrown together that devolve to the point of nonsense. Thus, the use of the name 
“chimera” often is not meant to signify an imaginable creatures, such as in the case of Aeneid VI, but the 
improper and impossible combination of simple concepts, which as combined leads to a nonsensical, 
although nameable, utterance.  
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becomes necessary, albeit ab alio. It is important to look more closely at Avicenna’s 
argument as it forms the backdrop of Aquinas’s existential response.  
      According to Avicenna in the Metaphysics, there is only one per se necessary 
existent, such that existence follows by necessity from its essence.6
     In taking up Avicenna’s discussion of necessary and possible existence, we must not 
lose sight of the fact that such designations refer to the necessity or possibility of 
something through itself.
 For everything else, 
when considered in itself (i.e., per se), existence does not follow by necessity. Everything 
that is not the one necessary being, if it is to be (esse), must receive its existence from 
another (i.e., from its cause). This caveat (i.e., when considered in itself), however, 
contains important implications for Avicenna’s understanding of the contingency of 
secondary beings in relation to the first per se necessary being. He argues that insofar as 
something other than the first is or exists, it has a necessity through its cause. Thus, in 
relation to itself (per se) it is possible, but in relation to its cause (ab alio) it is necessary. 
Necessity, Avicenna states, has a “vehemence of being” (vehementia essendi). 
Furthermore, although everything that is derives its necessity from the per se necessity of 
the first, such a derivation is not immediate, but mediated by a series of successive 
causes: necessity emanates from causes to their effects. Both of these issues, namely the 
necessity of all actual effects and their mediated relationship to the first, must be further 
discussed. 
7
                                                 
6 Avicennae Metaphysica (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1948). See Treatise I, Chapters 
VI-VIII.  
7 Such designations (i.e., necessary and possible) divide being in the intellect. Avicenna states: “Dicemus 
igitur quod ea quae cadunt sub esse possunt in intellectu divide in duo. Quorum unum est quod cum 
consideratum fuerit per se eius esse non est necessarium; et palam est etiam quod eius esse non est 
impossibile, alioquin non cadet sub esse, et hoc est in termino possibilitatis. Alterum et quodcum 
consideratum fuerit per se eius esse erit necesse” (I.VII.25).  
 Per se necessary existence, according to Avicenna, is 
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necessary through itself because it does not require a cause in order to be.8 Such an 
existent—and in Chapter 8, Avicenna shows how this must be a singular designation (i.e., 
God)—suffices for the determination of existence. If there were not such a per se 
necessary existent, everything else would remain possible with respect to its being. 
Nothing could suffice to determine such essential possibility to be. Thus, such a per se 
necessary existent must be, and there can only be one such existent, lest absurdities 
follow if we grant more than one such existent.9
      The quiddity of every other being, although non-repugnant through itself (i.e., 
possible), lacks this necessary determination to existence, but retains through itself the 
possibility of receiving existence through another.
  
10 This entails that in lacking existence 
through itself, such a possible quiddity must have existence come to it from some source 
outside its essence. That which comes to something externally (accedit) without being 
implicated through its essence is an accident.11
                                                 
8 “Dicemus igitur quod necesse esse per se non habet causam, et quod possible esse per se habet causam…” 
(I.VII.25).  
9 I.6.  
10 “Quidquid autem possible est consideratum in se, eius esse et eius non esse utrumque est per causam” 
(I.VII.26).  
11 As Morewedge points out, this traditional reading of Avicenna greatly reduces the complexity of his 
thought. See Parvis Morewedge, “Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sina’s ‘Essence-Existence’ Distinction,” 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 92, No. 3 (July-September 1972): 425-435.  
 Something possible through itself, 
however, takes on a second-tier necessity when viewed through and in relation to its 
cause. If the effect were not necessitated by its cause with respect to existence, this would 
mean, Avicenna argues, that it would remain possible in terms of specification to 
existence or non-existence. A further cause would be required to determine this 
existential modification of its essence. But it terms of this third cause, we must ask 
whether it necessitates its effect: if so, then the effect exists necessarily; whereas if not, 
then the effect remains possible with respect to existence and non-existence, and yet a 
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further cause is required to determine it to be, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, everything 
outside the first exists through a cause, but so long as it exists, it exists necessarily ab 
alio, or through its causes.  
      Actual existence becomes synonymous with necessity for Avicenna, opposed only to 
per se essential possibility. As we will come to see, Aquinas opposes his radically 
incidental existential actuality to this giving of necessity to “contingent” beings and 
failing to mind the gap between the necessity of the First Cause and the derived existence 
of all else that follows. The problem as Aquinas sees it is: If the first cause is necessary 
through itself, does not all that follows (i.e., caused by the first) take on some degree of 
derived necessity in Avicenna’s scheme? And if partaking of a derived necessity, would 
not contingent beings lose their radical contingency? Such chain of necessity was 
established for Avicenna because all “contingent” beings could be grounded in the 
necessity of the first cause, or God. Although Avicenna begins by establishing the 
distinction between the one necessary being and beings merely possible through 
themselves, this second-tier (or “emanated”) necessity seems to bridge the gap between 
God and creatures.12
                                                 
12 Cf. Gilson: “[…] the same Christian theologians [of the thirteenth-century] could not fail to realize the 
fact that the God of Avicenna, although ontologically separated from merely possible beings by his own 
necessity, still remained tied up with them in a necessary way. From the very fact that the Necessary Being 
is, the Avicennian universe of finite beings necessarily follows […]” Christian Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages (New York: Random House, 1955), 216.  
 The same principles of necessity that governed God’s being also 
governed created being, albeit in a weakened or diminished state of vehemence. 
Avicenna, thus, puts forth a thoroughly essentialist metaphysics, as any recourse to extra-
essential esse can be grounded in the necessary existence of the first, which gives rise to a 
necessary procession of all the rest.  
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      Aquinas’s existential problematic in a large part responds to such inflation of 
necessity, which Aquinas diagnoses as stemming from Avicenna’s commitment to 
emanation. From the plenitude of the first’s being, it “overflows itself” giving rise to the 
first effect. In Avicenna’s scheme, such an effect is an intelligence, which thinks both the 
first and also itself as possible (per se) and as a necessary effect of the first (ab alio), thus 
emanating the next set of effects: a subsequent intelligence, a celestial sphere, and its 
soul.13
      In terms of the first point, the one per se necessary existent does not retain the 
possibility of stopping the flow from the source. Once the first is granted, all else follows. 
 Such a chain of emanation proceeds until reaching the sublunary world over 
which the tenth and final of the separate intellects presides as the cause of being for all 
generation and the giver of forms for all intellection. Two points must be noted in 
preparation for Aquinas’s understanding of this model of emanation: first, there is no 
“gap” between the first, per se necessary existent and its effect, but instead it causes 
necessarily and not by will; second, the chain of emanation is mediated, which means that 
the first acts upon the second immediately, but upon each subsequent effect only through 
intermediaries. Such a scheme can explain how the first gives rise to everything that is 
without holding that a single cause is capable of a multitude of diverse effects and 
thereby violating the principle ex uno unum.  
                                                 
13 In SCG II.42, Aquinas rejects the position of Avicenna, which argues that in knowing himself, God 
produces a first intelligence, which in knowing God produces a second intelligence, and by knowing itself 
as act produces the soul of the first sphere and in potentiality produces the substance of the first sphere, a 
process that extends to the final intelligence (e.g., the agent intellect). God thus acts only indirectly and 
through his intellect which generates the second being without his free legislation. Thus, we must begin 
with God’s “relation” to creation before the act of creation. I must provide a word of caution here about the 
use of this temporal phrase. What is at stake is not a time before and after creation, but a logical relation 
between God’s power to know something without actually bringing it into being. Aquinas will want to hold 
open the possibility that God could create something from eternity (thus leaving no time before which), but 
such a thing nevertheless even though eternal would radically depend upon God’s free and unnecessitated 
bestowal of being. Thus, time is not the issue, but the terms of the relation between creator and created. 
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This means that the accidental existence of “contingent” things is only accidental through 
their own essences, but grounded in the necessity of the one necessary being, thereby 
undermining the radical distinction between the two. The first exercises a foundation of 
causal necessity upon all of its effects in the same way that it exercises its own 
necessity.14
      Furthermore, and to the second point, Aquinas’s First must act immediately upon all 
effects as their total “cause of being” (causa essendi). As will be seen, Aquinas 
accomplishes such immediacy through arguing contra Avicenna that God knows all 
possible effects as rationes in the divine intellect prior to creating them, and any effect 
that does come to be follows not from a necessitated emergence from the divine intellect, 
but freely in accordance with divine wisdom, based on a decision to issue this order in re.  
To avoid such an outcome, the First must be understood not merely as a source that gives 
 They share in the necessity of the first, removed only by degrees or positions 
in the causal chain. Such a communion of being based on an overflow of necessity 
introduces problems for a strict understanding of creation ex nihilo.  
                                                 
14This is what Marion following Heidegger, call “onto-theology.” A preeminent being (ens) should ground 
entities and being (esse), “exercising a foundation on all other beings—indeed upon being and its own 
foundation [...].”Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” 42. The preeminent being serves as 
cause of everything because it first serves as cause of itself (causa sui): the ground grounds itself. God as 
causa sui, Marion argues, follows the assumption that God as preeminent entity should be subject to the 
same metaphysical rules as every other entity: existence requires a cause. Thus, God as preeminent in 
existence also requires a cause, which turns out to be himself. In a grounded totality, exceptions cannot be 
made, not even for the first. Once God becomes part of the causal order (as ground and grounded), all other 
principles of metaphysics, such as the principle of order and of sufficient reason, also apply to God, 
according to Marion. This preeminent being, to incorporate Gilsonian terminology, sets the standard for the 
essential economy as that by which all other beings are measured. Thus, we find—if not altogether an 
isomorphism—at least a deep kinship between Gilson’s critique of conceptual imperialism and Marion’s 
critique of onto-theo-logy. In both thinkers, the hegemonic accounting of beings and of being itself is 
accomplished by the enshrinement of a preeminent being as the foundation of a totalized system, which 
does not leave a remainder. “Just one condition rules all of them, however: that they should ground entities 
and being in the name of preeminent entity, thus that they could be inscribed precisely without exception or 
remainder within the onto-theo-logical frame of the ontological difference, which is itself thought in a 
metaphysical manner, starting with and for the exclusive benefit of the entity” Marion 43. According to 
Marion, at least in “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” even though not in the earlier God without 
Being, Aquinas’s notion of esse does not offer an onto-theo-logy. For Heidegger’s account of onto-theo-
logy, see Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).  
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rise to the rest; instead It must be understood as a benefactor capable of issuing 
immediately all that follows, but equally capable of withholding such an issuance. Any 
creative expression by the first thereby is not the result of a necessary overflow of itself, 
but what we can only call a “gratuitous” act of generosity (actus liberalitatis).15 This will 
mark the battleground between an essentialism that reduces esse to a derived (or 
deduced) essential predicate and an existentialism that desperately seeks to disavow its 
ties to such a conceptual schema. Avicenna started with this distinction, but reduced the 
esse received in creatures to a second-order necessity once the existence of the first 
necessary being had been established. Aquinas will need to show how the prior 
intelligibility of creatures in the divine intellect remains non-identical to the manner in 
which creatures actually come to be (i.e., ex nihilo).16
                                                 
15 “Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, finis ultimus propter quem Deus vult omnia, nullo modo dependet 
ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam. Unde non vult 
alicui suam bonitatem communicare ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare 
est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem non propter aliquod commodum ex datione 
expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis, est actus liberalitatis, ut patet per 
philosophum, in IV Ethicorum. Deus igitur est maxime liberalis: et, ut Avicenna dicit, ipse solus liberalis 
proprie dici potest; nam omne aliud agens praeter ipsum ex sua actione aliquod bonum acquirit, quod est 
finis intentus. Hanc autem eius liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit, dicens in Psalmo: aperiente te manum 
tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate; et Iac. 1-5: qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat.” SCG I.93. 
The passage Aquinas references from Avicenna (i.e., Metaphysics Book VI Chapter 5 231-234) discusses 
“liberality” as an act of giving for which there is no recompense for the giver. It may seem surprising that 
Aquinas references Avicenna to make his point. But for Avicenna, however, unlike Aquinas, although the 
giving of a benefit does not supplement the giver, there need be a cause if it is given.  
 Thus, Aquinas must argue that in 
16 The status of such a nature will be questioned in what follows along with the manner in which God 
brought everything into being, that is, immediately and freely, or through intermediaries (i.e., intelligent 
agents, formal exemplars, primordial matter as passive potency) and necessarily. I will focus only on the 
issue of exemplars, although Aquinas takes up and rejects both the need for God to create through 
intermediaries (i.e., a second intellect, that gives rise to the next, and so on) and also through matter. See, 
for example, SCG II.42 and 43 (respectively) and also De Aeternitate Mundi. In SCG II.42, Aquinas rejects 
the position of Avicenna, which argues that in knowing himself, God produces a first intelligence, which in 
knowing God produces a second intelligence, and by knowing itself as act produces the soul of the first 
sphere and in potentiality produces the substance of the first sphere, a process that extends to the final 
intelligence (e.g., the agent intellect). God thus acts only indirectly and through his intellect which 
generates the second being without his free legislation. Thus, we must begin with God’s “relation” to 
creation before the act of creation. I must provide a word of caution here about the use of this temporal 
phrase. What is at stake is not a time before and after creation, but a logical relation between God’s power 
to know something without actually bringing it into being. Aquinas will want to hold open the possibility 
that God could create something from eternity (thus leaving no time before which), but such a thing 
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creating as an intelligent agent, God does not act by natural necessity, but preordains 
those beings to which he will give being, even though this giving of being is not co-
extensive with or determined by the preconception. Such precreated intellection provides 
a slate of possibles and compossibles, but does not suffice to bring them about in re. For 
Aquinas, the challenge thus is to ordain a role for possibility prior to creation without 
allowing such possibility to “make gains” (Gilson) in terms of its actuality of existence. 
In other words, Aquinas must separate the ground of essential possibility from the ground 
of existential actuality.  
 
Section 2: The Status of Creatures Prior to Creation 
      What determines something’s possibility before it was created and what status do 
such possibles have in relation to God prior to creation?17 The question of possibility and 
impossibility first surfaced above in reference to the intellectus essentiae argument: what 
makes the essence of phoenix possible, as opposed to an outright impossibility such as 
“squared circle,” even though there are no more phoenixes than squared circles? In De 
Aeternitate Mundi, Aquinas argues that if something cannot be made, it is said to be 
impossible for one of the following reasons: either there is an absence of passive potency 
to receive such a form or there is a contradiction between the ideas determining the 
nature of the thing.18
                                                                                                                                                 
nevertheless even though eternal would radically depend upon God’s free and unnecessitated bestowal of 
being. Thus, time is not the issue, but the terms of the relation between creator and created. 
17 The latter part of this question asks whether such “possibles” are distinct from the ideas of the divine 
intellect or reducible to them. 
 Before creation, the former condition applies to everything. Other 
18 “Si autem dicatur hoc esse impossibile, uel hoc dicetur quia Deus non potuit facere aliquid quod semper 
fuerit; aut quia non potuit fieri, etsi Deus posset facere. In prima autem parte omnes consentiunt, in hoc 
scilicet quod Deus potuit facere aliquid quod semper fuerit, considerando potentiam ipsius infinitam; restat 
igitur uidere, utrum sit possibile aliquid fieri quod semper fuerit. Si autem dicatur quod hoc non potest fieri, 
hoc non potest intelligi nisi duobus modis, uel duas causas ueritatis habere: uel propter remotionem 
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than God, nothing preexists creation, which could serve as a co-cause in the making of 
creatures. There is no primordial matter to which God merely adds form, as a sculptor 
giving shape to clay, a position with obvious heretical implications. God is the cause of 
all being, even that of prime matter.19 After creation, however, various species are made 
possible in regard to the passive potency of matter, the “stuff” from which forms can be 
educed or imposed and which subtends substantial change.20
                                                                                                                                                 
potentiae passive, uel propter repugnantiam intellectuum. Primo modo posset dici antequam angelus sit 
factus ‘Non potest angelus fieri’, quia non praeexistit ad eius esse aliqua potentia passiua, cum non sit 
factus ex materia preiacente; tamen Deus poterat facere angelum, poterat etiam facere ut angelus fieret, 
quia fecit, et factus est. Sic ergo intelligendo, simpliciter concedendum est secundum fidem, quod non 
potest creatum semper esse, quia hoc ponere esset ponere potentiam passiuam semper fuisse, quod 
hereticum est. Tamen ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus non possit facere ut fiat aliquid semper ens. Secundo 
modo dicitur propter repugnantiam intellectuum aliquid non posse fieri, sicut quod non potest fieri ut 
affirmatio et negatio sint simul uera, quamvis Deus hoc possit facere, ut quidam dicunt, quidam uero dicunt 
quod nec Deus hoc posset facere, quia hoc nichil est: tamen manifestum est quod non potest facere ut hoc 
fiat, quia positio qua ponitur esse, destruit se ipsam. Si tamen ponatur quod Deus huiusmodi potest facere 
ut fiant, positio non est heretica, quamuis, ut credo, sit falsa, sicut quod preteritum non fuerit includit in se 
contradictionem; unde Augustinus in libro Contra Faustum: <<Quisquis ita dicit: Si omnipotens est Deus, 
faciat ut ea quae facta sunt, facta non fuerint, non uidet hoc se dicere ‘Si omnipotens est Deus, faciat ut ea 
quae vera sunt, eo ipso quo vera sunt, falsa sint.’>> Et tamen quidam magni pie dixerunt Deum posse 
facere de preterito quod non fuerit preteritum; nec fuit reputatum hereticum.” Opera Omnia Iussu Leonis 
XIII P.M. Edita, t. 43: De aeternitate mundi. (Roma: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), 17-61. Hereafter: 
“De Aeternitate Mundi.” 
19 See, for example, ST I, q. 44, a. 2, resp. and Chapter III Section 2 above.   
20 The difference between “eduction” and “imposition” concerns the distinction between natural and 
artificial creation. Although Aquinas will say that with the former, matter has some active role in allowing 
for a form to be educed, such activity is nevertheless reducible to its formal determinations.  
 The difference between 
human and phoenix after creation stems from the former’s possible and the latter’s 
impossible educibility from matter: according to the established order of the universe, 
matter does not stand in potency to the form of phoenix. It lacks the disposition to receive 
such form, even if there were an agent with the power (virtus) to educe it. Matter can 
compose the sinew, bones, and blood that comprise a human, but it cannot subtend the 
“mythical” species of phoenix according to its current ordinated power. The latter, 
however, is not an absolute impossibility, and this is what distinguishes it from an 
outright contradiction and makes possible an understanding of its essence (intellectus 
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essentiae eius). Even though the current condition of matter is unreceptive to the essence 
phoenix, such an essence as understood does not form an outright contradiction. 
      In De Potentia, Aquinas offers a more extended account of the possibility of essences 
apart from actually existing instantiations. In addition to the essentia in intellecu21
Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in 
virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu [m.e.]: sed hoc quod habet esse, efficitur actu 
existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et propter 
hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum.
 and 
essences in potency to matter, he here introduces also the power of an agent. He states: 
22
Humanity or fire can be considered as existing in the potency of matter, or in the power 
of an agent, or even in the intellect. But, Aquinas explains, that which has esse is effected 
as exisiting in act. It has the actuality of all acts and the perfection of all perfections. 
Despite this pre-created lack of esse, something still can be regarded as either possible or 
impossible in terms of the second and third conditions listed above, but not yet the first, 
as there is no preexisting, co-eternal matter. That is, God can conceive the essence human 
 
                                                 
21 Here one may object that the intellectus essentiae argument considered essences apart from the intellect, 
in the same manner as such were being considered apart from being. Despite his discussion of the absolute 
consideration of essence in De Ente III, Aquinas seems to reject a status for essences equal to their 
subsistence in re or in intellectu. This, however, will be the matter to be discussed in what follows. For a 
more detailed discussion of the issue, and a comparison of Aquinas, Avicenna, and Scotus on this question, 
see Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Comparison,” 1-14. 
22 Aquinas’s explanation of the possibility of non-existents. Namely, before creation, they are in the power 
of the agent and in the divine intellect, althought not yet inherent in matter. “[...] quod hoc quod dico esse 
est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectio potentia. Quaelibet autem 
forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam humanitas vel igneitas potest 
considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam ut in intellectu: sed hoc quod 
habet esse, efficitur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas omnium actuum, et 
propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. Nec intelligendum est, quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid 
addatur quod sit eo formalius, ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam: esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est 
aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determinandum. Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit 
extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens, quod non potest esse nec forma nec materia. 
Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. 
Nam et in definitione formarum ponuntur propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dicitur quod anima 
est actus corporis physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc esse ab illo esse distinguitur, in quantum est 
talis vel talis naturae. Et per hoc dicit Dionysius [cap. V de divin. Nomin.], quod licet viventia sint nobiliora 
quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere: viventia enim non tantum habent vitam, sed cum vita 
simul habent et esse.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 9. 
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or fire or even phoenix and he has the power (virtus) to create such beings, even though 
all three lack the actual esse necessary to stand outside their cause. Such non-beings are 
possible in relation to the non-contradiction of their terms and to the power of an agent. 
      Again in Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas lays out an extended account of this 
matter:  
Possibile autem fuit ens creatum esse, antequam esset, per potentiam agentis, per quam et 
esse incoepit. Vel propter habitudinem terminorum, in quibus nulla repugnantia invenitur: 
quod quidem possibile secundum nullam potentiam dicitur, ut patet per philosophum, in 
V Metaph. Hoc enim praedicatum quod est esse, non repugnat huic subiecto quod est 
mundus vel homo, sicut commensurabile repugnat diametro: et sic sequitur quod non sit 
impossibile esse, et per consequens quod sit possibile esse antequam esset, etiam nulla 
potentia existente.23
In this passage, Aquinas follows Aristotle in distinguishing between possibility in an 
absolute sense and a more limited sense of potency (potentia): something can be said to 
be in potency to the power of an agent or the passive receptivity of matter; whereas, its 
possibility stems from the relatablility and non-repugnance of terms. The predicate “esse” 
is not repugnant to the subject “world” or “human” or even, we might add, “phoenix,” 
whereas certain terms such as “commensurable diameter” or “squared circle” fight 
against each other, and thus are impossible.
 
24 Even with no potency existing (i.e., passive 
potency), that which is not impossible is possible to be (possibile esse) even before it 
comes to be.25
                                                 
23 SCG II. 37. 
24 Ross seeks to intervene at this point and maintain that such non-repugnance entail merely “vacant 
possibility” and not a realm of possibles or even a multiplicity of divine ideas.  E.g., “antilichts repel 
chronons” (not impossible per se). Ross wants to dissociate such vacant possibilities from the more robust 
esse essentiae of Henry of Ghent. He argues that with Wippel, Gilson, and Maurer, possibility in Aquinas 
becomes too closely associated with such essential being as an object separate from divine ideas, an 
association stemming from underemphasizing what he calls “Aquinas’s Voluntarism.” See James Ross, 
“Aquinas’s Exemplarism; Aquinas’s Voluntarism,” 171-198.  
 
25 From the context of this discussion, we can see that Aquinas is concerned with a preexisting passive 
potency, but does not yet consider an active potency or power. He states: “Ex hoc etiam patet quod non 
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      Although Aquinas seems in such passages to uphold the absolute possibility or 
impossibility of such essences, elsewhere he grounds eternal truth in the divine mind. He 
states: “[...] dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent aeternitatem 
in mente divina”.26
      In order to address this question, we must clarify what Aquinas means by divine ideas 
and how they stand in relation to possibility in an absolute sense.
 At this point, we might ask about the status of such “possibility” in 
relation to the divine mind, which alone, before creation, is able to understand such. In 
addition, we might add the question of how divine omnipotence along with the non-
contradiction of certain terms “co-determines” what can be created. That is, does the 
divine intellect in conjunction with the divine will determine such possibility, or does 
such possibility determine the potency of God’s omnipotence? Or to put it in other terms, 
does possibility (i.e., either in relation to the divine intellect or independent of it) dictate 
the conditions of what divine power can create or does divine omnipotence determine the 
nature of possibility? 
27
                                                                                                                                                 
oportet aliquam potentiam passivam praecedere esse totius entis creati, ut tertia ratio concludebat. Hoc 
enim est necessarium in illis quae per motum essendi principium sumunt: eo quod motus est actus 
existentis in potentia. Possibile autem fuit ens creatum esse, antequam esset, per potentiam agentis, per 
quam et esse incoepit. Vel propter habitudinem terminorum, in quibus nulla repugnantia invenitur: quod 
quidem possibile secundum nullam potentiam dicitur, ut patet per philosophum, in V Metaph. Hoc enim 
praedicatum quod est esse, non repugnat huic subiecto quod est mundus vel homo, sicut commensurabile 
repugnat diametro: et sic sequitur quod non sit impossibile esse, et per consequens quod sit possibile esse 
antequam esset, etiam nulla potentia existente. In his autem quae per motum fiunt, oportet prius fuisse 
possibile per aliquam passivam potentiam: in quibus philosophus, in VII Metaphys., hac utitur ratione.” 
SCG II. 37.  
26 ST  I, q. 16, a. 7, ad 1. 
27 On this question, see Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism; Aquinas’s Voluntarism,” especially pp. 173-176. 
He argues against attributing any real status to possibles prior to creation and also against multiplying the 
one divine idea. As mentioned above, possibles prior to creation represent mere vacant possibilities, not 
blueprints of creation. This also avoids introducing any relation between God and a realm of possibility 
(i.e., a referent) outside of the one divine idea.   
 “Ideas,” Aquinas 
states, translates the Latin “forma,” which exist apart from the things themselves of 
which they are the forms. If the world was not made by chance, but designed by an 
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intelligent agent, then a form, or forms, must exist in the intellect of the maker by which 
the ultimate product comes to be made.28
      Aquinas further clarifies what it means for an agent to act on account of a form: in 
one sense, an agent acts by its nature, and thereby (i.e., insofar as its nature is determined 
by its form), it acts on account of it form; in another way, however, an agent that acts 
intelligibly acts on account of form, although not necessarily in a univocal sense. In both 
types of generation, if they are to avoid the influence of mere chance, the form must serve 
as the end of generation, that idea toward which the thing strives (“In omnibus enim quae 
non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse finem generationis cuiuscumque”). The 
first way consists of natural generation in which one thing generates another like itself 
(e.g., human begets human, and fire fire). Because such natural generation requires the 
agent to act only on account of its form, and thereby communicate a univocal likeness to 
its effect, it will be important, as Aquinas indicates, to show that God does not act 
 Everything not generated by chance, Aquinas 
maintains, must be ordered according to a form as the end of its generation. Such a form 
is that to which its generation is ordered and in which it terminates. Thus, by realzing its 
form, something becomes what it is meant to be as established by its nature. The world 
that eventually may or may not come to be will have a basis of intelligibility in an 
ideational preconception in the divine intellect. 
                                                 
28 “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim graece, latine forma 
dicitur: unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem 
alicuius rei praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest: vel ut sit exemplar eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit 
principium cognitionis ipsius, secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. Et 
quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. Quod sic patet. In omnibus enim quae non a casu 
generantur, necesse est formam esse finem generationis cuiuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter 
formam, nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam 
enim agentibus praeexistit forma rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per naturam; 
sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae 
agunt per intellectum; sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea 
domus, quia artifex intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur mundus non est 
casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina 
sit forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc consistit ratio ideae.” ST I, q. 15, a. 1, resp.  
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naturally, but instead acts in the second way, according to intelligible being. With 
Avicenna in mind, Aquinas will argue that God acts through intellect on account of 
forms. Because God can intellectually grasp a multitude of possible effects according to 
their intellected form, he can thereby serve as the total and immediate cause of all 
diversity, instead of requiring the agency of secondary causes to introduce such 
diversity.29
      If God were merely acting according to his nature, then the universe would 
necessarily follow from God without his prior intellection, but also without his 
deliberation. God acts on account of form, but form that he knows and is able to propose 
to himself in rational deliberation, not form that determines his nature and requires him to 
act. For the entirety of nature to have an end of action on account of its form, the diverse 
forms that make up nature must have an ideational ground in the divine intellect, just as 
to use Aquinas’s example, an arrow flies toward a target as to its natural end, but such 
direction reduces to the foresight of an archer.
 God intends each thing according to its form, which orders a multitude of 
things toward preordained ends as understood by God.      
30
                                                 
29 See, for example, SCG II.42. 
 What such a ground of intelligence 
30 See “The Fifth Way” of ST I. q. 2, a. 3, resp. Aquinas uses the idea of design for the God’s free act of 
creation (as opposed to necessity) based upon the universe being ordered to an end. “... Quarum prima est, 
quod oportet dicere universum aliquem finem habere: alias omnia in universo casu acciderent; nisi forte 
diceretur, quod primae creaturae non sunt propter finem, sed ex naturali necessitate; posteriores vero 
creaturae sunt propter finem; sicut et Democritus ponebat caelestia corpora esse a casu facta, inferiora vero 
a causis determinatis, quod improbatur in II Phys., per hoc quod ea quae sunt nobiliora, non possunt esse 
minus ordinata quam indigniora. Necesse est igitur dicere, quod in productione creaturarum a Deo sit 
aliquis finis intentus. Invenitur autem agere propter finem et voluntas et natura, sed aliter et aliter. Natura 
enim, cum non cognoscat nec finem nec rationem finis, nec habitudinem eius, quod est ad finem in finem, 
non potest sibi praestituere finem, nec se in finem movere aut ordinare vel dirigere; quod quidem competit 
agenti per voluntatem, cuius est intelligere et finem et omnia praedicta. Unde agens per voluntatem sic agit 
propter finem, quod praestituit sibi finem, et seipsum quodammodo in finem movet, suas actiones in ipsum 
ordinando. Natura vero tendit in finem sicut mota et directa ab alio intelligente et volente, sicut patet in 
sagitta, quae tendit in signum determinatum propter directionem sagittantis; et per hunc modum a 
Philosophis dicitur, quod opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Semper autem quod est per aliud, est 
posterius eo quod est per se. Unde oportet quod primum ordinans in finem, hoc faciat per voluntatem; et ita 
Deus per voluntatem creaturas in esse produxit, non per naturam. Nec est instantia de Filio, quod naturaliter 
procedit a Patre, cuius generatio creationem praecedit: quia Filius non procedit ut ad finem ordinatus, sed ut 
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provides and what Aquinas finds lacking in emanationist theories is an immediate and 
essential reduction of the diversity of nature to a single unifying ground in the divine 
intellect, namely the good of the universe as a whole. Such a ground is immediate 
because every being depends directly upon God for its being (esse) and not upon other 
emanated intermediaries who themselves give rise to the next in the series.31
      For Aquinas the procession of beings from the first happens on account of an 
intellectual action ordered toward an end (“Processus autem entium a primo ente est per 
actionem ordinatam ad finem”).
 
Furthermore, it is essential because the order of the universe proceeds according to a 
preordained design and does not just “happen” outside the intention of the first.  
32
                                                                                                                                                 
omnium finis.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 15, resp. Thus, the work of nature, which contains many natural agents 
acting toward an end, is ultimately a work of intelligence on the part of the first agent.  
31 In SCG II.42, Aquinas rejects the argument that intermediary agents could account for diversity in the 
world. 
32 “In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis, ubi agitur propter finem, oportet quod fines causarum 
secundarum sint propter finem causae primae: sicut finis militaris et equestris et frenifactricis est propter 
finem civilis. Processus autem entium a primo ente est per actionem ordinatam ad finem: cum sit per 
intellectum, ut ostensum est; intellectus autem omnis propter finem agit. Si igitur in productione rerum sunt 
aliquae causae secundae, oportet quod fines earum et actiones sint propter finem causae primae, qui est 
ultimus finis in rebus causatis. Hoc autem est distinctio et ordo partium universi, qui est quasi ultima forma. 
Non igitur est distinctio in rebus et ordo propter actiones secundarum causarum: sed magis actiones 
secundarum causarum sunt propter ordinem et distinctionem in rebus constituendam.” SCG II.42. 
 If intermediaries assist in the execution of the divine 
plan and help to realize such preordained ends, this is not because they provide a 
diversification not-included by the plenitude of the first. Instead, Aquinas argues just as 
the art of war, of horsemanship, and of bridle-making (frenifactricis) are on account of 
the higher end of political affairs (propter finem civilis), so too secondary causes are 
directed toward the end of the first cause, the ultimus finis in caused things. This is not, 
according to Aquinas, the case in an emanated universe where diverse things may strive 
towards a common good, but such striving has not been arranged by the first cause as 
integral to the realization of an intended and preordained good. This is because in 
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thinking only itself, the first of emanation neither intends nor provides for the universe as 
a whole except through that which “overflows” from itself.33
      If God did not know the forms of all things, diversity would escape the intention of 
his agency. It may result, but outside the order of his intelligence (i.e., by chance). In 
addition, acting not only from his nature, but also by his will, God directs nature as a 
whole toward an end in a manner similar the archer dispensing the arrow (“Natura vero 
tendit in finem sicut mota et directa ab alio intelligente et volente, sicut patet in sagitta, 
quae tendit in signum determinatum propter directionem sagittantis...”).
  
34 The diverse 
parts of nature, Aquinas argues, agree in their “account of existence” (ratione existendi) 
much like multiple and diverse building materials agree and are gathered together around 
the unifying order of a house.35
      Aquinas frequently draws such analogies between nature and unified orders such as 
armies, households, organic bodies, etc. in order to highlight the intelligibility of all parts 
as integral to the whole. Only because nature is the work of intelligence, and not 
produced by natural necessity, can it be essentially directed toward an end and the 
 The various parts of a house contribute to the order as 
arranged by an architect and directed to an end (i.e., residence).  
                                                 
33 “It must, hence, be known that providence consists in the First’s knowing in Himself [the mode] of 
existence of the order of the good in His being, in Himself, a cause of goodness and perfection in terms of 
what is possible, and in His being satisfied [with the order of the good] in the manner that has been 
mentioned. He would thus intellectually apprehend the order of the good in the highest possible manner, 
whereby what He intellectually apprehends in the highest possible way as an order and a good would 
overflow from Him in the manner, within the realm of possibility, that is most complete in being conducive 
to order. This, then, is the meaning of providence.” Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing, trans. and 
intro. Michael E. Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), Book IX, Chapter 6, 339.  
34 De Pot. q. 3, a. 15, resp.  
35 “[...] ponit ea quae pertinent ad mansionem unius rei in alia. Unde sciendum est quod, cum ex aliquibus 
aliquid constitui oportet, primo quidem requiritur quod partes conveniant: sicut multi lapides conveniunt ad 
invicem ex quibus constituitur domus et similiter omnes partes universi conveniunt in ratione existendi; et 
hoc ideo dicit, quia non solum ex pulchro sunt mansiones rerum in seipsis, sed etiam communiones 
omnium in omnibus secundum proprietatem uniuscuiusque; non enim uno modo omnia sunt in omnibus, 
sed superiora quidem in inferioribus participatione, inferiora vero in superioribus excellenter et tamen 
omnia cum omnibus aliquid commune habent.” In De Div Nom., Chapter 4. Lec. 6. 364. For an analysis of 
these different analogies, see Blanchette, The Order of the Universe, 12-19. 
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diversity of creatures be the intended result of a single principium.36 The arche from 
which all beings emerge also determines the telos towards which all beings strive. Thus, 
the universe constitutes “an integral whole” existing as ordered to the whole.37
      The importance for Aquinas of such a first principium is not only that it has the power 
to causally give rise to being as their arche, but also archically dispenses such beings 
toward their final end. Beings as emanted from other beings would be teleologically 
anarchic with respect to the first insofar as they lacked a preordained order and 
connection to each other, but instead occurred as the result of blind necessity, a sort of 
cosmic overflow. The universe would be reduced to a first only indirectly insofar as each 
successive emanation follows from the previous, but the series as a whole is not 
intellectually designed by the first. If nature were the result of the first agent acting by 
natural necessity, each subsequent being would still have a form, but such form would 
not be an end of its generation as intended by the first agent. The work of nature (opus 
naturae) would not be a work of intelligence (opus intelligentiae), which would mean 
that the diversity between beings on account of their forms would not be insribed in terms 
of a natural end. This is why, Aquinas argues, God acts intelligibly and has a pre-existing 
idea of everything that can come to be. Like the architect who intends to build a house 
according to the form in her mind, God creates the universe according to a design with 
each thing corresponding to a likeness preconceived by its agent.
 The 
diversity of the universe is rendered intelligible in reference to the unity of both its origin 
and its end.  
38
                                                 
36 Aquinas argues that this allows God to give to things their principium durationis. SCG II.38. 
37 See Blanchette, The Order of the Universe. 
38 See ST I, q. 15, a. 1, resp. and fn 19 above. 
 As the reflection of 
these preconceived ideas, the universe, once created, resembles that after which its was 
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modeled and anything can be judged in accordance with how closely it approximates its 
ideated form. Things have an essential ground in divine preconception, even though, as 
we will come to see, their existential ground exceeds mere conceivability.  
      Given what has been said about such divine ideas, as the forms on account of which 
God acts as an intelligent agent, we must add the following: God does not understand 
things according to an idea existing apart from himself, as the Platonist might think.39
      The obvious problem with positing multiple ideas in the divine essence would be the 
multiplication of divine simplicity. Something absolutely simple would include a 
multiplicity of acts of understanding which would constitute a breach between God and 
his multiple acts of knowing. Aquinas argues, however, that it is necessary to posit many 
divine ideas on account of the order of the universe as a whole. To make this argument, 
he refers to the ultimate end of every effect, which follows from the intention of the 
principal agent and not from an accidental succession of multiple agents. God’s ideas 
must be multiple, otherwise any subsequent manifold of actual beings would not be 
sufficiently ordered according to God as their arche. Their unity would exceed the order 
preordained by the divine intellect. Such an accidental, or anarchic, unity would lack a 
 
Otherwise, there would be something other than God and uncreated by him. Given such 
an identity between God and the divine ideas, two questions arise at this point. First, 
whether God understands things through one or through many divine ideas? And second, 
in refering to the “things understood,” what is the referent of this understanding both 
before creation, but also after creation for uncreated possiblilities, such as phoenixes? 
These preliminary questions will help in formulating an answer to the earlier question of 
the relationship between divine power and absolute possiblity.  
                                                 
39 ST I, q. 15, a. 1, ad 1.  
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true sense of order, which Aquinas defines as a multiplicity unified around a guiding 
intention as determined by a principle. He illustrates this definition with the example of 
the order of an army as the proper intention of a general.40 The various parts of the army 
are ordered according to the intention of the general, who serves as the guiding principle 
of this ordered totality. Each individual part of the army is ranked according to its 
distance from the principle and finds its proper place within the order in relation to an 
end. Such an ordered relation to an end means that we can discern an intelligibility to 
what otherwise might appear as a disparate multiplicity insofar as an intelligent agent 
directs them all to some ultimate good.41
                                                 
40ST I q. 15, a. 2, resp. and also De Veritate, q . 3, a. 2, resp. The former states: “Respondeo dicendum quod 
necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud 
quod est ultimus finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo exercitus a duce. Illud autem 
quod est optimum in rebus existens, est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII Metaphys. 
Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non per accidens proveniens secundum successionem 
agentium: prout quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod creatum creavit 
secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est tanta rerum multitudo: secundum quam opinionem, 
Deus non haberet nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se creatus ab eo, et intentus ab 
ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi 
habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere 
non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente 
divina sint propriae rationes omnium rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro Octoginta trium Quaest., quod 
singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt. Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc 
autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in 
mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens 
intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius 
similitudinem domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus quod multa 
intelligat: sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde plures 
ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam 
perfecte cognoscit: unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. Potest autem 
cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem 
modum similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam speciem, secundum quod 
aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam 
essentiam ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et 
similiter de aliis. Et sic patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum; quae sunt plures 
ideae.” 
 All effects preexist in the mind of the creator 
41 According to Blanchette, the analogy of the army is introduced in order to capture the connection 
between the good of the order of parts and a separated good: in terms of an army, this corresponds to the 
good of the army itself and the good of the general who stands over the army. This analogy allows Aquinas 
to show that the good of the universe is both of an intrinsic good amongst parts and a separate good. This 
leads to yet another analogy of a household and the various grades of order (i.e., 1. the sons; 2. the servants; 
3. domestic animals) that exist apart from the principle of order (i.e., the head of house or paterfamilias). 
The importance of the household analogy, Blanchette argues, is that it adds the notion of “affinity” as an 
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and are directed according to the inteded good of his design. This account of order toward 
an end, Aquinas argues, is providence, a matter to be explored below.42
      Aquinas’s response, although not directly refuting such a theory, but instead arguing 
for a multiplicty of divine ideas, states that since the order of the universe is created by 
God immediately (i.e., not through a series of mediaries) and is intended by him, then he 
must have an idea of this order as a totality and of its individual parts, and not just of his 
 
      In terms of the universe, the highest good existing in things (optimum in rebus 
existens) is the good of an ordered universe, and the order of the universe is the proper 
intention of God. It is worth pausing to observe Aquinas’s tactic here insofar as it 
indirectly responds to theories of emanation. Against such theories—in which a series of 
successive agents follow (literally: fall out of) the previous one, and God only has an idea 
of the immediately subsequent agent—Aquinas counters that the order of the universe 
and each creature in it is intended immediately by God. According to an emanation 
account, Aquinas reports, God only creates the first creature, and the latter in turn creates 
the second, and so on down the line until a multiplicity is produced. Thus, the “order” of 
the universe does not follow from divine intention because God is responsible only for 
the first creature and not for the totality of the universe. Accordingly, God requires only a 
single idea sufficient to produce the first creature and nothing more.  
                                                                                                                                                 
ordering principle. Affinity functions as a natural principle of order between various ranks: i.e., one based 
upon natural differences, and not merely difference of assignment, which Blanchette argues, “is contingent 
upon the choice of the head” and not a matter of natural resemblance to the first itself. Thus, one might say, 
a sergeant and a private-first class do not differ by nature, but by their rank as recognized by the general, 
whereas a son and a servant differ by bloodline.  Thus, the father could not direct a servant (and even less a 
domestic animal) to fulfill the function of one of his sons insofar as they lack the father’s inheritance (i.e., 
bloodline). See Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe, 15-19. 
42 See Chapter VI Section 3 below. Also: “Hoc igitur bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo 
creatum est. Cum autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet sui effectus oportet 
rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem in 
mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est.” ST I. q. 22, a. 1, 
resp. 
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first effect. A proper account of any totality must account for those parts from which it is 
constituted: a general’s account of the order of his army must account for all the distinct 
units (e.g., infantry, cavalry, weaponry, etc.), just as a paterfamilias must account for his 
children, his servants, and his livestock in accounting for his family. Otherwise, the 
principal agent—whether it be God, a general, or a paterfamilias—could not establish 
that order in accordance with its proper end. Since God created a universe with multiple 
beings, which can be gleaned post facto, such a multitude of beings must be grounded in 
the ideational multiplicity of the divine intellect, otherwise they would be anarchic with 
respect to the first insofar as their actual being would exceed their divine preconception 
and they would be unordered in accordance with the proper intention of the agent.  
      The more Aquinas insists on the multiplicity of divine ideas, the more he seems to 
threaten divine simplicity. Aquinas, however, argues that God understands many things 
but not through a multiplicity of images informing his intellect. Such a manifold of 
images would require a multiplicity of forms actualizing God’s intellect. Ideas are not 
species by which God understands, but that which is directly understood.43 As Aquinas 
further explains in De Veritate, a form can be in the intellect in two ways.44
                                                 
43 “[...] ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua 
intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu [...].” See ST I q. 15, a. 2, resp.  
 In one way, it 
44 “Forma enim in intellectu dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo ita quod sit principium actus intelligendi, 
sicut forma, quae est intelligentis in quantum est intelligens, et haec est similitudo intellecti in ipso; alio 
modo ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitat formam domus, et cum illa 
forma sit excogitata per actum intelligendi et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus 
intelligendi ut sit primum quo intelligatur sed magis se habet ut intellectum quo intelligens aliquid operatur; 
nihilominus tamen est forma praedicta secundum quo intelligitur quia per formam excogitatam artifex 
intelligit quid operandum sit; sicut etiam in intellectu speculativo videmus quod species qua intellectus 
informatur ut intelligat actu est primum quo intelligitur, ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu per talem 
formam operari iam potest formando quidditates rerum et componendo et dividendo, unde ipsa quidditas 
formata in intellectu vel etiam compositio et divisio est quoddam operatum ipsius, per quod tamen 
intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris et sic est quasi secundum quo intelligitur. Si autem intellectus 
artificis aliquod artificiatum produceret ad similitudinem sui ipsius, tunc quidem ipse intellectus artificis 
esset idea, non quidem ut est intellectus sed inquantum intellectum. In his autem quae ad imitationem 
alterius producuntur, quandoque quidem id quod alterum imitatur perfecte imitatur ipsum, et tunc 
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is the principle of the act of understanding, or that which leads the intellect from potency 
to act. The form serves as a likeness of the thing in the intellect, enabling it to understand 
the thing from which the form has been abstracted. In another way, the form is the 
culmination of the act of understanding, as is the case when an architect contrives 
(excogitat) the form of a house. Since in the case of the latter the form is contrived 
through the act of understanding, as an effect of the intellectual act, it cannot be the 
principle of understanding. The form is not that by which the intellect understands 
something, as is the case for our intellect knowing something through its intelligible 
species, but instead that which is produced through the activity of thinking. Cognition in 
such a case is practical and productive. The former way of a form’s being in the intellect 
does not suffice to explain the divine ideas. Otherwise, the divine intellect would be 
called to act by something other than itself. Instead, Aquinas turns to the latter productive 
model of cognition to explain how the divine intellect operates as first artificer, or cosmic 
architect of all distinct manners of being (modi essendi).     
      Aquinas begins by explaining that if the intellect of an artisan produced something 
similar to itself, then her intellect itself would be an idea, not insofar as it is 
understanding (i.e., an intellect) something distinct from itself, but insofar as understood. 
As opposed to producing an idea of some other object (e.g., a house or a motorcycle), the 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectus operativus praeconcipiens formam operati habet ut ideam ipsam formam rei imitatae prout est 
illius rei imitatae; quandoque vero quod est ad imitationem alterius non perfecte imitatur illud, et tunc 
intellectus operativus non acciperet formam rei imitatae absolute ut ideam vel exemplar rei operandae sed 
cum proportione determinata secundum quam exemplatum a principali exemplari deficeret vel imitaretur. 
Dico ergo quod Deus per intellectum omnia operans omnia ad similitudinem essentiae suae producit, unde 
essentia sua est idea rerum; non quidem ut est essentia, sed ut est intellecta. Res autem creatae non perfecte 
imitantur divinam essentiam; unde essentia non accipitur absolute ab intellectu divino ut idea rerum, sed 
cum proportione creaturae fiendae ad ipsam divinam essentiam, secundum quod deficit ab ea vel imitatur 
ipsam; diversae autem res diversimode ipsam imitantur et unaquaeque secundum proprium modum suum 
cum unicuique sit esse distinctum ab altera; et ideo ipsa divina essentia, cointellectis diversis 
proportionibus rerum ad eam, est idea uniuscuiusque rei: unde cum sint diversae rerum proportiones, 
necesse est plures esse ideas, et est quidem una omnium ex parte essentiae sed pluralitas invenitur ex parte 
diversarum proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam.” De Veritate, q. 3, a. 2, resp. 
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artisan instead would produce its very likeness through the act of thinking. As Aquinas 
further explains, this is the way of divine ideation. For God, such a production of his 
essence as understood establishes an idea for all creatures. Such an idea, however, is not 
the divine essence absolutely understood, but instead as the proportion each thing might 
have to the divine essence as its exemplar. Thus, God knows various things according to 
the degrees in which they might imitate his essence, and as imitations always with some 
degree of deficiency. In knowing his essence perfectly, God also knows the various 
manners in which his essence can be participated by creatures. Such an imitatability on 
the part of the divine essence accounts for the multiplicity of divine ideas. There is but a 
single idea of God’s essence for all things, but many ideas follow according to the diverse 
proportions by which things are able to imitate the divine essence. Aquinas states: “Unde, 
cum sint diversae rerum proportiones, necesse est plures esse ideas; et est quidem una 
omnium ex parte essentiae; sed pluralitas invenitur ex parte diversarum proportionum 
creaturarum ad ipsam.”45 God does not serve indifferently as the exemplar of all things, 
in which case he would know everything indifferently.46 Instead, he must understand 
distinct things as various manners in which the divine essence can be imperfectly 
imitated.47
                                                 
45 See De Veritate, q. 3, a. 2, resp. and fn 44 above.  
46 See also, SCG I.54. 
47 In De Pot. q. 3, a. 16, ad. 12, Aquinas argues that if the exemplified were a perfect copy of its exemplar, 
there could be but one copy of it, multiplied only accidentally through matter. The only perfect imitation of 
the exemplar is the Son, who is an image of the Father. All other exemplification falls short.  
 In doing so, Aquinas thus has retained the simplicity of God’s essence while 
allowing it to serve as an ideational principle or arche of multiplicity, that by which 
everything falls short of divine perfection although according to diverse manners of 
being.  
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      To the degree each creature participates in the divine essence and can come to imitate 
such a perfection, to that degree it has its species. Through its species, each being 
assimilates itself to the divine essence. As the specific parts constituting the totality of the 
universe, species—and the individuals subsumed therein—find their highest good in the 
ordered universe. Through determinate forms, everything is placed within its species and 
reduced to divine wisdom ordering the unified multiplicity of the universe as their first 
principle. As Aquinas argues in the beginning of Summa Contra Gentiles, wise are those 
who order things rightly and govern them well.48 This rule of government and order for 
all things best disposes each thing when it is fittingly ordered to its end. A ship is best 
disposed when the technician produces it with regard to the end of navigation, or 
medicine when the chemist concocts the formula with regard for the health of the body. 
Thus, everything in the universe finds order according its specific end, and such ends are 
specified in terms of the general architectonic of the universe as a whole.49
      In intending an order for the universe according to the multiplicity of his ideas, God 
serves as the exemplary cause of everything wherein each creature receives its 
determinate form.
 A multiplicity 
comes to be unified in accordance with the intention of its proper governor. The role of 
the divine intellect for Aquinas is not only as arche from whence all things derive or 
emanate, but also as that to which all things are dispensed and ordered as a telos or end.   
50
                                                 
48 SCG I.1.  
49 In this chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas defines “architectonic” as the arts that rule other 
arts insofar as they establish the other’s end.   
 Such determinate forms link creatures to a species and also 
50 “[...] dicendum quod Deus est prima causa exemplaris omnium rerum. Ad cuius evidentiam, 
considerandum est quod ad productionem alicuius rei ideo necessarium est exemplar, ut effectus 
determinatam formam consequatur: artifex enim producit determinatam formam in materia, propter 
exemplar ad quod inspicit, sive illud sit exemplar ad quod extra intuetur, sive sit exemplar interius mente 
conceptum. Manifestum est autem quod ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatas formas consequuntur. Haec 
autem formarum determinatio oportet quod reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, 
 235 
distinguish them from members of other species. The rationes of all things, which 
Aquinas notes had earlier been called ideas, are the principles by which divine wisdom 
grounds all things, providing them with the order of a fully contrived (excogitavit) 
universe. This suggests that the subcontracting of creation through intermediary agents 
(e.g., Avicenna’s account of emanation), whose subsequent actions stand outside the 
purview of the first (primum principium), would leave creatures anarchic in a very real 
sense because although necessarily following from the first, such an order is not intended 
by the first as dispensed toward an end.  
      Even though Avicenna treats emanation according to a model of necessity (i.e., the 
existence of a cause sufficiently determines the production of its effect), not leaving 
much to contingency or chance, for Aquinas, there is no preconception of such an order 
as a totality. Thus, such a multiplicity is not grounded in the order of a single principle 
nor are such effects adequately forseen in their multiplicity. The vehemence of necessity 
implicates God in the natural order without a breach between cause and effect.51
                                                                                                                                                 
quae ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere quod in divina 
sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum [m.e.], quas supra diximus ideas [m.e.], id est formas exemplares in 
mente divina existentes [m.e.]. Quae quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non 
sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout eius similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur 
ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. –Possunt etiam in rebus creatis quaedam aliorum exemplaria dici, 
secundum quod quaedam sunt ad similitudinem aliorum, vel secundum eandem speciem, vel secundum 
analogiam alicuius imitationis.” ST I, q. 44, a. 3, resp. 
51 This is the issue that seems to concern Gilson: “…the same Christian theologians [of the thirteenth-
century] could not fail to realize the fact that the God of Avicenna, although ontologically separated from 
merely possible beings by his own necessity, still remained tied up with them in a necessary way. From the 
very fact that the Necessary Being is, the Avicennian universe of finite beings necessarily follows…” 
Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 216. 
 For 
Aquinas, instead, divine wisdom can think through an order for the universe without 
thereby committing God to its actual production. As he argues in De Veritate, much like 
an artist who has practical knowledge of what she might create, but merely “thinks 
through” (excogitat) without intending such a work, likewise, in merely contriving an 
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order for the universe, God does not yet actually produce such an order.52 When the 
divine rationes do come to serve as the principles of actual producion and pertain to 
practical cognition, they are called exemplares.53
      As the exemplary cause of everything, God makes creatures in his likeness. God 
knows different things according to the modes by which they accept something of the 
  
      Coming full circle from the intellectus essentiae argument of De Ente, at this point 
we begin to witness the importance of this separation insofar as in thinking through the 
imitatability of his essence, God provides an exemplar for all creatures without actually 
bringing them into being, which allows Aquinas to keep separate the conditions for 
something’s being intelligible, for example through a divine intellectus essentiae, from its 
being actual. Only through an endowment of being does something actually come to be. 
This is why our intellectus essentiae can grasp the intelligibility of any creature—even 
those non-existent creatures such as phoenixes—but cannot conceptually reproduce for 
itself the “what more” of actual being. We run up against such actuality when we 
encounter any being, and yet in attempting to render an account and conceptually unpack 
the content of our intellectual grasp, we seem always to come up short. The reason for 
esse’s fundamental incommensurability with conceptual thought is rooted in the distinct 
manners by which God causes something’s nature and by which he causes its being.  
                                                 
52 De Veritate, q. 3, a. 3, resp.  
53 “Respondeo dicendum quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et generationis 
ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium 
factionis rerum, exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. Secundum autem quod 
principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. 
Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod 
tempus. Secundum vero quod principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a Deo, 
etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et 
secundum quod cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.” ST I, q. 15, a. 3, resp. In his sed contra to 
a later question, he states: “Sed contra est quod exemplar est idem quod idea. Sed ideae, secundum quod 
Augustinus libro Octoginta trium Quaest. dicit, sunt formae principales, quae divina intelligentia 
continentur. Ergo exemplaria rerum non sunt extra Deum.” ST I, q. 44, a. 3 s. c. 
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divine essence.54
      Although exemplarity is a condition sine qua non, by itself it provides an insufficient 
causal ground of being. If the divine intellect were the sufficient cause of the being of 
creatures, then every creature would be a necessary being (ens). Their being (esse) would 
be but an extension of their essential intelligibility as understood by God, an identity 
 Such acceptance is itself a perfection, made imperfect only to the extent 
that it falls short (necessarily so, we might add) of true being. God understands the 
essence of each thing as a way (modus) of imitating his own essence. Although 
everything deficiently imitates the divine essence, life, for example, imitates God in a 
lesser noble manner than knowledge, whereby God knows the proper form of plant. This 
multiplicity of divine imitation accounts for a multiplicity in things and their varying 
degrees of nobility. It is important to note that Aquinas extends divine knowledge even to 
singulars, of which there is a proper account in the divine intellect (propria ratio 
singulorum). This move will help secure a robust account of divine providence, in which 
not only are particulars dispensed toward an end qua species, but also the divine intellect 
offers provision for individuals as well.   
                                                 
54 "Divina autem essentia in se nobilitates omnium entium comprehendit, non quidem per modum 
compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis, ut supra ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, tam propria quam 
communis, secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est perfectio quaedam: non autem imperfectionem includit nisi 
secundum quod deficit a vero esse. Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua 
comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit 
unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo essentiam suam ut imitabilem per modum vitae et non cognitionis, 
accipit propriam formam plantae; si vero ut imitabilem per modum cognitionis et non intellectus, propriam 
formam animalis; et sic de aliis. Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, inquantum est absolute perfecta, 
potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus propriam cognitionem de omnibus habere 
potest. Quia vero propria ratio unius distinguitur a propria ratione alterius; distinctio autem est pluralitatis 
principium: oportet in intellectu divino distinctionem quandam et pluralitatem rationum intellectarum 
considerare, secundum quod id quod est in intellectu divino est propria ratio diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit 
secundum quod Deus intelligit proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque creatura ad 
ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sint plures vel distinctae nisi secundum 
quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi. Et secundum hoc Augustinus 
dicit quod Deus alia ratione facit hominem et alia equum; et rationes rerum pluraliter in mente divina esse 
dicit. In quo etiam aliqualiter salvatur Platonis opinio ponentis ideas, secundum quas formarentur omnia 
quae in rebus materialibus existunt.” SCG I.54. 
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between esse and essence reserved only for God. The perfection posited by every 
essence, as understood by the divine intellect as a reflection of itself, is perfection 
borrowed from God and thereby does not help the essence to make gains against 
nothingness: all essences are equal in their existential impotence with none inching closer 
to the starting line of being. When they do come to be, they posit more and less perfect 
modes of being according to (what is presumably) their own actus essendi. But until 
created, essences lack a reality of their own apart from their being in the divine mind. 
      For this reason, divine ideas can be multiple and yet not complicate divine simplicity 
(i.e., because God understands only himself). But also, this means that real creatures 
require a radically distinct principle of being (principium essendi) if they are to emerge 
from out of the borrowed reality of essences. Granted, their essential preconceptions will 
determine their distinct manners of being (modi essendi) once they emerge in their being 
(esse), but first they must take a stand outside of divine ipseity, that is, they must be.55
                                                 
55This is why even though creatures are made in the divine image, they do not share a form with God. 
“Praeterea, similia sunt quae communicant in forma. Sed creatura potest Deo similari; quod patet Genes. I, 
26: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Ergo creaturae ad Deum est aliqua 
communicatio in forma. De omnibus autem communicantibus in forma potest aliquid univoce praedicari. 
Ergo de Deo et creatura potest aliquid praedicari univoce.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 7. arg. 2. Aquinas responds to 
the aforementioned argument for univocal predication as follows:  “[...] dicendum, quod similitudo 
creaturae ad Deum deficit a similitudine univocorum in duobus. Primo, quia non est per participationem 
unius formae, sicut duo calida secundum participationem unius caloris; hoc enim quod de Deo et creaturis 
dicitur, praedicatur de Deo per essentiam, de creatura vero per participationem; ut sic talis similitudo 
creaturae ad Deum intelligatur, qualis est calidi ad calorem, non qualis calidi ad calidius. Secundo, quia 
ipsa forma in creatura participata deficit a ratione eius quod Deus est, sicut calor ignis deficit a ratione 
virtutis solaris, per quam calorem generat.” De Pot. q. 7, a. 7, ad 2. Also, SCG. I. 29. What is interesting to 
note about this passage is that is spells out the consequence of the fourth way (discussed above) that 
creatures do not merely participate a relatively maxime ens, but an absolutely maxime ens. 
 To 
prepare for a more extended discussion in what follows of participation in esse, we must 
discuss further what accounts for the difference between mere divine ideas and those 
ideas that are brought into being and why God chooses to bring about a diverse 
multiplicity. 
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      In regard to the first question, let us begin by noting that the separation of exemplary 
causality from efficient causality stands as a central move in Aquinas’s argument for the 
radical givenness of being. This means that even though something is conceivable by the 
divine intellect, such a being is not necessarily issued in re following from its mere 
conception. The God of Aquinas can “stop the flow” of being insofar as all creatures are 
principiated by both divine exemplary causality and also by divine efficient causality. 
From these distinct lines of influence, irreducible to one another, creatures emerge as 
created, not emanated. For Aquinas and his existential readers, the distinctive mark of 
creation, which sets his account apart not only from emanation (e.g., Plotinus or 
Avicenna), but also from other creationist accounts (e.g., Duns Scotus or Suarez) is the 
givenness of being (dare esse), which both immediately grounds the actual existence of 
every being and also remains really other than its essential constitution. From the 
multiplicity of divine ideas, God can choose which to actually create, those to which he 
will endow the gift of being. This brings us to the questions of uncreated possibilities, or 
unlegislated ideas.  
      As repeatedly stated, the essence of phoenix is intelligible, that is, it is not a 
contradiction or mere non-sense, and yet there are no individual phoenixes. And given 
the inferiority of our intellect in comparison with the divine intellect, it seems that God 
even more can understand every possibility without there being such an instantiation of 
any given one. As has been shown, God’s having an idea does not necessitate that this, or 
any, idea is realized in re. But because its ideational status “pre-exists” its existential 
manifestation,56
                                                 
56 “Pre-exists” here is not meant to necessarily signify temporality, but instead that existence requires a 
“principium durationis,” distinct from such ideational preconception. As will be explained below, such a 
 in God there is an idea of that which is not, was not, and never will be:  
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Dicendum, quod idea proprie dicta respicit practicam cognitionem non solum in actu sed 
in habitu, unde, cum Deus de his quae facere potest quamvis nunquam sint facta nec 
futura habeat cognitionem virtualiter practicam, relinquitur quod idea possit esse eius 
quod nec est  nec fuit nec erit:  non tamen eodem modo sicut est eorum quae sunt vel 
erunt vel fuerunt, quia ad ea quae sunt vel erunt vel fuerunt producenda determinatur ex 
proposito divinae voluntatis, non autem ad ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, et sic 
huiusmodi habent quodammodo indeterminatas ideas.57
As Aquinas states here in De Veritate, God’s cognition of those things which are not, 
were not, and will never come to be, is more than merely speculative cognition, but 
“virtually practical cognition.” As practical, this means that such ideas are legislatable by 
the divine will and thought through as possibilities, but as virtual, they remain within the 
power of God, but never will be actualized.
 
58 The unlegislated ideas remain 
indeterminate, unlike actual ideas legislated by the divine will (ex proposito divinae 
voluntatis). Ideas of both things that have determinate being (i.e., they are, were, or will 
be) and things that lack such being (i.e., are not, were not, or will not be) belong 
primarily to practical cognition, or the divine intellect as oriented towards what will come 
to be. 59
                                                                                                                                                 
“principle of duration” implies a radical break or rupture (thus “principium” in the sense of beginning) 
although not necessarily in time.   
57 De Veritate q. 3, art. 6, resp. 
58 For this distinction, see De Veritate, q. 3, a. 3, resp. Practical cognition considers something insofar as it 
is operable, unlike speculative cognition, which considers the absolute truth of something. The latter can 
also consider something (e.g., a house) according to its genus or differentia, that is in an inoperable manner. 
For a more extended discussion of the difference between speculative and practical, as well as actual and 
virtual, cognition, see Dewan, “St. Thomas, James Ross, and Exemplarism,” 226-229. Against Ross’s 
ideational minimalism, Dewan maintains that God not only has multiple ideas of what he does make and 
what he can make (i.e., actual and virtual practical cognition), but that he has knowledge of such things in 
modes by which they are not operable (i.e., speculative cognition). The latter category, the operables 
conceived inoperably, should be properly called rationes and not ideas. See also ST I. q. 15, a. 3, resp. and 
ad 2 and De Veritate, q. 3, a. 3, resp.  
 Although Aquinas allots a role to the divine will in such production, the exact 
59 To the argument that nothing has an idea unless it has determinate being (esse), Aquinas states: “Ad 
primum igitur dicendum, quod quamvis quod nec est, nec fuit, nec erit, non habeat esse determinatum in se, 
est tamen determinate in Dei cognitione.” De Veritate q.3, art. 6, ad. 1. Ross’s voluntaristic reading of 
Aquinas states: “Aquinas modulates the general answers acceptable to Augustinians to fit his Aristotelian 
metaphysics. For instance, the divine ‘rationes’ are a virtual plurality of ideas denominated from finite 
natures, contained ‘in an excelling manner,’ ‘as the imperfect is within the perfect’ (ST I, 14, 6c). The 
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nature of their interrelation (i.e., practical cognition and will) remains to be seen after the 
event of creation itself has been treated.60
      Although Aquinas’s account may be misread as foreshadowing the position of Henry 
of Ghent, an important distinction separates the two: for Henry, such ideas have being of 
their own, what he calls “esse essentiae,” apart from either their intentional being in the 
divine mind or their existential being (esse existentiae). For Aquinas, on the other hand, 
such indeterminate ideas do not have esse in themselves, but derive their esse from divine 
cognition.
  
61
                                                                                                                                                 
proper ratio of each thing is contained in God according to the diverse ways in which different creatures 
participate in and imitate God (ST I, 14, 6 ad 3). These, however, are ‘incomplete ideas,’ not the ideas of 
one making such things (De potential Dei 1.5 ad 11; De veritate 3, 6).” Ross, “Aquinas’s Exemplarism, 
Aquinas’s Voluntarism,” 178. He argues that Wippel’s manner of questioning the “status of possibles” 
transforms vacant possibility into a realm of extensional reference. Ross argues that instead prior to 
creation, there is only one eternal truth, linked to the unity of the divine idea. He seeks to reduce possibility 
to the divine will (hence his voluntarism) and eliminate any referential extension for possibility apart from 
created things themselves. 
60 See Chapter VI Section 1 below.  
 Left to itself, the creature’s essence would be nothing. It does not subsist in 
61 For a comparison of Aquinas and Henry on this question, see John F. Wippel, “The Reality of 
Nonexisting Possibles According to Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines,” Review 
of Metaphysics 33 (June 1981): 729-758. Henry of Ghent’s argument can best be understood as a response 
to Giles of Rome’s reading of Aquinas’s real composition between esse and essence as a real distinction 
between two things (res). The problem with treating esse as a really distinct res, to paraphrase Henry’s 
argument against the unnamed Giles, would be the following: if esse were some thing (res) outside the 
essence of the creature, such a thing obviously would not be God (otherwise every creature would be 
composed with God). Thus, esse (as a res) must be a created thing. But any created thing does not have 
esse from itself, but through participation and acquisition. If something always has participated esse from 
that thing in which it participates, then we must ask does that thing have esse through itself or through 
another? If the latter, the process goes on ad infinitum. If the former, then that thing must be uncreated as 
created things must participate their esse. Quodlibet I, q. 9, 51. Ultimately, esse as a distinct thing becomes 
an unnecessary posit, because it cannot by itself account for creaturely existence, but instead leads back to 
God. Henry will eliminate such a reified principle and simply define esse as a relation to God himself. Esse 
is not something really distinct from essence, but merely an intentionally distinct manner in which created 
beings relate to God. In the following passage, Henry puts forward a clear expression of what he means by 
esse and essence being intentionally distinct (Quodlibet I, q .9, 56). He offers a number of examples to 
illustrate his intentional distinction (i.e., running, lighting, living). Take for example living. The participle 
“living” (vivens), the noun “life” (vita), and the infinitive “to live” (vivere) all signify the same thing. And 
yet, to state “’life’ is ‘to live’” would be a mistake. In one and the same thing, a certain less than real 
distinctness is signified by all three terms. That is, we understand the same thing under distinct concepts. 
To gain a better grasp on this distinction as it relates to “ens, essentia, et esse,” it might help to compare 
Henry to Siger, who also used such examples to make his case. Both thinkers would agree that “essentia” 
and “esse” do not signify two really distinct things. Henry wants to maintain, however, that we understand 
one and the same thing under distinct concepts (intentiones): either as conceived in the Divine Intellect or 
as actualized by the Divine Will. As discussed above in Chapter I, Siger rejects such an intentional 
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limbo, midway between being and nothingness, prior to its actualization. It does not have 
“incomplete being” to which esse merely adds the final touch. 62
                                                                                                                                                 
distinction on the grounds that a single thing was not conceived under two distinct concepts through 
‘essentia’ and ‘esse.’ At stake in Henry’s intentional distinction is the eternal conceivability of natures apart 
from their actual existence, which had not troubled Siger because of his position on the eternity of the 
world. With this issue, we find Henry’s famous discussion of esse essentiae (i.e., essential being) and esse 
existentiae (i.e., existential being). (Quodlibet 1, q. 9). Creatures enjoy esse essentiae insofar as they are 
formal exemplars in the Divine Intellect. Thus, such essential being grounds eternal truth even without 
actual creatures: essential being safeguards true possibility in the Divine Intellect separating it as a genuine 
object of scientific knowledge apart from mere cognitive fancy (i.e., chimeras). Such a theory goes along 
with Henry’s theory of illumination and distinction of the Truth of beings from what is true. On this matter, 
Wippel states: “Reflecting an interest already manifested by certain members of the Arts Faculty at Paris in 
the 1260’s, Henry is much concerned with accounting for the possibility of there being some kind of 
knowledge, even scientific knowledge, of nonexistent possible entities. Going hand in hand with this 
concern is his effort to show that a creaturely essence is in some way indifferent to its actual existence and 
nonexistence” Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 740-741. Giles of Rome had offered a 
similar account concerning how form gives a positive nature as distinct from actual existence. Where Giles 
and Henry differ, concerns the question of what is given in giving esse. Giles had maintained that the given 
esse is a differens res in re from the essence. Henry, having attacked this view, holds that the given esse—
and here I mean esse existentiae—is not a thing, but a relation to the Divine Will as an effect. Whereas 
essential being designates the status of being an exemplar in the Divine Intellect (i.e., the eternal 
conceivability of precreated possibility), existential being designates the actualization of such possibility 
through a free act of the Divine Will. In each case, one and the same nature is under consideration, but in 
each case it is conceived under different concepts (i.e., as merely possible or as actual). Godfrey of 
Fontaines argues that even though Henry attempts to free up creation through intentionally distinguishing 
essential and existential being, such a move ultimately restricts Divine Freedom much more than Henry 
would like. Creation, under Henry’s model, allows God to freely actualize the possibilities exemplified in 
the Divine Intellect, but such possibilities themselves are governed by formal necessity and not free choice. 
This is why Henry had intentionally distinguished essential from existential being: it allowed him to uphold 
eternal truth alongside the free act of creation. Even if God had not (freely) decided to create roses, “a rose 
is a flower” still would be true. By hedging his bets, however, Henry does not fully escape the essentialist 
bind (characteristic of such an Augustinian Platonism) that relapse his view into an eternalized model of the 
universe. Wippel provides an excellent discussion of how Divine Freedom comes under threat in Henry’s 
view such that the Divine Intellect governs essential possibility, which as possible is not freely chosen, but 
only its actualization is a matter of volition. Wippel goes on to discuss Godfrey’s reaction to such a view 
and how it takes up this issue of limiting creation to the actualization of essences. See both Wippel “The 
Reality of Nonexisting Possibles” and The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: A Study in Late 
Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981). 
62 On this question, Carlo states: “”Between esse and esse intentionale there is no alternative except the 
never-never land of Platonic Ideas and Avicennian essences […] The doctrine of the Possibles is so critical 
because it can serve as a fulcrum to shift a metaphysics in an existential or essential direction and even to 
degrees of existentiality or essentiality.” Carlo, The Ultimate Reducibility, 91-92. In comparing Aquinas’s 
account of God as an exemplary cause to the question of necessary truth as addressed by Modern 
Philosophy (e.g., Descartes, Leibniz, Gassendi, etc.), Menn states: “By this account [Aquinas’s] God would 
produce the esse cognitum of rosehood, or the eternal truths about roses, not by any act of his will, but by 
his knowledge of his own essence through scientia naturalis. Sixty years after Descartes’ death, Leibniz is 
still commending this solution as the way to grant Descartes’ point that the necessary truths of things are 
not independent of God, while avoiding the anarchic consequences of a creation of the eternal truths: 
contingent truths depend on God’s will, but ‘necessary truths depend only on his intellect, and are its 
internal object.’” Stephen P. Menn Descartes and Augustine. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1998), 348. 
 To the argument that the 
divine ideas afford too much pre-created being to essences, and verge on placing essences 
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prior to the act of creation and thus making them uncreated,63 Aquinas maintains that 
both essence and esse are created.64 In De Potentia, he states:  “[...] quod ex hoc ipso 
quod quidditati esse attribuitur, non solum esse, sed ipsa quidditas creari dicitur: quia 
antequam esse habeat, nihil est, nisi forte in intellectu creantis, ubi non est creatura, sed 
creatrix essentia.”65 Before the essence is instantiated in creatures, its only being is in the 
intellect of the creator not yet reaching a status extra intellectum. Essences are created in 
the sense that without the intellect of the creator (intellectus creantis), they would have 
no esse whatsoever. This means that essences do not occupy the role of Platonic Ideas 
subsisting in themselves and determining the possibility of things in separation from their 
actual instantiation of them, but that their esse cognitum in the divine mind accounts for 
their being.66
                                                 
63 “Praeterea, omnia quae a Deo sunt facta dicuntur esse Dei creaturae. Creatio autem terminatur ad esse: 
prima enim rerum creatarum est esse, ut habetur in Lib. de causis. Cum ergo quidditas rei sit praeter esse 
ipsius, videtur quod quidditas rei non sit a Deo.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 5, arg. 2.  
64 Against those who might maintain the eternity of the world, Aquinas argues that ‘ex nihilo’ need not 
imply a temporal move from nothingness to being (even though from Genesis such is to be believed) but a 
relation of dependence. God could have created from eternity, and creatures nevertheless depend upon this 
gift of being such that were it withheld, they would be made nothing. Aquinas states: “[E]sse autem non 
habet creatura nisi ab alio, sibi autem relicta in se considerata nichil est: unde prius naturaliter est sibi 
nichilum quam esse. Nec oportet quod propter hoc sit simul nichil et ens, quia duratione non praecedit; non 
enim ponitur, si creatura semper fuit, ut in aliquo tempore nichil sit; sed ponitur quod natura eius talis esset 
quod esset nichil, si sibi relinqueretur: ut si dicamus aerem semper illuminatum fuisse a sole, oportebit 
dicere quod aer factus est lucidus a sole. Et quia omne quod fit ex incontingenti fit, id est ex eo quod non 
contingit simul esse cum eo quod dicitur fieri; oportebit dicere quod sit factus lucidus ex non lucido, vel ex 
tenebroso, non ita quod umquam fuerit non lucidus vel tenebrosus, sed quia esset talis, si eum sibi sol 
relinqueret. Et hoc expressius patet in stellis et orbibus quae semper illuminantur a sole.” De Aeternitate 
Mundi. 
65 De Pot. q. 3, a. 5, ad 2. 
 
66 Menn holds that Aquinas dodges a more serious set of difficulties faced by his theory, namely: “Since 
God’s essence is simple, there is precisely one thing that God knows prior to creation: his scientia naturalis 
cannot give him knowledge of a plurality of intelligible contents (such as the many truths of geometry), and 
he cannot produce a plurality of essences in esse cognitum prior to his willing and creating. Since Thomas 
shares Descartes’ commitment to God’s simplicity, he cannot avoid Descartes’ conclusion. Thomas tries to 
solve the problem by saying that God knows himself in one way as the paradigm of roses, in another way 
as the paradigm of lions, and so on. But since the divine ideas are not a real multiplicity, but are all really 
identical with the divine essence, and distinguished only by reason comparing the divine essence with the 
different creatures that can imitate it, God cannot recognize a plurality of truths by looking at himself, 
unless he also looks at creatures for comparison: so Thomas has no explanation of how God can know a 
plurality of things by scientia naturalis. The only honest way to explain a plurality of content in God’s 
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      To answer our earlier question of whether divine power determines possibility or 
possibility determines divine power, the answer seems to be both. If we consider 
possibility as the imitability of divine essence, then God’s very nature determines the 
conditions of possibility. Arguing against a reading of Aquinas as a strict voluntarist, 
Wippel states: “God can effect certain things only because they are possible in 
themselves. They are possible in themselves only because the divine essence is as it is in 
itself.”67 Thus, possibility requires divine imitability without which nothing would be 
possible, but God does not choose his own nature, but he necessarily is such. Thus, even 
though Aquinas speaks of something’s being “possible in an absolute sense” according to 
the relation of its terms and power being said in reference to possibility (potentia dicatur 
ad possibilia),68
                                                                                                                                                 
knowledge, prior to any act of will, is to posit some real complexity in God himself: not merely a 
complexity in God’s intellect, but a complexity in God’s essence, giving rise to the complexity in the 
intellect. Leibniz, unlike Thomas or Descartes, is willing to pay this price (God has an infinite number of 
perfections, and by distinctly contemplating each of these, and their possible combinations, he knows all 
possible creatures); but for Descartes this is no better, either religiously or scientifically, than subjecting 
God to Styx and the Fates. We would merely be saying that Styx and the Fates belong to the structure of 
God’s essence.” Menn, Descartes and Augustine, 349. 
67 Wippel, “The Reality of Nonexisting Possibles,” 738. Thus, Aquinas does not posit the robust essences 
of Henry of Ghent, because if God did not exist, there would be no divine essence to determine possibility. 
Thus, without the divine essence, and God’s knowledge of his imitatability, there would be no possibility. 
But because God does not chose his essence, and thus imitatability is dictated by what is necessarily the 
divine essence, Wippel also counters the voluntarism of Ross. Thus, on the question of “nonexisting 
possibles,” he locates Aquinas between the extremes of essentialism (e.g., Henry of Ghent) and 
voluntarism.  
 such terminological relatability requires God’s essence as the thesaurus 
68 Aquinas argues that God is omnipotent insofar as he can do all things that are absolutely possible (i.e., 
whose terms do not involve contradiction). “Socrates sits” is possible, whereas “a donkey is human” is 
impossible because of the compatibility or incompatibility of their terms.  Such compatibility or 
incompatibility depends upon some referent (i.e., the divine essence) by which such terms become 
meaningful, and thereby take on possible syntactical relations with other terms. See: “Respondeo dicendum 
quod communiter confitentur omnes Deum esse omnipotentem. Sed rationem omnipotentiae assignare 
videtur difficile. Dubium enim potest esse quid comprehendatur sub ista distributione, cum dicitur omnia 
posse Deum. Sed si quis recte consideret, cum potentia dicatur ad possibilia, cum Deus omnia posse dicitur, 
nihil rectius intelligitur quam quod possit omnia possibilia, et ob hoc omnipotens dicatur. Possibile autem 
dicitur dupliciter, secundum philosophum, in V Metaphys. Uno modo, per respectum ad aliquam 
potentiam, sicut quod subditur humanae potentiae, dicitur esse possibile homini. Non autem potest dici 
quod Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia naturae creatae: quia divina potentia 
in plura extenditur. Si autem dicatur quod Deus sit omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia suae 
potentiae, erit circulatio in manifestatione omnipotentia: hoc enim non erit aliud quam dicere quod Deus est 
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of their meaning.69
      Just as monetary currency has no value apart from an economic system of 
exchange—ideally reducible to some gold standard that grounds the entire economy—
likewise, all possibility reduces to the terminological exchange of definitional parts 
grounded in the gold standard of divine imitatability: without God, the definition 
“squared circle” would be no more a contradiction than “rational animal” because none 
of the terms have any meaning or signification in themselves. Thus, the semantics of 
terms and the syntax of their combinations, whose exchange gives rise to the logic of 
contradiction and non-contradiction, become meaningful only in terms of an ultimate 
significatum, or analogatum, whose independence from the system of meaning that is the 
 “Circle,” or “human,” or “phoenix” derive meaning because their 
constituitive terms reflect possible imitations of the divine essence, they become 
meaningful in reference to the divine essence as their transcendental referent.  
                                                                                                                                                 
omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae potest. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur omnipotens, quia potest 
omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel 
impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum: possibile quidem, quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, 
ut Socratem sedere; impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut hominem esse 
asinum. Est autem considerandum quod, cum unumquodque agens agat sibi simile, unicuique potentiae 
activae correspondet possibile ut obiectum proprium, secundum rationem illius actus in quo fundatur 
potentia activa, sicut potentia calefactiva refertur, ut ad proprium obiectum, ad esse calefactibile. Esse 
autem divinum, super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum, non limitatum ad aliquod 
genus entis, sed praehabens in se totius esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis, 
continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur omnipotens. Nihil autem opponitur 
rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae 
omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim omnipotentiae non subditur, non 
propter defectum divinae potentiae; sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilis. 
Quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum 
dicitur Deus omnipotens. Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non 
continentur: quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde convenientius dicitur quod non possunt 
fieri, quam quod Deus non potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis, non erit 
impossibile apud Deum omne verbum. Id enim quod contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, 
quia nullus intellectus potest illud concipere.” ST I, q. 25, a. 3, resp. In De Pot. q. 5, art. 3, resp., he argues, 
however, that something is said to be impossible to God in two ways: It is impossible in itself, insofar as it 
involves a contradiction; or because, the opposite is necessary. He subdivides the latter into cases of natural 
agents determined to a certain effect (e.g., heat to fire) and cases of determination to a certain end (e.g., 
man to happiness). Once again, such terms (i.e., heat, fire, man happiness) derive their meaning from a 
transcendental referent, namely God.  
69 Carlo uses this term throughout The Ultimate Reducibility of Essence to Existence in Existential 
Metaphysics.  
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world exemplifies the diverse and manifold imitations of itself whereby they become 
meaningful expressions of their exemplary ground. This means that although divine 
power does not arbitrarily choose the fabric of possible reality, such is modeled after the 
divine essence as the ground of imitatability itself. Thus, absolute possiblility depends on 
divine being as its transcendental source of meaning, the “gold standard” of intelligibility, 
without relapsing into volunary election on the part of divine omnipotence.70
      To this point, we have seen how Aquinas accounts for a possible multiplicity of 
beings through the divine ideas, which means that the divine intellect accounts for 
diversity and, as will be seen in what follows, this allows him to rule out other candidates 
such as matter, the concordance of multiple agents, or any other accidental means as the 
source of such diversity.
 How such a 
diverse multiplicity of possible imitations could signify God’s perfect ipseity of being 
remains to be seen.  
 
Section 3: Creation as Ordered Multiplicity 
71
                                                 
70 Aquinas also argues that certain things (e.g., uninformed matter) cannot be created. See De Pot. q. 4, a. 1, 
s.c. 3: “Praeterea, Deus plus potest operari quam natura. Sed natura facit de ente in potentia ens actu. Ergo 
Deus potest facere de ente simpliciter ens in potentia; et ita potuit facere materiam sine forma existentem.” 
And: Ad tertium dicendum, quod si Deus faceret ens in potentia tantum, minus faceret quam natura, quae 
facit ens in actu. Actionis enim perfectio magis attenditur secundum terminum ad quem, quam secundum 
terminum a quo; et tamen hoc ipsum quod dicitur, contradictionem implicat, ut scilicet aliquid fiat quod sit 
in potentia tantum: quia quod factum est, oporteret esse cum est, ut probatur in VI Phys. Quod autem est 
tantum in potentia, non simpliciter est.” De Pot. q. 4, a. 1, ad s.c. 3 
71 See SCG II.39-45. 
 The ideas are the modes of imitation by which creatures can 
imitate and thereby ultimately fall short of (i.e., be unlike) the divine essence insofar as 
they are other than God himself. We also have seen that God knows such imitability 
through a practical cognition distinct from his actual legislation of those creatures. This 
distinction, however, does not mean that God knows, and then acts in a temporal sense, 
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but that God as an intelligent agent can determine what ideas he will act upon (i.e., 
create) or he can choose not to create at all. His knowing by itself does not necessarily 
give rise to, or “emanate,” a distinct being outside divine cognition, but only contrives the 
scope of possibilities capable of receiving being. Such contriving, or thinking through, 
the order of universe makes beings archic or principated such that they are accounted for 
in the wisdom of a first agent as directed toward an end. At this point, the focus will 
begin to shift toward the divine will and what is actually created by God, attempting to 
penetrate insofar as possible God’s reason for choosing this particular order of creation 
over others and over outright nothingness. Why would God choose to create a 
multiplicity consisting of such diverse beings, which due to its manifold diversity seems 
to least resemble the perfect ipseity of God himself? 
      We must begin with the question of why creation consists of a diverse multiplicity of 
beings instead of a single being. Instead of a multiplicity that includes material creatures, 
would not a single intelligence most resemble God, thus enabling the whole of creation 
(i.e., consisting of a single creature) to be the best possible imitation of its exemplar? 
What reason can be found for such diversity? Possible diversity, as outlined above, can 
be accounted for by the distinct manners of imitating the divine essence and preconceived 
by the divine intellect. But why would God choose to institute such diversity?   
      In the tradition of emanation, Avicenna had argued that multiplicity results from a 
series of agents, beginning with the first, each giving rise to a single effect out of 
necessity. Each subsequent effect is a little more unlike the first, until the prime matter of 
the sublunary world is reached and distinct species of beings emerge therein given the 
superlunary influence of the tenth and final intelligence (i.e., the giver of forms, or the 
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agent intellect). Nothing in this line of causal succession “chooses” one effect over 
another, but each agent simply acts according to its nature. Diversity arises as a matter of 
necessity (i.e., from gap between thought thinking and thought thought), not forseen by 
any single agent, but issued by all in conjunction.  
      Aquinas’s immediate concern with such a position is at least twofold: first, God 
neither foresees nor chooses the full range of his effects, which limits the practical 
wisdom of this first agent as a providential governor of an ordered multiplicity; second, 
agents other than God “create” (i.e., give being to) their effects, even though they 
themselves have been created. In such a universe, God’s sovereign influence extends only 
to the first effect, leaving each subsequent effect as a plenipotentiary or instrument in the 
diffusion of being. Thus, God does not hold a monopoly on creation. Aquinas’s response 
to such a position will be not only that God executes a full range of effects (i.e., he 
creates, conserves, and governs everything that is), but also that the existing order as 
composed of a diverse multiplicity is not at all accidental, but the immediate product of 
divine wisdom. Divine goodness as guided by divine wisdom is the cause of multiplicity 
and diversity in creation: no single creature alone could reflect God, so God chose to 
institute a diverse multiplicity that as a whole most reflects divine perfection.  
      Because all creatures bear at least a minimal degree of composition (i.e., a real 
distinction between esse and essence) no effect could attain perfect self-identity (i.e., 
ipseity). Thus, the single effect that most reflects God’s perfect nature, more than any 
single creature standing alone, is the totality of diverse creatures ordered to a common 
end. Diversity means that not only are there many beings other than God, but these 
multiple beings consist of different orders and fulfill different functions in terms of the 
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organization of the universe as a whole. Thus, difference is more than numerical. A well-
ordered multiplicity instead requires specific or qualitative distinction between its parts. 
An ordered totality that does not collapse the distinction between its parts, but integrates 
them in their diversity to the greater whole, attains a self-identity next in perfection only 
to pure ipseity. Thus, a universe in which the greatest diversity of beings find their self-
identity through ordered unity (i.e., hierarchy) surpasses the production of a single 
imperfect (i.e., composed) effect.  
     If we are to imagine Aquinas’s oft-invoked analogy of an army, the need for diversity 
can be seen: if all an army’s soldiers were of the same rank and distinction, such a 
homogeneous multiplicity could not be well-ordered because it would lack qualitative 
distinction between its parts. It would be totalizable, but unlike an army with distinct 
ranks, each performing a different function, and all ordered by well-defined chains of 
command grounded in a single principium (i.e., the general), such a homogeneous totality 
could not realize its true end on the battlefield, unless accidentally. Its actions would be 
vague and ill-defined, with each part performing the same function as every other part. A 
wisely-ordered army, however, contains distinct units, each with a separate function, but 
all serving the commands of its general as ordered to the end of victory. So too a house 
that is habitable or a body that is livable must consist of distinct parts (i.e., not just roofs 
or not just eyes), which altogether contribute to the greater good of the whole.72
                                                 
72 “Ex ipso enim ordine universi potuisset eius ratio apparere, quod ab uno principio, nulla meritorum 
differentia praecedente, oportuit diversos gradus creaturarum institui, ad hoc quod universum esset 
complementum (repraesentante universo per multiplices et varios modos creaturarum quod in divina 
bonitate simpliciter et indistincte praeexistit) sicut et ipsa perfectio domus et humani corporis diversitatem 
partium requirit. Neutrum autem eorum esset completum si omnes partes unius conditionis existerent; sicut 
si omnes partes humani corporis essent oculus, aliarum enim partium deessent officia. Et similiter si omnes 
partes domus essent tectum, domus complementum et finem suum non consequeretur, ut scilicet ab 
imbribus et caumatibus defendere posset. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod ab uno primo multitudo et 
diversitas creaturarum processit, non propter materiae necessitatem, nec propter potentiae limitationem, nec 
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      Applying this organic model to the universe, Aquinas states that the distinction of 
things follows from the intention of the first agent, who through his wisdom (ex divina 
sapientia) causes there to be multiple and diverse forms in order to best represent his own 
incommunicable goodness:  
Unde dicendum est quod distinctio rerum et multitudo est ex intentione primi agentis, 
quod est Deus. Produxit enim res in esse propter suam bonitatem communicandam 
creaturis, et per eas repraesentandam. Et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter 
repraesentari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad 
repraesentandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia, nam bonitas quae in Deo est 
simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim. Unde perfectius 
participat divinam bonitatem, et repraesentat eam, totum universum, quam alia 
quaecumque creatura. –Et quia ex divina sapientia est causa distinctionis rerum, ideo 
Moyses dicit res esse distinctas verbo Dei, quod est conceptio sapientiae. Et hoc est quod 
dicitur Gen. I, dixit Deus, fiat lux. Et divisit lucem a tenebris.73
To communicate his goodness and represent himself in creation, God intentionally 
ordained there to be multiplicity and distinction between things. Although God’s choice 
to institute such an order could have been otherwise, since he chose the best possible 
order, multiple and diverse creatures are necessary to reflect divine goodness. Divine 
goodness is simple and uniform, whereas goodness in creatures is manifold and divided. 
Thus, one creature alone could not sufficiently represent divine goodness because any 
individual creature is in some way limited and thereby an inadequate representation of 
divine perfection. The universe represents through ordered manifoldness what preexisted 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
propter bonitatem, nec propter bonitatis obligationem; sed ex ordine sapientiae, ut in diversitate 
creaturarum perfectio consisteret universi.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 16, resp. 
73 ST I. q. 47, a. 1, resp. Also SCG II.45 (see his arguments leading up to this conclusion in Chapters 39-
44). And De Pot. q. 3, a. 16, resp.: “Quod enim Deus tale universum constituere voluerit, non est 
necessarium neque debitum, neque ex fine neque ex potentia efficientis, neque materiae, ut ostensum est. 
Sed supposito quod tale universum producere voluerit, necessarium fuit quod tales et tales creaturas 
produxerit, ex quibus talis forma universi consurgeret. Et cum ipsa universi perfectio et multitudinem et 
diversitatem rerum requirat, quia in una earum inveniri non potest propter recessum a complemento 
bonitatis primae; necesse fuit ex suppositione formae intentae quod Deus multas creaturas et diversas 
produceret; quasdam simplices, quasdam compositas; et quasdam corruptibiles, et quasdam 
incorruptibiles.” 
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simply and indistinctly in divine goodness. Aquinas states: “...repraesentante universo per 
multiplices et varios modos creaturarum quod in divina bonitate simpliciter et indistincte 
praeexistit.”74
      As we have seen above, any effect of God cannot attain to the same nature as its 
cause, but analogically resembles such, and thus no single species or being could 
perfectly resemble God in his simplicity.
 Thus, the differential expression that is the universe is grounded in a 
unified end, an end to which its order testifies and such that would not be possible if not 
the result of an intellectual agent. 
75 All species (i.e., as defined by their 
determinate mode of imitating the divine essence) are lacking and deficient in reference 
to their cause. Only through the order of the universe as a whole, each deficiency is 
supplemented by others of different kinds that make up for what it lacks; therein each 
species finds its highest good.76
      With lack as constitutive of the very being of creatures, the universe comprises an 
existential community ordered around supplementing each other’s deficiency; taken as a 
whole, this ordered multiplicity is the least deficient resemblance of the existential 
 Otherwise, many beings of the same kind could not 
supplement what the others of their kind lack as the lack is essential to each species: E.g., 
rationality is essentially lacking in all non-human species of animals, otherwise they 
would be human.  
                                                 
74 See De Pot. q. 3, a. 16, resp. 
75 For a discussion of analogical likeness, see Chapter 3 above. Also, SCG II.45: “Cum enim omne agens 
intendat suam similitudinem in effectum inducere secundum quod effectus capere potest, tanto hoc agit 
perfectius quanto agens perfectius est: patet enim quod quanto aliquid est calidius, tanto facit magis 
calidum; et quanto est aliquis melior artifex, formam artis perfectius inducit in materiam. Deus autem est 
perfectissimum agens. Suam igitur similitudinem in rebus creatis ad Deum pertinebat inducere 
perfectissime, quantum naturae creatae convenit. Sed perfectam Dei similitudinem non possunt consequi 
res creatae secundum unam solam speciem creaturae: quia, cum causa excedat effectum, quod est in causa 
simpliciter et unite, in effectu invenitur composite et multipliciter, nisi effectus pertingat ad speciem 
causae; quod in proposito dici non potest, non enim creatura potest esse Deo aequalis. Oportuit igitur esse 
multiplicitatem et varietatem in rebus creatis, ad hoc quod inveniretur in eis Dei similitudo perfecta 
secundum modum suum.” 
76 ST I q. 47, a. 1, resp.  
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perfection, which grounds the community. The best, albeit still imperfect, representation 
of divine goodness requires the totality of the ordered universe with the greatest possible 
diversity in order to reflect the incommunicable nature and self-identity of its creator. 
Once again, it is important to emphasize that divine wisdom is the sole cause of the 
distinction of things, and such distinction does not arise by chance, matter, secondary 
agents, or any other principle. The ordered multiplicity that is the universe thus attests to 
the intelligence of its cause insofar as such cause chose the greatest possible diversity of 
kinds and ordered them to a common good.  
      Although matter is a principle of multiplication and individuation for Aquinas, true 
diversification requires a cause at least as perfect as the totality of its effects. Matter 
provides potentiality to manifoldness, but lacks the internal perfection (i.e., actuality) to 
ground essential diversification.77
                                                 
77 See SCG II.40. Actually, matter is not even solely responsible for individuation, but determinate matter 
(i.e., matter having received the form of quantity).  
 Diversity contributes more to the common good than 
does multiplicity alone. At this point, it is worth reviewing the case Aquinas makes for 
the superiority of diverse species to multiple individuals. Aquinas argues that a diversity 
of species is better than a mere multiplicity of individuals insofar as a diversity of species 
adds more to the goodness of the universe than does a multiplicity of individuals all of 
the same species. Individuals of the same species cannot supplement what members of 
their own species lack because they are essentially the same and differ only as individuals 
(i.e., numerically). One plant does not supplement the lack of another plant; such lack is 
constitutive of the species itself. The perfection of the universe requires other species to 
add what it lacks (i.e., sensitivity and rationality). Thus, only on the level of species 
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supplementing other species does the universe form an ordered totality. For this reason, 
the good of the species surpasses the good of the individual.  
      On this matter, Aquinas states:  
Bonitas speciei excedit bonitatem individui, sicut formale id quod est materiale. Magis 
igitur addit ad bonitatem universi multitudo specierum quam multitudo individuorum in 
una specie. Est igitur ad perfectionem universi pertinens non solum quod multa sint 
individua, sed quod sint etiam diversae rerum species; et per consequens diversi gradus in 
rebus.78
      Here we see the priority afforded to form over matter insofar as matter only multiplies 
but does not perfect. Matter, as the principle of  individuation, accounts for multiplicity 
according to Aquinas, and thus plays a necessary role in the order of the universe. And 
although numerically many individuals are necessary for the realization of any 
hylomorphic species (i.e., unlike angelic species that contain only a single member), 
ultimately the contribution of such a multiplicity must be rendered in terms of its service 
to the species. Individuation does not perfect so much as it multiplies according to 
  
A universe with many humans would be less perfect than a universe with angels, humans, 
and irrational animals, as the graded range of the latter better reflects the perfection of 
divine being which is its cause. The mere repetition of a single species amongst a 
multiplicity of individuals—like a singer who knows but one tune—requires a less 
perfect cause than does causing specifically diverse effects. Fire repeats fire given a 
multiplicity of flammable patients, whose multiplicity requires only distinct material 
substrata; whereas a human—a more noble cause than fire—can generate offspring or 
produce a house or wage war, and thus is capable of specifically diverse effects.  
                                                 
78 SCG II.45. 
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Aquinas.79
      Matter, and the hylomorphic beings that it subtends, enter the existential ranks only 
on account of form. Although Aquinas argues that matter and form are one in being 
(esse), there is a pronounced prioritization of form to matter: form provides matter with 
intelligibility and order without which the latter would verge on the brink of nothingness. 
The being of matter might better be called a type of “quasi-being,” which requires the 
actual determination of form to participate in existential actuality: matter as such must be 
something in order to receive actual being. Furthermore, the more noble the form 
informing the matter, the more it surpasses the matter and exceeds the conditions set by 
the latter, the more it conquers (vincit) the matter and unites the composite as a particular 
member of its species.
 Thus, as seen with the argument at hand, the individual occupies somewhat of 
a subordinate role in relation to its species as individuals are not the basic currency of this 
economy. Instead, only as particulars (i.e., paricularized instantiations of a universal) can 
individuals emerge within an exchange that takes place at the level of species. Individuals 
find their highest calling through form, which places them within a species and through 
which they participate in their highest good.  
80
                                                 
79 As noted by Gilson, whereas for Aquinas esse is the highest perfection of every being, for Scotus 
individuation plays this role.  “In the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, it is existence; in that of Duns 
Scotus, it is ‘thisness’ (hecceitas) that is ultima actualitas formae.” Being and Some Philosophers, 94. 
 Because Aquinas upholds a unicity of form position, each 
80 “Hoc autem modo mirabilis rerum connexio considerari potest. Semper enim invenitur infimum supremi 
generis contingere supremum inferioris generis: sicut quaedam infima in genere animalium parum excedunt 
vitam plantarum, sicut ostrea, quae sunt immobilia, et solum tactum habent, et terrae in modum plantarum 
adstringuntur; unde et beatus Dionysius dicit, in VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit 
fines superiorum principiis inferiorum. Est igitur accipere aliquid supremum in genere corporum, scilicet 
corpus humanum aequaliter complexionatum, quod attingit ad infimum superioris generis, scilicet ad 
animam humanam, quae tenet ultimum gradum in genere intellectualium substantiarum, ut ex modo 
intelligendi percipi potest. Et inde est quod anima intellectualis dicitur esse quasi quidam horizon et 
confinium corporeorum et incorporeorum, inquantum est substantia incorporea, corporis tamen forma. Non 
autem minus est aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex forma ignis et eius 
materia, sed forte magis: quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, ex ea et materia efficitur magis unum. 
Quamvis autem sit unum esse formae et materiae, non tamen oportet quod materia semper adaequet esse 
formae. Immo, quanto forma est nobilior, tanto in suo esse superexcedit materiam. Quod patet inspicienti 
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substantial form immediately unites the matter without the mediation of lesser forms.81
      Between distinct species, wherein numerically distinct individuals find their exchange 
as specifically distinct particulars, there is contiguity, with the lowest of a higher genus 
touching (attingit) the highest of the lower genus. Oysters, Aquinas observes, are more 
like plants than they are like higher grades of animals, even though they share a genus 
with the latter. Following Dionysius, Aquinas argues that such contiguity means that not 
only are all species ordered to a common good, but also that the beginnings (principiis) of 
lower species are ordered to the ends of higher species. Thus, lower orders are embedded 
in higher ones, as the former serve and are subordinate to the latter, while the latter guide 
and utilize the former. As seen from such “a  marvelous order,” diversity and inequality 
of creatures arises not as a matter of chance, nor as a matter of necessity, but as a matter 
of design. Some beings are of a higher nature than others and such inequality amongst 
beings, all measured against the transcendent reference of being, completes the perfection 
of the universe.
 
Thus, the noblest form informing matter (i.e., the incorporeal human soul) must win the 
greatest victory over the underlying matter, more than an elementary form such as fire or 
earth. But through this victory of form over matter, material individuals are ordered to the 
good of the universe and particularized as members of a species.  
82
                                                                                                                                                 
operationes formarum, ex quarum consideratione earum naturas cognoscimus: unumquodque enim operatur 
secundum quod est. Unde forma cuius operatio superexcedit conditionem materiae, et ipsa secundum 
dignitatem sui esse superexcedit materiam.”SCG II.68.  
81 His “Unicity of Form” position means that there is a single substantial form for each being. Thus, 
humans do not have multiple uniting forms (i.e., a form of the body, a vegetative form, a sensitive form, a 
rational form, as held by a “Plurality of Form” theory), but a single form that contains the other functions 
(i.e., sensation, generation, reproduction, etc.) that one might ascribe to a separate form.  
82 Aquinas provides a helpful and pithy summary of the conclusions of his arguments on this matter: “Est 
igitur diversitas et inaequalitas in rebus creatis non a casu; non ex materiae diversitate; non propter 
interventum aliquarum causarum, vel meritorum; sed ex propria Dei intentione perfectionem creaturae dare 
volentis qualem possibile erat eam habere.” SCG II.45. 
 A single manner of being by itself could not reflect the perfection of its 
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creator. Thus, the incompletion of each manner of being fits together to form a more 
perfect totality. Unable to be being itself (ipsum esse), but always limited to being in 
some such a manner, each being belongs to a certain species, which characterizes its 
manner of being, and each species is hierarchized in relation to others: some manners of 
being more closely resemble that of being itself, but only taken together as an ordered 
whole do they most closely resemble their source.  
      Like in a “family” where the individual parts exist (i.e., are legally recognized) only 
through the good of the whole toward which they are dispensed by the paterfamilias, the 
good of the total universe takes priority over its individual parts, making each part 
ordered to the whole better than any single member as an isolated unit.83 Each singular 
being, more valuable as such than as this, is subordinated to the universal form of the 
good that governs this diverse multiplicity.84
                                                 
83 See also Blanchette, The Order of the Universe, 16-19.  
84 “Operi a summe bono artifice facto non debuit deesse summa perfectio. Sed bonum ordinis diversorum 
est melius quolibet illorum ordinatorum per se sumpto: est enim formale respectu singularium, sicut 
perfectio totius respectu partium. Non debuit ergo bonum ordinis operi Dei deesse. Hoc autem bonum esse 
non posset, si diversitas et inaequalitas creaturarum non fuisset.” SCG II.45. 
 Around their service to the good of the 
universe, beings are rendered intelligible in terms of this order. Each beings finds its 
place in the universe according to its end through which it serves the good of the whole. 
By placing all beings within a unified order, Aquinas inscribes inequality as a necessary 
feature both to distinguish and to totalize unequal ranks of being. The realization of the 
higest good requires an order uniting an unequal multiplicity wherein creatures of 
superior and inferior ranks form hierarchized legions tending to the good of the universe 
with each particular member (called forth from its singularity) located in its proper 
station. Difference is made intelligible as inequality and inequality is accountable in 
terms of the good of the universe itself.  
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      As each distinct individual becomes part of a natural kind, their singularity becomes 
reducible to higher level essentiality wherein they are ordered to an end and made 
intelligible. As the principle of individuation and itself teetering on the verge of 
nothingness (i.e., as mere being in potency), designate matter comes to serve as a 
reservoir for formal actuality.85 Matter is form in waiting and the individual a particular 
instantiation of an essence accountable in terms of its rank within the order of the 
universe as a whole. Thus, as we shall continue to see in what follows, Aquinas does not 
leave the order of creation unaccounted for, but renders a reason for each being in terms 
of its natural end.86
      In order to make this case for the order and the intelligibility of the universe as a 
whole, albeit not for the original givenness of esse itself as will be addressed below, 
Aquinas’s existential metaphysics must appeal to a familiar move from its essentialist 
counterpart; namely, it must overcome any resistance offered on the part of matter. If 
matter serves as the principle of limitation to all formal enterprise, then order extends 
only so far as matter enables formal actualization. If matter resists form, however, then 
the form lacks the power to impose order upon and to render intelligible its effect, which 
qua effect cannot exceed its cause in perfection. Matter must subtend the action as a fund 
of potency, but cannot serve as a real causal contributor to the operation itself. Otherwise, 
 Every creature is rendered intelligible and tends toward the good on 
account of its nature. Each individual in its singularity is made intelligible as a particular 
instantiation of an essential kind, a kind whose members the intention of the creator 
mobilizes in a coordinated effort with all other kinds toward the good of the universe.  
                                                 
85 On the question of whether God knows singulars, see De Veritate  q. 2, a. 5, resp. SCG I.65. ST I, q. 14, 
a. 11. Aquinas argues that God can have knowledge of designate matter (the principle of individuation), 
which as being in potency is also a similitude of the divine essence (ipsum esse subsistens). God as the 
principle of being (principium essendi) must have knowledge of that which he causes.  
86 See Chapter VI Section 3 below.  
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matter would counteract the production of form and thereby disrupt the order of the 
universe.  
      Aquinas reins in such excess causality, or overdetermination, by making the motion 
of matter begin with the prior actuality of form.87
     Such an explanatory gap can only occur between the first cause and the first effect, 
namely God and the gift of being that is creation: in giving being (esse), God both 
exceeds and grounds the formal economy altogether.
 When an effect follows the 
“disposition” of matter and the intention of the agent, in such “normal” cases, matter does 
not exercise its own power in the causal process. It is pliable to form without providing 
counter-determinations of its own. The effect does not exceed its cause in perfection, and 
is able to be accounted for (i.e., ordered and made intelligible) through its cause. We 
might say that there is a balanced economy between cause and effect insofar as the cause 
(or causes) completely funds the effect without the effect requiring anything more. This 
means that the form educed from or imposed onto matter cannot exceed the sum total of 
formal perfection offered by its causal contributor or contributors. Otherwise, some effect 
would occur without a complete causal explanation, thus without a reason why.  
88 Such power to act outside the 
determinations of a formal nature—as both purpose and essence are created by such a 
power itself—belongs only to divine power, which is beyond essential determination, 
whereas all creatures must act similiar to themselves (i.e., to their essence).89
                                                 
87 See fn. 80 above. 
88 As I will argue below, Aquinas covers over the groundlessness of the gift of being in terms of “seeking 
return” (i.e., in terms of teleological and providential intelligibility) upon this gift. See Chapter VI Part 3.  
89 As Lee has argued in terms of violent causation: “The order of the universe must be the order produced 
by some intellect. If it is the case that the order of the universe is the order of the powers of things, then the 
powers of all things, even those that act violently [m.e.], is now opened up to the gaze of reason through the 
order of the universe itself. In this way, the universe of power or force is reduced to the universe of the 
intellect.” “Mana and Logos: Violence and Order in Thomas Aquinas,” Graduate Faculty Philosophy 
Journal 22:2 (2001): 44.  
 This is 
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especially true of matter, which occupies the lowest point on the hierarchy of being and 
without form verges on the brink of pure nothingness.90
      In the normal course of nature, form conquers matter, and matter receives the formal 
determinations enacted upon it. Aquinas does address in passing, however, cases where 
matter resists form. Thus, in those abnormal cases where matter resists, we must ask with 
what power. In such cases, there results “monstrosities and other failures of nature” 
(monstra et alia peccata naturae), recalcitrant to the order and aim of the universe as a 
whole.
  Matter cannot exact the same 
formal excess as God without altogether fracturing the order of the universe as a whole. 
As a cause, matter is a cause from which (ex eo) something comes to be, as determined 
by the actuality of form, but not itself responsible for the determinations that it receives. 
Thus, matter and materiality must be neutralized by form.   
91
                                                 
90 See “Sciendum est tamen quod, cum Avicebron sic argumentatur, est aliquid quod est movens non 
motum, scilicet primus factor rerum, ergo, ex opposito, est aliquid quod est motum et patiens tantum, quod 
concedendum est. Sed hoc est materia prima, quae est potentia pura, sicut Deus est actus purus. Corpus 
autem componitur ex potentia et actu, et ideo est agens et patiens [m.e.].” ST I, q. 115, a 1. ad 2. Here 
Aquinas states that the universe is ranged hierarchically from pure act (God) to pure potency (matter). 
91 “Ea quae sunt ex intentione agentis, non sunt propter materiam sicut propter primam causam. Causa enim 
agens prior est in causando quam materia: quia materia non fit actu causa nisi secundum quod est mota ab 
agente. Unde, si aliquis effectus consequitur dispositionem materiae et intentionem agentis, non est ex 
materia sicut ex causa prima. Et propter hoc videmus quod ea quae reducuntur in materiam sicut in causam 
primam, sunt praeter intentionem agentis: sicut monstra et alia peccata naturae. Forma autem est ex 
intentione agentis. Quod ex hoc patet: agens enim agit sibi simile secundum formam; et si aliquando hoc 
deficiat, hoc est a casu propter materiam. Formae igitur non consequuntur dispositionem materiae sicut 
primam causam: sed magis e converso materiae sic disponuntur ut sint tales formae. Distinctio autem rerum 
secundum speciem est per formas. Distinctio igitur rerum non est propter materiae diversitatem sicut 
propter primam causam.” SCG II.40.  
 This means that matter contributes something more, something exceeding, the 
perfecting and actualizing power of form alone. Aquinas, however, can reconcile such 
explanatory overdetermination on the part of matter by casting such material resistance in 
terms of form and thereby remain consistent with his making intelligible the manifold 
diversity of the universe (i.e., making the universe a work of divine intelligence). Prime 
matter does not harbor some extra-formal potency distinct from its passive potency for 
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receiving elementary forms, some occult power impenetrable to form. Instead, when 
things go wrong and monsters result—or even for that matter when things go right, but 
change takes time to complete or certains patients must undergo a series of 
transformations before receiving a more perfect form (e.g., water becoming wine)–the 
reason must be sought not in terms of matter but in terms of form. As we will see, such a 
shift from matter to form allows Aquinas’s to close the explanatory gap that would result 
from an active power on the part of matter.    
      The impetus for granting matter some active power is that if matter were merely a 
passive recipient of formal determination, it would seem that anything could become 
anything else and change would be an effortless and immediate. But as Aristotle correctly 
notes “You can’t make a saw out of wool,” even though the human artisan is more 
perfect than the material patient (i.e., the wool). Likewise, water must undergo a lengthy 
process of fermentation before taking on the more complex character of wine. Except in 
cases of miraculous or supernatural action (e.g., when Jesus instantaneously changes 
water into wine or God’s infusion of grace), all matter must be properly disposed to 
receive the form introduced by the agent. A natural agent cannot immediately enact just 
any form in matter because of some “disproportion between the power (virtus) of the 
agent and that in the matter which resists.”92
                                                 
92 “Respondeo dicendum quod tota iustificatio impii originaliter consistit in gratiae infusione, per eam enim 
et liberum arbitrium movetur, et culpa remittitur. Gratiae autem infusio fit in instanti absque successione. 
Cuius ratio est quia quod aliqua forma non subito imprimatur subiecto, contingit ex hoc quod subiectum 
non est dispositum, et agens indiget tempore ad hoc quod subiectum disponat. Et ideo videmus quod statim 
cum materia est disposita per alterationem praecedentem, forma substantialis acquiritur materiae, et eadem 
ratione, quia diaphanum est secundum se dispositum ad lumen recipiendum, subito illuminatur a corpore 
lucido in actu. Dictum est autem supra quod Deus ad hoc quod gratiam infundat animae, non requirit 
aliquam dispositionem nisi quam ipse facit. Facit autem huiusmodi dispositionem sufficientem ad 
susceptionem gratiae, quandoque quidem subito, quandoque autem paulatim et successive, ut supra dictum 
 But what does Aquinas mean by such 
“disproportion” and by “that” in matter which resists?  
 261 
      We can formulate an answer by following further Aquinas’s line of reasoning. In 
terms of this argument, he goes on to state that the infinite power of God, unlike the finite 
power of natural agents, can in fact dispose matter to any form instantaneously and 
without preparation. Furthermore, the stronger the power of the natural agent, the more 
quickly the matter becomes disposed. Because superable, the power of material resistance 
responsible for disproportion between an acting agent and its passive patient can be 
ascribed to some other form inhering in the matter, but not some power of the matter 
itself: all resistance simply requires a stronger power.93 Such an illusion of material 
resistance can be dispelled by looking at matter in its more basic state (i.e., prime matter 
and elementary forms). Elementary bodies are active only to the extent that they have 
form and thereby participate some similitude of divine being. Prime matter, however, is 
in no way active, and thus does not by itself contain the power by which to be disposed 
and indisposed to form. This is why God, whose effects have no existential debt to matter 
(“...quod effectus eius habeat debitum essendi ex materia”), can introduce any form into 
matter, whereas natural agents must compete with some pre-existing form, which qua 
form, not qua matter, is responsible for “material resistance.”94
                                                                                                                                                 
est. Quod enim agens naturale non subito possit disponere materiam, contingit ex hoc quod est aliqua 
disproportio eius quod in materia resistit, ad virtutem agentis, et propter hoc videmus quod quanto virtus 
agentis fuerit fortior, tanto materia citius disponitur. Cum igitur virtus divina sit infinita, potest 
quamcumque materiam creatam subito disponere ad formam, et multo magis liberum arbitrium hominis, 
cuius motus potest esse instantaneus secundum naturam [m.e.]. Sic igitur iustificatio impii fit a Deo in 
instanti.” Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita, t. 6-7: Prima secundae Summa theologiae 
(Ex Typographia Polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1895-1897-1899) q. 113, a. 7, resp. 
Hereafter “ST I-II.”  
93 “Ad quartum dicendum quod corpus non est id quod maxime distat a Deo, participat enim aliquid de 
similitudine divini esse, secundum formam quam habet. Sed id quod maxime distat a Deo, est materia 
prima; quae nullo modo est agens, cum sit in potentia tantum.” ST I, q. 115, a. 1, ad. 4. 
94 “Non potest autem dici in Deo, quod effectus eius habeat debitum essendi ex materia. Nam cum ipse sit 
totius esse auctor, nihil quolibet modo esse habens praesupponitur eius actioni, ut sic ex dispositione 
materiae necesse sit dicere talem vel talem eius esse effectum.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 16, resp. 
 Form is the source of 
intelligibility for resistance.  
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      Aquinas thus can supply a natural (i.e., formal) explanation for such resistance 
without appealing to some occult power on the part of prime matter, which would 
altogether stand outside intelligibility. In the face of recalcitrance, he simply can maintain 
that one form has a more powerful hold over the matter and does not give way to the new 
form: the form of wool prevents the form of saw’s victory, but not because of some 
power on the part of matter itself. Thus, the active principle on the part of matter—to bear 
and to resist—can be understood in terms of form and thereby rendered intelligible. 
Granting some degree of resistance in all generation (i.e., natural causation) and 
production (i.e., artificial causation)—otherwise such change would be instantaneous—
even the occasional cases of outright resistance (e.g., when nature produces a 
monstrosity) do not become altogether unintelligible, but can be explained in terms of 
one substantial or accidental form withstanding the introduction of another when it 
should give way. Such individual cases do not render explanation invalid. What may 
seem recalcitrant on the level of individuals becomes recoverable on the level of the 
species (i.e., the population). Aquinas’s view is not troubled by deviation from the norm 
in terms of “monsters and other failures of nature” because despite such fortuitous 
material resistance, a resistance of one material form to another, matter ultimately owes 
its existence to God. Matter’s causal contribution to any effect is merely to multiply, and 
not to diversify, and even its power to multiply is on account of some intelligible form 
(i.e., quantity).  
      To explain “a monster,” or something without a recognizable essence and essential 
powers thereby falling outside the scope of intelligible classification, does not require a 
distinct economy of subaltern material causes. Instead, the acting agent has simply 
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exerted insufficient power to educe or impose a new form from or onto the matter, the 
result of which is something in-between two forms, an indeterminate mixture of features 
from both. Such “a monster,” although a failure of nature because in-between essences, 
does not require some supernatural explanation or cause, especially one involving matter. 
As Aquinas explains in the case of a mule, which is not a “monster” in the proper sense 
because it has its own species but a freak of sorts because due to sterility is incapable of 
natural regeneration, the matter resists the form in a certain way.95 The male is incapable 
of bringing the material offered by the female to the perfection of its own species, 
because the female herself is of a different species. Thus, the male leads (perduxit) the 
matter to something close to his own species. But in a case such as this and even in the 
case of more outright material resistance where a monster would result, that which resists 
imposition is some other form (e.g., the substantial form of female’s “egg” resisting 
imposition of the male’s sperm). And as Aquinas argues in De Potentia, monsters may 
result contrary to a particular nature, although they cannot be contrary to universal nature, 
but are recoverable within the scope of the order of the universe as a whole.96
      By making matter completely subordinate to form, and able to be only on account of 
its determination by form, insofar as matter does not fall outside the scope of divine 
providence, but it too has a divine idea, Aquinas preserves the order of the universe as the 
work of an intelligible cause and a reflection of divine goodness. 
 
97
                                                 
95 “Ad quartum dicendum quod mulus habet speciem mediam inter asinum et equum, unde non est in 
duabus speciebus sed in una tantum, quae est effecta per commixtionem seminum, inquantum virtus activa 
maris non potuit perducere materiam feminae ad terminos propriae speciei perfectae propter materiae 
extraneitatem sed perduxit ad aliquid propinquum suae speciei; et ideo eadem ratione assignatur idea mulo 
et equo.” De Veritate q. 3, a. 8, ad 4.  
96 De Pot. q. 6, a. 2, ad 8. 
97 Aquinas argues that in the broad sense of the term “idea” God has an idea of matter. In the narrow sense 
of the term, matter only has an idea through its form, that is, as part of the composite. See, for example, De 
Veritate q. 3, a. 5, resp.; ST I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3; and Chapter VI Section 3 below. 
 Such an ideational 
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containment of matter holds together the totalized order of the universe as a whole, and 
moreover when individuals and future contingents seem to happen by chance and outside 
the intended order of nature, such an excess of causal operation falls within the scope of 
divine providence.98
      Nature, as we have seen, is a work of intelligence. This means that God does not 
create by natural necessity, but chooses an order based on his preconceived rationes. 
Although everything in nature acts toward an end, Aquinas clearly distinguishes those 
agents that naturally act toward an end and those that voluntarily act toward an end. Thus, 
despite everything in nature being accountable in terms of some such end, it is important 
that Aquinas shows such teleological directedness of the universe ultimately to reside not 
in natural necessity, but in intelligence. To restate the earlier example, an arrow flies 
toward a target, as to its natural end, but such direction reduces to the foresight of an 
archer.
 All of nature, including the incidental, is the work of divine 
scientia—theoretical, practical, and productive.  
 
Conclusion 
99 In Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas argues if all of nature were produced by 
natural necessity, nature would not have an end. 100
                                                 
98 See De Veritate q. 5, a. 8, ad 2 and SCG I. 65, 67 and III 92. 
99 Aquinas argues for the God’s free act of creation (as opposed to necessity) based upon the universe being 
ordered to an end. See De Pot. q. 3, a. 15, resp. Thus, the work of nature, which contains many natural 
agents acting toward an end, is ultimately a work of intelligence on the part of the first agent.  
100 “Potest autem efficacius procedi ad hoc ostendendum ex fine divinae voluntatis, ut supra tactum est. 
Finis enim divinae voluntatis in rerum productione est eius bonitas inquantum per causata manifestatur. 
Potissime autem manifestatur divina virtus et bonitas per hoc quod res aliae praeter ipsum non semper 
fuerunt. Ex hoc enim ostenditur manifeste quod res aliae praeter ipsum ab ipso esse habent, quia non 
semper fuerunt. Ostenditur etiam quod non agit per necessitatem naturae; et quod virtus sua est infinita in 
agendo. Hoc igitur convenientissimum fuit divinae bonitati, ut rebus creatis principium durationis daret.” 
SCG II.38. 
 Beings as emanted from other beings 
would be teleologically (and providentially) anarchic insofar as they lacked a 
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preordained order and connection to each other, but instead occurred as the result of blind 
necessity (i.e., a sort of cosmic overflow). But what’s more, for nature to be the result of 
intelligence, it must also be radically unintelligible and unnatural. Otherwise, if the mere 
intelligibility of created beings in the divine intellect were a sufficient cause of their 
being (esse), then they would have being as a result of such intellection. God would act 
according to his nature as intelligence, the result of which would be that he acted by 
necessity. To allow God to act as the cause of everything’s nature in such a way that 
natures have an end and reflect the intelligence (not necessity) of their cause, the ground 
of God’s action when he in fact gives a beginning of being (principium essendi) to nature 
must be distinct from the ground of their intelligibility. The former, as we shall see, is the 
principium essendi that is creation. Having reviewed Aquinas’s economy of essential 
causes and natural purposiveness, as established by the divine rationes and ordered to an 
end by God as first and sole principium, we are now in a postion to reflect upon what it 
means for God’s being to serve as the cause and exemplar of all being (“[...] etiam esse 
suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse”).101
      God as a “principium essendi” or “causa et exemplar omnis esse” means not only and 
not primarily that the universe has a beginning in time. Instead, it means that God’s 
contrivance of any and all possible orders of nature can occur for the very reason that no 
amount of contrivance suffices as a principium essendi, because such a principium is 
extra-esseential. In other words, God’s intellectus essentiarum prior to creation does not 
impart any being (esse) to such essences because such virtually practical cognition alone 
lacks the causal force necessary to compel God to act. This is because creatures other 
than God owe their being to him as their principium essendi, and yet his nature accrues 
 
                                                 
101 See above the Introduction to this chapter, and also In I Sent. d. 38, q. 1, art. 3, sol. 
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nothing in return from such an endowment. If his acts were determined by his nature, 
something in him would demand or necessitate that he act in order to fulfill his nature, 
and in this sense, nature would lack an end. It would be the result of necessity, and not 
the result of intelligence. Instead, God is able to give nature an end because he himself 
acts as principium essendi completely without end. God’s power is infinite, not only 
because he can create an infinite variety of effects, but because God gives to created 
things being as such (esse simpliciter).   
      Having explored how God’s nature can be the cause and exemplar of every nature, it 
remains to be seen how God’s incommunicable esse can serve as the cause and exemplar 
of all created esse. This will require treating the question of how creatures can 
have/participate esse without having/participating God’s own esse and what it means to 
attribute “esse” to creatures. Given the infinite power of the divine will, God must know 
what is possible if he is to legislate a diverse multiplicity that most realizes the good of 
the universe, as opposed to other possibilities that would be a less perfect realization 
(e.g., a universe without intellectual creatures).102
                                                 
102 For Aquinas’s argument on the necessity of intellectual creatures for the perfection of the universe, see 
SCG II. 46. 
 And yet, underlying this divine 
intellection of various possibilities stands the free act by which God gives being (dare 
esse) to all beings, a distinction of causal grounds that accounts for our ability to 
understand essences as other than their actual existence. In what follows, we must further 
determine what the accrual adveniens extra of esse to beings entails both through the 
originary free act of creation ex nihilo and the sustaining act of conservation. This will 
help to determine the nature of “esse” when predicated of creatures and whether it retains 
meaning apart from their extrinsic relation to their cause. 
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Chapter V. The Existential Ground of the Universe: Creation and the Giving of 
Being 
 
      Picking up from the previous chapter’s treatment of the archetypal ground of creatures 
in the divine intellect, we are now in a position to address God’s own being as the cause 
and exemplar of all being: If the universe is an ordered totality of diverse and multiple 
beings, together presenting the most perfect possible imitation of divine perfection, and 
everything in the universe is made intelligible within its kind and aiming toward the good 
of the universe as a whole, we must ask after that inaugural act wherein God furnishes 
not merely this or that mode of being (i.e., essence), but being as such (esse simpliciter). 
As we have seen, although being itself (ipsum esse) belongs to God alone and cannot be 
communicated to creatures under the same ratio as possessed by God in his simplicity 
and radical self-identity (ipseity), the being (esse) of creatures both stands as a necessary 
precondition for all further essential determination and yet cannot be reduced to such 
essentiality. Thus, once created, creatures are ordered to the good of the universe in terms 
of their form as aiming at a natural end, but this belies the deeper question of what is 
given in creation. In what follows, drawing on all of the resources from Aquinas’s 
metaphysics discussed to this point, we must attempt to more thoroughly understand this 
“perfection of all perfections” and “actuality of all essential acts”1
      The problematic of this chapter arises from a recognition on the part of Aquinas that 
although God gives being to creatures, God cannot be the formal esse of things.
 that is esse, or that 
which is given in the inaugural act of creation and sustained through the subsequent act 
of conservation.  
2
                                                 
1 De Pot. q. 7, a. 2, ad 9 
 If God 
2 SCG I.26. See also In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1. a. 2. Here Aquinas shows how the divine esse can be called “esse 
omnium rerum” without making creatures a part of God. God instead, he argues, is the efficient cause of 
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were their formal esse, God would be a part of creation, and no longer radically diverse. 
This follows from the discussion above, which addressed the analogical attribution of 
“esse” to creatures and whether the attribution can be more than an extrinsic attribution.3
      The task at hand requires that we render an account of what constitutes the difference 
between an idea in the divine mind and something that actually is. Facing this gap 
between understandable essences and real beings, a parallel, albeit metaphysically more 
originary (i.e., in itself, although not to us), question arises as the one confronted in the 
intellectus essentiae argument of De Ente: namely, what more do real beings have than 
mere understandables? When this question is recast in terms of divine understanding and 
the reality that God creates, we face the metaphysically more robust task of indicating 
and isolating the irreducible contribution of esse. By posing this question in terms of the 
divine act of creation, we will be in a better position to evaluate Aquinas’s real distinction 
between esse and essence and to ask: does esse signify the extra-essential actuality of all 
 
The question thus emerges, that once God has been identified as ipsum esse subsistens—
and thus cannot enter into any other nature, but must remain really distinct—how can ens 
creatum “have being” in any meaningful sense? Does not all being (esse) remain proper 
to God and utterly incommunicable to creation? 
                                                                                                                                                 
their esse. He then moves to identify God as “superesse” following along with Pseudo-Dionysus. I will 
address the feasibility of this solution throughout the chapter.  
3 See above Chapter III, especially Section 3. If, as has been argued, being must be given to creatures who 
lack such through themselves because only God has being as his essence, then all being must be given by 
that being who has being per se, ipsum esse subsistens. To call something other than God “a being” (ens) 
comprises an analogical predication, derivative in reference to the true sense of being. Such derivativeness 
stems from the need for all creatures to be given their being from another, in which esse and essence are 
identical. This gift or endowment of being, as will be seen, arises through the act of creation. If being is 
analogical for Aquinas, created beings who are given being resemble God, who is ipsum esse subsistens, in 
so far as they have being, but differ from him insofar as their having (i.e., participating) being entails a 
limited expression of being. Essence serves as the principle of dissimilar multiplicity and esse as the 
principle of assimilation, thus achieving a unity in a diversity, both distancing creatures from God and yet 
allowing them to resemble their creator as a participative similitude. 
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essential actualities thinkable outside the conceptual determinations of the thing or can it 
be reduced to such essential determinations of the thing, a rationally distinct repetition of 
a series of already conceived determinations?  
      Addressing this question will require us to track down and investigate exactly what 
Aquinas means by the claims addressed above that creatures must participate their esse. 
As has been noted, such esse cannot be the same as divine esse and the link between the 
two must be one of non-reciprocal proportion, that is, analogy. I have left open the 
question, however, of what exactly is this participated esse: Is it ipsum esse subsistens;  
esse commune; each creature’s own actus essendi; or some combination of all three? And 
furthermore, what does esse add to the essential determinations of the creature such that 
an account based on its essential principles alone fails to grasp its full actuality? To take 
up this question, I will begin in Section 1 by discussing Aquinas’s characterization of 
creation as the inception of being and a relation of dependence. Section 2 will address 
how God’s monopoly on creation results due to the perfective nature of esse itself. This is 
followed by a discussion in Section 3 of Aquinas’s argument that God is not the formal 
esse of creatures. In Section 4, bringing together lingering threads, I address the 
aforementioned “ambiguity of created esse” or what being is participated by creatures 
(i.e., ipsum esse subsistens, esse commune, actus essendi suum). Finally Section 5 will 
attempt to use Aquinas’s metaphor of illumination to determine whether esse retains any 
existential meaning proper to creatures apart from their conservational cause. This will 
result in the final question of whether esse withstands essential reduction or becomes 
merely an unwarrented assertion mystifying the essential economy from which it 
attempts to escape.  
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Section 1: Creation as Participation in Esse 
      Creation marks the distinction between a merely possible imitation of the divine 
essence and an actual creature. As Aquinas notes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the 
number and distance of stars could have been otherwise, and although incommensurable 
with the current order, “more stars” (i.e., more actual imitations of the divine essence) is 
not impossible per se.4
      In ST I, q. 44, a. 1, Aquinas asks whether omne ens is created by God. The use here of 
“created” should be noted as a more contracted and restricted form of “caused,” the latter 
which Aquinas had introduced in regard to the fourth way. Although “cause of being” 
seems to include creation, Aquinas will need to rule out emanation as the causal process 
 Or, we might add, God could have made phoenixes and other 
such fictive creatures whose essences do not include a contradiction of terms. Thus, how 
do we account for this seemingly radical difference between those things that emerge 
from the divine intellect and those possibilities left unmade? As shown by Aquinas, 
conceivability by itself cannot provide such an explanation insofar as no created essence 
posits more existential reality than any other created essence. The essence “seraphim” has 
no more power “to be” qua essence than does “worm” or even “phoenix.” Following 
from our discussion of exemplarity in the divine intellect above, we can say that the 
emergence of certain essences in re requires not only conceptual intelligibility, but also 
the effective production by the divine will. A crucial question that will be answered in 
what follows is whether such beings enjoy their own act of being, and thus whether esse 
can denominate them intrinsically, or whether God’s ipseity bars any true sharing of 
being even in a derivative and limited sense. To address this question, we must turn now 
to what Aquinas means by “creation” as the act of giving being (dare esse).  
                                                 
4 SCG II.23. 
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of giving being. As discussed above with Avicenna, the one necessary being causes being 
in everything else, albeit indirectly and through a causal overflow.5
      To this question of whether God creates every being, Aquinas responds that every 
thing that in any way is is from God.
 Thus, Aquinas will 
need to show that ipsum esse subsistens as the cause of being gives being through the free 
act of creation, and not through the mandatory outcome of its nature. Such a “free act,” as 
discussed above, is necessary for creation to be a work of intelligence, not natural 
necessity.  
6
Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo 
esse. Si enim aliquid invenitur in aliquo per participationem, necesse est quod causetur in 
ipso ab eo cui essentialiter convenit; sicut ferrum fit ignitum ab igne. Ostensum est autem 
supra, cum de divina simplicitate ageretur, quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. Et 
iterum ostensum est quod esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum: sicut si albedo esset 
subsistens, non posset esse nisi una, cum albedines multiplicentur secundum recipientia. 
Relinquitur ergo quod omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse. Necesse 
est igitur omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam participationem essendi, ut sint 
perfectius vel minus perfecte, causari ab uno primo ente, quod perfectissime est.
 He states:  
7
If some perfection is found in something through participation, it is necessary that it was 
caused by that thing to which the perfection belongs essentially. I emphasized above this 
link between perfection and participative causality, which Aquinas highlights through the 
example of heat in iron by which iron is ignited (i.e., participative) and heat in fire (i.e., 
essential): any participated perfection must be resolved to a cause that has that perfection 
  
                                                 
5 See Chapter IV Section 1 above. 
6 Aquinas also asks “Is God able to create?” “Et inde est quod in Lib. de causis, dicitur, quod esse eius est 
per creationem, vivere vero, et caetera huiusmodi, per informationem. Causalitates enim entis absolute 
reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur; vel quibus 
esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secundas, quae agunt per informationem, quasi supposito effectu 
causae universalis: et inde etiam est quod nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae 
virtutis. Propter quod etiam dicitur in lib. de causis, quod anima nobilis habet operationem divinam in 
quantum dat esse.” De Pot. q. 3 a. 1, resp. 
7 ST I, q. 44, a. 1, resp.  
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essentially.8 God as the first principle of being, or ipsum esse per se subsistens, serves as 
that by which esse is caused in everything else and through which they participate esse. 
But in the causal act of distributing a perfection, the first does not give itself, even though 
contra the Neoplatonic tradition, neither is it without the given perfection.9
      At this point, Aquinas deploys many of the same issues surrounding the fourth way: 
everything other than God is not its own esse, but participates in esse; creatures 
participate in esse more and less perfectly; God as the first being, who is most perfect, 
causes being in everything else. Whereas before (i.e., in the fourth way) he sought to 
demonstrate the existence of God from these points, now they are meant to reveal a 
deeper truth about creatures: namely, having demonstrated the self-subsistence and 
oneness of God, the being (esse) of everything else must be other than it and participated. 
Because there is something that is being itself (ipsum esse), the conditions of its self-
identity require that the being of everything else to be participated. Creatures are united 
with each other and radically distinguished from God insofar as they must participate 
their being in order to be. In such participation, however, they are diversified on account 
of their diverse participation of being (“...omnia quae diversificantur secundum diversam 
participationem essendi”). Thus, Aquinas locates the principle of unity in the common 
bond of creaturely participation (i.e., “participant esse”), a commonality diversified by 
the fact that they must participate being according to some modus essendi, that is, 
according to their essence.  
 
                                                 
8 As discussed with the De Ente argument from above, only the reference to an actually existing separate X 
necessitates the real distinction between a participated X and the sole instance of essential X. See Chapter 
1. Also, on this matter, Owens states: “The third [example], that of heat from its subject, would be real in 
real things since heat is a predicamental accident. But for the moment the text is concerned only with the 
distinction between separate heat and participated heat, and not with the distinction between participated 
heat and its subject.” “Stages and Distinction in ‘De Ente,’” 118. 
9 For a comparison between Aquinas’s and Plotinus’s first principles, see Taylor, “Aquinas, the Plotiniana 
Arabica, and the Metaphysics of Being and Actuality,” 220-222. 
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      Due to the imperfect having of being on the part of creatures, such a perfection must 
be given to them from a cause, a cause to which the perfection essentially belongs 
(essentialiter convenit). Participation, Aquinas argues, means that creatures have been 
caused by God.10 As most perfect cause of being and highest actuality, God does not lack 
any power (virtus) for communicating his being, but virtually contains every perfection.11 
Like the king whose power transcends the particular powers of the governors in his 
realm, and makes their governance possible, or the sun that makes possible all sublunary 
illumination, God as the universal cause of being makes possible the particular being of 
all other beings.12
      The example of ignited iron (ferrum fit ignitum ab igne) used above to explain 
existential participation captures how something non-essentially hot (e.g., ignited iron) 
must have as its cause something essentially such (i.e., fire). The example, however, does 
not exhaust the full scope of participation insofar as ignited iron or even hot water 
 God communicates being to beings by way of likeness (per modum 
similitudinis) without communicating himself. Because God is ipsum esse subsistens, and 
cannot be such unless one and indivisible (i.e., an ipseity), everything else that is must 
receive esse through participation and as really other than its own nature.  
                                                 
10 Aquinas spells out this relation between participation and causality in more detail in what follows. In 
response to the claim that it is not necessary for every being to be created by God, Aquinas responds: “Ad 
primum ergo dicendum quod, licet habitudo ad causam non intret definitionem entis quod est causatum, 
tamen sequitur ad ea qua sunt de eius ratione: quia ex hoc quod aliquid per participationem est ens, 
sequitur quod sit causatum ab alio [m.e.]. Unde huiusmodi ens non potest esse, quin sit causatum; sicut nec 
homo, quin sit risibile. Sed quia esse causatum non est de ratione entis simpliciter, propter hoc invenitur 
aliquod ens non causatum.” ST I, q. 44, a. 1, ad 1.  
11 On this giving of being to creatures, and their imperfect resemblance of God’s being, Aquinas states 
“Ostensum est in primo libro quod Deus vult suum esse aliis communicare per modum similitudinis. De 
perfectione autem voluntatis est quod sit actionis et motus principium: ut patet in III de anima. Cum igitur 
divina voluntas sit perfecta, non deerit ei virtus communicandi esse suum alicui per modum similitudinis. 
Et sic erit ei causa essendi. Adhuc. Quanto alicuius actionis principium est perfectius, tanto actionem suam 
potest in plura extendere et magis remota: ignis enim, si sit debilis, solum propinqua calefacit; si autem sit 
fortis, etiam remota. Actus autem purus, qui Deus est, perfectior est quam actus potentiae permixtus, sicut 
in nobis est.” SCG II. 6. The reference to the “first book” is SCG I.75. Aquinas further argues that the more 
perfect anything is, the further its power extends.  
12 For this analogy, see SCG II.15. 
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temporarily retains heat in the absence of its cause. Thus while the participant remains 
heated, it takes part in the perfection, and the perfection inperfectly inheres in the subject 
even once the cause has withdrawn. We might say the property, in this case “heat,” 
belongs to the subject for a time. Such a model taken by itself tends to be misleading 
when translated to participation in being insofar as it suggests that created beings need 
only participate their own actus essendi given to them as a real property not needing to be 
sustained by the continued presence of the cause. The difficulty of this image will be 
clarified as we further explore Aquinas’s account of creation and conservation.    
      To begin explicating what is entailed by “having been created,” we must understand 
the sense in which this causal relationship between creator and creation requires 
participation of the effect in its cause.13 As discussed above, in his De Hebdomadibus 
exposition, Aquinas introduces three types of participation: a species/individual’s 
participation in a genus/species; a subject/matter’s participation in an accident/form; and 
an effect’s participation in a cause.14
                                                 
13 The two thinkers most responsible for understanding the importance of “participation” in the metaphysics 
of Aquinas are Fabro and Geiger. Opt. cit.  
14 See Chapter II Section 1 above. “Est autem participare quasi partem capere. Et ideo quando aliquid 
particulariter recipit id quod ad alterum pertinet, uniuersaliter, dicitur participare illud, sicut homo dicitur 
participare animal quia non habet rationem animalis secundum totam communitatem; et eadem ratione 
Sortes participat hominem. Similiter etiam subiectum participat accidens et materia formam, quia forma 
substancialis uel accidentalis, que de sui ratione communis est, determinatur ad hoc uel ad illud subiectum. 
Et similiter etiam effectus dicitur participare suam causam, et precipue quando non adequat uirtutem sue 
cause, puta si dicamus quod aer participat lucem solis quia non recipit eam in claritate qua est in sole.” 
Expositio L.2, ll. 70-85. 
 With the third, which will be pertinent for our 
discussion, the effect partakes of its cause, but the integrity of the cause itself is not 
compromised or diminished by this sharing. To illustrate this point, Aquinas turns to his 
stock example that the illuminated air must participate in its solar cause because it cannot 
receive its full power, even though the imperfect distribution of this perfection does not 
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diminish the sun’s power in any way.15 The oneness of the principle remains intact 
amidst its dissemination to many. The many in turn liken themselves to their principle 
through participation.16 Participation serves as the operative model by which to explain 
the communication of esse to creatures, with a particular emphasis upon the example of 
the sun illuminating air, which of itself lacks illumination but receives light through the 
power of the sun. Although creation is a relation of participation, participation by itself 
does not mark the existentiality at work in Aquinas’s conception of creation.17
      For Aquinas, God is the universal cause of all being, which means that his power 
extends to everthing that is, even matter. It is not impossible, Aquinas emphasizes, that 
 What 
more is needed to stave off a return to essentialism is an emphasis upon the givenness of 
such an act, both inaugurated through creation and sustained through conservation. 
                                                 
15 See De Ente IV and the fourth way. 
16 Fabro in his work on participation in Aquinas has called this an “intensive” plenitude of being. Thus, the 
more proper and pure our notion of being (notio entis) becomes, the more intense the perfection. The 
greatest intensity of being belongs to ipsum esse subsistens. This goes against the emptying abstraction of 
being, wherein the more abstract our notion of being becomes the more extensive (i.e., covering a broader 
range) and emptier. Fabro notes that this is the tendency of thinking being in modern ontology, the best 
witness being Hegel’s Science of Logic where being (as empty, abstract, and extensive) passes over into 
nothingness. Opt. Cit.  
17 Merely maintaining that source of esse comes from outside the essence and must be participated by the 
essence does not guarantee an escape from essentialism. This is why creation as the giving of being is vital 
to an understanding of esse in Thomistic metaphysics. A cursory glance at Avicenna’s treatment of esse, 
which promisingly began by distinguishing possibility from actuality—the latter condition marked by esse 
over against mere non-repugnant conceivability—revealed a relapse into essentialism, as the to be of all 
beings necessarily derives from, or better yet “overflows,” the abundance of the first necessary existent. 
Such a generous overflow, however, radiates and yet does not give. Aquinas’s existential break with 
essentialist hegemony, I would argue, is by thinking creation in terms of the giving of being, thus 
preserving the novelty of coming to be and sheltering its radical inceptuality against reinscription into an 
essential order. To think true givenness, Aquinas mobilizes esse as the true meaning of creation ex nihilo: 
being becomes a gift incommensurable with any essential order. Creation marks the giving of being, which 
lacks any determinate ground to anticipate its arrival (i.e., the event of its givenness). This means that 
creation cannot proceed by natural necessity; otherwise given the existence of God, all his possible effects 
would necessarily result. Instead, God as omnipotent is capable of a variety of diverse effects, not all of 
which come to be. Such diversity reflects the power of God, who through his action, and not variation in 
patients or a series of intermediaries that assist the creative effort, is capable of a various effects. This 
distinguishes God from natural agents, which produce only one type of effect and cannot give rise to a 
diversity. Given the range of possibilities that could be created, however, God has chosen to institute a 
certain order containing a diverse multiplicity of beings, which in their integrated entirety fulfill the 
intended end of the universe; for this reason, nature can be deemed a work of intelligence. See, for 
example, De Pot. q. 3, a. 15, resp. Also SCG II.23. 
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nothing pre-exist the creative act and yet be brought into being through such an act.18 If 
there were some preexisting “stuff,” the uncaused matter posited by the ancients, then the 
first principle would not be a universal agent productive of the totality of being. Instead, 
its action would be proportioned to some pre-existing material ground, and both would be 
governed by a higher causal law, lest their order of proportion be a matter of chance. God 
is the total cause of being for the very reason that nothing assists God in creation nor 
stands as a measure of proportion for his action. In cases of natural causation, an agent 
acts in proportion to its patient without exceeding the limits of its receptivity. We have 
seen cases of causal incommensurability in which the power of the agent exceeds the 
receptivity of the patient (e.g., the generation of a mule). With creation, however, there 
can be no balanced economy of natural proportion because nature itself arises from such 
an act, and thus divine power must exceed the totality of all balance if it is to give rise to 
such an economy of particular causes. Thus, without some proportion by which to 
measure the activity of the first principle, it remains incommensurable with the totality of 
being because as the ground of everything that is, nothing can serve to measure its action. 
This is why, as Richard A. Lee has argued, creation is a type of violent causation, even if 
Aquinas seeks legitimacy for the violence of this excessive inauguaral act through the 
subsequent institution of an intellible order.19
      Creation results from the free act of the divine will in concert with (but not compelled 
by) divine intelligence whereby certain rationes contained in the divine intellect are 
issued in re. To speak of an “in re” prior to creation, however, is misleading as it suggests 
that there were some preexisting space or void which comes to be filled with creatures. 
 
                                                 
18 SCG II.16. 
19 See Lee, The Force of Reason and The Logic of Force (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).  
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Instead, creation itself opens such a space of being. As has been stressed above, God acts 
by the decision of his will and not by the compulsion of his intellect. What this ultimately 
entails is that nothingness endures as a real possibility for beings who receive their esse 
as a gift whose arrival cannot be anticipated. And yet, such a coming-to-be is marked by 
the gratuitiousness that has left others (equal in their essential possibility) undone. As we 
witness in Aquinas’s account of creation, such a letting come to be of certain 
possibilities, while leaving others undone, constitutes the mark of creation. The definition 
of creation which he gives is the creature’s being ordered to God as its principle from 
which (a quo) it has esse and on which it depends for its being anything whatsoever.20
      Creation, Aquinas argues in Summa Contra Gentiles, is a kind of relation.
 
Creation is the act through which God draws forth creatures from out of the dark canvass 
of nothingness.  
21
                                                 
20 “Respondeo. Dicendum quod quidam dixerunt creationem aliquid esse in rerum natura medium inter 
creatorem et creaturam. Et quia medium neutrum extremorum est, ideo sequebatur quod creatio neque esset 
creator neque creatura. Sed hoc a magistris erroneum est iudicatum, cum omnis res quocumque modo 
existens non habeat esse nisi a Deo, et sic est creatura. Et ideo alii dixerunt, quod ipsa creatio non ponit 
aliquid realiter ex parte creaturae. Sed hoc etiam videtur inconveniens. Nam in omnibus quae secundum 
respectum ad invicem referuntur, quorum unum ab altero dependet, et non e converso, in eo quod ab altero 
dependet, relatio realiter invenitur, in altero vero secundum rationem tantum; sicut patet in scientia et 
scibili, ut dicit philosophus. Creatura autem secundum nomen refertur ad creatorem. Dependet autem 
creatura a creatore, et non e converso. Unde oportet quod relatio qua creatura ad creatorem refertur, sit 
realis; sed in Deo est relatio secundum rationem tantum. [...] Creatio autem, sicut dictum est, non potest 
accipi ut moveri, quod est ante terminum motus, sed accipitur ut in facto esse; unde in ipsa creatione non 
importatur aliquis accessus ad esse, nec transmutatio a creante, sed solummodo inceptio essendi, et relatio 
ad creatorem a quo esse habet; et sic creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum 
novitate essendi.” De Pot., q. 3, a. 3, resp. See also ST I, q. 45, a.3. “Respondeo dicendum quod creatio 
ponit aliquid in creato secundum relationem tantum. Quia quod creatur, non fit per motum vel per 
mutationem. Quod enim fit per motum vel mutationem, fit ex aliquo praeexistenti: quod quidem contingit 
in productionibus particularibus aliquorum entium; non autem potest hoc contingere in productione totius 
esse a causa universali omnium entium, quae est Deus [m.e.]. Unde Deus, creando, producit res sine motu. 
Subtracto autem motu ab actione et passione, nihil remanet nisi relatio, ut dictum est. Unde relinquitur 
quod creatio in creatura non sit nisi relatio quaedam ad creatorem, ut ad principium sui esse [m.e.]; sicut 
in passione quae est cum motu, importatur relatio ad principium motus.”   
 But, 
keeping in mind the discussion above concerning analogy, one must be careful to stress 
21 Also “Non enim est creatio mutatio, sed ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium a quo statuitur. Et 
sic est de genere relationis. Unde nihil prohibet eam in creato esse sicut in subiecto. [...] Apparet autem, si 
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the unidirectional nature of such relationality: creation is the real relation of creatures to 
God, but not of God to creatures. Otherwise, God as a self-identity of being would 
welcome real otherness, which would fracture his ipseity. Insofar as relation is one of the 
categories of accident, such a category cannot be a real relation happening to God. Thus, 
a real relation holds on the side of the creature to its creator, whereas only a logical 
relation links God back to creatures. But for creatures, creation is thus something real (in 
rerum natura) whereby creatures emerge into being. And unlike mere change, which 
presupposes a subject undergoing such a process, whether it be a substance’s change in 
place (i.e., locomotion) or even the more radical production of a new substance (i.e., 
generation and corruption), creation, instead, marks an even more radical development: 
the inception of being (inceptio essendi) from out of nothingness. Creation initiates a 
relation of real dependency whereby created being in its dependency upon its principle is 
established (ipsa dependentia esse creati ad principium a quo statuitur). Creation is thus 
the grounding of beings in their relation of dependency to God.  
      The grounding act of creation, in which God opens a space wherein creatures can 
emerge in being (essendi), is fundamentally characterized by a “newness” or “novelty” of 
being (cum novitate essendi). Aquinas’s use of this term (i.e., novitate) is not meant to 
express temporal change, as in a “time before” and a “time of” being. The inception of 
being denotes not primarily and not merely that at one time there was nothing, now there 
is something. Such “creation in time,” as revealed by the book of Genesis, although a 
                                                                                                                                                 
creatio relatio quaedam est, quod res quaedam est: et neque increata est; neque alia relatione creata. Cum 
enim effectus creatus realiter dependeat a creante, oportet huiusmodi relationem esse rem quandam. Omnis 
autem res a Deo in esse producitur. Est igitur in esse a Deo producta. Non tamen alia creatione creata, 
quam ipsa creatura prima quae per eam creata dicitur. Quia accidentia et formae, sicut per se non sunt, ita 
nec per se creantur, cum creatio sit productio entis: sed, sicut in alio sunt, ita aliis creatis creantur. 
Praeterea. Relatio non refertur per aliam relationem, quia sic esset abire in infinitum: sed per seipsam 
refertur, quia essentialiter relatio est. Non igitur alia creatione opus est, qua ipsa creatio creetur, et sic in 
infinitum procedatur.” SCG II.18.   
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truth of the faith, cannot be philosophically demonstrated.22 Nor is this Aquinas’s 
primary philosophical concern. Instead, such “newness” or “inception” indicates the 
radical gratuitousness or givenness at the ground of being such that everything that is 
fundamentally depends upon a gift that not only is radically other to it and to its essential 
constitution but also that opens the very space in which beings can stand out or “ex-ist” in 
their being (esse). An account for the universe as a whole cannot be taken from any 
single being within the universe nor from the formal totality of all beings, but instead 
such an account must be derived from the unnecessitated divine will alone (ratio sumatur 
ex simplici voluntate producentis).23
                                                 
22 See, for example: Si enim intelligatur quod aliquid preter Deum potuit semper fuisse, quasi possit esse 
aliquid tamen ab eo non factum, error abominabilis est non solum in fide, sed etiam apud philosophos, qui 
confitentur et probant omne quod est quocumque modo, esse non posse nisi sit causatum ab eo qui maxime 
et verissime esse habet. Si autem intelligatur aliquid semper fuisse, et tamen causatum fuisse a Deo 
secundum totum id quod in eo est, videndum est utrum hoc possit stare.” It can be demonstrated that the 
world is not eternal and that God gives being to everything that is from out of nothingness, but it cannot be 
demonstrated that God created the world in time. De Aeternitate Mundi ll. 6-16. 
23 “Nec hoc potest aliqua physica demonstratione efficaciter impugnari. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, 
quod sicut in quaestione alia est habitum, in operatione Dei non potest accipi aliquod debitum ex parte 
causae materialis, neque potentiae activae agentis, nec ex parte finis ultimi, sed solum ex parte formae quae 
est finis operationis, ex cuius praesuppositione requiritur quod talia existant qualia competunt illi formae. 
Et ideo aliter dicendum est de productione unius particularis creaturae, et aliter de exitu totius universi a 
Deo. Cum enim loquimur de productione alicuius singularis creaturae, potest assignari ratio quare talis sit, 
ex aliqua alia creatura, vel saltem ex ordine universi, ad quem quaelibet creatura ordinatur, sicut pars ad 
formam totius. Cum autem de toto universo loquimur educendo in esse, non possumus ulterius aliquod 
creatum invenire ex quo possit sumi ratio quare sit tale vel tale; unde, cum nec etiam ex parte divinae 
potentiae quae est infinita, nec divinae bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis 
universi sumi possit, oportet quod eius ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut si quaeratur, 
quare quantitas caeli sit tanta et non maior, non potest huius ratio reddi nisi ex voluntate producentis.” De 
Pot. q. 3, a. 17, resp. The “reason” (ratio) must be found in the mere will of the creator.    
 Creation is incidental in the sense that it happens—
and continues to happen through conservation—outside any created nature, arriving 
adveniens extra to everything that is and never merging with it as part of its essential 
constitution. Esse remains fundamentally other to each being, never becoming “its own 
property,” not even for a time.  
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      Coupled with his earlier argument that what is given in creation (i.e., esse) grounds 
all further essential actuality of any being,24 we see how Aquinas radicalizes this actuality 
brought by God’s inaugural act of gratuity: esse has become the really distinct ground of 
any being in its being without which it would fundamentally lack the power to be. Thus, 
“esse” is not merely another name for the sum total of emanated beings or for the 
essential completion of any given being, but is itself—when analogically applied to “esse 
creatum”—the very ground upon which such an essential vocabulary is inscribed. 
Although esse does not appear as one such being (ens) governed and made intelligible by 
essential determinations, nor can it without undermining its fundamental nature, this does 
not mean that it is thereby redundant.25
      Creation, we might say, is the opening or the “exitus” of a world—of the world—
wherein an ordered multiplicity of beings come to have being through a real relation of 
dependence, or participation, in another distinct from themselves. The world is an ordered 
totality of beings united around their shared participation in esse, albeit a sharing marked 
by degrees of inequality based upon a diversity of essences united in their common 
dispensation toward the fulfillment of the good of the universe. The esse common to all 
beings (i.e., esse commune) in which they must participate so that they participate in 
ipsum esse subsistens—a relation to be outlined in more detail below—is not itself some 
thing distinct from any of them, but that which in its indifference to all determination 
  
                                                 
24 “[...] dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil 
enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam 
ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad 
recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut 
formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.” ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.  
25 Its irreducibility appears as the actualization whereby an essential lexicography finds expression. 
Creation ex-presses (and conservation sustains the expression of) the divine ideas through the irreducible 
act of esse, which is not merely something added to such ideas (i.e., thought’s supplement of expression) 
but is the very fundament of their inscription and actualization. 
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gives rise to all real differences between beings and, more importantly, between God and 
the world. Thus, the world as the totality of such distinct beings, and containing the full 
range of conceptual intelligibility based on the unity of essences and ends, does not 
simply add up to or equal esse as the space of such emergence. For this reason, esse more 
than anything else, is what is given by the act of creation. As will become clear in 
Aquinas’s argument for God’s monopoly on creation, esse commune is the most universal 
effect and can be issued only from an omnipotent cause not because it stands as the 
highest genus encompassing every other species, but because the omnipresent actuality 
that is esse opens the entirety of regions in which essential actuality can be distinguished 
from essential potentiality.26
     Although Existential Thomism acknowledges that “forma dat esse”—a phrase 
Aquinas repeatedly invokes
 Esse, as that which is given in the act of creation and 
sustained through the abiding act of conservation, cannot be reduced to a mere repetition 
of every other formal perfection in sum, albeit conceived more abstractly.  
27—nevertheless they argue that beneath or behind such a 
formal determination of being, there must underlie an existential enactment of such an 
essence non-identical to the being given by form.28
                                                 
26 See ST I, q. 45, a. 5, resp. and fn. 31 below. Between being and nothingness there stands an infinite 
distance. Without this first and continual endowment of being, there would be absolute nothingness. As 
Aquinas clearly expresses the matter in De Potentia: “creation is really nothing other than a relation to God 
with a newness of being” (“et sic creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum 
novitate essendi.”) De Pot. q. 3, a. 3, resp.This newness of being inaugurates the very relationality whereby 
creatures participate in the divine plenitude of being without it in anyway being diminished (through 
sharing) or supplemented (through expressing) through this act. Perhaps the best way to express the nature 
of creation, although not in Aquinas’s own words, would be it gives without any possiblity of return. 
27 See, for example, In II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 4, resp; De Prin. Nat. c. 1; De Ente III; SCG II.68; and ST I, q. 
76, a. 4, resp.  
28 Below, I will return to this existential rendering and argue that to uphold an existential act distinct from 
form drowns out the creature itself behind the radiance of another’s causal activity. See Section 5 below.  
 Gilson plays out this principle in 
terms of Aquinas’s metaphor of illumination: the being given by form is comparable to 
the diaphaneity of the air, which receives the light of another, but requires the constant 
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influx of that light to sustain its illumination.29 And it is here that Gilson tells us that by 
dissociating form and act such that esse could be an act of the form without being a 
formal act, Aquinas does nothing less than bring about a revolution in metaphysics.30
                                                 
29 Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 173-175. 
30 Being and Some Philosophers, 174. 
 The 
forma of each created thing thus fails to sustain it in being, but only determines it as such 
once sustained through the power of another. Instead, esse represents a distinct ground of 
perfection altogether and this is why no creature gives being (dat esse) properly speaking, 
even when causing a variety of formal changes, including the most formally radical of all, 
substantial generation and corruption.  
 
Section 2: God’s Existential Monopoly  
      If we characterize creation as God’s inaugural act of giving esse, we must ask about 
those beings that follow later in time: to what do they owe their esse? Once the order of 
creation has been instituted, does God entrust creatures somehow to administrate being or 
must he continually preside over and concur in their causal operations? From the 
foregoing discussion of Aquinas’s account of creation and thinking on esse, it is no 
surprise that in addressing this question, he answers that God alone can create. If being 
(esse) is the extra-essential actuality of all essential actuality, which is really other than 
any created nature, such an act obviously would exceed the causal activity of any created 
agent, even the most perfect: how could any creature give that which it most 
fundamentally lacks, even as a plenipotentiary endowed with the power of being? It is not 
Aquinas’s restriction of creation to God that makes his argument uniquely existential, 
but, as will be seen, the reasons he gives for such a restriction.  
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      To make the case for a divine monopoly of giving being, Aquinas argues that a more 
universal effect must be reduced to more universal and prior cause.31
                                                 
31 In ST I, q. 45, a. 5, resp.: “Respondeo dicendum quod satis apparet in primo aspectu, secundum 
praemissa, quod creare non potest esse propria actio nisi solius Dei. Oportet enim universaliores effectus in 
universaliores et priores causas reducere. Inter omnes autem effectus, universalissimum est ipsum esse. 
Unde oportet quod sit proprius effectus primae et universalissimae causae, quae est Deus. Unde etiam 
dicitur libro de causis, quod neque intelligentia vel anima nobilis dat esse, nisi inquantum operatur 
operatione divina. Producere autem esse absolute, non inquantum est hoc vel tale, pertinet ad rationem 
creationis. Unde manifestum est quod creatio est propria actio ipsius Dei. Contingit autem quod aliquid 
participet actionem propriam alicuius alterius, non virtute propria, sed instrumentaliter, inquantum agit in 
virtute alterius; sicut aer per virtutem ignis habet calefacere et ignire. Et secundum hoc, aliqui opinati sunt 
quod, licet creatio sit propria actio universalis causae, tamen aliqua inferiorum causarum inquantum agit in 
virtute primae causae, potest creare. Et sic posuit Avicenna quod prima substantia separata, creata a Deo, 
creat aliam post se, et substantiam orbis, et animam eius; et quod substantia orbis creat materiam 
inferiorum corporum. Et secundum hunc etiam modum Magister dicit, in V dist. IV Sent., quod Deus potest 
creaturae communicare potentiam creandi, ut creet per ministerium, non propria auctoritate. Sed hoc esse 
non potest. Quia causa secunda instrumentalis non participat actionem causae superioris, nisi inquantum 
per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret 
secundum illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra adhiberetur ad agendum, nec oporteret esse determinata 
instrumenta determinatarum actionum. Sic enim videmus quod securis, scindendo lignum, quod habet ex 
proprietate suae formae, producit scamni formam, quae est effectus proprius principalis agentis. Illud autem 
quod est proprius effectus Dei creantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, scilicet esse absolute. 
Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive et instrumentaliter ad hunc effectum, cum creatio non sit ex 
aliquo praesupposito, quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis agentis. Sic igitur impossibile est 
quod alicui creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria, neque instrumentaliter sive per ministerium. 
Et hoc praecipue inconveniens est dici de aliquo corpore, quod creet, cum nullum corpus agat nisi tangendo 
vel movendo; et sic requirit in sua actione aliquid praeexistens, quod possit tangi et moveri; quod est contra 
rationem creationis.”  
 And because the 
most universal effect is esse, it must have as its cause the most universal cause. This 
cause is ipsum esse subsistens, which is the cause of all being. Although certain creatures 
may exceed others essentially, this does not mean, however, that they are more universal 
in terms of giving esse. This is why, as will be seen below, no other being, not 
intelligence nor soul, gives being (dat esse) no matter how noble its nature. An angel 
does not cooperate in giving being to an ant; the former may exceed the latter in term of 
essential determination and exert causal influence over it essentially; however, there is 
nothing proper to its nature by which it gives being (esse). Thus, contrary to the 
emanationist theory of Avicenna, it cannot act as a secondary cause in the conferral of 
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being.32 Instead, what the givenness of being (datum esse) conveys is that although 
something can be a substance, it can never truly subsist. All subsistence requires esse, 
and once received, that is, once an essence has been posited “outside its causes,”33
      Suarez follows Scotus in holding that the claim “a more universal effect must be 
traced back to a more universal cause” entails that there is a ratio objectiva applicable to 
the widest multiplicity of objects and the universal cause of such a widespread ratio 
contains such effects within itself eminently.
 esse 
still lacks a root in being. To be is the most universal of all acts because even self-
subsisting forms, were there such, would stand in potency to such existential actuality.  
      But what does Aquinas mean here by “more and less universal”? There seem to be at 
least two distinct understanding of how an effect can be more or less universal: the 
opinion of Scotus or Suarez, in which the universality of an effect corresponds with its 
indeterminacy and imperfection with esse as the most indeterminate and imperfect of all 
effects; and the opinion of Aquinas, in which esse in being most universal is also most 
perfect. The difference between the answers to this question will reveal why unlike 
Scotus and Suarez, who also argue that creatures cannot create, Aquinas’s argument is 
uniquely existential.  
34
                                                 
32 See above Chapter IV Section 1. As stated in the fn.  33 above: “Quia causa secunda instrumentalis non 
participat actionem causae superioris, nisi inquantum per aliquid sibi proprium dispositive operatur ad 
effectum principalis agentis. Si igitur nihil ibi ageret secundum illud quod est sibi proprium, frustra 
adhiberetur ad agendum, nec oporteret esse determinata instrumenta determinatarum actionum.” For a 
discussion of this matter, see Blanchette, The Perfection of the Universe, 164. 
33 Cf. the Suarezian treatment of “esse” in its distinction from essence in DM 31. 
34 DM 20.2.  
 The highest perfection of such effects, 
however, is not their indeterminate ratio objectiva in which they agree, but instead the 
individual completeness of each and every effect. Thus, their most universal ratio essendi 
is also their most imperfect ratio. This is why the giving of being (esse) is not what is 
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noteworthy about creation, because every efficient cause gives being. Instead, as will be 
seen, for Scotus and Suarez the production of a complete effect without a preexisting 
subject (i.e., matter) serves to monopolize the act of creation.  
      For Aquinas, on the other hand, to say that God as most universal cause creates the 
most universal effect (i.e., esse) is not merely to say that God creates the totality of 
beings. The latter would mean only that God’s power extends to everything that is—
which it does—but not also that God creates every being (ens) in its being (esse). This 
would be to leave unthematized the existential dimension of the creative act as that in 
which esse as the most universal and the most perfective effect endows. The stakes can be 
made apparent by further developing Suarez’s answer to the question at hand (i.e., 
whether God can endow creatures with a creative power).  
      According to Suarez, a creative power is not infinite and incommunicable to creatures 
on account of being a “surplus of eductive power,” or a power that reaches and actualizes 
even the most remote passive potencies; instead, creative power occupies a different 
order than any eductive power because it calls forth its effect in the absence of any 
potency (i.e., ex nihilo).35
      Aquinas’s argument at ST I. q. 45, a. 5 accords with this assessment, but tends to 
diverge around parsing the question of esse’s contribution to the universality of the 
created effect. Aquinas penetrates the universal depth of esse, instead of stopping short at 
the mere “fact of being” of the essence. Whereas, for Suarez, the incommensurability of 
 Creative power is incommensurable with any finite power 
insofar as the former requires no real preexisting potency upon which to act, but requiring 
only objective potency (i.e., non-contradiction), acts upon nothing. Suarez emphasizes 
the independence of the creative act from any (i.e., ex nihilo) economy of real potencies.  
                                                 
35 DM 20.2.  
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creation with all other “types” of efficient causation does not stem from its introduction 
of the existential actuality of esse, as this is included in the production ex nihilo of an 
actual essence. The emphasis for Suarez instead shifts to the creative act’s complete 
independence from any preexisting subject of potency: God creates an actual essence 
(i.e., an essentially determined individual) from no real potency. Creation creates real 
essential beings. What makes of this model of creation a “conceptual imperialism,” 
according to Gilson, is that grasping to explain the difference between a potential and an 
actual essence, and on the verge of thinking esse, Suarez attributes the difference to the 
latter’s created actuality. And in explaining what such created actuality means, Suarez 
fails to address such actuality by its proper name, “esse”; that is, he reduces esse to the 
actuality of essence without comprehending that such “actuality of” already entails an 
otherness to essence, an otherness that is existence. To account for such otherness, Suarez 
mistakes “of” for an essential property, as something belonging to the essential domain, 
which allows him to conceptualize and render essentially determinate such created 
actuality. And thus by asking “what is it?” when confronted by such existential actuality, 
itself thinkable only outside the conceptual domain, Suarez’s account of creation thus 
relapses into essentialism.36
      Against such a backdrop, we begin to see how esse as the most universal effect of all 
created beings serves as the “most universal perfection” according to Aquinas, a 
perfection whose depth cannot be made intelligible by thinking any being nor even the 
totality of beings. Although he agrees with Suarez that creation is the proper act of God 
alone, and cannot be administered to creatures, Aquinas’s definition of creation as 
“producing being absolutely, not as this or that (non inquantum est hoc vel tale)” reflects 
  
                                                 
36 Being and Some Philosophers, 102-105. 
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a different concern and emphasis than that of Suarez; namely, an uncovering of the 
existentiality at work in the universal effect of esse.  
      Even once certain beings (i.e., creatures) have been given esse, creation as the giving 
of esse still requires a cause able to endow this highest perfection: i.e., conservation. And 
because such esse does not belong to creatures as part of their essential constitution, but 
retains an otherness to them even when they exist, creatures cannot create because they 
cannot give esse. This is the significance of Aquinas’s real distinction: any creature as 
determined by its essential determinations never becomes identical to its being (esse) in 
such a way that it could causally endow another with esse. Esse retains a fundamental 
otherness to its essential constitution even when such a being does in fact exist. And the 
“fact of its being” does not fully reflect the existential perfection by which such a being 
in its essential constitution emerges from nothingness. There is a monopoly on creation 
because there is a monopoly on giving being insofar as esse never becomes a real 
property of creatures even when they exist (i.e., the real distinction).37
      Although other scholastics may agree with the claim that creatures cannot create, this 
is not necessarily because they acknowledge that “to create” means to “give esse.” 
Suarez, for example, defines “efficient causality” generally as the “communication of 
esse,” insofar as the cause makes the effect “to be.”
 
38
                                                 
37 Compare, for example, the difference between hot water and illuminated air. Heat belongs to hot water as 
an accidental quality and such can cause heat (even in a limited degree) in other patients. Light, however, 
belongs to the continued endowment of the source, never taking up root in the patient. Thus, the quality 
remains incidental to the patient.  
38 DM 17.1.  
 Creation is a unique moment of 
such causality because it makes something be from nothing, whereas all other 
communication of esse (i.e., efficient causation) makes a this be a that. And here is where 
we witness the divergent understandings of “esse” in Suarez and Aquinas: to be (esse), 
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for Suarez, is merely the “fact or state of being” of some essence, the temporal duration 
of its extantness, the life-cycle of its effective actuality before it passes over into another 
essential fact. For Aquinas, however, to be marks the very extra-essential act of standing 
out of nothingness, a relation of real dependence derived from the primus et purus actus 
essendi, or that alone which subsists. This was why, as discussed at length above, the real 
distinction could emerge only after esse was identified as the proper nature of a subsisting 
being, ipsum esse subsistens. Prior to this conclusion, an opponent of the real distinction 
could accept the various steps of the argument, yet merely assert that the occluded esse 
signifies nothing more than whether a given essence factually is or is not. And because 
esse is never identical to any creature, no creature can create (i.e., give esse) even on 
behalf of God.  
      In discussing whether the power to create can be communicated to creatures, 
Aquinas’s argument thus targets those thinkers (e.g., Avicenna) who might maintain a 
coordinating causal act on the part of creatures (most especially, the intelligences) or 
those (e.g., Peter Lombard) who would hold that although not through their own 
authorship, but through a ministration, creatures are communicated the power of creation 
(“ut creet per ministerium, non propria auctoritate”). Against such views, Aquinas 
argues that such instrumental causality (i.e., when something participates the power of 
another and acts as a plenipotentiary) does not occur in creation. Creatures are not 
instruments used by God to create.  
      The reason, Aquinas maintains, is that even though operating through a superior 
agent, any instrument must effect something by something proper to it. Otherwise, the 
instrument would be superfluous. Aquinas gives the example of a saw used to cut wood. 
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Given the property of its form (i.e., sharp metal teeth), the saw enables the sawyer to 
produce a bench. Such a proper effect of the principal agent (i.e., the human who saws) 
cannot be completed without the instrument. The sawyer alone lacks the power to saw 
without a certain property belonging to an instrument. But because esse cannot be 
appropriated by any created nature, a created being cannot serve as an instrument of 
creation. What this means for creation, Aquinas concludes, is that God’s proper effect 
(i.e., absolute being), which is presupposed by all other effects, presupposes nothing else 
insofar as it is most universal. Thus an instrumental agent cannot be invoked otherwise 
something proper to the essence of creatures would be required for God to give being 
(i.e., create). Creatures, thus, altogether lack the power to create either through 
themselves or instrumentally.  
      To the claim that the power (virtus) of the maker is measured by the thing made, and 
because creatures are finite, only a finite power is required to create them, Aquinas 
responds that we must consider not only the substance of the thing made, but also the 
mode in which it is made.39
                                                 
39 “Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus facientis non solum consideratur ex substantia facti, sed etiam ex 
modo faciendi, maior enim calor non solum magis, sed etiam citius calefacit. Quamvis igitur creare 
aliquem effectum finitum non demonstret potentiam infinitam, tamen creare ipsum ex nihilo demonstrat 
potentiam infinitam. Quod ex praedictis patet. Si enim tanto maior virtus requiritur in agente, quanto 
potentia est magis remota ab actu, oportet quod virtus agentis ex nulla praesupposita potentia, quale agens 
est creans, sit infinita, quia nulla proportio est nullius potentiae ad aliquam potentiam, quam praesupponit 
virtus agentis naturalis, sicut et non entis ad ens. Et quia nulla creatura habet simpliciter potentiam 
infinitam, sicut neque esse infinitum, ut supra probatum est, relinquitur quod nulla creatura possit creare.” 
ST I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 3.  
 A greater heat heats not only more, but more quickly. What 
this means for creation, Aquinas claims, is that even though the creation of a finite effect 
does not require an infinite power, to create that effect ex nihilo (i.e., in its being) requires 
an infinite power. As Aquinas has argued previously, creatures lack such infinite power 
and thus are unable to create. To overcome the threshold from nothingness into being, 
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even the most miniscule finite effect presupposes an infinite power. Aquinas thus would 
agree with Suarez that the mode of the making (modus faciendi) must be taken into 
account just as much as the substance of the thing made (substantia facti).  However, 
whereas Suarez emphasizes a creature’s inability to actualize ex nihilo an essence due to 
its inability to confer essential actuality to nothingness (i.e., an absence of essential 
potentiality), Aquinas would stress that the very actuality needed is something altogether 
non-essential to any being, not because it is accidental (pace Avicenna), but because it is 
supra-essential.40
     In summation, we can say that the emergence of beings from out of nothingness 
through the creative act brings about a participation in God whereby creatures liken or 
assimilate themselves to the first and perfect act of being. Such assimilation is made 
possible by God’s exemplarity (that is, as exemplary cause), but made actual by his 
legislation of certain similitudes in re (through the efficient cause of the divine will). 
Creation is made to be like God, and yet remains unlike him insofar as any creature must 
participate its most fundamental act of being. The actus essendi is the act of assimilation 
and marks a radical otherness on the part of creatures to their participated esse. God, as 
 To overcome the gap between being and nothingness, infinite power is 
necessary for the very reason that it is extra-essential: the currency of essential power, no 
matter how great, finds exchange and measure only in proportion to preexisting potency, 
and no matter how large its surplus, it cannot overcome nothingness “because 
nothingness exceeds the scale of essential potency” (...quia nulla proportio est nullius 
potentiae ad aliquam potentiam) and cannot be measured in an economy that already 
presupposes being’s (esse’s) overcoming of nothingness.   
                                                 
40 DM 31.3. Suarez states the actuality of an actual essence, as distinct from a potential essence, stems not 
from the addition of esse (or esse existentiae), but from its being an essence. A potential essence is not an 
essence (but only something potential), and thus lacks essential actuality.  
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the total plenitude of being, actuates the being of everything else through the creative act 
whereby creatures come to participate being and partake of this existential plenitude. 
Creatures participate in ipsum esse subsistens and thus assimilate themselves to the first 
act through participation. God is obviously the efficient cause of being for all creatures, 
but in what sense do they too have being? That is, through their assimilative participation 
in God whose being is un-shareable, does God himself (ipse) come to constitute their 
being? Or do they realize and exercise their own act and power of being outside of God’s 
conservation and concurrence? If we are to crack the code of Aquinas’s existential 
metaphysics, we must determine whether esse provides more than an “extrinsic 
denomination” of the being of creatures or whether “esse” when applied to entia creata 
refers only to their relation to ipsum esse subsistens designating nothing intrinsic to 
them.41
      In SCG I.26, Aquinas introduces an important polemic against those unnamed 
individuals who maintain “the heresy”
 
 
Section 3: God as the Formal Esse of Creatures? 
42 that God is the formal esse of all things.43
                                                 
41 For a discussion of this problem, see Introduction to Chapter II above.  
42 According to Gilson, such a view was condemned in 1210. Gilson identifies the targets of contemporary 
followers of the teachings of the ninth-century Neoplatonic philosopher John Scotus Erigena (e.g., Amaury 
of Bene and the “Amauricians”). Amaury taught God to be all things. Etienne Gilson, Christian Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages, 240-241. In ST I. q. 3. a. 8. resp. Aquinas states: “Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse 
principium formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum.” The  “Almariani” of ST 
seem to be one and the same as the “Amauricians” discussed by Gilson and unnamed in SCG.  
43 Although the basic sense of both accounts is the same, the Contra Gentiles version treats God as the 
formal esse of things, whereas Summa Theologiae treats God as the formal principle of things. Due to its 
more explicit concern with the question of esse, and its more sustained argument against 
“misinterpretations” of existential participation, the Contra Gentiles account will serve as the primary focus 
in what follows. See also In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, sol.  
 Such a 
heretical claim at first might seem to be consistent with what follows from Aquinas’s 
argument that only God has esse from himself, that is, God’s essence is esse. If things 
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other than God lack esse from themselves, then they must receive it from somewhere 
else. This means that creatures must participate in the divine to be (i.e., ipsum esse 
subsistens), if they are to have being at all, which they cannot receive from their essences. 
But if creatures participate the divine esse for their own esse, and if God’s proper being 
somehow constitutes created beings’ own actus essendi, does this not make God their 
formal esse, which is what the heresy claims?  
      The obvious problem with such a view, for Aquinas, is that it leads to pantheism: if 
all beings partake of God’s being, then all things would be identical with God in some 
way. For creatures to be, they would have to be God. Although God is the efficient cause 
of esse in all beings (i.e., through creation, conservation, and concurrence), Aquinas must 
refute any suggestion that God’s esse forms a part of the esse of created beings. 
Otherwise God himself (ipse) would be made communicable and divisible as a part of 
creation, thus compromising his radical self-identity.   
      Aquinas rejects the Amaurician view on the grounds that if God were the formal esse 
of all things, God and creatures could not differ in esse, but would have to differ some 
other way.44
                                                 
44 “Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc omnia conveniunt. Si ergo 
res differunt ad invicem, oportet quod vel ipsum esse specificetur per aliquas differentias additas, ita quod 
rebus diversis sit diversum esse secundum speciem: vel quod res differant per hoc quod ipsum esse diversis 
naturis secundum speciem convenit. Sed primum horum est impossibile: quia enti non potest fieri aliqua 
additio secundum modum quo differentia additur generi, ut dictum est. Relinquitur ergo quod res propter 
hoc differant quod habent diversas naturas, quibus acquiritur esse diversimode. Esse autem divinum non 
advenit alii naturae, sed est ipsa natura, ut ostensum est. Si igitur esse divinum esset formale esse omnium, 
oporteret omnia simpliciter esse unum.” SCG I.26.  
 They would agree in being because their being would be formally derived 
from divine being, as each instantiation of a form derives from the form itself. Thus, if 
they are to differ at all, they must differ according to added difference or through the 
accrual of esse to diverse natures. Neither alternative can explain the diversity of beings, 
however, because the former would require esse to be a genus to which additions could 
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be made and the latter would divide divine esse from the separate nature to which it 
accrues. Aquinas already has rejected both possibilities.45
      The former explanation, which would treat “being” as a genus, would require some 
difference to be added to being, whereby distinct species would be constituted. One 
might think created/uncreated, finite/infinite, potential/actual, and so forth could serve in 
such a differential capacity, thereby give rise to two distinct species of being (i.e., finite 
being and infinite being). Against such a treatment of being as a genus, Aquinas issues 
the longstanding Parmenidean consequence of dividing being: any difference would have 
to be included in the genus—and thus unable to divide it. Otherwise it would be outside 
the genus, but something not included in the genus of being would be nothing.
  
46
                                                 
45 SCG I.25 and 22, respectively.  
46 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1, 2, and 3. Here we find Scotus’s argument for the univocity 
of being and “finite/infinite” as distinct modes of a single univocal transcendental concept. Thus, 
everything that is has the modification of being either finite or infinite. Such modifications, he argues, are 
not attributes or accidents, but as intrinsic modes marking grades of perfection: just as a certain intensity of 
whiteness is not said to constitute a really distinct addition to whiteness in itself (i.e., because all real 
instances of whiteness have some intensity of whiteness) as would “visible,” so too finite and infinite are 
modally distinct (i.e., less-than-real) intensities of being. Thus, they need not be differences external to 
being and thereby nothing, as posed by Parmenides. What is important to note is that “being” is not a genus 
for Scotus and yet between its distinct modifications it remains a single concept (ratio). This is of central 
importance in demonstrations for the existence of God against treating being as analogical (e.g., Aquinas) 
or equivocal (e.g., Henry of Ghent), which Scotus maintains cannot demonstratively move between the two 
concepts without fallaciously importing an extraneous concept. I will return to this issue below. See 
Chapter VI Section 1. In an excellent discussion of Scotus’s larger role in the transition from scholasticism 
to modern and post-modern philosophy, Catherine Pickstock assesses the changes that result with such a 
concept of being. Instead of thinking of the abstraction to being as an elevation of the mind (the ascent 
from the finite to the infinite), such abstraction empties but no longer elevates. Being is no longer the most 
exalted concept, but the most common. Above, I discussed Joseph Owens’s claim that scholasticism 
inherited two concepts of being (i.e., being as most common and being as most perfect), neither of which 
they could accept wholesale. Pickstock argues that Scotus puts forth the empty commonality of being at the 
expense of a certain transcendent richness of being that can only be imitated by finite creatures. Such 
emptiness means that being can even be thought without God: even though every being is either finite or 
infinite, we can know something as a being without knowing whether it is finite or infinite. The ability to 
think a being independent of its causes and all other realities, “tends to encourage,” Pickstock argues, both 
epistemological and political atomism. Such atomism is at odds with a “space of participation.” See: 
Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus,” 545-553; Also see the final paragraph of Section VII, p.64 below. On 
a similar note, the treatment of God and creatures both as beings has led some such as J-L Marion to charge 
Scotus’s thought as onto-theo-logy: being for Scotus can be thought in terms of entity; even God becomes 
merely an infinite entity, but not something radically transcendent, or to put in Marion’s term “God without 
being.” See Jean-Luc Marion, “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” 47-48. 
 Either 
 294 
possibility leaves being indivisible thereby consuming all distinctions—and most 
especially between God and creatures—within the genus of being.   
      The other possibility for treating God as the formal esse of beings would be to explain 
their diversity of being (esse) through an accrual (acquiritur) of divine being to their 
diverse natures. Thus, they would agree in their being—for in this they do not disagree, 
Aquinas states—but differ in their distinct natures. Thus, being (esse) would differ 
between this and that being insofar it accrues to (at the very least) distinct individuals if 
not members of distinct species. The problem with this approach, however, is that divine 
esse cannot accrue to any nature because—as shown in both SCG I.22 and ST I q.3, 
a.4.—God’s esse cannot be other than his nature. “Accrual” signifies a non-identity 
between esse and essence that has already been procluded. Such a non-identity would 
rupture the ipseity of divine being, an ipseity necessary to ground the causal lineage of 
being.47
      In the subsequent argument against the same position, Aquinas utilizes God’s status 
as a first (i.e., per se) necessary cause to disprove the heresy.
 Thus, the esse that is divided through its accrual to diverse participants—as 
discussed in reference to De Ente—cannot be ipsum esse subsistens. 
48 A principle must be prior 
to that which it principiates because the principiated is not without its principle.49
                                                 
47 We should take note of the conclusion Aquinas draws, however, because he argues merely the 
conditional “if God were formal esse, everything would be absolutely one,” not that such is altogether 
impossible. Even though such a conclusion that everything is God runs contrary to the faith, such an 
argument does not prove the conclusion to be impossible. 
48 “Amplius. Principium naturaliter prius est eo cuius est principium. Esse autem in quibusdam rebus habet 
aliquid quasi principium: forma enim dicitur esse principium essendi; et similiter agens, quod facit aliqua 
esse actu. Si igitur esse divinum sit esse uniuscuiusque rei, sequetur quod Deus, qui est suum esse, habeat 
aliquam causam; et sic non sit necesse-esse per se. Cuius contrarium supra ostensum est.” SCG I.26. For his 
argument for God as a first necessary being, see: “the third way” of ST I, q. 2, a. 3, resp. And SCG I.15.  
49 King notes that Scotus coins this neologism “principiare.” Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003): 46. A principle stands in relation to a cause as genus to species. In this passage, Aquinas does not 
seem to clearly distinguish between the two.  
 He 
argues that being in certain things has something as its principle (principium essendi), 
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which Aquinas enumerates as both form and agent: the former that makes them be what 
they are and the latter that makes them be in act. With such “certain things,” Aquinas 
refers to his earlier discussion of contingent beings (i.e., those subject to generation and 
corruption), whose nature equally relates to the contraries “being and not-being.” Here he 
had argued that due to such contingency of being and to avoid infinite regress, the being 
of hylomorphic beings must accrue from a cause having necessary being, which he 
subsequently shows can either be through another (i.e., as in the case of immaterial 
beings) or through itself (i.e., God as first necessary cause).50 In terms of his argument 
against the Amaurician heresy, if God were the formal esse of such things, then for things 
that require a principle to be in act, God as their esse would also require a separate 
principle, which would make God caused. Instead, as Aquinas has argued, God is 
unprincipiated, or “anarchic,” insofar as he grounds the entire economy of all principles. 
If divine esse were collapsed into esse commune, such that God were the formal esse of 
each thing, God himself would have a principle and no longer be per se necessary. He 
would be subject to (i.e., principiated by) something else—even if he were his own 
principle as “causa sui”—and thereby without such a principle, he would not be.51 To 
ground and to principiate the community of beings, the grounding principle must 
“except” itself from the order which it founds.52
                                                 
50 SCG I.15. Concerning Aquinas’s understanding of necessity as pertaining to necessary beings ab alio, 
see Section 5 below. 
51 Aquinas has already rejected such a conclusion in the third way of ST and SCG I.15. This means that if 
the formal esse of anything (e.g., this human) were God, then because this human has a principle that is 
prior to it in nature (e.g., humanity) whereby it can be in act as this human, then the principle of humanity 
also causes God (as the esse of this human).  
 We witness the role of such transcendent 
exceptionality in Aquinas’s “exegesis” of Dionysius’s Celestial Hierarchy. 
52 On this matter, Marion states: “For Descartes, it will henceforth be the divine essence that will play the 
role of cause for the divine existence, at the risk, at least implicit, of only existing at the price of the 
transcendence of its irreducible esse. But the stake also amounts to the dispute with (or the confirmation of) 
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      Seeking next to identify of the source of this Amaurician error, which has often found 
ground in authoritative texts such as Celestial Hierarchy, Aquinas offers a defense of 
Dionysius’s misleading claim that “the super-essential divinity is the esse of everything.” 
Aquinas maintains that if God were the formal esse of things, he would be within them 
(inter) and not above them (super) as self-subsisting being.53 God’s ipseity of being 
would be communicable to creatures, and thereby God would not be subsisting being 
itself untouched by anything other than itself. As constituting a part of all beings, 
everything would be God. Such contiguity, let alone communication, between God and 
creatures would rupture both the purity of divine being as well as expose the universally 
grounded order of esse commune to self-referentiality. In terms of the latter, Dionysius’s 
cosmic hierarchy would become a flattened field in which the principle of being is merely 
primum inter pares, and not a pure actuality radically exceeding and yet grounding all 
subsequent actuality.54
                                                                                                                                                 
the prior decision made by Thomas Aquinas to except God from the esse commune and hence from 
metaphysica, since it is a matter of submitting or not to causality understood as the common feature of esse 
commune.” “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-logy,” 58.  
53 “Primum est quarundam auctoritatum intellectus perversus. Invenitur enim a Dionysio dictum, IV cap. 
Cael. Hier.: esse omnium est superessentialis divinitas. Ex quo intelligere voluerunt ipsum esse formale 
omnium rerum Deum esse, non considerantes hunc intellectum ipsis verbis consonum esse non posse. Nam 
si divinitas est omnium esse formale, non erit super omnia, sed inter omnia, immo aliquid omnium. Cum 
ergo divinitatem super omnia dixit, ostendit secundum suam naturam ab omnibus distinctum et super omnia 
collocatum. Ex hoc vero quod dixit quod divinitas est esse omnium, ostendit quod a Deo in omnibus 
quaedam divini esse similitudo reperitur. Hunc etiam eorum perversum intellectum alibi apertius 
excludens, dixit in II cap. de Div. Nom., quod ipsius Dei neque tactus neque aliqua commixtio est ad res 
alias, sicut est puncti ad lineam vel figurae sigilli ad ceram.” SCG I.26. The failure of reason to grasp God 
as proper esse without addition. This latter clarification will set up ST I q. 4 a. 1 and SCG I.27, in which 
Aquinas argues God is not the form of any being (i.e., nothing but God is God). This failure of reason, 
Aquinas points out, concerns the misapplication of creaturely specifications (i.e., specific differences) and 
individuations (i.e., matter and accidents) to God. The fallacious reasoning assumed that because what is 
common of creatures remains common without the addition of accidents, God, who is without accidents, 
must also be common. Such common being, however, cannot subsist apart from thought, unlike God whose 
very esse is marked by the fullness of act that excludes the addition of accidents. This very fullness of act, 
Aquinas argues, is God’s proper being, which is not common. 
 Thus creatures, Aquinas pleads on the author’s behalf, do not 
54 “When Aristotle says, quoting the Iliad, ‘The rule of many is not good; let there be one ruler,’ he is here 
designating a primum inter pares, not a transcendently more complete actual instance of ούσία. Thus it 
seems not at all unfair or incorrect to state that Aristotle seems not to have given serious consideration to 
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share in a part of God; instead when Dionysius states that divinity is the being of 
everything (“divinitas est esse omnium”) he means that a similitude of divine esse is 
found in all things deriving from God. This entails that God must be outside the order of 
being, although analogical traces of the creator can be found within creation. God himself 
remains uncommunicated and unparticipated, although he gives a similitude of himself to 
be participated by creatures.55
      Although implicit in Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas draws out this distinction (i.e., 
through it, but not it) more explicitly in terms of analogical causation in his Sentences 
commentary, once again on the question of “whether God is the esse of all things.”
 Everything that is, is through divine being, but is not it. 
This difference (i.e., through it, but not it) enables God to be the efficient cause of esse in 
creatures without being their formal esse. 
56
                                                                                                                                                 
being outside of or beyond what Aquinas would call ens commune or esse commune…Aristotle never saw 
fit to affirm the reality of a transcendent efficient cause of being, a cause of esse commune outside esse 
commune, which cause is itself ipsum esse per se subsistence as we find in the thought of Aquinas.” Taylor, 
“Aquinas, the ‘Plotinian Arabica,’” 219. 
55 See In div. nom., cap. 2 lect. 3. 158 and above p. 195. 
56 “Respondeo, sicut dicit Bernardus, Serm. IV super Cant., Deus est esse omnium non essentiale, sed 
causale. Quod sic patet. Invenimus enim tres modos causae agentis. Scilicet causam aequivoce agentem, et 
hoc est quando effectus non convenit cum causa nec nomine nec ratione: sicut sol facit calorem qui non est 
calidus. Item causam univoce agentem, quando effectus convenit in nomine et ratione cum causa, sicut 
homo generat hominem et calor facit calorem. Neutro istorum modorum Deus agit. Non univoce, quia nihil 
univoce convenit cum ipso. Non aequivoce, cum effectus et causa aliquo modo conveniant in nomine et 
ratione secundum prius et posterius; sicut Deus sua sapientia facit nos sapientes, ita tamen quod sapientia 
nostra semper deficit a ratione sapientiae suae, sicut accidens a ratione entis, secundum quod est in 
substantia. Unde est tertius modus causae agentis analogice. Unde patet quod divinum esse producit esse 
creaturae in similitudine sui imperfecta: et ideo esse divinum dicitur esse omnium rerum, a quo omne esse 
creatum effective et exemplariter manat.” In I Sent. d. 8, q.1. a 2, resp.  
 This 
may not seem like an obvious move at first and requires us to unpack the exact nature of 
the problem (i.e., God being the esse of all things). A preliminary issue to note is that 
even if God acted univocally this would not necessarily entail that he also would be the 
formal esse of his effects. In the case of univocal efficient causation, such as when a 
human begets a human, even though both are of the same species, the begetting and the 
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begotten human are really and numerically distinct. So too in causing being: if God acted 
as a univocal cause, this would mean that both creatures and creator would share a 
common, univocal ratio essendi, but would not be enough to conclude that God’s effects 
would be really and numerically identical with him. This would pose a problem, but not 
the problem that God would be the formal esse of all things. Esse would in fact precede 
God as a genus.57
      In attempting to free God from the communal order of being, so that he remains that 
through which the order comes to be but not a real part of the order itself, Aquinas 
confronts the earlier problem of navigating between radical transcendence and 
immanence: it seems that the first either must be beyond being altogether in order to 
cause “all being” and thus not be essentially being; or the first must be a part of being and 
thereby either causa sui or cause only of beings, but not their being. If God acted as an 
equivocal arche, as Aquinas discusses in the Sentences commentary, he would not be the 
perfect causal actuality (i.e., essentially and only being) in which all else must participate, 
but instead something beyond being, “an arche without energeia” to use Lloyd Gerson’s 
expression.
 He would remain really distinct from creatures, thus avoiding 
pantheism, but he would share a principle with them through their common genus, thus 
compromising his firstness, per se necessity, and simplicity.  
58
                                                 
57 See, for example, SCG I.25.  
58 Gerson, “Plotinus’s Metaphysics: Emanation or Creation?” 569. See also Taylor, “Aquinas, the 
‘Plotinian Arabica,” 234-238. 
 On the other hand, if the first being is merely primum inter pares, or “first 
among equals,” then such an arche cannot account for the totality of the order in which it 
is first. As principiated by the order itself (i.e., of being), God (i.e., being + something 
else) still could cause all other beings, but not in their being (esse). This is not a problem 
if, as is the case with Aristotle, the first is called upon to provide a causal account of 
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everything subsequent to it, but not account for being as such. For Aquinas, however, the 
first cause as first creative cause must provide being to all beings. And yet, if the first 
itself were a part of such a community of being, there would be no subsistence of being, 
nothing would be being essentially. Being would only be an essential part of God’s 
essence, but being itself (ipsum esse) would not subsist because nothing (i.e., not even 
God) would be only being. Without such subsistence of being, there would be nothing for 
other beings in which to participate for their being.59
      Aquinas’s appeal to analogy in the Sentences commentary thus operates on two 
fronts: first, it counters the univocity of being whereby creatures and God would share in 
a common ratio essendi. Second, it maintains that God is the esse of all things causally, 
but not essentially, and furthermore as cause of all things, he acts as an analogical cause. 
What an analogy of being shows is that God cannot be the esse of creatures because they 
are deficient in their being and cannot share in the same ratio essendi as God’s 
incommunicable ipseity of being insofar as such is pure by its own nature.
  
60
                                                 
59 On this matter, Owens states: “To exercise efficient causality, being has to subsist in its primary instance. 
The real subsistence of being is in fact shown by tracing to its source the being found in observable things 
and participated by them through efficient causality. If being did not subsist, there could not be efficient 
causality and so no participation of being.” “Diversity and Community of Being” in St. Thomas Aquinas on 
the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., ed. John R. Catan (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1980): 106.  
60 “Praeterea, nihil habet esse, nisi inquantum participat divinum esse, quia ipsum est primum ens, quare 
causa est omnis entis. Sed omne quod est participatum in aliquo, est in eo per modum participantis: quia 
nihil potest recipere ultra mensuram suam. Cum igitur modus cujuslibet rei creatae sit finitus, quaelibet res 
creata recipit esse finitum et inferius divino esse quod est perfectissimum. Ergo constat quod esse creaturae, 
quo est formaliter, non est divinum esse.” In I Sent. d. 8, q.1. a 2, s.c. 2.  
 By arguing 
that God cannot act univocally such that he would communicate and disrupt his own 
purity of being, Aquinas thereby shows that the finite and inferior measure of being 
received by creatures must be other than God. God cannot be the formal esse of creatures 
because their esse defects from his most perfect being, thereby distancing the perfect and 
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pure ipsum esse from its various participants.61
      As we have seen above with Aquinas’s arguments for analogy, there is nevertheless, 
some manner of non-reciprocal agreement, and that is between “prior and posterior” 
wherein the prior remains altogether untouched by the addition of the posterior. And 
they, in turn, proceed (manant) from him as their exemplary and efficient cause. God 
produces the esse of creatures, and thereby can be said to be the esse of all things, but he 
cannot be the formal esse of creatures as they are an imperfect similitude of himself and 
his ipseity.
 Thus, reference to the pure actuality of 
being must be made in order to show the otherness of all derived modes of being. By 
arguing against a univocity of being, which would make being equally divisible between 
God and creatures, Aquinas also counters the charge of pantheism.  
62
                                                 
61 Salas states: “Within the Commentary on the Sentences and De veritate, formal or exemplar causality—
in which the relationship between cause and effect is one of imitation—operates with a particular 
dominance in Thomas’s thought. In an effect’s sharing in its cause’s form—a sharing which never attains 
the same degree of formal similitude as the cause itself—the effect imitates its cause. As Montagnes points 
out though, beginning with the Summa contra gentiles and carried throughout the rest of the later works, for 
example, the De potential Dei and Summa theologiae, Thomas approaches the issue of analogy in terms of 
efficient causality; for now in the later works the relationship between a cause and its effect is rendered, 
more often than not, in terms of the communication of act.” Further: “Beginning with the Summa contra 
gentiles, however, there is a marked movement away from the formalist-exemplarist direction of the early 
works—which, again, is not to say that there is radical reorienting with respect to Aquinas’s understanding 
of the nature of being—towards a more existential perspective.” Salas, “The Judgmental Character,” 131. 
Throughout his work, Fabro has attempted to bring together around the notion of participation this 
Platonic-exemplary element of Aquinas’s thought with his Aristotelian-actuality element. Against Geiger, 
he maintains that “participation by similitude” and “participation by composition,” the former more clearly 
reflected in the above passage, do not mark distinct modes of participation in Thomas’s thought, but a 
“Thomistic synthesis…which is the assimilation and mutual subordination of the couplets of act-potency 
and participatum-participans in the emergence of the new concept of esse” “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 469.  
62 And he argues further that God can be called “superesse” because he is not essentially the being in 
creatures. See In I Sent. d. 8, q.1. a 2. ad 1. 
 Creatures are through God, but he completely transcends creation and 
remains untouched in his perfect self-same identity. But, if we altogether remove God 
from the community of beings, insofar as they cannot formally share in his being, what 
formal principle explains their being?  
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      As we have discussed, Aquinas introduces esse to explain the existence of everything 
that is and to serve as the most fundamental ground of their actuality, which does not 
follow from their essential determinations alone.63
      The problem, however, concerns the status of this principle (either esse commune or a 
creature’s own act of being) and its existence.
 But what exactly is this principle of 
being? Is it some fund of being common to all creatures (esse commune) or an act of 
being belonging to each creature (actus essendi suum) and intrinsically attributable to it? 
Either solution has the advantage that the formal esse of creatures, or that which explains 
the fact that they are, is not God, thus avoiding the aforementioned heresy of pantheism.  
64 That is, even if we posit esse commune as 
a fund of existence accounting for the being of all beings (i.e., as the formal esse in which 
all beings participate and thereby are said to be), does such a fund subsist on its own or 
must it too participate in something other than itself (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens)? Unless 
it exists through itself (ipsum esse), an untenable position, it must have an account of its 
formal being, which merely displaces the original problem one step further down the 
explanatory line. The same is true of an actus essendi proper to each creature: does its 
own proper act of being exist through itself or another? And if through another, then what 
explains the actus essendi? Thus, we face the problem of being by extrinsic denomination 
raised above.65
      According to such extrinsic denomination, what explains the being of creatures is 
their participation in ipsum esse subsistens, just as, for example, “health” extrinsically 
denominates medicine or exercise insofar as each reflects the health of an animal (i.e., its 
 
                                                 
63 Such was the early recognition of De Ente and was further developed in other contexts of his corpus. 
64 Stephen Menn states the problem thusly: “Whenever X is a contingent being, X exists through the 
existence of X, which is something other than X. But the existence of X also exists. Does it exist through a 
further existence and so ad infinitum […]?” See Menn, “Metaphysics: God and Being,” 160.  
65 See Chapter III Section 3 above and Conclusion.  
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intrinsic denomination). Thus, what is most actual to any being is something extrinsic to 
it, and its most fundamental perfection is God. Such an account evacuates the explanatory 
power of esse as it indicates nothing about the thing and its existence, but instead refers 
to an extrinsic perfection. “Esse” thereby would no longer signify any intrinsic perfection 
of a being that distinguishes it from something lacking existence. On the other hand, and 
in agreement with essentialists such as Siger, Scotus, or Suarez, Aquinas could maintain 
that “esse” signifies nothing more than the causal status (i.e., fact of being) of an essence, 
namely “that is has been caused,” but such a move would be to deprive existentialism of 
any ground.66
                                                 
66 Fabro states: “But since the essence of a creature has also its own participated act of being (actus 
essendi), its actualization is not merely a relation of extrinsic dependence; rather, it is based on the act of 
esse in which it participates and which it preserves within itself and is the proper terminus of divine 
causality” “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 482. See also: “Nonetheless, Thomas hotly denies that the esse of 
creatures is God. God is not esse-in-general (esse commune): he is ‘just esse,’ but not all esse is God. Both 
God and esse-in-general are ‘esse without addition,’ but differently (q. 3, a. 4, ad 1) […]”  Menn, 
“Metaphysics: God and Being,” 161.  
  
      By looking further at the relation of esse commune and actus essendi to ipsum esse 
subsistens, and what explanatory power the former hold apart from the latter, we can find 
an answer to what Aquinas means by “participation in esse,” central to his account of 
creation. I will argue that without reference to the former, the latter relapses into 
essentialism whereby “esse” signifies nothing more than the thing itself without capturing 
a distinct extra-essential perfection. However, when reference is made to ipsum esse 
subsistens, the meaning of esse for creatures becomes eclipsed to the point of altogether 
undermining the original impetus for the existential turn. Thus, Aquinas faces this double 
bind of either relapsing into essentialism or depriving creatures of existential actuality.  
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Section 4: The Ambiguities of Participation in Esse  
      As has been seen, esse commune is the fullness of created being indifferent to any 
manner of being (modus essendi) in such a way that does not preclude such 
determinations as does ipsum esse subsistens.67 And yet, esse commune is nothing apart 
from its distinct members who participate being. In his argument dissociating ipsum esse 
subsistens from esse commune, Aquinas states that since all commonality exists only in 
the intellect and is derived from particular things, the multiple individuals of which it is 
predicated, then esse as the most common of all would only subsist in intellectu but not in 
re.68 Thus, if God who is his esse were esse commune, then he too would exist only in the 
intellect. Aquinas has already argued against such a conclusion, which would limit God’s 
esse to the intellect.69
      More than showing God to be something outside the intellect and not esse commune, 
this argument reveals the emptiness of esse commune as a principle by itself. Without 
ipsum esse subsistens as the efficient cause of its fund, and without those being to which 
 Aquinas here employs a moderate realism in order to argue that as 
common, esse commune has no subsistence of its own apart from its conception in 
intellecu, thus adding nothing in reality (in rerum natura) over and above the entia 
themselves. Beings (entia) logically participate in esse commune, but as something 
existing only in the intellect, esse commune does not contribute any extra perfection in 
addition to what the beings themselves already contain.  
                                                 
67 See ST I q. 3, a. 4, ad 1. 
68 “Adhuc. Quod est commune multis, non est aliquid praeter multa nisi sola ratione: sicut animal non est 
aliud praeter Socratem et Platonem et alia animalia nisi intellectu, qui apprehendit formam animalis 
expoliatam ab omnibus individuantibus et specificantibus; homo enim est quod vere est animal; alias 
sequeretur quod in Socrate et Platone essent plura animalia, scilicet ipsum animal commune, et homo 
communis, et ipse Plato. Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res 
existentes nisi in intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit esse commune, Deus non erit aliqua res nisi quae sit in 
intellectu tantum. Ostensum autem est supra Deum esse aliquid non solum in intellectu, sed in rerum 
natura. Non est igitur Deus ipsum esse commune omnium.” SCG I.26. 
69 See SCG I.11.  
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it is common, as itself nothing outside existing things (praeter omnes res existentes), esse 
commune does not provide a separate principle by which to account for the being of 
beings.70
      This seems to suggest that between esse commune and individual created beings, 
there can only be a “less-than-real” distinction insofar as the former does not exclude the 
latter determinations, but remains indifferent to them. Esse commune does not subsist on 
its own apart from various modi essendi (i.e., essential determinations), although in itself 
specifying no single mode in particular. Such specification comes from the divine 
intellect as the ground of exemplarity, having preordained the best possible order. The 
divine will, however, funds such an order with esse commune, with “commune” 
signifying the grounding of beings through creation and conservation, which allows for 
them to remain in presence, a dynamic act apprehensible only through judgment. Unlike 
with ipsum esse subsistens, which cannot be divided and can only be participated, if the 
 Admittedly, one finds Neoplatonic vestiges in Aquinas’s treatment of esse 
commune, as the first emanation following the One and itself a reality (hypostasis) apart 
from the multiplicity deriving from it. But despite such vestiges, esse commune does not 
subsist for Aquinas apart from its inherence in individual beings. The being’s 
participation in esse commune is only on the order of logical participation (e.g., Socrates 
in humanity), not adding existential perfection over and above essential determinations.  
                                                 
70 Some may argue that for us, an understanding of a creature’s participation in esse commune precedes an 
understanding of its participation in ipsum esse subsistens—even though per se the former depends on the 
latter. That is, an understanding of participation in esse commune is first in the order of discovery. 
Although this may be the case, without reference to a creature’s having been created, a reference to the 
existential plenitude of the giver of esse, “participation in esse” implies only logical participation, as a 
runner “participates” in to run. The understanding could not grasp what perfection had been added over-
and-above the already conceived essential perfections and array of possible accidents of a given substance. 
This move beyond essence, as argued above, can only be glimpsed by accounting for a creature not in 
terms of its essential determinations, but in terms of the order of efficient causes by which it has come to 
be, an account that ultimately terminates in a self-subsistence of being (ipsum esse subsistens). See Wippel, 
The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 117, 130-131; and “Metaphysics,” 98. See also Chapter I 
Sections 3-4, and Chapter II Section 1 above.  
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esse participated by creatures and signifying their actual existence means esse commune, 
then it seems that creatures need not really participate such esse at all. As we saw above 
with Siger of Brabant, at most one can speak of a logical participation in esse commune 
until esse has been shown to be a deeper existential perfection identifiable with ipsum 
esse subsistens, instead of the most extensive and abstract of all concepts.71
 […] quia nihil ponitur in genere secundum esse suum, sed ratione quidditatis suae; quod 
ex hoc patet, quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium, et distinctum ab esse cuiuslibet 
alterius rei; sed ratio substantiae potest esse communis: propter hoc etiam philosophus 
dicit, quod ens non est genus.
  
      If esse commune cannot be an independent source of causal actuality apart from the 
individual esse of each being, we must ask whether each being’s own intrinsic act of 
being instead serves as its formal esse. That would mean that each thing is through its 
own actus essendi. Even though such an act requires a cause outside itself, namely ipsum 
esse subsistens, for each being such an act accounts for that thing’s own being. And when 
Aquinas speaks of “participation in esse,” at least in part he means that a being 
participates in an act really distinct from its own essence, but an act with which it is 
composed and is proper to it.  
      One of the strongest claims for this reading can be found in the following passage 
where Aquinas seems to provide each thing with its own act of being. He states:  
72
The “esse” of which Aquinas here speaks is not the esse commune discussed above, and 
most certainly not the esse subsistens of God, but an act proper to each thing (esse 
uniuscuiusque est ei proprium) and distinct from the esse of others. This seems to suggest 
that each thing is distinguished from others according to its esse. Each thing has its own 
  
                                                 
71 See Chapter I Section 3 above. 
72 De Pot. q. 7, a. 3. resp. The question asks whether God is contained in a genus. As Aquinas argues 
further, because God is “being itself” he cannot be in a genus. 
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act of being and, in relation to this act, there is a proportionality to God: i.e., this being is 
to its actus essendi as God is to God’s actus essendi. Creatures do not directly imitate 
God—and thus analogy of similitude is not the primary mode of explaining creatures’s 
relation to God—but instead there is proportionality between their relation to their being, 
and God’s relation to God’s being. Thus, we could conclude that such an intrinsic act of 
being serves as the formal esse of each thing, thereby avoiding the aforementioned threat 
of identifying such formal esse with God.  
      This would mean that each thing enjoys its own act of being separate and distinct 
from every other thing, and more importantly distinct from God’s subsisting being. With 
the generation of each new substance, an accompanying act of being would follow. 
Likewise, with its corruption, its act of being would expire. Thus, in addition to the 
essential determinations that make possible each new substance, an existence proper to it 
must accompany its subsistence so that it can pass the threshold of nothingness. Such an 
act proper to each being thereby explains the formal being of everything that is. Each 
thing participates its own created esse by which it formally is able to be.73
                                                 
73 As with the passage from De Potentia, each being’s intrinsic actus essendi formally accounts for its 
being. In In I Sent. d. 29, q. 5, art. 2, resp., Aquinas again raises this issue of each thing having its own esse 
by which it formally is and which is diverse from the esse of other things. The explanatory “by which” of 
each thing’s being is predicated upon the one divine esse “by which” everything is. He states: “Respondeo 
dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ratio veritatis in duobus consistit: in esse rei, et in apprehensione virtutis 
cognoscitivae proportionata ad esse rei. Utrumque autem horum quamvis, ut dictum est, reducatur in Deum 
sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem; nihilominus tamen quaelibet res participat suum esse creatum, 
quo formaliter est [m.e.], et unusquisque intellectus participat lumen per quod recte de re judicat, quod 
quidem est exemplatum a lumine increato. Habet etiam intellectus suam operationem in se, ex qua 
completur ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod sicut est unum esse divinum quo omnia sunt, sicut a principio 
effectivo exemplari, nihilominus tamen in rebus diversis est diversum esse, quo formaliter res est; ita etiam 
est una veritas, scilicet divina, qua omnia vera sunt, sicut principio effectivo exemplari; nihilominus sunt 
plures veritates in rebus creatis, quibus dicuntur verae formaliter.” Thus, just as the light of each created 
intellect, by which it correctly judges concerning a thing (de re), is exemplified by the uncreated light, so 
too the created esse of each thing is exemplified by the one divine esse which is their cause. This means 
that each thing has its own act of being apart from the being of God.  See also SCG II.53. “In quocumque 
enim inveniuntur aliqua duo quorum unum est complementum alterius, proportio unius eorum ad alterum 
est sicut proportio potentiae ad actum: nihil enim completur nisi per proprium actum [m.e.]. In substantia 
autem intellectuali creata inveniuntur duo: scilicet substantia ipsa; et esse eius, quod non est ipsa substantia, 
 The stress on 
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“formally” places emphasis on each being having its own proper act of being by which it 
is, despite God standing as the ultimate source of all being (i.e., the efficient creative 
cause). Otherwise, it would depend formally on God’s incommunicable being and 
thereby either be God or not be at all.  
      The question remains that if each thing has its own esse, by which it formally is, 
diverse from the esse of other things, what explanatory power does “esse” hold as that 
which makes actual an actually existing thing?  If something’s “act of being” is meant to 
provide a formal account of something’s being anything at all, answering the question of 
what enables this individual to be, then we must ask what accounts for it? Thus, even if 
“act of being” were used to explain something’s “power of being” (virtus essendi), and 
served as the power by which something persists in act, a further issue needs to be 
addressed: does the power of being reside within creatures themselves and arise through 
their effective exchange with one another (i.e., generation and corruption) or must they 
appeal—even in their limited acts of being—to their unlimited source of creation and 
conservation? That is, can Aquinas uphold each thing’s actus essendi as a perfection 
proper to it as distinct from both its essence and its external efficient cause if such an act 
must arise outside the course of its natural causes through divine concurrence and be 
sustained by an influx of divine conservation?  
      The problem, it seems, is that something’s own intrinsic act of being cannot be called 
upon to account for its existential subsistence. Only God existentially subsists and 
everything else must have their subsistence enacted by God through creation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
ut ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse est complementum substantiae existentis: unumquodque enim actu est 
per hoc quod esse habet. Relinquitur igitur quod in qualibet praedictarum substantiarum sit compositio 
actus et potentiae.” Here he speaks of a substance’s own proper act of being, which completes the 
substance and with which it is composed.   
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conservation. Thus, to say “a creature exists through its intrinsic actus essendi” attributes 
some perfection to the constitution of the thing itself, which really belongs to it through 
an extrinsic relation of dependence to another (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). However, if 
by something’s “intrinsic act of being” Aquinas means only those acts something 
exercises of itself, then this need not mean anything beyond my exercise of the form 
human as distinct from your exercise of the form human, the two forms being enacted 
distinctly by two individuals although sharing in a common specific ratio. Such a reading 
would be consistent with the claim that forma dat esse insofar as my being results from 
my form and is distinct from your being resulting from your form. This reading also can 
be squared with the above-cited passage, in which Aquinas discusses that nothing is 
placed in a genus through its esse. What is missing from such an account is a distinct role 
for an intrinsic actus essendi as existentially distinct from each thing’s formal 
constitution.   
       The problem with maintaining the existentialist reading, which continues to reserve 
such an existentially irreducible act, as we will come to see more clearly, is that esse fails 
to pinpoint a distinct existential perfection in things beyond something’s formal 
constitution on the one hand and God’s conserving influence on the other. If each 
existing creature is like a marionette possessing its own formal constitution but ultimately 
tied to its actuating power through existential strings (i.e., the esse given in creation and 
preserved in conservation), to demarcate its own act of being somewhere between the 
formal structure of its essential makeup and the extrinsic power by which it is in act 
seems nebulous. Reference to a creature’s intrinsic act of being becomes superfluous 
insofar as it always misses its mark: either it targets the creature’s essential constitution 
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and thus says nothing of its actual existence or it appeals to the existential act which 
preserves the listless shade, not its own actus essendi but the actus primus et purus as 
participated. Thus, each thing lacks its own act and power of subsisting existentially, but 
extrinsically depends upon the sustaining act of another.  
     Without God’s abiding presence as part of the creation and conservation of every 
newly generated thing as a co-efficient cause, nature itself would retreat into the 
nothingness from which it emerges.74 In that same moment as God withdraws his 
presence, the being ceases to be. What this entails is that esse when applied to creatures 
signifies not an intrinsic power of being in beings, but an external influx of being, which 
allows and continues to allow creatures to “participate being.” “Nec aliter res in esse 
conservat, nisi inquantum eis continue influit esse.”75 Whatever esse commune and actus 
essendi suum may suggest in reference to a creature, “the primary import” of a creature’s 
being always references the source of existential influx and the primary referent of being, 
ipsum esse subsistens. This seems to follow from Aquinas’s definition of creation 
discussed above as a passive relation of dependence added to a creature, not an intrinsic 
act of its own.76
                                                 
74 On the question of conservation, see De Pot. q. 5, a. 1, resp. “Respondeo. Dicendum quod absque omni 
dubio concedendum est, quod res conservantur in esse a Deo, et quod in momento in nihilum redigerentur, 
cum a Deo desererentur. [...] Unde sequitur quod divina operatione cessante, omnes res eodem momento in 
nihilum deciderent, sicut auctoritatibus est probatum in argumentis sed contra.” The authority cited by 
Aquinas in the sed contra is Augustine (Genesis ad lit.) who argues that if the ruling power of God were 
withdrawn, the form of creatures would cease to be and all nature would collapse. See also John Wippel, 
“Thomas Aquinas on Creatures as Causes of Esse,” International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (June 2000): 
197-213. 
75  ST I, q. 104, a. 3, resp. 
76 See p. 278 above.  Also: “[...] in eo quod ab altero dependet, relatio realiter invenitur, in altero vero 
secundum rationem tantum [...] unde in ipsa creatione non importatur aliquis accessus ad esse, nec 
transmutatio a creante, sed solummodo inceptio essendi, et relatio ad creatorem a quo esse habet; et sic 
creatio nihil est aliud realiter quam relatio quaedam ad Deum cum novitate essendi.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 3, 
resp. 
 But as Fabro has argued, for example, while it is true that God operates 
immediately in every agent as its “grounding Act,” nevertheless Aquinas reserves a role 
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for the having-been-created and remaining-unannihilated creature as “an actuated act to 
the full extent of its metaphysical import.”77
      By returning to Aquinas’s metaphor of illumination as used to explain such existential 
inflowing or communication of the incommunicable act, perhaps existential metaphysics 
finds the clue for salvaging an adequate role for esse as distinct from either something’s 
formal constitution or its relation to an external efficient cause. Accordingly, the 
adveniens extra of esse captures a presencing or advent of being as happening between, 
and yet irreducible to, either beings themselves or the source of such coming-into-
presence. The process of creation and conservation as an influx of being operates 
similarly as physical illumination wherein light—as distinct from either its source or its 
object—opens the space in which objects appear. Along such lines, esse can be viewed as 
really other than either its eminent source or its formal recipient, but requiring both a 
cause by which it is given and a virtual object in which it can be received. Such a 
metaphor helps to avoid a reification of esse as a third something between God and 
creatures, for example, as was the case with Giles of Rome’s “reading” (or misreading) of 
Aquinas. Such reification of esse is at least in part responsible for a relapse into a 
metaphysics of substance (i.e., essentialism). Esse in reference to creatures can retain its 
dynamism only once the giving of being is thought in terms irreducible to either the giver 
or the recipient, that is as neither a static part of the latter’s constitution nor an extension 
 Such an extent of metaphysical import is 
exactly what remains in question and must be addressed presently.  
                                                 
77 “Esse is the act that constitutes the proper terminus of transcendent causality (creation, conservation) and 
it is by virtue of this direct causality of esse that God operates immediately in every agent. Hence the 
derivation of participated esse from the esse per essentiam is direct, and along strict metaphysical lines, as 
grounded act from grounding Act. In fact, the participated actus essendi, precisely as participated, is 
intrinsically dependent on God. But once it has been created, and as long as it is not being annihilated, it 
remains an actuated act to the full extent of its metaphysical import. It belongs therefore to God to be the 
cause of esse by virtue of his very nature.” “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 474.  
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of the former’s over-abundant actuality. Instead, creation is the opening (initium) of the 
world as an ordered totality of beings whose being is their varied acts of participation in 
and dependence upon the first; or to cash out our metaphor, their borrowed luminosity 
insofar as they refract the light of another.  
      The central issue that we have been following throughout this chapter is how to 
understand creation as participation in being (esse) in a way that neither deprives 
creatures of a real act of being nor communicates God’s own being to creatures. 
Although Aquinas often discusses a creature’s participation in esse commune and also its 
own actus essendi, without an appeal to ipsum esse subsistens, or to invoke Fabro’s terms 
the “grounding Act,” such participation remains existentially vacuous: To speak of a 
creature’s participation in its own actus essendi formalizes such an act, making it really 
identical to a substance’s essential perfection; whereas to speak of its participation in esse 
commune renders esse void, insofar as such communality contributes nothing over and 
above the beings themselves. In thinking together these three elements of participation in 
terms of the metaphor of illumination, however, we can appreciate the distinctly 
existential element of the created universe, or “world,” as the irreducible space wherein 
beings emerge as determined by an essential intelligibility. But how far can this metaphor 
go in sustaining an existential reading that does not collapse a creature’s esse into “the 
borrowed light of another?”       
      If the existential reading of Aquinas is to hold, esse must be thought as an act in the 
verbal sense, and not a state in the adjectival or participial sense. As both Gilson and 
Fabro have taken pains to show, a static conception of esse petrifies the dynamic activity 
into an extension of the substance itself, failing to capture being-in-act at the core of 
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every being differentiating it from mere essential possibilities.78
      As has been discussed, the metaphor of illumination often serves to buttress 
Aquinas’s explanation of the diffusion of esse to creatures. As early as De Ente, we 
encountered Aquinas’s use of this metaphor as a means of explaining that which happens 
upon something from outside its essence and thus is received in an accidental (i.e., 
incidental) way. And, as the metaphor suggests, beings reflect the radiance of divine 
being and yet themselves do not possess such. This seems to leave creatures with little in 
the way of “ontological density” apart from God.
 And yet, does Aquinas’s 
metaphor of illumination allot enough dynamism of act to creatures themselves or do 
they remain mere reflections of their grounding Act? 
 
Section 5: The Illumining Light of Being 
79 However, Gilson assures us that such 
errors of misrepresentation, although numerous, are misguided: “Thomistic philosophy, 
in which the creature is nothing and does nothing without God, is set off against any 
teaching which would refuse to confer upon second causes the full share of being and 
efficacy to which they are entitled.”80
      In discussing the conservation of being by God in Summa Theologiae as part of the 
special effects of divine government, Aquinas introduces the example of air being 
illuminated by the light of the sun.
 Thus, we must address whether Aquinas allots a 
full share of being to secondary causes who reflect God’s perfect share.  
81
                                                 
78 One point to note is that although Siger agrees that esse signifies the act, while ens signifies the habit, the 
two are not really distinct.  
79 For the use of this term, see Stephen L. Brick, review of Participation and Substantiality in Thomas 
Aquinas, by Rudi A. Te Velde, Acta Philosophica 8 (1999): 178.  
80 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 181. 
 Light, when received by the air, does not enter into 
81 In response to the question of whether God conserves creatures in being, Aquinas answers in the 
affirmative. He beings by discussing cases of univocal causation, whereby one thing is the cause of 
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the nature of the air itself, as if air were on its way to becoming a source of light. Instead, 
light is “participated” by the air so long as the source of illumination has not withdrawn 
its causal influence.82
                                                                                                                                                 
another’s becoming (i.e., this thing becoming that thing), but not of the cause of its being. If it were the 
cause of the effect’s being (e.g., a human), then it would be cause of its form (and not just its becoming that 
form), and thereby causa sui. In natural generation, when one human begets another human, the parent is 
only the cause of the child’s becoming human, which allows the child (in being human) to survive its 
parents. Or in the case of artificial generation, the material becomes a building through the builder, but does 
not require her to conserve it being. With a cause of being, however, the cessation of the cause entails the 
cessation of the effect. Because hot water is hot according to the same ratio as its cause, whereas 
illuminated air merely participates the light of the sun (i.e., its cause) according to a different and lesser 
ratio, water retains heat with the cessation of fire whereas air instantly passes back into darkness. The latter 
exemplifies the case of with divine conservation of being. If God were to withhold his conserving influence 
(i.e., continual influx of being), creatures would become nothing. As Aquinas states:  “Sed aliquando 
effectus non est natus recipere impressionem agentis secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in 
agente, sicut patet in omnibus agentibus quae non agunt simile secundum speciem; sicut caelestia corpora 
sunt causa generationis inferiorum corporum dissimilium secundum speciem. Et tale agens potest esse 
causa formae secundum rationem talis formae, et non solum secundum quod acquiritur in hac materia, et 
ideo est causa non solum fiendi, sed essendi. Sicut igitur fieri rei non potest remanere, cessante actione 
agentis quod est causa effectus secundum fieri; ita nec esse rei potest remanere, cessante actione agentis 
quod est causa effectus non solum secundum fieri, sed etiam secundum esse. Et haec est ratio quare aqua 
calefacta retinet calorem, cessante actione ignis; non autem remanet aer illuminatus, nec ad momentum, 
cessante actione solis. Quia scilicet materia aquae susceptiva est caloris ignis secundum eandem rationem 
qua est in igne, unde si perfecte perducatur ad formam ignis, retinebit calorem semper; si autem imperfecte 
participet aliquid de forma ignis secundum quandam inchoationem, calor non semper remanebit, sed ad 
tempus, propter debilem participationem principii caloris. Aer autem nullo modo natus est recipere lumen 
secundum eandem rationem secundum quam est in sole, ut scilicet recipiat formam solis, quae est 
principium luminis, et ideo, quia non habet radicem in aere, statim cessat lumen, cessante actione solis. Sic 
autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum, sicut aer ad solem illuminantem. Sicut enim sol est lucens per 
suam naturam, aer autem fit luminosus participando lumen a sole, non tamen participando naturam solis; ita 
solus Deus est ens per essentiam suam, quia eius essentia est suum esse; omnis autem creatura est ens 
participative, non quod sua essentia sit eius esse. Et ideo, ut Augustinus dicit IV super Gen. ad Litt., virtus 
Dei ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si cessaret aliquando, simul et illorum cessaret species, omnisque 
natura concideret. Et in VIII eiusdem libri dicit quod, sicut aer praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo 
sibi praesente, illuminatur, absente autem, continuo tenebratur.” ST I, q. 104, a. 1, resp. 
 Since the light does not have “root in the air” (radicem in aere), 
82 Aquinas argues that light is not the substantial form of the sun because what is the substantial form of 
one thing cannot be the accidental form of another. Although it may seem that light is not really a quality of 
illuminated air, but instead merely something with intentional being, Aquinas argues otherwise. Thus light 
is not the substantial form of the sun, but a quality following upon the substantial form, just as heat is an 
active quality (but not the substantial form) of fire. Although light does not remain in air once its source has 
withdrawn, nevertheless light is a quality of air. The difference between such a quality that temporarily 
remains (e.g., heat in water) and one that vanishes immediately upon the withdrawal of its source concerns 
the mode in which the subject receives a quality: sometimes its matter perfectly receives the substantial 
form, and then the qualities consequent upon such a form are firmly rooted (firmiter stabilitur etiam 
qualitas consequens formam); sometimes the matter receives the substantial form imperfectly, and, before 
the patient returns to its natural state (e.g., water to cold), the qualities (e.g., heat) of the substantial form 
follow; and sometimes the matter is not transmuted toward the substantial form at all (e.g., light in air), and 
thus the qualities immediately disappear when the cause recedes.  See ST I. q. 67, a. 3, resp and ad 1. His 
discussion of matter in reference to conservation of being in De Potentia (q. 5, a. 1, resp.) verges on 
thinking of the power of matter yet stops short. He argues that matter can be in a disposition unsuitable to 
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when the action of the sun ceases, the air returns to darkness. Water or iron, for example, 
can receive heat according to the same ratio as their cause and remain hot for some time 
after the cause ceases, returning to their original states due only to their matter. In the 
case of illuminated air, however, it requires the continual influx of light in order to 
remain illuminated, never possessing light according to the same ratio as its cause. Due 
to the claritas of the cause, its perfection cannot be communicated univocally. Likewise, 
creatures, apart from a continual influx of divine conservation, relapse into the 
nothingness from which they first emerged and against which they are continually 
measured. Their being (esse) amounts to—if we may borrow Aquinas’s own illuminative 
analogy—a reflection of being, a reflection, that is, of the conserving influence of divine 
power without which beings would expire, retreating into the darkness at their root.  
      Lacking a root in being, creatures remain existentially groundless. Thus, when a 
creature comes to be (e.g., when a human is generated), in addition to its cause of 
becoming, it also requires a cause of being, which “holds it in being” (tenet in esse). 
Thus, Aquinas argues, although creatures offer a real formal contribution to the act 
according to what they are (i.e., omne agens agit sibi simile), that is, they inherit their 
essential actuality from their particular causes, God must be at work in every being as the 
universal cause of all being to ensure its existential conservation. God is most intimate to 
every being because insofar as esse is the ground of all other perfections and yet 
                                                                                                                                                 
form. He goes on, however, to maintain that it will then require something to transmute it, thereby 
preparing it for the reception of a form.  What is interesting to note, both with this physical example of 
illumination and the metaphysical example of conservation, is the conspicious absense of materiality in the 
explanation. Aquinas merely states that air is not made (natus est) to receive the light of the sun according 
to its complete ratio. Likewise, to restate another example, he does not explain why the sun melts wax, but 
heats clay. The diversity must find ground in the character of matter, which, however, Aquinas only treats 
as an empty receptical of forms, possessing no power of its own. Its inability to receive the complete form 
of light, we are meant to assume, is because it falls short of the agent’s perfection.  Nowhere does matter 
take on a power of its own either to endure or to resist the reception of such forms; instead, such a failed 
production is ascribed to the inferiority of the patient, its inability to reach the superiority of its cause. 
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something that can never be communicated to or shared by any creature, the withdrawal 
of the existential ground would return beings to their root of nothingness.83 Just as for the 
becoming visible of any particular color, the sun must give and conserve (dat et 
conservat) light as the universal cause of light, so too as the abiding cause of being, if 
God withdrew his conservation, the effect would expire. Instead its very presencing and 
remaining in presence requires conservation of being, which serves as a concurring cause 
in all particular acts of generation.84
      What is given in giving being (dans esse) is not some operating power (virtutem 
operandi) entrusted to the community of beings at the beginning of creation (a principio), 
and then left unattended. Conservation means not only that God does not interfere with 
the procession of nature (i.e., conservation per accidens), but actively and immediately 
imparts esse to each being for the duration of its being (i.e., conservation per se). Like the 
power for self-illumination, being is an act fundamentally other to the nature of any 
being, and thus cannot be imparted to it, but requires a sustained influx. God thus 
conserves creatures in being and applies them to act, dispensing them toward the end of 
 
                                                 
83 “[…] considerandum est quod Deus movet non solum res ad operandum, quasi applicando formas et 
virtutes rerum ad operationem, sicut etiam artifex applicat securim ad scindendum, qui tamen interdum 
formam securi non tribuit; sed etiam dat formam creaturis agentibus, et eas tenet in esse. Unde non solum 
est causa actionum inquantum dat formam quae est principium actionis, sicut generans dicitur esse causa 
motus gravium et levium; sed etiam sicut conservans formas et virtutes rerum; prout sol dicitur esse causa 
manifestationis colorum, inquantum dat et conservat lumen, quo manifestantur colores. Et quia forma rei 
est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa 
ipsius esse universalis in rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus; sequitur quod Deus in 
omnibus intime operetur.” ST I, q. 105, a. 5, resp. 
84 “[...] et non solum est causa quantum ad fieri rerum, sed et quantum ad totum esse et durationem, quod 
manifestat cum dicit: et a nullo existentium recedit: aedificatore enim recedente, domus remanet, quia est 
causa domus quantum ad fieri et non quantum ad esse, sed si Deus ab effectu recederet, effectus non 
remaneret, quia est causa ipsius esse.” De Div. Nom. Cap. V, Lec. 1 631.  
 316 
all their action, which is God himself (“...conservat eas in esse, et applicat eas ad 
agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dictum est”).85
      Like being visible, being itself is an act distinct from its object (i.e., beings) and is 
made possible by an external influx, which cannot be simply given to its recipient but 
requires an abiding presence. Air requires an abiding presence of light to sustain its 
luminosity, and so too, Aquinas argues, beings requires the abiding presence of God to 
sustain their being.
 
86 And yet, if the metaphor of illumination is meant to explain what 
that esse is proper to “really existing beings” and distinguishing them from mere 
possibilities, Aquinas comes dangerously close to making their esse the inhering presence 
of God. If God must be present to each thing (“Deus adsit ei”) according to its mode of 
being, as Aquinas states, then it seems that God himself is that which is adveniens extra 
to its essence. This is because insofar as esse most fundamentally inheres in all things as 
that which is received by all things (i.e., receivers) as the act of all acts, even their forms, 
esse is that by which such things exist as the most foundational or grounding of all acts.87
                                                 
85 “Praeterea, faciens dicitur esse causa operationis facti, inquantum dat ei formam qua operatur. Si igitur 
Deus est causa operationis rerum factarum ab ipso, hoc erit inquantum dat eis virtutem operandi. Sed hoc 
est a principio, quando rem facit. Ergo videtur quod ulterius non operetur in creatura operante.” ST I, q. 
105, a. 5, arg. 3. “Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in 
esse, et applicat eas ad agendum, et est finis omnium actionum, ut dictum est.” ST I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 3.  
86 See Aquinas’s response to the question of whether God is in all things. He states: “Respondeo dicendum 
quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest 
ei in quod agit. Oportet enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute illud 
contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit 
ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est 
proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, 
sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quandiu aer illuminatus manet. 
Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. Esse 
autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale 
respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et 
intime.” ST I, q. 8, a. 1, resp.  
 
87 “[...] dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil 
enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam 
ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis sicut receptum ad 
recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut 
formale et receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.” ST I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.  Here, insofar as 
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And from this Aquinas concludes that God is in all things and most intimate to them 
(“Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime”), which seems to make God 
himself the being of creatures. Such an agent becomes more intimate to each recipient 
than the recipient itself, becoming little more than a medium of reflection. 
      As reflections of ipsum esse subsistens, however, creatures are able to imitate being, 
to be like being, but are not able to actually be. Unable to subsist apart from divine 
conservation, the actual existence of creatures is the way in which their forms attract and 
refract (i.e., borrow) another’s sustaining light. As we have seen, Aquinas is careful not 
to make God the formal esse of creatures. God’s essence remains uncommunicated and 
unparticipated.88
The diminished, parasitic esse of creatures consists in their being somehow related to 
God; but, likewise, the diminished, parasitic esse of a fictive being, say a goatstag, 
 And yet, that similitude of divine being participated by creatures does 
not reference an intrinsic act by which they are, but merely their relation to an extrinsic 
source of sustenance. Although God is not the esse of creatures essentially, but only 
causally, the explanatory work left over for esse commune or a creature’s own actus 
essendi (i.e., in explaining the act by which a creature is) becomes vacuous. For a 
creature to exist (i.e., as a similitude of being) means that it is held in being by God 
because esse can never take root in or belong to a creature.   
      This mimetic posture of existing, however, turns out to be very much like the posture 
by which fictions imitate actual things. Although referencing Henry of Ghent’s 
equivocity of being, Stephen Menn’s apt statement fits just as well with Aquinas’s 
reduction of creatures to mere similitudes of being. Menn states:  
                                                                                                                                                 
addressing a question concerning divine perfection and responding to an objection that holds esse to be 
most imperfect (i.e., most common and receptive of everything else), Aquinas clearly means “ipsum esse 
subsistens.”   
88 See, for example, the discussion of In div. nom., cap. 2 lect. 3. 158 at p. 195 above.  
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consists in its being somehow related to creatures (to a goat and a stag, or to the mind that 
imagines it). What is remarkable about God, though, is that he can give real esse to the 
objects he creates, where a human mind gives only fictive esse to the objects it 
imagines.89
Aquinas’s account of esse as that which distinguishes something in re from a mere 
conception in intellectu fails to posit a distinct perfection in creatures whereby they 
appear as something distinct from their fictional counterparts. The difference between a 
merely “possible” being and an actual being, according to Aquinas, is that the entirety of 
the former’s being is derived from the power of another.
  
90
                                                 
89 See Menn, “Metaphysics,” 163. The real and fictive being of creatures (and even virtually possible 
beings, we may add)—for example, my dog, a phoenix, and my not-yet-conceived offspring—turns out not 
to be a fundamental distinction, but due to different types of derivation. All three cases resemble the true 
sense of being (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens) and stand in analogical relation to it. Obviously, my dog, unlike 
a phoenix or my future offspring, is out there in the world, and not merely an object conceived in the mind, 
as an object of either logical or virtual possibility. 
90 ST I, q. 9, a. 2, resp.  
 Before creation, possibles 
derive the entirety of their being from the divine intellect, but after creation, created 
intellects can also give them being (e.g., my understanding of the essence “phoenix”). In 
either case, they are beings only by extrinsic denomination because they rely on the 
power of another. Thus, if esse is meant to explain the “what more?” of actual beings, 
and yet creatures never emerge from out of the shadow of the influx of divine power, 
then it seems that actual beings are also beings only by extrinsic denomination. Granted, 
possibles derive their being from the divine intellect alone whereas actual beings have a 
relation to the influx of the divine will (i.e., creation and conservation), but structurally 
both are cases of being by extrinsic denomination because in neither case does being 
designate anything intrinsic to the creature itself. Much like the air’s illumination refers 
to the power of the sun (i.e., that power in which it participates), to speak of something’s 
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esse, we are already referencing that extrinsic power by which it is able to receive such a 
perfection, “a quo esse habet.”  
      Instead of merely consigning Aquinas’s understanding of esse to an existential 
metaphysics that blends a creature’s most fundamental actuality with the power of 
another acting upon it (i.e., that makes its highest perfection an extrinsic relation to 
another), making the perfection of all perfections an extrinsic relation of dependence to 
another, it seems that instead we should understand the “existential incident” only as a 
certain moment in the opening of being (initium essendi), a moment overcome by 
essential tendencies of each actual being. This means granting both the form of 
something, which gives to it the being it has (dat esse), but also the external efficient 
cause, which creates and conserves such a form (i.e., God). Such a reading, however, 
does not require an additional existential principle, which would provide an actus essendi 
distinct from either something’s essential constitution or its conserving efficient cause.  
      As Aquinas explains, the form of each thing gives being (dat esse) to that being.91
                                                 
91 To the claim that esse follows form in creatures, Aquinas responds: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod 
esse per se consequitur formam creaturae, supposito tamen influxu Dei: sicut lumen sequitur diaphanum 
aeris, supposito influxu solis. Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, 
magis est in Deo, qui potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.” 
ST I, q. 104, a. 1, ad 1.  
 For 
any creature’s form to give being to it, for this to be human or that to be platypus, God 
must actively conserve (i.e., not annihilate) such a form. Being results for each creature 
consequent upon its form (esse per se consequitur formam creaturae), supposing, 
however, the influence of divine action, just as light follows the diaphanous nature of air 
following the influence of the sun. Thus the actus essendi suum follows the form of each 
creature and is proper to each thing (quia esse uniuscuiusque est ei proprium) and distinct 
from the esse that is God. Despite functioning like a real (i.e., more than intentional) 
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quality or property, like light in the air, esse does not belong to the nature of creatures 
whereby they could exercise it on their own once the source has withdrawn itself. The 
forms of creatures are real and so is their conservation, but the identification of a further, 
extra-formal existential actuality remains unnecessary. 
      In response to the objection that certain necessary creatures (i.e., spiritual creatures 
and celestial bodies) do not require conservation, insofar as their nature “keeps them from 
departing” (ne abscedat), Aquinas objects, but not on the existential grounds one might 
suspect. Being (esse), he argues, results from the form of a creature, but only given the 
influence of divine action. Thus, there is divine action resulting in a created form that 
gives being (dat esse) to a substance. What is left out of this account, however, is a 
distinct act of being for the creature. Even “the power not to be” in necessary beings 
reflects the power of God to withdraw his influence instead of a separate actus essendi 
proper to the creature. Thus, between the form of creatures and its external cause, there 
remains no explanatory justification for a separate actus essendi.  
      There is the static condition of its essence and the external conserving activity of its 
cause, but apart from the form of each thing, “esse” indicates nothing more than a 
reflection of the latter’s activity, the thing’s refraction of an external activity. Aquinas 
addresses the claim that because everything has a natural appetite to conserve its 
existence, and a natural appetite cannot be null and void, a thing must be able to conserve 
its esse through itself. But he responds that such an appetite for conservation must be the 
desire for another’s actuality:  “[...] quod licet quaelibet res naturaliter appetat sui 
conservationem, non tamen quod a se conservetur, sed a sua causa.”92
                                                 
92 De Pot. q. 5, a. 1, ad 13.  
 Thus, to speak of 
“something’s esse,” reference is made either to that extrinsic source by which (a sua 
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causa) it remains in being or to its form which gives it the being it has. The explanatory 
power of actus essendi suum by itself is a surd, voiceless in indicating the perfective act 
by which a creature emerges from and withstands a retreat back into sheer nothingness.  
      In the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas takes up this question of conservation around 
the necessity imparted to non-contingent creatures (i.e., creatures incapable of generation 
and corruption).93 Although he argues nothing is owed (debitum) to creatures and all 
things depend upon the gratuitousness of the divine will, necessity can be imparted to 
certain creatures according to God’s indebtedness to his own purposes; that is, he freely 
bestows certain creatures with necessity in order to fulfill the ends of the universe.94 Such 
necessity is not owed to creatures according to an essential economy (e.g., the derived 
necessity of Avicennian emanation), but given to them through the free act of creation 
and sustained through conservation, or the active act of not-annihilating. A necessary 
thing, Aquinas argues, can have a cause of its necessity (i.e., creation and conservation) 
and still be necessary.95
                                                 
93 SCG II. 30-31. 
94 For the argument against a dueness or debt, see SCG II.28-29. For a further discussion of the language of 
“indebtedness” in Aquinas’s account of creation, see Section 3 of Chapter VI below.  
 The meaning of “esse,” as can be gleaned from the fact that 
95 I have preferred the term “incidental” to “contingent” with respect to esse because of the usage of the 
latter term throughout Aquinas’s corpus. That is, immaterial beings are incidental (at least at the decisive 
moment of creation in which outright nothingness and subsequent annihilation is possible) even if not 
contingent. In terms of Aquinas’s understanding of the pair necessity/contingent, Kenny argues that in 
regard to the third way Aquinas adopts an understanding of necessity as incorruptibility, unlike his earlier 
understanding along more Avicennian lines as impossible not to be. With regard to the latter, only God is 
included and thus everything else is in some sense contingent. Kenny states: “Guy Jalbert has shown that at 
the time of writing the contra Gentiles Aquinas was converted by the reading of Averroes to a doctrine of 
necessity different from that of Avicenna. Henceforth he defined necessity not in terms of essence and 
existence, but in terms of unalterability, following Aristotle’s definition of the necessary as that which 
cannot be otherwise (Metaphysics Δ 1015a 34). In this sense something is necessarily the case if it cannot 
cease to be the case, and a being has necessary existence if it cannot cease to exist (ScG II, 30). Since 
Aquinas believed that the heavenly bodies, the human soul, and the angels were all naturally incapable of 
ceasing to exist, he was henceforth prepared to say that their existence was necessary and to call them 
necessary beings…” Anthony Kenny. The Five Ways, 48.  Note that with such necessary beings as the 
heavenly bodies, the human soul, and the angels, that they are naturally unable not to exist. In terms of 
supernatural conservation, however, God could have decided to annihilate them, which means that they are 
“incidental.” Below, I explore the lingering incidentality with respect to annihilation and ask whether 
 322 
necessary beings cannot cease to exist, need only indicate the factual status of the 
essence, not an extra-essential act of existence. As this argument reveals, Aquinas can 
grant both that form gives esse and also that such forms have been caused (i.e., created 
and conserved) without needing to introduce an additional existential principle to explain 
each being’s actus essendi as distinct from either its form or from God’s causal activity.     
      According to this argument, the esse eius—or the actus essendi proper to each 
thing—differs between necessary creatures (i.e., the intelligences, the soul, and the 
heavenly bodies), whose actuality need not conquer the contrariety of hylic materiality, 
and contingent hylomorphic beings, whose forms do not fulfill the total potency of their 
matter, but instead remain open to contrariety. In hylomorphic beings, which lack a 
necessitas essendi, their virtus essendi follows from their form’s victory over and 
subjugation of matter. Thus, its power of being (virtus essendi) is limited by its 
materiality, thus necessitating its ultimate corruption.96 In separate substances, which 
contain no potency to not-being insofar as their forms are always able to be, or in 
heavenly bodies, whose forms equal the perfection of their ethereal matter, they are 
always in virtute essendi through their form, according to which they exist in act (“per 
eam res actu existent”).97
                                                                                                                                                 
God’s resolution to create a universe in which nothing will be annihilated “covers over” or “neutralized” 
the incidentality to which the existential Thomists appeal. See Chapter VI Section 3 below. For an 
existential reading of such matters, see Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 163-167. 
96 Gilson rejects this equation of “actus essendi” with “virtus essendi” insofar as in the latter such virtus is 
measured by and corresponds with formal intensity and does not capture the extra-essential actus essendi. 
 In both cases, “the full extent of its metaphysical import,” to 
97 “Ex his autem principiis, secundum quod sunt essendi principia, tripliciter sumitur necessitas absoluta in 
rebus. Uno quidem modo, per ordinem ad esse eius  cuius sunt. Et quia materia, secundum id quod est, ens 
in potentia est; quod autem potest esse, potest etiam et non esse: ex ordine materiae necessario res aliquae 
corruptibiles existunt; sicut animal quia ex contrariis compositum est, et ignis quia eius materia est 
contrariorum susceptiva. Forma autem, secundum id quod est, actus est: et per eam res actu existunt. Unde 
ex ipsa provenit necessitas ad esse in quibusdam. Quod contingit vel quia res illae sunt formae non in 
materia: et sic non inest ei potentia ad non esse, sed per suam formam semper sunt in virtute essendi; sicut 
est in substantiis separatis. Vel quia formae earum sua perfectione adaequant totam potentiam materiae, ut 
sic non remaneat potentia ad aliam formam, nec per consequens ad non esse: sicut est in corporibus 
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reference Fabro’s phrase, which a being has in the actus or virtus essendi proper to it, 
does not reflect some really distinct existential actuality, but instead the mere fact of 
substantial being, a fact determined by its form. Forma dat esse.  
     The forms of necessary beings are impervious to corruption, and thus do not tend 
toward not-being (i.e., corruption) as do the forms of hylomorphic beings, which must 
overcome and conquer the material element through which they are realized. In his 
Commentary on the Liber De Causis, adopting the language of the Proclus, Aquinas even 
refers to such necessary beings as “beingly beings” (enter or existenter ens) or those 
which steadfastly abide in being (esse stans).98 Nevertheless, despite their steadfast 
abidance, they require the conservational influx of another’s power. If they did not, then 
they would be beings per se (i.e., they would have esse through their essence), which, as 
we have seen, Aquinas argues is impossible.99
                                                                                                                                                 
caelestibus. In quibus vero forma non complet totam potentiam materiae, remanet adhuc in materia potentia 
ad aliam formam. Et ideo non est in eis necessitas essendi, sed virtus essendi consequitur in eis victoriam 
formae super materia: ut patet in elementis et elementatis. Forma enim elementi non attingit materiam 
secundum totum eius posse: non enim fit susceptiva formae elementi unius nisi per hoc quod subiicitur 
alteri parti contrarietatis. Forma vero mixti attingit materiam secundum quod disponitur per determinatum 
modum mixtionis. Idem autem subiectum oportet esse contrariorum et mediorum omnium, quae sunt ex 
commixtione extremorum. Unde manifestum est quod omnia quae vel contrarium habent vel ex contrariis 
sunt, corruptibilia sunt. Quae autem huiusmodi non sunt, sempiterna sunt: nisi per accidens corrumpantur, 
sicut formae quae non subsistunt sed esse earum est per hoc quod insunt materiae.” SCG II. 30.  
98 “His igitur praemissis sciendum est quod haec propositio in libro Procli LXXXVIII invenitur sub his 
verbis: Omne enter, vel existenter, ens aut ante aeternitatem est, aut in aeternitate, aut participans 
aeternitate. Dicitur autem enter ens per oppositum ad mobiliter ens, sicut esse stans dicitur per oppositum 
ad moveri; per quod datur intelligi quid est quod in hoc libro dicitur omne esse superius, quia scilicet est 
supra motum et tempus.” Super lib. De cau. Prop. II. I borrow the translation offered by Guagliardo, et al. 
See St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo, O.P., Charles 
R. Hess, O.P., and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 
15. 
99 See, for example, De Pot. q. 5, a. 2, resp. 
 Granted, the forms of both necessary and 
contingent beings must be produced by an extrinsic efficient cause. Nevertheless, “esse” 
denotes only the result (i.e., necessity or contingency) following from something’s form 
once it has been produced by its cause. Form gives being (forma dat esse) to creatures, 
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necessity in the case of those beings that need not conquer a recalcitrant material in order 
to reach essential per-fection and contingency in the case of those beings that do.100
      Aquinas again returns to the insight that forma dat esse, even though not denying that 
formae are caused by God.
  
101
                                                 
100 On this matter, Fabro states: “Thus the authentic notion of Thomistic participation calls for 
distinguishing esse as act not only from essence which is its potency, but also from existence which is the 
fact of being and hence a ‘result’ rather than a metaphysical principle” Fabro, “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 
470. The difference, which reflects my discussion, is the distinct contribution of esse as a principle rather 
than the mere outcome of essential determination. Gilson, for example, also distinguishes between “the 
state of actual existence,” which is reducible to essence (i.e., the actually existing essence) and “the act of 
being,” which is the proper sense of esse. He states: “Existence may mean either a state or an act. In the 
first sense, it means the state in which a thing is posited by the efficacy of an efficient or a creative cause, 
and this is the meaning the word receives in practically all the Christian theologies outside Thomism, 
particularly those of Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, Scotus, and Suarez. In a second sense, existence (esse, 
to be) points out the interior act, included in the composition of substance, in virtue of which the essence is 
a ‘being,’ and this is the properly Thomistic meaning of the word.” Elements of Christian Philosophy, 130-
131. Further: “To understand this doctrine in its proper nature, it is necessary to remember that esse, like 
every verb, designates an act and not a state. The state in which the esse places that which receives it is the 
state of ens, that is to say, of that which is a ‘being.’” Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, 34. In response to Fabro and Gilson, both of whom argue that the principle “forma dat esse” does 
not compromise the radical distinction between the order of form/essence and the order of actual existence, 
Te Velde argues against such an “existential” reading. Although the form cannot be the cause of itself and 
thus cannot give being in the sense of being its own efficient cause, but requires God to continually give 
being to it, Te Velde suggests that such a principle should be understood to mean only that the form itself is 
something’s determinate act of being, not that a separate extra-formal act of being is required. Form is not 
the same as being in the sense that it is not the ultimate act of being, which is reserved for a single being 
(i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). Rudi Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden: 
E.J. Brill, 1995), 218. Further, he argues: “The more a form is what it is, that is, the more it participates in 
being, the greater its unity, in the sense that it comprehends all the lower and divided forms in a higher 
(more unified) unity.” Ibid., 253. Thus, the existential import of any being is derived from its form. See 
also Dewan, “Etienne Gilson,” 86-87. He too rejects Gilson’s distinction between “an act of being” and the 
essence in “a state of actual existence.”   
101 In terms of esse as being the existential actuality of all act, cf. “This text has become famous for the 
almost lyrical tone in which being is declared to be most perfect of all. It sounds like a eulogy of being; 
being is the actuality of all acts, the perfection of all perfections. It is one of the rare places where Thomas 
tries to explain how he thinks being should be understood. In all its lucidity and transparency this text 
requires a careful interpretation. It is by no means immediately clear what Thomas means by an unusual 
formulation like ‘the actuality of all acts.’ In the literature one often finds these expressions being quoted 
rather enthusiastically without their logical structure being analyzed and without an explanation why being 
should be understood in this way.” Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, 197. He 
goes on to state that: “Being is not the same as actual existence by which the essence is posited outside its 
causes. I think the meaning of the formula ‘actuality of all acts’ should be taken quite literally. Being is the 
actualitas—a similar expression as humanitas—that is, the common ‘form’ of all acts/forms signified as 
such, the form of act by which all acts are in fact acts.” Ibid., 198-199. Being is the most formal of all 
forms because it is the actuality of the essence. 
 And certain forms, once caused, take on a necessity of 
being. Once God has decided to create and conserve the intelligences, which Aquinas 
argues are required for the perfection of the universe such that the universe as a whole 
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“return to its principle” (SCG II.46), their immaterial forms give them necessary being. 
As Aquinas states, they lack the potency to “non-being,” but instead they enjoy a 
necessity of being through their immaterial forms.102
      Once again, what must be noted is the role attributed by Aquinas to form. Form gives 
being (dat esse) to beings. This is not to deny that God must conserve such forms as an 
external efficient cause, but once he has decided to sustain such an order—in other 
words, to normalize the operations of the universe—things have being through their form. 
We can continue to insist upon the fact that they require the sustaining influx of their 
 “Esse” here signifies a fact about 
their essences. Thus, although their necessity has a cause, namely God’s resolve to create 
and eternally conserve such forms, nevertheless through their forms, the intelligences 
have a necessity of being. Their forms give them the power of always being (per suam 
formam semper sunt in virtute essendi). On the other hand, the reason why hylomorphic 
beings lack necessity of being (necessitas essendi) concerns the fact that their power of 
being (virtus essendi) derives from the victory of their form over their matter (non est in 
eis necessitas essendi, sed virtus essendi consequitur in eis victoriam formae super 
materia). Such a victory must conquer matter, but due to the non-identity between matter 
and form, the conquest lasts only for a time. Once the form loses its hold over the matter, 
and another form comes to occupy its place (e.g., when heat causes water to become air), 
the one form no longer gives being (dat esse) to the matter, but instead the new form is 
responsible for giving being to the same material subject. And such transformation of 
forms is what Aquinas means by “contingency of being.” 
                                                 
102 “Sunt enim quaedam in rebus creatis quae simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse. Illas enim res 
simpliciter et absolute necesse est esse in quibus non est possibilitas ad non esse. Quaedam autem res sic 
sunt a Deo in esse productae ut in earum natura sit potentia ad non esse. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc 
quod materia in eis est in potentia ad aliam formam.” SCG II.30.  
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creator, but such insistence does not diminish the role of form in giving being and even 
less does it uncover an existential act in addition to something’s form or its external cause 
of conservation. Instead, such insistence on the part of Existential Thomists both 
minimizes the actuating role of form and also drowns out the actuality of the creature 
behind the radiance of another insofar as each thing’s highest act is its passively being 
acted upon by another. Its deepest perfection is its relation of dependence upon its cause.  
      Here we witness a tension, if not a shift, in Aquinas’s existential metaphysics wherein 
when called upon to explain some intrinsic “property” of the creature itself, esse must 
either refer back to form or outside itself to its cause: pace Gilson and Fabro, there seems 
to be no room for the third “act” as distinct from something’s essence or its grounding 
Act.103 Thus, to return to our earlier question of what “esse” signifies in relation to 
creatures, the being intrinsic to a creature is its formal determinations whereas its extra-
formal determinations is the sustaining activity of its cause.104
                                                 
103 In response to Fabro and Gilson, both of whom argue that the principle “forma dat esse” does not 
compromise the radical distinction between the order of form/essence and the order of actual existence, Te 
Velde argues against such an “existential” reading. Although the form cannot be the cause of itself and thus 
cannot give being in the sense of being its own efficient cause, but requires God to continually give being 
to it, Te Velde suggests that such a principle should be understood to mean only that the form itself is 
something’s determinate act of being, not that a separate extra-formal act of being is required. Form is not 
the same as being in the sense that it is not the ultimate act of being, which is reserved for a single being 
(i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality, 218. For the views of Fabro and 
Gilson, see passim. Further, he argues: “The more a form is what it is, that is, the more it participates in 
being, the greater its unity, in the sense that it comprehends all the lower and divided forms in a higher 
(more unified) unity.” Ibid., 253. Thus, the existential import of any being is derived from its form.  
104 See Chapter III above.  
 Absent in such an account 
is the emergence of an existentiality distinct from either the formal structure of a creature, 
on the one hand, or the factual positing of an essence outside its causes, on the other. 
Existentially speaking, the problem of delineating an extra-essential act of being for 
creatures is that thinking esse as a creature’s participation in its cause (i.e., ipsum esse 
subsistens) seems altogether to deprive a creature of its own power to be and fails to seize 
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upon the actuality which distinguishes it from a mere fiction. The creature gets lost in the 
radiant abundance of God’s causal influx, just as, to return to the example from above, 
the darkened air as a medium for illumination gets drowned out behind its refraction of 
another’s brilliance (claritas). 
      What lends permanence to Aquinas’s universe and makes beings more than 
inefficacious specters, I would argue, is not any real existential act imparted to them in 
addition to their essences or forms, but God’s providential scientia through which he 
eternally degrees an order for the universe, thereby rendering an account of the seemingly 
incidental fact of creatures’ actual existence. What this means is that although free in an 
absolute sense to do or not do anything that does not pose a logical contradiction, 
including annihilate beings at any point, God has decided upon a universe that most 
resembles his own perfection, a universe in which beings in fact fulfill a role as 
secondary causes, and also will not be annihilated but remain in being. In other words, 
nature (i.e., the world or universe of beings) is not a “constant substitution of God’s 
power for the power of creatures,” but instead a real and lawful exchange: beings act 
according to their essences with causal regularity.105
      Although Aquinas argues that it is impossible for God to create creatures—even 
necessary ones—who do not require divine conservation, and thus the first act of 
providing for creation is an immediate and per se conservation of their being (esse), such 
a conservational act becomes institutionalized. Due to a divine resolve, the annihilation of 
 
                                                 
105Although attempting to keep open the existential dimension, Gilson expresses such a notion: “It is this 
constant relationship between natural effects and their second causes which prevents our supposing that 
there is a pure and simple substitution of God’s power for theirs. For if God’s action were not diversified 
according to the different beings in which he operates, the effects which it produces would not be 
diversified in the way that the things themselves are, and anything might produce anything. The existence 
of the laws of nature prevents our supposing that God has created beings deprived of causality.” Gilson, 
The Christian Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, 181. 
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creatures, or the withdrawal of the conserving influence, becomes impossible for God.106 
Such impossibility does not belong to the creatures themselves (i.e., whereby the analysis 
of a created essence would include esse and preclude not-being), but to the necessity of 
annihilation’s opposite (i.e., conservation). Conservation is necessary because God has 
bound himself to his own providential order in which he has decreed and foresaw what he 
will do (i.e., not annihilate, but conserve). Thus, God is not bound by natural necessity, 
but by his own infallible providential insight and wisdom, in which he cannot be 
deceived nor “change his mind.”107 Considered in itself, no created nature contradicts the 
predicate “does not exist at all,” although from the presupposition of divine 
foreknowledge and degree (i.e., the scientia of providence), God will perpetuate his 
holding in being of such things that he has resolved should be.108 God’s power (potestas) 
considered absolutely does not contradict acting outside the order of his providence: for 
example, God can “repossess being” by annihilating any or all creatures. But due to his 
immutability, it becomes impossible that he act in such a way to contradict what eternally 
falls under his providential order, having been established in reference to divine 
goodness.109
                                                 
106 This argument transpires over Question 5, Articles 2-4 of De Pot. Gilson notes this connection between 
conservation and providence in The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 179. 
107 “Si vero divinam dispositionem consideremus qua Deus disposuit suo intellectu et voluntate res in esse 
producere, sic rerum productio ex necessitate divinae dispositionis procedit: non enim potest esse quod 
Deus aliquid se facturum disposuerit quod postmodum ipse non faciat; alias eius dispositio vel esset 
mutabilis vel infirma. Eius igitur dispositioni ex necessitate debetur quod impleatur.” SCG II. 28.  
108 “Relinquitur ergo quod non est impossibile Deum res ad non esse reducere; cum non sit necessarium 
eum rebus esse praebere, nisi ex suppositione suae ordinationis et praescientiae, quia sic ordinavit et 
praescivit, ut res in perpetuum in esse teneret.” De Pot. q. 5, a. 3, resp.  
 Thus, not even his own absolute power can undo what the divine 
providential scientia has decreed.  
109 “Ostensum est autem in secundo quod res ipsae quae a Deo sub ordine ponuntur, proveniunt ab ipso non 
sicut ab agente per necessitatem naturae, vel cuiuscumque alterius, sed ex simplici voluntate, maxime 
quantum ad primam rerum institutionem. Relinquitur ergo quod praeter ea quae sub ordine divinae 
providentiae cadunt, Deus aliqua facere potest; non enim est eius virtus ad has res obligata. Si autem 
consideremus praedictum ordinem quantum ad rationem a principio dependentem, sic praeter ordinem 
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      Beginning with this initial commitment to conserve (i.e., the first resolution of 
normalcy), the possibility of radical withdrawal (i.e., annihilation) has been precluded by 
providence.110
      There is a loss, we might say, of the radical groundlessness which had marked the 
extra-essential incidentality of being. Such a loss can best be seen in the case of beings 
necessary ab alio, in which the radical incommensurability between esse and essence 
comes to be nearly collapsed.
 Thus, the radical incidentality associated with the gratuitous giving of 
being, frequently highlighted by existential Thomists and others alike (e.g., Marion’s 
incident par excellence), has been pushed back to a primordial “moment of decision” and 
eclipsed by an unwavering commitment to conservation within a larger providential 
order. Despite the decisiveness of creation for Aquinas’s universe, in that according to a 
groundless decision on the part of the divine will being has been given, his account of 
conservation shows how quickly this moment fades, sustaining only a weak ontological 
force in the normal operations of the universe. An operational order takes effect as divine 
wisdom directs everything that is toward a common end.  
111
                                                                                                                                                 
illum Deus facere non potest. Ordo enim ille procedit, ut ostensum est, ex scientia et voluntate Dei omnia 
ordinante in suam bonitatem sicut in finem. Non est autem possibile quod Deus aliquid faciat quod non sit 
ab eo volitum: cum creaturae ab ipso non prodeant naturaliter, sed per voluntatem, ut ostensum est. Neque 
etiam est possibile ab eo aliquid fieri quod eius scientia non comprehendatur: cum voluntas esse non possit 
nisi de aliquo noto. Neque iterum est possibile quod in creaturis aliquid faciat quod in suam bonitatem non 
sit ordinatum sicut in finem: cum sua bonitas sit proprium obiectum voluntatis ipsius. Similiter autem, cum 
Deus sit omnino immutabilis, impossibile est quod aliquid velit cum prius noluerit; aut aliquid de novo 
incipiat scire, vel in suam ordinet bonitatem. Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin sub ordine suae 
providentiae cadat: sicut non potest aliquid facere quod eius operationi non subdatur. Potest tamen alia 
facere quam ea quae subduntur eius providentiae vel operationi, si absolute consideretur eius potestas: sed 
nec potest facere aliqua quae sub ordine providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non fuerint, eo quod mutabilis esse 
non potest.” SCG III.98. 
110 Scotus will take issue with this preclusion, to which we will return below. See Chapter VI Section 1.  
 Remember Aquinas states that in such beings, their 
111 The tendency to nothingness or not-being results from the same tendency to being (i.e., the power of the 
agent). “Si autem dicatur quod ea quae sunt ex nihilo, quantum est de se in nihilum tendunt; et sic omnibus 
creaturis inest potentia ad non esse:- manifestum est hoc non sequi. Dicuntur enim res creatae eo modo in 
nihilum tendere quo sunt ex nihilo. Quod quidem non est nisi secundum potentiam agentis. Sic igitur et 
rebus creatis non inest potentia ad non esse: sed creatori inest potentia ut eis det esse vel eis desinat esse 
influere; cum non ex necessitate naturae agat ad rerum productionem, sed ex voluntate, ut ostensum est.” 
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power not to be (potentia ad non esse)—and for that matter their power to be (potentia ad 
esse)—reflects some power in God (i.e., his ability to withdraw his influence) rather than 
some power in creatures.112
      Given God’s rational commitment to his own order and his infallible knowledge of 
what will come to be (fiendum), the radical indeterminacy of this grounding act can be 
neutralized. God knows that he will not annihilate, but will continue to conserve 
creatures. Thus, his rational agency eliminates the possibility of withdrawal, which had 
provided a spectral absence to all existential presence, a matter whose consequences will 
be explored in more detail below. Furthermore, providence lends intelligibility to the 
 Thus, once God has decided not to annihlate such creatures, 
their forms give them necessary being, that is, they are necessarily and eternally through 
their forms (forma dat esse), although one might continue to add the caveat that God 
could have decided to withhold conservation for such beings. But such a caveat does not 
suggest that esse is some distinct perfection intrinsic to the things themselves. Thus 
“esse”—when applied to creatures—does not signify some act they exercise through 
themselves. It is true that conservation of being still stands as the most intimate 
perfection of any being, but as inscribed in a providential order, it takes on new meaning. 
No longer does it mark the radical groundlessness and incidentality of the gift of being, 
but now comes to signify the grounding act of a providential order. This means that 
creatures are no longer receivers of a gift, but instead debtors who must make return 
(reddere) on a loan, which they “pay back” through their service within God’s 
providential plan. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Furthermore, the nearer something is to this cause, the further it is from non-being. “Quanto aliquid magis 
distat ab eo quod per seipsum est ens, scilicet Deo, tanto magis propinquum est ad non esse. Quanto igitur 
aliquid est propinquius Deo, tanto magis recedit a non esse.” SCG II.30 
112 “Unde potentia ad non esse in spiritualibus creaturis et corporibus caelestibus, magis est in Deo, qui 
potest subtrahere suum influxum, quam in forma vel in materia talium creaturarum.” ST I q. 104, a. 1, ad 1.  
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radical incidentality of creation, which sub specie aeternae, includes reference to all 
being and all beings (esse et ens commune) and thus captures being (esse) as an 
intelligible moment within a providential order. Any possible creature, if understood 
from the perspective of providence as a whole, would be made intelligible in terms of its 
being or non-being insofar as providence necessitated the emergence of certain beings 
(e.g., humans) and prohibited (i.e., made impossible according to its order) other beings 
(e.g., phoenixes). By inscribing creation and conservation within a providential order, and 
thereby relegating any radical decisiveness between being and non-being (i.e., either in 
the guise of creation/nothingness, conservation/annihilation, or concurrence/non-
concurrence) to a bygone resolution, providence thus sublates the real effectiveness of 
incidental contingency at the heart of being. “Contingency” no longer means the real and 
ever-present possibility of nothingness, but merely the tendency of certain (i.e., 
hylomorphic) beings to be corrupted due to their material element. And even such 
corruption, as will be seen, has a necessary allotment in the providential order.113
      In response to Gilson, Fabro, et al., it appears that esse in reference to creatures turns 
out not to be their own expression of an act of being, but the fact that they reflect the 
conserving influence of ipsum esse subsistens. Such a “fact of being,” even for the most 
mundane creatures (i.e., those who are present to sensory intuition), is a fact whose 
 This 
limited sense of contingency and “not-being”—for example that the lion will consume its 
prey, thereby bringing corruption and “not-being” to such an animal—finds intelligibility 
within the providential order through whose sublation God as essential and as existential 
ground finds its highest expression of unity.  
                                                 
113 As will be discussed in Chapter VI below, contingency is necessary for Aquinas, and even though 
foreseen by God, it happens in a contingent manner. See also De Pot. q. 3, a. 6, resp. 
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content finds its highest expression and intelligibility within a providential order. 
Although we may have some limited insight into the factual presence of certain things 
and the factual absence of others (e.g., phoenixes), and express various modes of being or 
non-being in the dynamic acts of judgment, such existential expressions of being become 
part of intelligible content of the divine practical scientia of providence and can be 
understood—although not to us—as necessitated by God’s resolution to provide 
according to a certain order (i.e., the best possible). The esse of creatures turns out to be 
the conserving influence of their provider, which refers not to their own act of being 
against which they withstand a tendency toward nothingness, but the providential fact of 
being for certain creatures and not others. Each creature’s “share of being” is not some 
existential act proper to it, but its “share in providence” by which—first and most 
generally—it reflects the fact that God has resolved to provide for it. Thus, if we could 
understand the universe according to God’s practical scientia of providence, the factual 
absence of phoenixes would be most intelligible as a reflection of their 
incommensurability with the best possible order—to which God has resolved himself—
and not an existential lack at the root of their being.  
 
Conclusion 
      Although the above discussion of analogy warned of treating esse as a perfection 
proper to God, thereby depriving a meaningful reference to everything else due to its 
purity of act, now having brought Aquinas’s account of analogy in constellation with his 
metaphysics of creation (i.e., the giving of being), we can see the full effects of the 
concentration of esse in a primus et purus actus essendi. The problem faced by 
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existentialism is that an analogical concept of being borrows against the content derived 
from experience (i.e., of created beings) in order to arrive at a purified and perfected ratio 
essendi attributable to ipsum esse subsistens. And yet, when it comes time to pay back 
this loan, esse as reapplied to creatures—either in the form of esse commune or actus 
essendi suum—turns out to be devoid of real meaning apart from the substantial being of 
the creature itself on the one hand or God’s external causal influence on the other. “Esse” 
fails to capture a distinct perfection intrinsic to creatures themselves, which would 
differentiate them from “non-existing possibles.” Where Fabro envisions a seemless 
passage from finite to Infinite accomplished through analogical discourse and marked by 
intensification, there seems to be equivocation, or better yet evacuation.114
      One sees from the metaphor of illumination, which Aquinas often uses to explain the 
distribution of being, how he has invited a deeper problem for the creation and 
conservation of esse on the metaphysical level. Illuminated air, especially as it becomes 
more and more illuminated, reflects the majesty of its cause to such an extent that the air 
itself disappears behind its reflection of light. The air itself, permeated by light, merely 
becomes a reflection of something else’s perfection and it has no power of its own. So 
too created existence gets lost as a pale reflection of the plenitude that is divine existence, 
drowned out by the radiance of ipsum esse subsistens. God touches things by his power 
 That which 
“esse” is originally meant signify in creatures (i.e., the reality by which they are and are 
distinguished from mere possibilities), once invested in the incommunicable ipseity of 
ipsum esse subsistens—that sovereign actuality neither beyond being nor primum inter 
pares—no longer captures the dynamic actuality of being, but grounds a mere semblance 
of actuality. 
                                                 
114 Intensive Hermeneutics, 481. See Section 1 of Chapter VI below.  
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of creation and conservation, allowing them to remain in being, but by no power of their 
own. The problem faced by an existential metaphysics is that creatures turn out to be little 
more than reflections of God’s actuating presence, a position which deprives them of 
their own share of being. 
      This return to (or approach toward) “God as the formal esse of creatures” position is 
not, however, accidental or due to an over zealous fidelity to the metaphor of 
illumination. Instead, it results in attempting to both elevate and isolate a concept of esse 
applicable only to God (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). By isolating such a pure concept, 
which would analogically exclude the impurities of created “being,” esse as an intensive 
concept no longer retains its extensive range, and thus necessarily deprives creatures of 
their “ontological density,” a matter to be explored further below.115 Being is the richest 
of concepts, as Gilson, Owens, Fabro, and others have argued, because it can be isolated 
in an intensified and purified form without rendering it empty and abstract. “Its wealth 
consists, first, of all the judgments of existence it virtually comprises and connotes, but 
much more of its permanent reference to the infinitely rich reality of the pure act of 
existing.”116
                                                 
115 See Chapter VI Section 1 below.  
116 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 44.  
 The problem, however, that emerges with such an analogic of being, as seen 
from the metaphor for illumination, is that the being of creatures (i.e., being according to 
a secondary or derived ratio) becomes little more than a “reflection” of being itself. The 
making permanent of this reference to “the pure act of existing” deprives “esse” of 
signficance for creatures insofar as what distinguishes the “real existence” of an actual 
being from the “intentional existence” of a possible being (e.g., a phoenix) concerns only 
the distinct ways in which “esse” extrinsically denominates each as dependents, and yet 
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neither as beings in their own right. When the derivative (i.e., analogical) concept is 
reapplied to creatures, from whence it originated, it no longer captures the dynamic 
actuality differentiating a mere possibility (e.g., a phoenix) from a real something, but 
comes to signify something’s passive reflection of God’s activity (actuating presence).  
      Despite the lobby of existential Thomists, “esse” becomes unable to think the real, at 
least the real apart from God himself: as reflections of divine radiance, beings are 
flooded to the point of disappearance. Just as the more air is illuminated by light, the 
more the air itself as the medium disappears, so too the more we shift focus from the 
essential determination of something to its existential actuality, the more the creature’s 
own actuality makes reference to the abiding omnipresence of an external power. In the 
end, “esse” comes to mean only the fact of an essence’s having been caused, much in the 
semi-repetitive and essential way observed above with Sigerian essentialism, or more 
properly how this fact extrinsically denotes a relation to the universal cause of all being.  
      The deeper structural problem with existential metaphysics is not that it fails to 
conceptually think the actuality of existing things as exceeding their formal actuality. 
Instead, the problem results because the only actuality left in excess of their formal 
natures is God himself. Thus, to think the being of something, not merely as this or that 
(e.g., as a mule or as a runner) but simpliciter, means to think the factual status of the 
essence, how it in fact reflects its cause. As seen from the distinction between necessary 
and contingent beings, esse comes to indicate a decision or providential resolution on the 
part of God that certain rationes should come to be exemplified, and others not. If 
Aquinas or his existential apologist were to argue that unlike mere possibles, actual 
beings have been legislated by the divine will, and this having-been-legislated through 
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the efficiency of the divine will marks the extra-essential actuality of esse unaccountable 
in terms of the essence, then “esse” merely signifies the factual relation of an essence in 
reference to God’s plan, of what God has decided should come to be (fiendum). But the 
reference once again is not to anything (or any perfection) intrinsic to the creature itself, 
but to its relation to God as its efficient cause of being. The full entailment of such a 
move to treat esse as the decision of “what should come to be” on the part of God’s 
providential plan will be explored in what follows. 
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Chapter VI. Conceptualism without Imperialism and the Collapse of the Existential 
Project  
 
      Following from the conclusions drawn above that Aquinas reduces creatures to 
analogical similitudes of divine ipseity lacking their own act or power of being, and 
“esse” becomes something of an extrinsic attribute when applied to everything outside of 
such incommunicable perfection of being, three consequences of Aquinas’s existential 
metaphysics need to be considered: First, given that a real composition between esse and 
essence was introduced to secure the real diversity between God and creatures, and yet 
creatures turn out to be not-much-more than essential dependents on divine esse, 
reflections of an incommunicable ipseity without their own esse, why persist in upholding 
such a composition? Why not, instead, rethink creation without bracketing a distinct 
existential act? Such a rethinking will be outlined presently.  
      Second, what is the contribution of Aquinas’s existential metaphysics for thinking, or 
rethinking, the history of metaphysics? In other words, must a new beginning be found 
for metaphysics and what does Aquinas’s existential problematic offer for such an 
inception? In particular, I will address the claim of existential Thomism that “judgment” 
(i.e., the second operation of the intellect) offers a means by which to think the real, that 
is, “esse” beyond the imperialism of the concept and to reawaken a questioning of being 
beyond (or better “underneath”) essentialized “ontic” forgetfulness. Against such an 
attempt to overcome metaphysical essentialism, I will argue that it merely mystifies the 
essential economy without exceeding it. Instead, what needs to be realized is a 
“conceptualism without imperium,” that which locates a gap within thinking and a 
conceptual remainder from within the essential economy itself.  
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      And third, we will treat how the finality of the created universe complicates (in the 
most literal sense of the word) the original groundlessness of this existential perfection. 
We started our inquiry by noting how the gift of being has been characterized as a radical 
incidentality incommensurable with and unaccountable by an essential economy. Yet, by 
tracing such existential gift throughout Aquinas’s thought, he seems to cover over and 
neutralize this original groundlessness in terms of the teleological and providential 
finality of the universe. As will be discussed, his attempt to render a reason for each 
singular creature in terms of the good the universe not only reduces singularity to 
particularity (and thereby inscribes such within an essential order and within a 
hierarchical rank) but also renders a return on the very “gift” of being.1
                                                 
1 Singularity differs from particularity insofar as the former has not yet been conceptualized according to 
universal determinations whereas the latter falls under a universal concept as a particular instantiation of 
such. Such a process reflects the move from a this to a this X, where “X” reflects a general term. See, for 
example, Reiner Schümann, Broken Hegemonies. trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2003). See also Richard A. Lee, Science, the Singular, and the Question of Theology (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
 Each being must 
“pay back” that which it has been given by fulfilling its natural end in service of the 
good. Such service by which return is made on the investment of being undermines the 
very nature of the gratuity of the gift itself. Creation, although initiated by a radical 
unaccountability of the free act of divine volition, finds ground in a totalized order 
directed to the good. The return (reditus) of creatures to God through their providential 
orientation overcomes the groundlessness by which they been created (exitus): i.e., as 
radically incidental. Furthermore, esse becomes reinscribed as part of the essential 
economy of divine ideas, the terminus of what the divine practical intellect plans “should 
come to be” (fiendum) as opposed to “should not come to be” (non-fiendum). The divine 
practical scientia of providence adopts the means the ordered totality of this universe 
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toward the end of best realizing divine goodness, which offers an account for the 
incidental esse of all creatures. Together these three considerations will be used in 
assessing both the legitimacy of Aquinas’s existential problematic and also its historical 
effects within scholastic thought and beyond.    
 
Section 1: Analogical Concept Laundering—A Case for the Univocity of Being 
beyond Conceptual Imperialism 
 
      A real composition between esse and essence was introduced to solve the problem of 
how all created essences, including those without materiality such as the soul or 
intelligences, are marked by some degree of potency and non-simplicity. Relying merely 
on the Aristotelian couplet of form/matter would entail that immaterial essences (i.e., 
souls and intelligences) are pure actuality uncomposed with any potency.2
      In order, however, for us to know God—the “we” being defined by embodied humans 
whose knowledge of God is not per se nota, but taken from sensitive cognition—there 
 In order to 
protect the uniqueness of God’s pure actuality, Aquinas needed to find a means by which 
to complicate all creatures. As we have seen, he does this by introducing a composition 
between esse and essence, which entails that even the actuality of immaterial forms 
stands in potency to the actuality of esse. God alone enjoys a pure simplicity of being, an 
identity between essence and esse indivisible in any way. Such self-subsisting being is 
what I have been calling “ipseity,” which signifies its incommunicable pure perfection 
and eminent power as being itself.  
                                                 
2 The human soul according to Aquinas differs from the intelligences insofar as it informs matter and 
thereby is not a species onto itself. For a detailed exploration of the complicated relationship of the human 
soul to matter, both in its “separate” and restored condition, see William E. Carroll, “Thomas Aquinas On 
Science, Sacra Doctrina, and Creation,” in Nature and Scripture in the Abrahamic Religions: Up to 1700, 
vol. 1, ed. J.M. van der Meer and S. Mandelbrote. Brill’s Series in Church History, 36 (Leiden-Boston: 
Brill 2008), 219-248. 
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must be some semblance or trace of the first cause within its observable effects. In order 
to ground a community of beings somehow related to a first being without flattening all 
beings (including God) to a single voice or ratio of being, Aquinas invokes analogical 
causation to hold together “the bond of being”3
      According to such an account, God does not communicate his own nature to creatures 
(i.e., ipsum esse) such that his own being and that of creatures would fall under a single 
ratio. Analogical causation instead brings together a multiplicity of disparate beings in 
reference to a common principle, whose perfect instantiation of the ratio—in this case, 
being (esse)—they resemble imperfectly to greater and lesser degrees. Thus, amidst a 
diversity of beings, there can be repetition of a shared perfection. Such repetition, 
however, does not undermine the radical diversity between the proper ratio of that 
perfection in which being is rooted, on the one hand, and those derivations that follow 
from such a perfection but which remain participants unable to receive its full power, on 
 around the principle of similitude. God as 
eminent cause causes beings to be like himself without allowing them to share in his 
incommunicable ratio essendi. Participation in esse (i.e., the manner in which creatures 
have being) allows for creatures to resemble God, to liken and assimilate themselves to 
his perfection of being, but to remain fundamentally other than God. Such a remaining 
other is secured because all creature must participate being according to a determinate 
mode of being (i.e., through their essence), which entails that they defect from perfect 
plenitude of being. Even immaterial substances resemble God in a limited and imperfect 
manner because esse remains distinct from their essential determinations. They may be 
essentially perfect, but nevertheless existentially imperfect (i.e., incomplete, limited).  
                                                 
3 For an explicit use of this phrase, see James Anderson, The Bond of Being. See also, Lovejoy’s classic 
The Great Chain of Being.  
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the other. Analogy purports to solve the metaphysical problem first issued by Parmenides 
of what divides being into a multiplicity if not being (or if not-being). The answer, 
offered by Aquinas, is that being according to its proper ratio remains fundamentally 
indivisible (an ipseity), whereas for everything else, being must be participated, and 
according to such participation, a multiplicity of diverse participants arise. Participation 
of the many in the one thus provides the connective tissue of Aquinas’s universe, a 
universe crowned by the sovereign perfection of something exceeding the order itself, 
actus essendi primus et purus.4
      By ordering the community of beings to this one true being (i.e., ipsum esse 
subsistens) and removing all finite traces from its purified ratio essendi, in order that it 
may be the universal cause of all being without being cause of itself (causa sui), 
Aquinas’s metaphysics of analogical causation has incurred a deeper cost. The cost, one 
recognized by Scotistic univocity, is that all the content of our knowledge is on loan from 
creatures, but once demonstration reaches its terminus (i.e., in maxime ens and ipsum esse 
subsistens), according to Aquinas’s theory of analogy, any trace of the finite must be 
excluded from the “purified” concept. Otherwise, the latter, or the “primary analogue,” 
would retain contact with those derivations based on it and share in a univocal ratio with 
them. As will be seen in what follows, Aquinas’s attempt to intensify the concept (e.g., 
moving from less and more to most) in order to remove it from the scale altogether meets 
not with the purification and perfection of the ratio, but its obliteration. Excluding esse 
commune from communion with ipsum esse subsistens leaves Aquinas with nothing in 
 God, thus, is neither merely primum inter pares nor 
beyond being in his utter transcendence.   
                                                 
4 For such a characterization, see for example De Pot., q. 3, a. 5, resp., De Ente IV l. 54., Super lib. De cau. 
IX. 
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hand by which to designate the latter save an empty name appropriated from creatures. 
By dislodging divine being from esse commune, Aquinas’s remotional procedure has not 
removed the finite impurities and extracted a refined and intensified concept of being 
(i.e., ipsum esse subsistens). Instead, its “excavations” linger as irreducible traces of the 
concept’s origin and any attempt to secure a purified concept (i.e., of actus essendi 
primus et purus) results in a failed laundering operation.5
      Analogical causation, as we have seen, removes God from the existential order while 
maintaining enough of a resemblance to draw the conclusion that God exists based upon 
our knowledge of creatures. Aquinas maintains that if God agreed with creatures 
according to a common ratio essendi, then two consequences would follow.
  
6
                                                 
5 Scotus uses this term “to excavate” or “dig beneath” (suffodere) to describe how the intellect derives all of 
its concepts from creatures and thus by excavating such concepts, it cannot reach some notion with no 
finite traces. This means that if we are to have natural knowledge of God, it cannot be by using concepts of 
a different sort (alterius rationis) because our intellect has no such concepts at its disposal. Thus, with the 
concepts we have derived from creatures, we can have natural knowledge of God, but only according to a 
univocal ratio as derived from creatures. See Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q 1-2, 62.  
6 See, for example, In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, resp. and above Chapter 3.  
 First, the 
entire proper concept of being would not belong to God, but would be shared between 
God and creatures. Second, God could not be the universal cause of all being because he 
would be part of the order of which he was the cause. Thus, analogical causation allows 
Aquinas to extract a proper concept of being (i.e., ipsum esse subsistens), purified of any 
traces of its derivations (i.e., esse commune), and to posit a universal cause of all being, 
which itself is uncaused and outside the metaphysical economy. If the entirety of being 
(i.e., esse commune) included both God and creatures, however, then God would be 
principiated by something not entirely identical to him (i.e., because it would at least 
virtually includes the modification created). Such non-identity would upset a 
metaphysical account of being because even though “all subsequent beings” would be 
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caused by the primum inter pares, this would not be an account of all being and its 
universal cause. God would not transcend the order of being, but be one of its members. 
Aquinas, thus, attempts to overcome this accounting gap by removing God from the 
economy so as to secure a complete field of being (i.e., esse commune) and ground such 
based on the similitude it bears to its cause, the universal cause of all being.  
      As we have seen, in univocals, the ratio is one and the same, whereas in equivocals, 
the rationes are totally diverse. In the case of being (esse), however, there must be an 
analogy between the terms such that there is multiple usage of the name according to the 
diverse proportions to one and the same thing.7
      Thus, to be the demonstrable, universal cause of all being, God must be both “not 
being” (at least in the sense of the esse commune caused by him) otherwise he would 
either need a cause or be uncaused, and also be “most being” (that is, according to an 
elevated and separate ratio essendi) otherwise he would leave behind no trace of himself 
in creatures whereby demonstration of their cause would be possible. Thus, each creature 
as an effect bears some proportional likeness to its cause whereby it can testify that it is 
 This same thing is ipsum esse subsistens, 
which constitutes the proper and primary ratio essendi. Thus, the term can be used 
demonstratively without reducing all the usages to a single ratio. What Aquinas attempts 
to argue on the basis of analogical predication is that a universal agent (i.e., cause of 
everything in a kind) produces its own likeness in its effects only because it is neither a 
univocal agent nor an equivocal agent.  
                                                 
7 “Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut 
ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus 
communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his 
quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed 
nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de 
urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem 
sanitatis” ST I, q. 13, a. 5, resp.  
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an effect of this cause. Such a testimony serves as the foundation for all of Aquinas’s 
demonstrations for the existence of God. He begins with the imperfect nature of 
creatures, which as inadequate effects of their cause fall short of its perfection, yet as 
similitudes reflect the fact that (quia) such a cause must exist in order to account for the 
effect.8
      In reference to what has been discussed, we continually witness such moments in 
Aquinas’s metaphysics. For example, throughout the three stages of the De Ente 
argument, Aquinas moves from essences that can be understood without esse, through the 
possibility of something that is only esse, to the actuality of such a subsisting being itself 
(ipsum esse subsistens). As argued in detail above, it is only after Aquinas reaches the 
third stage does esse fully emerge as an extra-essential actuality distinct from the 
common and indeterminate “ens.” And yet, this argument attempts to elevate the concept 
of being (esse) outside the register of those beings whose essences do not include esse so 
that the former can account for this field in its entirety as the universal cause of being for 
all beings. Such a per se first cause is necessary in order to secure the causal economy 
from an infinite regress, whereby all accounting would become useless because running 
to infinity there would be no first and everything would be without a reason why.
 And yet, as will be seen presently, such a move to isolate a separate analogously 
elevated ratio falls short. 
9
                                                 
8 “Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis 
effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem 
rationem, sed deficienter [m.e.], ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter 
et eodem modo [...]”ST I. q. 13, a. 5, resp. 
9 The argument states: “Ergo oportet quod omnis talis res cuius esse est aliud quam natura sua habeat esse 
ab alio. Et quia omne quod est per aliud reducitur ad id quod est per se sicut ad causam primam, oportet 
quod sit aliqua res que sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tantum; alias iretur in 
infinitum in causis, cum omnis res que non est esse tantum habeat causam sui esse, ut dictum. Patet ergo 
quod intelligentia est forma et esse, et quod esse habet a primo ente quod est esse tantum, et hoc est causa 
prima que Deus est.” De Ente, Cap. IV, ll. 127-146.  
  There 
must be, Aquinas argues, something that is the cause of being for all things (causa 
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essendi omnibus rebus), which itself is only being (esse tantum). The ground of all being 
(esse) as esse tantum must be of different kind, however, otherwise it would have to be 
ground of itself and thus be causa sui. Such esse tantum, or ipsum esse subsistens, must 
expel from its own proper ratio of being any reference to the being that it grounds, 
otherwise God would enter into a univocal community with such beings and he would 
have to ground his own being (i.e., as the universal cause of all being).  
      And yet, to conclude to such a subsistence of being, demonstration must utilize a 
single concept of being (ratio essendi) such that we can begin with one concept and reach 
its superlative degree of intensity (i.e., remaining within the bounds of a single concept). 
Otherwise, by removing the derivative elements of the ratio in hopes of retaining its 
purified and proper ground, Aquinas removes the entirety of the concept and is left with 
an empty name. To seek the universal cause of being, one need only acknowledge that it 
itself is not-being, not that it is being according to an elevated and distinct ratio. Now in 
the lands of negative theology, Aquinas does not hold a purified and intensified concept 
of being, shed of any trace of that which it grounds. Instead, he faces a silent abyss across 
which the superlative of being can bridge no more than could any superlative name (e.g., 
“most rock”). To seek the ground of being in its entirety, he must leave being altogether.  
       One can find this reductio ad absurdum (i.e., concluding “God is most rock”) around 
the Scotistic position of univocity, which brings to the fore the detrimental consequences 
of such an analogic for natural knowledge of God.10
                                                 
10 “Quod si dicas, alia est formalis ratio eorum qua conveniunt Deo, ex hoc sequitur inconveniens, quod ex 
nulla ratione propria eorum prout sunt in creaturis, possunt concludi de Deo, quia omnino alia et alia ratio 
illorum est et istorum; immo non magis concludetur quod Deus est sapiens formaliter, ex ratione sapientiae 
quam apprehendimus ex creaturis, quod quod Deus est formaliter lapis: potest enim conceptus aliquis, alius 
a conceptu lapidis creati, formari, ad quem conceptum lapids ut est idea in Deo habet iste lapis 
attributionem, et ita formaliter diceretur ‘Deus est lapis’ secundum istum conceptum analogum, sicut 
‘sapiens’ secundum illum conceptum analogum.” Ordinatio I, d. 3, pars 1, q. 1-2, 40.  
 Scotus maintains that every inquiry 
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regarding God presupposes the intellect’s having a univocal concept taken from 
creatures. The difference, however, between this view and that of Aquinas is not the 
taking of the concept from creatures, but its ability to extend both to God and creatures. 
Thus, says Scotus, the concept of being (ens) taken from creatures covers both finite 
being and infinite being without variation in its intelligible content (i.e., ratio). To deny 
this (i.e., to say that God’s ratio is other than that of creatures) would amount to saying 
that from the intelligible content taken from creatures nothing can be inferred about God 
because his ratio is altogether different. The explanatory gap between the two rationes—
Scotus gives the example of divine wisdom and human wisdom—cannot be bridged by 
analogy because when we say “President Obama is wise” and when we say “God is wise” 
the intelligible content in each case is different. If we begin with the former (i.e., human 
wisdom), and the former cannot be broken up into a generality (i.e., wisdom) and its 
modification (i.e., human), how does removing all finite measures give us the latter (i.e., 
divine wisdom), which is of a different sort (i.e., ratio)?  
      As addressed in reference to De Ente, being (ens) is the first object of the intellect 
according to Aquinas. However, if the concept of being from which we commence is 
proper only to creatures and does not univocally include God, then there can be no 
separation of the concept from itself: being and finite being are synonymous. 
Furthermore, an intensification of the latter in order to remove finite “impurities” would 
destroy the concept itself. We no more have an elevated concept of “divine being” (or 
“divine wisdom”) with its own ratio than we have of “divine rockedness” because neither 
can be derived from the ratio of human wisdom if the latter is treated non-univocally. 
The concept of wisdom—or being—taken from finite creatures, such as humans, once 
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purified by remotion does not leave behind a ratio of a different sort, but either provides 
a concept attributable to God according to the same voice (i.e., univocally) or nothing is 
left at all besides a trace (i.e., equivocity). 
      What is needed, Scotus argues, is a single concept virtually containing disjunctive 
modifications, themselves really diverse from one another. Otherwise, how could the 
finite human intellect ever achieve a concept worthy of God? No object produces a 
simple and proper concept of itself and a simple and proper concept of another in the 
intellect unless the first object contains the second essentially or virtually. Scotus argues 
that a created object does not virtually or essentially contain the uncreated, and thus 
cannot produce such a concept in the mind.11
      A univocal concept of being is one with sufficient unity such that to affirm and deny it 
of one and the same thing would be a contradiction and such that can serve as the middle 
term of a syllogism uniting the two extremes without equivocation.
 Instead, something more common than and 
modally distinct from either one must give rise to both. Such is the univocal concept of 
being (ens), which arises through our contact with finite beings, but because the 
modification of “finite” can be separated from the concept and yet the concept itself 
remain the same, the same concept can be applied to infinite being. 
12
                                                 
11 “Et confirmatur ratio, quia ‘obiectum’: praeter conceptum suum proprium adaequatum, et inclusum in 
ipso altero duorum modorum praedictorum, nihil potest cognosci ex isto obiecto nisi per discursum; sed 
discursus praesupponit cognitionem istius simplicis ad quod discurritur. Formetur igitur ratio sic, quia 
nllum obiectum facit conceptum simplicem proprium, in isto intellectu, conceptum simplicem proprium 
alterius obiecti, nisi contineat illud aliud objectum essentialiter vel virtualiter; obiectum autem creatum non 
continet increatum essentialiter vel virtualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuitur, ut ‘posterius 
essentialiter’ attribuitur ‘priori essentialiter’,--quia contra rationem ‘posterioris essentialiter’ est includere 
virtualiter suum prius, et patet quod objectum creatum non essentialiter continent increatum secundum 
aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune; ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti 
increato.” Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, 23-24. 
12 “Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico, qui ita est unus quod eius 
unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem; sufficit etiam pro medio 
syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri.” 
Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, 18. 
 As he goes on to 
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argue, the intellect can be certain about one concept, but doubtful about another, as is the 
case with “being” (ens) and “infinite or finite.” Every philosopher was certain that his 
first principle was a being (e.g., fire, water, love, or number). And yet such 
conceptions—in being false—lacked certitude about whether such were first or secondary 
beings, and likewise created or uncreated (beings). Thus, the fact that Thales believed—
falsely, according to Scotus—water to be the first, uncreated principle of everything else 
in no way undermined his certitude that water was a being.13
      At the risk of overly conceptualizing being, a risk to which we will return below,
 Despite our ignorance of 
anything’s modification (e.g., whether a given being is primary or secondary), we still 
retain an equally applicable conception of it as a being: thus, if it turns out as one rather 
than the other (e.g., primary as opposed to not primary) we still retain the same 
conception of it as a being, but add the proper modification.  
14
                                                 
13 See Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2. See also Lectura I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2.  
14 See Section 2 below.  
 
being cannot be an analogous concept lest the realization that water is not the first being 
introduce a completely new concept. This may seem trivial, but the very nature of 
demonstration, which moves from something prior for us to something prior by nature 
without presupposing the latter’s ultimate primacy, depends upon such mediated 
movement between terms. A univocal concept, such as being, allows one to neutralize its 
modifications while demonstrating the actual existence of the one from the other (e.g., 
infinite from finite, or necessary from contingent) without moving between concepts 
during the process. To obtain a distinct and proper concept of God, conceptually 
unrelated to the finite ratio essendi, the human mind would need extra-sensory 
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illumination, which Scotus (and Aquinas) deny.15 All concepts pertaining to God retain 
traces of creation, although in neutralizing the created modifications, the infinite 
modifications can be attributed to the univocal concept. Being as a unifying concept thus 
holds a certain indifference to the diverse and disjunctive modifications of finite/infinite 
without “absorbing” all real beings—themselves either finite or infinite—into its wake.16
                                                 
15 Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, 45. 
16 This term is meant to resonate the earlier concerns on the part of Owens such that esse and essence must 
be really distinct in creatures lest the single subsisting instance of being absorb everything else in a 
Parmenidean/pantheistic fashion.   
 
Although God and creatures remain unified in their concept, they remain radically 
diverse in their reality due to their intensive modes, as will be discussed below.  
      Unlike for Scotus who attempts to neutralize modifications of finitude from our 
concepts in order to retain a ratio common to both creatures and God, for Aquinas, such 
removal must also elevate the isolated concept outside the field of creatures in order to 
secure its sovereignty of meaning divested of all traces of finitude. Aquinas also extends 
such sovereignty to the causal realm insofar as that which gives meaning to all beings in 
their being and serves as their transcendental signifier is also the cause of all beings in 
their being and not itself primum inter pares or part of what it causes in its entirety: the 
ratio essendi is the causa essendi. Such a procedure, mostly clearly executed by the 
fourth way, however, deconstructs itself. The borders of the sovereign ipseity could only 
be fortified by a radically non-univocal concept proper only to God. In other words, such 
a concentrated actuality of “only being” excluding all reference to anything other than 
itself and incommunicable to anything outside of itself, could only be designated by a 
proper name intrinsically belonging to one.  
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      Of the divine names, esse holds a special place for Aquinas.17 Referring to the scene 
from Exodus 3:14, in what comes across more as a rebuke than an answer, God reveals to 
the inquisitive Moses that “I am who I am.” He bids Moses to tell the Israelites that “I 
am” sent me to you.18 Aquinas renders the “who I am” in the third person form qui est 
(“he who is”), nevertheless capturing the sense of being at the heart of this divine 
revelation. To the question “Utrum esse proprie dicatur de Deo,” which he treats on 
multiple occasions,19 Aquinas argues that such is the maximally proper (maxime 
proprium) name of God, even more than the other divine names.20 The general argument 
behind Aquinas’s privileging qui est above the other divine names stems from its 
indeterminacy with regard to the other names, whereas each of them already presupposes 
esse.21 That name which sustains and is included in all the others must be the principal of 
all the rest.22
                                                 
17 See, for example, ST I. q. 13. a. 11; De Veritate q. 10, a. 12; In Sent. I d. 8, q. 1, a. 1. Aquinas does not 
take up this issue in SCG.  
18ST I. q. 13, a. 11, s.c. See also De Veritate q. 10, a. 12. ll. 263-265. In response to the argument that 
according to Exodus 3:14, God’s proper name is “He Who Is” and therefore it is impossible to think God is 
not, he states: “Ad decimum dicendum quod, quamvis nomen Dei sit ‘Qui est’, non tamen hoc est per se 
notum nobis, unde ratio [supra] non sequitur.”  
19 See, for example, ST I. q. 13, a. 11; In Sent. I d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.  
20 Two caveats must be mentioned: “Ad primum ergo dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis 
proprium nomen Dei quam hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et quantum 
ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad 
significandum, est magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum naturam divinam. 
Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei 
substantiam incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem. Ad secundum dicendum quod hoc 
nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute 
praeintelligitur causae.” ST I q. 13, a. 11, ad 1-2. On the Reply to Objection 1, in reference to the 
tetragrammaton (i.e., YHWH), Dobbs-Weinstein makes the following observation: “The 
incommunicability of the divine name, its very singularity, its ineffable nature, is likewise the focus of 
Aquinas’ only reference to the Tetragrammaton. In the body of the response to article 9, in an equally 
hesitant manner, Aquinas mentions that among the Jews the Tetragrammaton perhaps is an 
incommunicable name. One cannot over emphasize the great caution, the hesitancy, manifest in the two 
very brief references to the Tetragrammation, the one mention proceeded by forte est, the other succeeded 
by ut sic liceat loqui. This ineffable name, about which Aquinas says nothing, is the one name, even more 
appropriate than Qui Est, because it clearly exceeds being.” Dobbs-Weinstein, Maimonides and St. 
Thomas, 194. 
    
21 The other names say esse according to some determinate ratio, but the name “qui est” says esse 
absolutely and not determined through some addition. See In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a.1, ad 4. Even the other 
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      Aquinas counters the objection that, since every divine name implies relation to 
creatures, and yet qui est holds no such relation, it cannot properly be a divine name.23
                                                                                                                                                 
transcendentals, unum, bonum, verum, add something to ens, as unum adds indivisibility, bonum relation to 
an end, and verum relation to an exemplary form. In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, solution.  
22 One argument in particular, from his commentary on the Sentences, should be noted. This argument 
holds special interest because it utilizes the identity of esse and essence in God, and their distinctness in 
creatures, to impose the name qui est on him, while withholding it from creatures. In this argument taken 
from Avicenna, Aquinas argues: “[…] cum in omni quod est sit considerare quidditatem suam, per quod 
dicitur de eo quod est in actu, hoc nomen <<res>> imponitur rei a quidditate sua, secundum Avicennam, 
tract. II Metaph., cap. I, hoc nomen <<qui est>> vel <<ens>> imponitur ab ipso actu essendi. Cum autem 
ita quod in qualibet re creata essentia sua differat a suo esse, res illa proprie denominatur a quidditate sua, 
et non ab actu essendi, sicut homo ab humanitate.  In Deo autem ipsum esse suum est sua quidditas: et ideo 
nomen quod sumitur ab esse, proprie nominat ipsum, et est proprium nomen ejus: sicut proprum nomen 
hominis quod sumitur a quidditate sua.” In I Sent. d. 8, q. 1, a.1, solution. For created things, in which esse 
differs from their essence, the thing is properly denoted by its essence (e.g., the name “human” from 
humanity). Because of this difference between quiddity and esse, however, created things are not properly 
denoted by their actu essendi. In the case of God, as has been shown, the identity between his essence and 
his esse (“ipsum esse suum est sua quidditas”) entails that the name taken from esse (i.e., qui est) properly 
names him. 
23 See ST I. q. 13, a. 11. arg. 3 and the response: “Ad tertium dicendum quod non est necessarium quod 
omnia nomina divina importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab aliquibus 
perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen 
Qui est.”   
 
The divine names do not need to import a relation to creatures, which qui est clearly does 
not: God is apart from any relation to creation. Instead, Aquinas argues, the name 
signifies a perfection proceeding from God to creatures. Thus, esse stands as the most 
appropriate of the divine names signifying more than God as the causal fund of some 
created perfection, but instead as the analogical ground that sustains such a perfection in 
creatures through their similitude to God’s own pure plenitude of such perfection. But 
has Aquinas not borrowed such a term from creatures (i.e., “esse”) and now laundered 
any traces of finitude in order to enshrine a proper name for God? And once proper to 
God, the reapplied quasi-concept becomes radically other to all creatures in such a way 
that the once most-extensive of all concepts now becomes so closely identified with its 
proper signification so as to become devoid of meaning when attributed (extrinsically, 
that is) to anything else. 
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      We see this aforementioned problem of using “esse” as a proper name in Aquinas’s 
other arguments as well. With the fourth way discussed above, he argued that something 
that is more or less being requires there to be something that is most being. This maxime 
ens causes to be (esse) for all beings, which exhibit various degrees of being but none 
equal to the superlative. Similar to the argument of De Ente, the fourth way attempts to 
remove the various degrees of being in order to retain a concept of that which is maxime 
ens. In addition to removal, the argument needs to elevate the maximal outside the order 
that it grounds (i.e., all being) otherwise it would need to account for its own being. 
Furthermore, such elevation must diversify the superlative from all comparative degrees 
so that more, less, and most do not all occupy a single conceptual register. Instead, most 
being as the universal cause of all being transcends the field of beings in order to account 
for the field in its entirety. Just as the king as the universal cause of all governance 
(universalis causa regiminis) in his realm cannot participate in the governance to which 
he gives rise—otherwise he too would need a cause, which could only be himself—the 
most being cannot be bound by being if it is to be the principle and cause of all being 
(principium et causa essendi). Once again, as seen from the Scotistic rejoinder, to elevate 
the concept of being so as to render a distinct principle of all “being” that nevertheless is 
itself “being,” Aquinas not only removes any traces of finitude—or those imperfect 
degrees of being from which the concept is derived—he in turn removes the concept 
altogether: “Most being,” as something with a proper and pure ratio distinct from all 
other degrees of being, cannot be virtually contained in the original concept. If Aquinas 
seeks to retain the name of being (esse) for that cause of all being, then the former must 
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function as a proper name divorced from its conceptual and causal bonds to the latter. But 
to repeat the Scotistic refrain, “most rock” (or just “Rock”) would function just as well.   
      As both the De Ente argument and the fourth way show, a first with its own separate 
and purified account, which transcends the field of finite being and yet stands close 
enough to be reached through demonstration, collapses in upon itself. By removing ipsum 
esse subsistens or maxime ens from a univocal field of being, the cause of all being no 
longer should bear the name of being (i.e., equivocity). Thinking in terms of Aquinas’s 
example of governance, a sovereign who stands as universal cause of all governance 
should not himself be called a governor.24
      Again we find a similar pattern with the “argument from participation” as offered in 
Aquinas’s exposition on De Hebdomadibus. The crucial step in this argument is to show 
that ipsum esse is absolutely simple, following which Boethius via Aquinas can argue 
anything composite cannot be ipsum esse. As argued above, although one can put forth an 
account of “human itself” or “to run itself,” conceptually excluding any foreign content 
 Removing or extricating all particular causes 
from the field does not leave behind the most purified and proper sense of governance, 
but a void and abysmal ground that is itself bound by no governance. The universal cause 
of all governance is not himself subject to the economy of governance, but is the very 
ground of the economy itself. To analogically call such a sovereign cause by the name 
“governor,” as if a unity of the original concept were retained, just elevated to a higher 
level, would be a grave misnomer. Likewise, “a most being” or “a subsisting being itself” 
that does not share a common ratio essendi with finite being is no more worthy of such a 
name than of any other name. Having started our assent from within finite being, we 
cannot reach infinite being unless the latter shares a common ratio with the former. 
                                                 
24 See SCG II.15. 
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from the account (i.e., anything other than to be human or to run), a real multiplicity 
always accompanies these concepts insofar as all concrete humans or runners contain 
elements other than to be human or to run, such as “musicality” or “paleness.” The 
account of being itself, on the other hand, must actually exclude real multiplicity and 
anything alien to itself—not even allowing the virtual containment of disjunctive 
modifications a la Scotus. This is because unlike the other concepts, ipsum esse actually 
subsists and, as dictated by the conditions for such pure subsistence, it must exclude 
anything other than or in excess of its self-subsistence. Furthermore, such actual 
subsistence is necessary for there to be a real participation, which itself demands there to 
be a real distinction between the participants (i.e., beings other than subsisting being 
itself) and that in which they participate. To repeat a common refrain, Socrates only 
logically participates in “human itself” because such a form does not subsist apart from 
concrete humans such as Socrates. And with such logical participation, a real distinction 
does not result.  
      The underlying problem with this argument, as with the others, is that Aquinas 
transforms the transcendental concept with which he begins (i.e., ens and esse as most 
indeterminate and abstract) into an actual perfection excluding the real multiplicity of 
beings, and once transformed, belongs properly to God alone and only derivatively to 
creatures. There is no univocal share between the finite and infinite, but insofar as being 
is made to subsist, all causal and linguistic exchange between finite and infinite “beings” 
must be curtailed. Although analogy is not explicitly operative in this argument, it is 
close at hand, especially in terms of the account of participation: because something that 
only participates a perfection, but is not such through its essence, can make claim to that 
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perfection only according to a lesser ratio. Thus, the argument really seeks to exclude 
multiplicity from the unity of being and find the latter’s proper voice when speaking of 
“the simple, one, and sublime, God himself.” For the very reason, however, that any 
concept of being with which human intellection begins borrows its content from creatures 
(e.g., Scotus’s confused and indeterminate concept of being indifferent with respect to 
modification) Aquinas’s tactics of remotional elevation erect nothing less than a 
phantasmatic pure act of being itself by itself (i.e., ipseity) and instituted around the 
proper name of “esse.” 
      We can also see such move with the argument from act and potency. The existential 
impotence of every created essence, such that the essence “seraphim” is no closer to 
being qua essence than is the essence “phoenix,” requires there to be some actual 
existential ground by which such essences can come to be. This means that such a ground 
must be per se, otherwise it too would stand in potency to its existential actuality. Any 
traces of potency refer to something more actual and prior to it. And, once again, to keep 
the chain from running into infinity, Aquinas must both find a first, but then also elevate 
this first to a position outside the order as a whole. The reason why such an elevation 
takes place is that to account for the cause of all being, something which itself is not 
being must be posited. Otherwise, if it itself were part of this same order it would be 
causa sui.25
                                                 
25 This argument is similar to his arguments against a composition in God, put forth both in his Expositio 
and also in ST I, q. 3, a. 1, resp. I will skip over a separate discussion of these arguments.  
 Aquinas concludes with something that must be only being, that is by 
“removing” any ground for composition, otherwise we could not account for the causal 
chain itself.  
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      Like with the other arguments, once elevated above all being of which it is the cause 
(causa essendi), it seems that the most proper name for the cause itself should be “not-
being.” Once again, however, Aquinas concludes that such a cause is still being, but 
being according to a different and elevated ratio. If Aquinas seeks to provide an account 
of “all being,” then he needs either some cause that is not itself included within being or 
something with being that is cause of itself (causa sui).26
      For metaphysical demonstrations that utilize the process of remotion, the removal 
must operate within one and the same concept so that after the removal, what is left (i.e., 
the concept applicable to God) is still linked to the original concept. If the finite wisdom 
or finite being of creatures is not wisdom or being in the same sense (ratio) as that of 
their cause (i.e., univocally), then by removing the former we are left with no concept at 
all. Based on our knowledge of the former, we have just as much reason to conclude that 
 But such an eminent cause need 
not be an analogical cause. At best, we could say that such a cause is “beyond being” but 
we cannot conclude that it is “only being” or “most being” or “pure being,” or any of the 
other superlatives that Aquinas uses on an analogical register. Aquinas smuggles in an 
analogical concept of being to do the demonstrative work of a univocal concept, but 
concluding to such a concept is unfounded. As Scotus argues, the ground of all being, if 
not itself included under the same ratio essendi as its effects, should no more be called 
most being or subsisting being (i.e., being according to a separate ratio) than it should be 
called a rock.  
                                                 
26 One argument in particular, from his commentary on the Sentences, should also be noted. This argument 
holds special interest because it utilizes the identity of esse and essence in God, and their distinctness in 
creatures, to impose the name qui est on him, while withholding it from creatures. For Aquinas’s argument 
taken from Avicenna, see above fn. 22. For created things, in which esse differs from their essence, the 
thing is properly denoted by its essence (e.g., the name “human” from humanity). Because of this 
difference between quiddity and esse, however, created things are not properly denoted by their actu 
essendi. In the case of God, as has been shown, the identity between his essence and his esse (“ipsum esse 
suum est sua quidditas”) entails that the name taken from esse (i.e., qui est) properly names him. 
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God is a stone. We are left only with a trace of the cause, best accompanied by apophatic 
discourse, but not positive affirmations that continue to use the original name (i.e., esse) 
in a dual manner of both intrinsically relating to God and extrinsically to creatures as 
having been caused by God. The problem, however, is that being is a concept derived 
from creatures; thus attempting to purify the concept by removing any vestiges of 
finitude in order to retain a proper concept that signifies an actus primus et purus 
eradicates the concept in its entirety. To institute the empty signifier, or phantasm, that 
remains as the proper name of God would require a great metaphysical imperialism. 
      We see this imperialism enacted when Aquinas’s existential metaphysics, and even 
more his existential apologists, must explain what exactly esse means in reference to 
creatures. In other words, once God has been established as ipsum esse subsistens, what 
does the reapplication of esse to creatures entail? We have found that the problem with an 
“existential metaphysics” is that beings must participate ipsum esse subsistens in order to 
be and yet such a perfection, having been introduced to explain the actuality of real 
beings as distinct from mere fictions, turns out to be nothing more than their participative 
relation to something else. Because esse and essence are really distinct in creatures, and 
really identical only in God, an analogical concept of being (ens) must be used to bridge 
the gap. But in terms of creatures, they are beings (entia) only insofar as having being 
(esse) from another (i.e., through participation); but the esse that they have turns out to be 
nothing more than a semblance or reflection of being itself, and thus they are “entia” only 
by relation, not by their own intrinsic act.    
      As illustrated by the sun’s illumination of air, the air itself lacks the act of 
illumination by itself and does not have the power to be illuminated apart from its cause. 
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“Illumination” turns out to be nothing more than the intimacy of the sun’s radiance to the 
air, which more and more overruns the air itself as it becomes increasingly illuminated. 
Likewise with the corresponding conservation of being, God’s intimacy to beings as the 
cause of their “being” fails to reveal what it is about these beings themselves by which 
they (formally) are.27
      But to argue that “God’s presence” is what distinguishes an actual being from a mere 
fiction, or that which allows us to reach the thing in its reality beyond the mere 
determinations of our intellect and imagination, evacuates the explanatory power of esse 
as indicating some intrinsic act of being other than its essence. To return to Fabro’s term 
from above, the full metaphysical import of any creature seems to be either its essential 
determinations (i.e., form and matter in the case of sublunary beings, and form alone in 
the case of simple substances) or its relation to its cause, but not its own intrinsic act of 
 As a name proper to God, and God’s most proper name, the 
signifier “esse” comes to deprive creatures of the very perfection it was introduced to 
signify (i.e., actual existence) and to enshrine such deprivation as the ultimate actuality of 
created beings. Such a signifier comes to properly name only divine perfection and 
thereby, even when used to designate created existence in a secondary or analogical 
sense, it fails to signify the perfection of creatures beyond their substantiality or 
thingness. The innermost perfection of creatures is their being related to God through the 
act of creation and the continued act of conservation. Thus, their proper and intrinsic act 
of being by which they stand outside of nothingness is the spectral omnipresence of God.  
                                                 
27 See ST I, q. 8, a.1, resp. and Chapter V Section 3 above. Aquinas had asked whether God is in all things. 
He answers that God is in all things, but not as part of the essence or as an accident, but as an agent is 
present in that which it acts. He further explains that the agent must conjoined to that in which it 
immediately acts and touch it with its power (“Oportet enim omne agens...sua virtute illud contingere”). He 
once again invokes the analogy of illuminated air and its need for the conserving presence of light, without 
which it would relapse into darkness. Thus, he argues, being is most intimate to each thing.  
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being.28
      Although an existential reading of Aquinas would resist this reduction of esse to the 
mere factual status of the essence, appealing to the incidentality of the free act of 
creation, such a continued insistence only serves to deprive the creature of its most 
fundamental actuality insofar as esse can never explain anything “proper” to it. 
Furthermore, Aquinas’s thought seems to quickly move beyond this groundless initium of 
creation, focusing instead upon the intelligibility that results from the universe’s order as 
guided by a first principium, who in its wisdom dispenses all things according to their 
form toward a common end. In terms of such order, esse (or non-esse) comes to be 
 Although Fabro, along with Gilson and others, attempts to carve out a larger role 
for each being’s intrinsic act of being, to argue that “as long as it is not being annihilated, 
it remains an actuated act,” overly existentializes what for Aquinas can be rendered in 
essential terms: something’s “not being annihilated” relates to a commitment on the part 
of God as his first providential act, and thus concerns not the creature itself, but the way 
in which its cause has decided to relate to it. This allows some “actuated acts” to be 
necessary in virtue of their forms (i.e., they need not overcome materiality), whereas 
others are contingent due their formal act of informing the contrariety of a hylic matter. 
What seems to be left out of this account, once again, is a distinct extra-formal act of 
being, which would signify anything more than the factual status of various essences as 
determined by God.   
                                                 
28 “Esse is the act that constitutes the proper terminus of transcendent causality (creation, conservation) and 
it is by virtue of this direct causality of esse that God operates immediately in every agent. Hence the 
derivation of participated esse from the esse per essentiam is direct, and along strict metaphysical lines, as 
grounded act from grounding Act. In fact, the participated actus essendi, precisely as participated, is 
intrinsically dependent on God. But once it has been created, and as long as it is not being annihilated, it 
remains an actuated act to the full extent of its metaphysical import. It belongs therefore to God to be the 
cause of esse by virtue of his very nature” “Intensive Hermeneutics,” 474. It is exactly this “it remains an 
actuated act to the full extent of its metaphysical import” that I do not think that Aquinas’s account 
achieves.  
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treated as a mere moment in the essential content of something’s teleological and 
providential intelligibility. This does not mean, however, that Aquinas allots a status to 
essences themselves prior to creation apart from the divine intellect in the form of esse 
essentiae or Platonic subsistence.29
      Nevertheless, according to Scotus, Aquinas’s account draws a set of troubling 
distinctions in terms of the separation of exemplares from rationes as they relate to his 
separation of practical from speculative cognition. The trouble, according to Scotus, is 
minimization of the divine will in the actual production of things. As Aquinas argues in 
the Summa Theologica, ideas in their capacity as principles of divine knowledge are 
rationes, whereas in their capacity of divine production, they are exemplares.
  
30 Although 
in agreement that any account of divine ideas must secure the absolute groundlessness of 
creation with respect to all essential or ideational orders against the encroachment of an 
overabundant necessitation (i.e., emanation), Scotus highlights Aquinas’s failure to place 
enough emphasis on the divine will. Aquinas’s argument, he maintains, makes “the 
coming-to-be” or “not-coming-to-be” (fiendum et non fiendum) of any given ratio part of 
its ideational content.31
                                                 
29 See Chapter IV above.  
30 For a discussion of both these distinctions, see Chapter IV above. Scotus seems to be unaware of 
Aquinas’s distinction between speculative and virtually (i.e., non-actual) practical cognition. As Aquinas 
argues in De Veritate, God’s ideas of those things that are not, were not, and never will be are part of his 
virtually practical cognition. See De Veritate q. 3, a. 6, resp. In ST I, q. 15, a. 3, ad. 2, where Aquinas states 
that of non-existent things, God does not have practical knowledge, except virtually. Thus, there is no 
exemplar of such things in God, only a ratio. Scotus seems to be referring to this article and thus (seems to 
be) primarily concerned with the distinction between rationes and exemplares. For Scotus’s argument, see 
John Duns Scotus, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture Reportatio I-A: Latin Text and English 
Translation. Volume 2. trans and ed. Allan B. Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov (St. Bonaventure: The 
Franciscan Institute, 2008). Hereafter “Reportatio.” 
 Thus, although, on the one hand, God is radically free to create or 
31 “Minor patet, quia si idea ante actum voluntatis respiceret diversimode possibile fiendum et non fiendum, 
ergo, intellectus ostendens hoc voluntati ut unum possibile fiendum et aliud non fiendum, aut voluntas non 
posset non velle illud fieri (et sic non esset libera sed necessaria, respectu aliorum a se), vel si posset velle 
illud non fieri, posset esse non recta, quia faceret contra rationem rectam dictantem hoc esse faciendum—
quorum utrumque est impossibile. Ergo penes possible futurum et non futurum non accipitur distinction 
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not create, God, on the other hand, also knows what God will do. Barring any 
considerations of self-deception or change of mind, what God knows he is going-to-will 
must in fact happen. Thus, the infallibility of divine knowledge objectifies the extra-
essential incidentality of the founding act of creation: what existential Thomists took 
pains to describe as an extra-essential event, a grounding act outside of and presupposed 
by any essential economy of substances, has been rendered substantial and objective by 
the divine intellect. The coming-to-be or not-coming-to-be of any creature becomes part 
of its essential content as conceived by the divine intellect. The being per accidens, or 
incidentality, of the giving of being is absorbed into the ideational structure of God’s 
knowledge.  
      The problem, Scotus argues, concerns Aquinas’s impartation of necessity (as 
reflected by Scotus’s use of the gerundive fiendum or non-fiendum) to the content of the 
idea before it has been offered to the will: the practical role of the intellect, Scotus 
charges, should not add anything to speculation prior to the operation of the will lest we 
undermine the will’s free act.32 By distinguishing practical ideas containing the mark 
“meant to come to be” (fiendum) from the mere theoretical content of the idea itself, 
Scotus argues that such a view bars the will from its own radical act of legislation. Only 
the divine will, and not some essential difference between possible objects or divine 
ideas, should account for something’s coming into being.33
                                                                                                                                                 
ideae practicae a speculativa.” Reportatio d. 36, p. 2, q. 1-2, 101. For an extended analysis of this argument, 
see also Timothy B. Noone, “Aquinas on Divine Ideas: Scotus’s Evaluation,” 316-318.  
32 What worries Scotus is the type of argument established in SCG III.98. 
33 “Sed fiendum et non fiendum non sunt aliquae differentiae essentiales ‘possibilis’ in obiectis vel in 
finibus ideae practicae vel speculativae, —sed solummodo per actum voluntatis divinae—acceptantis hoc 
fieri et non acceptantis aliud fieri—illud est possibile fiendum et aliud non fiendum; et est ista differentia in 
obiectis, et non penes aliquas differentias possibilis in se, essentiales sibi.” Reportatio d. 36, p. 2, q. 1-2, 
102.  
 What distinguishes the two 
according to Scotus is not something contained within their concept or idea—even as 
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conceived perfectly by God from the perspective of the universe as a whole—but the 
divine will (voluntas) in its independence from the intellect.  
      The importance of Scotus’s argument, I would argue, relates back to the issue of 
God’s providential resolve as discussed above.34
      The will, according to Scotus’s reading of Aquinas, becomes but the expression of 
that which has been resolved by the divine intellect according to its providential 
resolution to carry out the best possible order. Gilson, however, interprets Scotus’s 
insistence on the divine will contra-Aquinas as the direct result of the former’s univocal 
theory of being and its concomitant rejection of a pure Act of Being. Once beings are 
 Although the choice between being and 
nothingness and conservation and annihilation required a free act of divine will in order 
to ground what otherwise would have remained groundless, God’s role quickly 
transitions from benefactor of a gift to provider of a loan. Thus the radical incidentality at 
the root of being, grounded upon a radical act of gratuity incommensurable with any 
created nature, comes to be neutralized through its inscription within a providential plan. 
Insofar as God indebts himself to his own plan, and short of any unforeseen intervention 
of his will, there is no room for the departure from nor interference with such a plan. A 
creature’s esse is the result (consequitur) following from its essential determination in the 
divine intellect of what should and should not come to be as necessitated by the 
providential plan to which God has indebted himself. Thus, for Aquinas, contingency 
barely retains traces of the radical incidentality of being otherwise (i.e., nothingness) 
against which being emerges. Such radical incidentality, which had formed a central 
mode of analysis for existential Thomism, comes to be neutralized once fiendum and non-
fiendum become part of the ideational content of divine ideas. 
                                                 
34 See Chapter V Section 5 above.  
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flattened into a univocal field of beings and nothing radically exceeds the field such that 
it in excelsu could ground the field as a whole and retain for itself an excellence by purity 
whereby it would be radically diverse from everything else, then from within the univocal 
field something else must distinguish the primum inter pares. The Scotistic primum’s 
mark of distinction, Gilson argues, by which it affirms its own necessity and renders all 
other beings contingent, due to their equality with it qua being, can only be the divine 
will.35
                                                 
35 “In a doctrine which is based on univocal being and not upon analogical acts of being, a dividing line 
other than the act of being must be drawn between God and creatures. The role played in Thomism by the 
existential purity of the divine Act of Being is played in Scotism by the divine will.” Gilson, Christian 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 460. See also Maritain’s Existence and the Existent. In speaking of an 
authentic Thomistic existentialism, he places Descartes—as an heir of Scotism—within a tradition (called 
“inauthentic existentialism” by Maritain) that emphasizes divine liberty at the expense of intelligibility. 
Maritain argues that “authentic existentialism” is one that affirms the primacy of existence, “but as 
implying and preserving essences or natures and as manifesting the supreme victory of the intellect and 
intelligibility” (3). “Inauthentic existentialism,” of which twentieth-century existentialism is the heir, also 
affirms the primacy of existence, but “destroys and abolishes” essences and natures and thus “manifests the 
supreme defeat of the intellect and intelligibility.” Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 3-5. 
 Lest Scotus make the same “mistake” as Avicenna and render everything 
necessary via a second order necessity, the divine will assures the radical contingency of 
all other beings. They (i.e., the pares) require the free act of the primum to bring them 
into existence. But once they come to be as beings, they have the same claim to being as 
the first, albeit as modified by finite attributes (i.e., finite, created, contingent, etc.). Thus, 
Gilson seems to suggest, Thomistic existentialism holds open the existentiality of any 
creature through a dynamic interplay and exchange between analogically distinct and 
irreducible acts-of-being, all crowned by the pure Act of Being of Qui Est. Although the 
divine intellect may infallibly know the workings of the existential economy, of 
everything that will or will not come to be as seen by His complete and eternal gaze over 
esse’s temporalized unfolding, and this would seem to render it an idea and part of the 
essential economy, the primary exchange between God and creatures is not between 
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knowing subject and known object, but between the purity of an Act and its limited 
imitating acts. Thus, Gilson would argue, what God knows is himself as imitable by other 
acts-of-being (i.e., creatures), able to enact imitations of his own pure act. As Aquinas 
argues, God knows all things as an imitation of himself, just as, if light knew itself, it 
would know all other colors, or if the center knew itself, it would know all other lines.36
      The problem with such a response, however, is that existentialism deprives creatures 
of their own actus essendi, making them instead spectacles of divine radiance. Insofar as 
the real distinction between essence and existence (esse) attempts to separate the 
conditions of essential possibility from existential actuality, such a view threatens 
creation ex nihilo, according to Scotus.
 
The emphasis on the primacy of act is retained without an overly-essentialized reduction 
to what is known.  
37
                                                 
36 See ST I q. 14, a. 6, resp.  
37 “igitur si propter scientiam Dei, quam ab aeterno habet de lapide, oportet ponere lapidem in esse 
essentiae, eadem ratione poneretur in esse existentiae ab aeterno; item, sicut argutum est, non erit creatio de 
nihilo,-vel si aliquo modo salvetur creatio, verius erit creatio rei secundum esse essentiae, ut supra argutum 
est.” Lectura I. d. 36 Unica, 24 
 The problem with holding onto esse as a really 
distinct act of being is not that it resists definition. Haecceitas, as will be seen, resists 
definition and yet remains indispensable in the account of the thing, according to Scotus. 
Instead, the problem arises from the fact that such“perfection” deprives the creature of 
what should be most fundamental to it (even if caused by another), namely, its factual 
emergence as being of a fundamentally different order than mere fictions. Such an 
emergence, as I will argue against Gilson below, requires real beings to be in their own 
right. Otherwise, creation merely creates a diminished and parasitical extension of divine 
being without issuing forth in re a diverse order of beings. Thinking creation as the “gift 
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of being,” and yet as a gift that is not really given, fails to diversify God from creatures, 
the very diversity for which “esse” was introduced in the first place. 
      The problem with thinking creation as the gift of being is not that esse fails to appear 
as a “real predicate” possessed by some beings and lacked by others. Such reification 
most certainly would reduce esse to the economic exchange of the essential economy, as 
merely one more property transferable between substantial agents grounded in the gold 
standard of divine esse. Creation must be thought in terms of givenness and this entails 
thinking the act of creation outside an economy of exchange and the logic of necessity 
bound by the principles of sufficient reason. Such a groundless arrival, what Marion 
refers to as “an unpredictable landing,” exceeds all essential determinability.38
      The mistake of an overly existentialized reading of Aquinas has been to mark off a 
separate role for esse as some act really distinct from essence.
 The 
problem thus results not from the groundlessness of creation as gift, but from the shackles 
of existential participation. With esse as the basis of creation and that which is given 
through the creative act, the landing is not unpredictable, but providentially ratified. 
39
                                                 
38 See Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness. Especially, pp. 131-139. “Only a 
phenomenology of givenness can return to the things themselves because in order to return to them, it is 
necessary first to see them, therefore to see them as they come and, in the end, to bear their unpredictable 
landing” Ibid 4. To think the true givenness of creation, creatures must emerge in their own right, an 
emergence stifled by binding creation to esse. The gift is not given, but necessarily misfires; such a failed 
landing results not on account of the demands of conforming to an essential economy, but from wedding 
esse so closely with the indivisible simplicity of divine ipseity. 
 If, however, the goal is 
39 A real distinction, Scotus argues, places too much emphasis on a pre-created esse essentiae (or “essential 
being”), which serves almost as a cosmic blueprint ready to be actualized when imparted with esse 
exsistentiae (or existential being). Against such an essentially robust account of pre-created possibility, 
Scotus argues that the relation of God to creatures from eternity does not require a real relation. There is 
instead an ideal relation according to “diminished being” (esse deminutum), which Scotus also calls 
“known being” (esse cognitum) and distinguishes from both essential being (esse essentiae) and existential 
being (esse exsistentiae). He thus moves to separate mere known being, which humanity has from itself as a 
“supposed being” (ens ratum) even before creation, from both essential being and actual existence, neither 
of which the ens ratum possesses before creation. “Ideo dico quod res ab aeterno non habuit esse verum 
essentiae vel exsistentiae, sed fundat relationem idealem secundum esse deminutum, quod habuit ab 
aeterno (quod est esse verum, distinctum contra esse essentiae et esse exsistentiae, sicut patet ex VI 
Metaphysicae): sicut si ponatur quod ego fuissem ab aeterno et quod ab aeterno intellexissem rosam, ab 
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to think the real, which somehow the conceptual imperialism of essentialism fails to 
capture, then perhaps instead, Scotus, Suarez, and others are correct in rejecting the real 
otherness of esse in the act of creation. As Scotus argues, creation creates something, that 
is, a fully actualized being. Why not simply reduce the fully actualized being to the 
creative act, instead of withholding a (really) distinct contribution for esse in this act, 
especially once esse becomes a perfection only extrinsically related to creatures?  Why 
continue to emphasize esse as the unique effect of the act of creation? Above we 
addressed Aquinas’s argument that to create even the most finite effect, an infinite power 
                                                                                                                                                 
aeterno tunc intellexi rosam secundum esse suum essentiae et secundum esse exsistentiae; et tamen non 
habuit nisi cognitum, -sicut si modo rosa omnino nihil esset, intelligo rosam et secundum esse essentia et 
exsistentiae, et tamen neutrum habet. Unde terminus intellectionis est esse essentiae vel esse exsistentiae, -
et tamen illud quod obicitur intellectui, tantum habet esse deminutum in intellectu.” Lectura I d. 36 q. 
Unica, 26-27. For a discussion of this term “esse diminutum,” see Armand Maurer, “Ens Diminutum: A 
Note on its Origins and Meaning.” Medieval Studies 12 (1950): 216-222. Closely associated with “ens 
diminutum” is the concept of “ens ratum.” Scotus states: “...quando arguitur quod humanitas de se non est 
ens ratum, dicendum quod si intelligatur per ‘ens ratum’ ens prout distinguitur ab impossibili, cui non 
repugnat esse, sic homo de se est ens ratum formaliter,-et a quod habet quod sit ens, ab eodem habet quod 
sit ens ratum de se formaliter: nec huius est aliqua causa, sicut non est aliqua causa quare albedo repugnat 
nigredini nisi quia est albedo; sed tamen non sequitur quod tunc humanitas sit Deus, quia Deus non tantum 
est ens cui competit esse, sed est ipsum esse. Si autem intelligatur per ‘esse ratum’ esse essentiae, tunc dico 
quod homo non est de se ens ratum quia de se non habet esse essentiae.- Et quando dicitur quod habet tunc 
respectum ad Deum et non ad Deum ut efficiens est, quia ‘efficiens’ non terminat quaestionem ‘quid est’ 
sed definitio, dico quod illud esse ratum, quod causa esse actualis exsistentiae; et ideo Deus sic terminat 
relationem utriusque, in quantum dat utrumque esse effective.” Lectura I d. 36 q. Unica, 32. Scotus argues 
that if by ‘ens ratum’ one understand that which is distinguished from the impossible and is not repugnant 
to esse, then “human”—or any other possible essence—has from itself ‘ens ratum.’ For example, there is 
no cause for why whiteness is repugnant to blackness “nisi quia est albedo.” Scotus makes known, 
however, that such ens ratum cannot be accounted for by preexisting essential being (esse essentiae). He 
states: “Si autem intelligatur per ‘esse ratum’ esse essentiae, tunc dico quod homo non est de se ens ratum 
quia de se non habet esse essentiae.” Lectura I d. 36 q. Unica, 32. In response to the position that creation 
adds actual existence to already (existing) essential possibility, Scotus offers the following response: 
According to such view, which attempts to safeguard essential possibility apart from actual existence, God 
would create de nihilo (as Scotus here calls it) only in a limited and restricted manner. Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 
2, 77-78. That is, He would create secundum esse existentiae, but not secundum esse essentiae. Against 
those who hedge their bets around such a distinction—and Scotus probably has Henry of Ghent in mind—
Scotus argues that from nothing, God creates both existential and essential esse because “...essential being 
is never really separate from existential being.” Instead, the two are modally distinct. The full passage 
reads: “Quantum ergo ad istum articulum [scil: n.76], dico quod de nihilo (id est non de aliquo) secundum 
esse exsistentiae postest Deus creare, et per consequens de nihilo (id est non de aliquo) secundum esse 
essentiae, quia ut probatum est distinctione 36 primi libri, numquam esse essentiae realiter separatur ab 
esse exsistentiae.” Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 2, 82. 
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is required.40
On this precise point, and obviously with the position of Thomas Aquinas in mind, 
Scotus argues along entirely different lines. Of course, he too agrees that God alone can 
create, but not for the reason that God alone can give esse. In point of fact, Scotus could 
not well accept such a principle without giving up his own notion of being. What is it, 
according to him, to be an actually existing being? As has been said, it is to be an actually 
complete essence. Now every time any efficient cause produces a compound of matter 
and form, all complete with all its individual determinations, since what it produces is a 
real essence, it also produces a real existence.
 The importance of this argument for existential Thomism is what it reveals 
in contrast to essentialism and its account of creation. Gilson, for example claims that 
Aquinas’s argument highlights the infinite distance between being and nothingness, a gap 
that no created essence, no matter how essentially complete, can overcome. Only God as 
the pure Act of Being can provide such being to creatures.  
       What certain readers of Aquinas miss, according to Gilson, is that creation is the 
“giving of being” from out of the dark abyss of nothingness. Duns Scotus, conceptual 
imperialist par excellence, is clearly guilty of such a charge. Gilson states:  
41
Creatures are productive of esse for Scotus because generation brings about essential 
completion. The problem, as Gilson sees it, is that Scotistic esse is nothing other than the 
complete essence, which entails that God’s infinite distance from creatures is not his 
being being itself (ipsum esse). Instead, such distance persists only because he is infinite 
being (ens), and they finite. Thus, God infinitely transcends creatures but only in terms of 
essence. Furthermore, although there is an infinite distance between infinite and finite 
being, the same distance does not hold between finite beings and nothingness. Each 
created being is removed from nothingness in proportion to its degree of being (i.e., 
essence). Existence becomes an intrinsic mode of created essences. Although only God’s 
  
                                                 
40 See Chapter V above.  
41 Being and Some Philosophers, 90. 
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existence necessarily belongs to his essence, once any creature comes to be (i.e., 
contingently through an act of divine will), such an intrinsic mode belongs to its essence. 
According to Gilson, placing existence under essential dominion as one of its modes 
undermines the revolution undertaken by Aquinas.  
      For Scotus, actual existence is the outcome of a fully determined essence. As 
outcome, esse does not add anything to the essence, but merely marks the essential 
completion. Such “modification” of the essential reality does not change nor perfect the 
essence because an existing essence does not acquire any additional reality than a “non-
existing essence.”42
                                                 
42 For Scotus, a created being’s esse is “modally” distinct from its essence. Esse is an essential 
modification. By “mode” Scotus implies the degree of intensity of a certain nature. In his Ordinatio, he 
defines the modal distinction as follows: “Requiritur ergo distinctio, inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus 
communis et inter illud a quo accipitur conceptus proprius, non ut distinctio realitatis et realitatis sed 
distinctio realitatis et modi proprii et intrinseci eiusdem,-quae distinctio sufficit ad habendum conceptum 
perfectum vel imperfectum de eodem, quorum imperfectus sit communis et perfectus sit proprius.” 
Ordinatio I, d. 8, Pars 1, q. 3, 139. The two concepts formed around this distinction do not conceive two 
distinct realities, but a distinction of a reality and its particular and intrinsic mode. The common concept of 
the nature as conceived without the intrinsic and proper mode is understood imperfectly, while that 
particular (proprius) concept which includes the mode is understood more perfectly. The modal distinction 
is less than real because no nature subsists in re without intensive modification. For example, the nature 
whiteness and this intensity or degree of whiteness marks a modal distinction. This particular whiteness 
with its degree of intensity could be conceived merely as common whiteness; and yet unmodified whiteness 
does not really exist apart from a specific degree. As Peter King succinctly states: “The core intuition 
behind Scotus’s modal distinction is, roughly, that some natures come in a range of degrees that are 
inseparably a part of what they are.” Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” The Cambridge Companion to 
Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 25. Perhaps the most 
noted use of this distinction for Scotus is distinguishing between the transcendental concept being (ens) and 
its modes of infinite and finite: although one can conceive a being apart from finite and infinite, there is no 
being that is not either finite or infinite. “...conceptus speciei non est tantum conceptus realitatis et modi 
intrinseci eiusdem realitatis, quia tunc albedo posset esse genus, et gradus intrinseci albedinis possent esse 
differentiae specificae; illa autem per quae commune aliquod contrahitur ad Deum et creaturam, sunt 
finitum et infinitum, qui dicunt gradus intrinsecos ipsius...” Ordinatio I, d. 8, Pars 1, q. 3, 108. Thus, when 
treating the mode as separate from the nature, a less than real distinction pertains between the two. 
According to Grajewski, an intrinsic mode allows a reality to be understood as a perfect concept; without 
such a mode the reality can only be understood imperfectly. Thus, the reality is not understood under two 
distinct concepts, and even less are two distinct realities understood, but one reality conceived either 
perfectly or imperfectly. See Maurice J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in 
Metaphysics (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), 86-87.Thus, to 
understand a created essence without esse would be to understand it imperfectly. Esse, for Scotus, is an 
intrinsic mode of the essence and not an extra-essential perfection as it is for Aquinas. Scotus describes the 
relationship between an essence and the mode of existing as a “modal distinction,” which does not require 
two distinct realities, nor two distinct concepts, but the conceptualization of a single reality according to 
 What the latter signifies is that the essence has not been individuated, 
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and thus has not taken on necessary determinations to actually exist. Against an 
essentialist reduction of esse to the mere emergence of a fully determined essence, Gilson 
notes both Aquinas and Scotus posit an ultimate actuality of form, which is itself not 
form: in the case of Aquinas, this is esse; for Scotus, however, it is haecceitas. On the 
latter, Gilson states: 
The Scotist “thisness” is not the cause of existence, but it is the unmistakable sign that the 
essence under consideration is now fit to exist; then, as a matter of fact, it does exist. Be 
it in God or in finite things, existence is that modality of being which belongs to 
completely individualized essence. Whether they be such by themselves, which is the 
case of God alone, or they be such by another one, which is the case of all creatures, fully 
individualized essences exist in their own right [m.e.].43
This “to exist in their own right,” which Gilson attributes to a failure on the part of 
Scotistic thought, is exactly where Aquinas’s thought on esse has fallen short. As argued 
above, creatures in Aquinas’s analogical universe become nothing more than a reflection 
of divine esse in whose perfect radiance they are lost. Instead of allowing thought to 
reach that condition by which things emerge as diverse from everything else, most 
especially from God, esse over-fortifies against the encroachment of the finite. This 
entails that God alone has being; everything else is reduced to a reflection, a pale 
similitude, of divine esse without actually emerging in its own right. Unlike with Scotus’s 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
various degrees of perfection. A conception of the essence alone provides an imperfect conception, whereas 
an essence along with existence provides a more perfect conception. Esse merely marks the degree of being 
something has until it reaches completion in the individual, or what, for Scotus, marks the “perfection” of 
the essence. Gilson discusses Scotus’s reading of esse: “For each and every condition of the essence, there 
is a corresponding degree of being (esse), which is exactly proportional to it. In other and perhaps better 
words, being (esse) is nothing else than the intrinsic reality of essence itself, in each one of the various 
conditions in which it is to be found. This is why, wherever there is essence there is being, and what we call 
existence is simply the definite mode of being which is that of an essence when it has received the complete 
series of its determinations. It is nothing new for it to be. Essence always is.” See Gilson, Being and Some 
Philosophers, 86. Most significant to note is the claim that “it is nothing new for [an essence] to be.” 
According to Gilson, esse is something an essence takes on in proportion to its degree of determination. 
Thus, when an essence is fully determined as this (i.e., haecceitas), it “exists.” As an intrinsic mode of an 
essence, however, esse must admit of degrees. What Gilson finds missing from such an account is an 
originary act of radical newness to supervene upon the essence from outside the essential order. 
43 Being and Some Philosophers, 94. 
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univocal community of being, which God exceeds through his infinite modification, the 
analogical community becomes a community of one sovereign ipseity of being.  
      For Gilson, Scotus’s fully modified essences (i.e., individuals) bound together by a 
common conception of being, which includes both finite and infinite modes, would seem 
to flatten the distance Aquinas strives to uphold through analogy. Furthermore, with 
creatures no longer needing to participate their being, they emerge in their own right as 
individuals. Instead of multiplying being into a multiplicity of subsisting ipseities, where 
each individual becomes its own sovereign subsistence (the concern of Dewan addressed 
above), being as a univocal ratio can hold together because singularity offers the source 
of radical diversity (i.e., not merely difference).44 Scotistic community is conceptual, to 
use Bettoni’s words, but not real.45
                                                 
44 For Scotus, singularity (haecceitas) is not without being determined by the otherness of everything which 
it is not. Thus, diversity stands as an irreducibly defining characteristic of singularity.      
45 Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. Bernadine Bonansea 
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 37. 
 Thus, “being” as the common conceptual condition 
for membership in such a community extends equally to all its members. The 
consequence of such an extension is that there is nothing like a pure act of being (or 
Being) because everything is equally contained in the community of beings. Such a 
univocal community, although conceptual, is neither an imperialism (Gilson) nor a 
“uniform regime of entity” (Marion), because the concept of being (conceptus entis) 
reigns over a reality whose ultimate perfection (i.e., in terms of singularity), which serves 
both to identify each thing as a this, but to also (and in the very same process) distinguish 
it from everything else, cannot be represented in conceptual terms. Thus, the concept’s 
imperium extends qua being to everything, but only in conceptual, not real, communion, 
and qua essence to all creatures as part of quidditive communities bound by some real 
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essential core (e.g., humanity or equinity) and yet comprised of individuals 
incommensurable as thises, an incommensurability unrepresentable by the concept.   
      Univocity, I would argue, functions in a metaphysical economy whose basic units are 
singular individuals irreducible in their singularity to an “analogical community.”46
      Individuals of the same nature, Scotus argues, both agree with one another in 
something (i.e., that they are of the same nature), but also differ in that they are diverse 
beings. That by which they differ must be reduced to some item that is diverse primarily. 
This means that even though this individual and that individual formally agree in their 
nature, their thisness and thatness by which they differ cannot be reduced to a common 
ground (i.e., primarily diverse). This “lateral move” between this and that, to borrow a 
phrase from Timothy Noone, cannot be bridged by a difference reducible to a common 
 
Ontologically, beings resist analogical communion according to Scotus due to haecceitas, 
or that by which each thing is both perfected, but also diversified, each one from the next. 
Such diversity resists analogical comparison insofar as there can be no commerce 
between a this and that: they remain radically incommensurable for Scotus, and a central 
feature of each thing’s haecceitas is the fact of not-being anything else. Haecceitas 
presupposes real diversity, whereas all commonality transpires in terms of essence. Thus, 
beings are both constituted by their radical diversity (i.e., part of what it means to be this 
is to be not-that), but also come-together in real unities of essences, which in each 
individual is formally distinct from its haecceitas.  
                                                 
46 “...conceptus speciei non est tantum conceptus realitatis et modi intrinseci eiusdem realitatis, quia tunc 
albedo posset esse genus, et gradus intrinseci albedinis possent esse differentiae specificae; illa autem per 
quae commune aliquod contrahitur ad Deum et creaturam, sunt finitum et infinitum, qui dicunt gradus 
intrinsecos ipsius...” Ordinatio I, d. 8, Pars 1, q. 3, 108. Anderson goes so far as to state: “In fact, every 
essentialism which purports to be a metaphysics is based on a univocal idea of being. In those philosophies, 
‘being,’ as summum genus, has many different names, but they are all fundamentally univocal: the supreme 
category, or the class of all classes is still a logical intention.” The Bond of Being, 276-277. 
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third, but must remain incommunicably “diverse.”47
Ergo praeter naturam in hoc et in illo, sunt aliqua primo diversa, quibus hoc et illud 
differunt (hoc in isto et illud in illo): et non possunt esse negationes, ex secunda 
quaestione, -nec accidentia, ex quarta quaestione; igitur erunt aliquae entitates positivae, 
per se determinantes naturam.
 Such primary diversity must fall 
outside the nature and its essential determinations otherwise the two individuals would 
agree in nothing. In addition, such diversity must be more than mere difference lest the 
process of accounting for difference reach to infinity. Without such primary diversity, 
“every difference among the differing” would fall back into some identity or 
commonality, and thus be unable to explain difference. Thus: 
48
      Because the nature is distinct from this or that, Scotus does not foreclose a real 
commonality between this and that. The real commonality, however, transpires between 
them at the level of essential reality, itself a less than numerical unity formally distinct 
from diverse individual realities. Numerical unity, on the other hand, explains the unity of 
the individual and determines the nature to this, and although not numerically distinct 
from the nature, such an item cannot be accounted for by the ratio (account) of the nature 
but requires its own account. Scotus goes on to explain this nonidentity between the unity 
that is the nature and the unity that is the individual. Between the nature and the 
individual, there is not a real distinction between two individuals or things (res), he 
  
Having already shown that neither negations nor accidents can account for individual 
diversity, Scotus now can conclude that the principle of individuation must be positive 
(i.e., because not through a negation), per se (i.e., because not through accidents), and 
determinative of the nature, but not identical to the nature itself.  
                                                 
47 See Ordinatio II, d. 3, Pars I, q. 6, 169. Also Timothy Noone. “Universal and Individuation,” The 
Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003): 100-128. 
48Ordinatio II d. 3 Pars I q. 6, 170.  
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argues, but a formal distinction between two entities or realties.49 The less-than-
numerical unity of the common nature is real and belongs to some numerical unity from 
which it is formally distinct.50
      Scotus follows Avicenna in treating the common nature as a reality apart from its 
universalization in the intellect or its individualization in the thing.
  
51
                                                 
49 “In eodem igitur quod est unum numero, est aliqua entitas, quam consequitur minor unitas quam sit 
unitas numeralis, et est realis; et illud cuius et talis, unitas, formaliter est ‘de se unum’ unitate numerali. 
Concedo igitur quod unitas realis non est alicuius exsistentis in duobus individuis, sed in uno” Ordinatio II 
d. 3, Pars I, q. 6, 172.  
50 The formal distinction, more real than the modal distinction, pertains to distinct realities each with a 
separate account or ratio relating to a single thing (res). Modalities modify something’s essential reality, 
whereas formalities constitute separate realities with their own ratio. Early in the text, Scotus had defined 
the formal distinction as preceding every act of created and uncreated intellect, and thus as a type of “real 
distinction.” Ordinatio I, d. 2, Pars 2, qq. 1-4, nn. 388-410. This is because the mind forms different 
rationes, which it takes as its object from the thing itself, and not merely from its own activity. One object 
is understood but according to formally non-identical perfections. He cites the example in something white 
(in albedine), there is something from which it has the ratio of color and something else from which it has 
the ratio of the specific difference. Each reality is outside the other and has its own ratio, which does not 
include the account of the other and yet both subsist in a single thing (i.e., in albedine). Otherwise, to use 
another example, “rational” and “animal” would account for the same reality in the individual human. 
Instead, both the genus and specific difference pertains to a formally distinct reality in the individual 
because the one does not merely modify the other: rational is not a mere modification of animality because 
rational also belongs to non-animals. “Comparando autem naturam specificam ad illud quod est supra se, 
dico quod illa realitas a qua sumitur differentia specifica, est actualis respectu illius realitatis a qua sumitur 
genus vel ratio generis,-ita quod haec realitas non est formaliter illa; alioquin in definitione esset nugatio, et 
solum genus sufficienter definiret (vel illa differentia), quia indicaret totam entitatem definiti. Quandoque 
tamen istud ‘contrahens’ est aliud a forma a qua sumitur ratio generis (quando species addit realitatem 
aliquam supra naturam generis),-quandoque autem non est res aliqua, sed tantum alia formalitas vel alius 
conceptus formalis eiusdem rei; et secundum hoc aliqua differentia specifica habet conceptum ‘non 
simpliciter simplicem’, puta quae sumitur a forma,-aliqua habet conceptum ‘simpliciter simplicem’, quae 
sumitur ab ultima abstractione formae (de qua distinctione differentiarum specificarum dictum est 
distinctione 3 primi libri, qualiter aliquae differentiae specificase includunt ens et aliquae non).” Ordinatio 
II, d. 3 Pars 1, q. 6, 179. 
51 Ordinatio II, d. 3, q. 1. 
 It is important to 
emphasize that although the nature and the individual constitute formally distinct 
realities, such realities must belong to a single numerical unity. For the matter at hand, 
Scotus argues that thisness offers a different account than whatness. The less-than-
numerical unity of the nature “stone” cannot account for the thisness of this stone. 
Otherwise, there would be no account of that by which this and that differ as diverse 
beings. The account of stoneness would account for this stone, and also that stone, thus 
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obliterating the diversity between them. Instead, Scotus argues, separate accounts must be 
rendered for each in its singularity in order to secure the real diversity of individuals. 
      Insofar as haecceitas is non-identical to essence, Scotus’s approach operates by way 
of remotion. By removing the essential features of an individual thing, and being left with 
a remainder that cannot be defined, but must be present to account for the diverse 
individuals through which a common agreement can be formed, haecceitas can be 
detected. The principle of individuation is neither matter, nor form, nor the composite of 
matter and form, but some reality distinct from the quiddity.52
      On the non-definability of the singular, Scotus states: “Et ideo concedo quod 
singulare non est definibile definitione alia a definitione speciei, et tamen est per se ens, 
addens aliquam entitatem entitati speciei; sed illa ‘per se entitas’ quam addit, non est 
entitas quidditativa.”
 The common nature, even 
though it is one and real, can be distinguished into a multiplicity of formally distinct 
realities: this one is not that one, and yet both share a common nature. Such is the work 
of individuation according to Scotus. Distinct singularities, unrepeatable in themselves 
and incommunicable with each other, nevertheless share in a common nature. As 
primarily diverse through haecceitas, formal agreement can be reached between 
individuals but not on account of their singularity. The entity of each singularity thus 
requires its own non-quidditative account. As non-quidditative it thus stands outside 
definition, demonstration, and scientific objectification.  
53
                                                 
52 Non est igitur ‘ista entitas’ materia vel forma vel compositum, in quantum quodlibet istorum est 
‘natura’,--sed est ultima realitas entis quod est materia vel forma vel quod est compositum; ita quod 
quodcumque commune, et tamen determinabile, adhuc potest distingui (quantumcumque sit una res) in 
plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa; et haec est formaliter entitas 
singularitatis, et illa est entitas naturae formaliter. Ibid., 188. 
 The singular is without definition and even though adding a per se 
53 Ordinatio II, d. 3, Pars 1, q. 6, 192. Thus, the singular has its own (formally distinct) ratio and yet does 
not have a definition other than that of the species. Further, he states: “...singulare autem non habet 
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entitativeness to the species, it does not add a quidditative entity. Haecceitas adds 
nothing more to defining what it was to be a thing: Socrates is no more what he is (i.e., 
human) by being this human. Furthermore, there can be no demonstration or scientia of 
the singular: from “human,” Socrates cannot be reached. However, unlike esse which 
modifies the essence without determining it, haecceitas contributes its own indefinable 
and indemonstrable reality to the essence in order to account for determination to this (as 
distinct from that). Otherwise, the essence would be left uncontracted to singularity and 
would be unable to account for diverse individuals. The community instituted around the 
common nature neither subsumes the singular, whose haecceitas possesses its own non-
quidditative ratio, nor completely excludes it as a fundamentally incommensurable act. 
Haecceitas instead serves as a necessary ground for a common exchange within the 
essential economy itself. Without singularity, there would be no difference to measure as 
common. Such a notion in its formal distinctness from quiddity cuts across Gilson’s 
divide between essentialism and existentialism.  
      A final question must be answered: To echo Gilson’s earlier claim, if haecceitas does 
the work for Scotus that esse does for Aquinas, what more is at stake philosophically than 
the semantic substitution of one term for another (i.e., haecceitas for esse)? Is this not 
merely a dispute with Gilson over whose pet term sounds better? The answer, I maintain, 
is philosophically more significant for the following reason: Scotus has argued that actual 
existence cannot be the ultimate act of the thing because, as act determines and 
distinguishes, ultimate act must bring with it the ultimate determination and distinction.54
                                                                                                                                                 
definitionem propriam, sed tantum definitionem speciei,- et ita non est de ipso demonstratio propria, sed 
tantum demonstratio quae est de specie (non enim habet passionem propriam, sed tantum passionem 
speciei). Ibid, 193. 
54 Ordinatio II, d. 3, Pars 1, q. 3. 
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But esse does not distinguish or determine except through essence. Hence, esse is 
determined by the determinations of another.55
      This critique of esse by Scotus reveals how an existential metaphysics reduces the 
individual into a mere participant in Divine Esse. When pressed to give an account of the 
actuality added to an essence by esse, existential metaphysics explains such donation of 
esse (i.e., creation) as participation in Divine Esse. Thus, the ultimate actuality of any 
created being is its relation to another. Gilson, however, does not think such a view of a 
creature’s ultimate perfection as participated esse collapses the diversity of God from 
creation. He states, “...the fact of receiving being from God is the best proof that its 
receiver is not God.”
 Esse cannot perfect and determine the 
essence because actual existence, unlike thisness, does not bring any determinations of its 
own beyond those of the essence.  
56
                                                 
55As Scotus states in reference to esse: “quia illud quod praesupponit determinationem et distinctionem 
alterius, non est ratio distguendi vel determinandi ipsum [...].” (Ibid., 62). This is why “this man” no more 
includes actual existence than “man.” 
56 “The connection between creature and creator, as it results from creation, is called participation. It must 
be noted at once [m.e.] that, far from implying any pantheistic signification, that expression, on the 
contrary, aims at removing it. Participation expresses both the bond uniting the creature to the creator, 
which makes creation intelligible, and the separation which prohibits them from intermingling. To 
participate in the pure act or perfection of God is to possess a perfection which was pre-existent in God, but 
is not to be ‘part of’ what one participates in; it is to derive and to receive being from another being, and the 
fact of receiving being from God is the best proof that its receiver is not God” Etienne Gilson, Christian 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages, 373. 
 True, in such an account “the receiver is not God.” Perhaps more 
troubling, however, is that neither is the receiver a true being (ens). By making 
participation the ultimate created perfection, such an account fails to explain the real 
diversification of God from creation, such that created beings come to take a stand as 
individuals, each with its own determination to this. Instead, each individual being as 
fundamentally “receiver of esse” becomes a diminished repetition of Ipsum Esse, and 
thus not primarily diverse from that which it inadequately repeats. Haecceitas, however, 
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brings its own non-quidditative ratio determinandi which accounts for individual 
diversity. Thus, counter to Gilson’s charge of conceptual imperialism, haecceitas while 
taking seriously the domain of the concept, outstrips its imperium.57
      By continuing to stress the otherness between a creature and its act of being, 
Aquinas—at least in the hands of his existential readers—fails to delimit where a being 
begins and God’s causal influence ends. So long as esse remains really other to creatures 
and their being stands as an analogical semblance of subsisting being itself—a failed 
iteration of its ipseity—creatures cannot be in any meaningful sense of the term. Nothing, 
including esse, marks their distinct status outside the divine mind as any such denotation 
can only ever be a parasitic iteration of divine perfection. Creatures are only a reflective 
similitude of being, which, apart from God’s continual conservation and concurrence, 
lack their own power by which to emerge in their own right. In the end, “esse” denotes 
not some distinct existential perfection, but essential dependence. Aquinas, thus, has 
made the esse of creatures—or that very perfection that he introduced to explain what 
 
                                                 
57 The univocal predication of being (ens) for both ens infinitum et ens finitum stems from Scotus’s 
argument for the univocity of being against treating being as analogical (e.g., Aquinas) or equivocal (e.g., 
Henry of Ghent). In an excellent discussion of Scotus’s larger role in the transition from scholasticism to 
modern and post-modern philosophy, Catherine Pickstock assesses the changes that result with such a 
concept of being. Instead of thinking of the abstraction to being as an elevation of the mind (the ascent 
from the finite to the infinite), such abstraction empties but no longer elevates. Being is no longer the most 
exalted concept, but the most common. Above (see fn. 5 p. 4), I discussed Joseph Owens’s claim that 
scholasticism inherited two concepts of being (i.e., being as most common and being as most perfect), 
neither of which they could accept wholesale. Pickstock argues that Scotus puts forth the empty 
commonality of being at the expense of a certain transcendent richness of being that can only be imitated 
by finite creatures. Such emptiness means that being can even be thought without God: even though every 
being is either finite or infinite, we can know something as a being without knowing whether it is finite or 
infinite. The ability to think a being independent of its causes and all other realities, “tends to encourage,” 
Pickstock argues, both epistemological and political atomism. Such atomism is at odds with a “space of 
participation.” See Catherine Pickstock, “Duns Scotus,” 545-553. On a similar note, the treatment of God 
and creatures both as beings has led some such as Marion to charge Scotus’s thought as onto-theo-logy: 
being for Scotus can be thought in terms of entity; even God becomes merely an infinite entity, but not 
something radically transcendent, or to put in Marion’s term “God without being.” See Jean-Luc Marion, 
“Thomas Aquinas and Onto-Theo-Logy,” 47-48. 
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more the essence human has than the essence phoenix—into something of an ephemeral 
specter: creatures reflect being, but they themselves do not have being.  
      An apologist for existential metaphysics might respond that this reading of esse has 
missed the dynamism of the existential act, a dynamism that I have rendered inert 
through an over-conceptualization. Thus, they might argue, to reawaken such dynamism, 
a correction must be made: such gift of being must be reached not through the static 
categories of conceptualization, but through judgment. This move, which I will address in 
turn, will help at least in part return metaphysics to a new beginning outside the essential 
order. If we wish to further inquire about the stakes of rejecting the real otherness 
between esse and essence along with its concomitant analogic of being in order to address 
Gilson’s claim that “[t]he chronic disease of metaphysical being is not existence, but its 
tendency to lose existence,”58
      A frequent argument put forward by defenders of existential Thomism has been that 
esse has been improperly conceived by the tradition of metaphysics insofar as it is not a 
concept at all. Even Aquinas himself had a difficult time describing this actuality of all 
acts without using a philosophical vocabulary that favors essence and categorial 
predicamentality. As discussed above, because esse “happens to” essence without being 
 we must turn to the proposed means by which to restore 
existence to its rightful place within metaphysical being: judgment. Thus, we both must 
determine the sufficiency of judgment to think (in the broad sense of the term) the reality 
of actual existence, but also must reconsider the possibility of conceptualism without 
imperialism. 
 
Section 2: Being and Judgment  
                                                 
58 Being and Some Philosophers, 214.  
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part of the essence, Aquinas goes so far as to use “accidit” to describe this relationship, 
even though such description does not seem to accord with Aquinas’s usual 
understanding of the matter.59 On orthodox Aristotelian grounds, as was seen above, 
Siger of Brabant rejects esse as some unwarranted posited “mysterious fourth” (i.e., not 
substance; not accident; not composite).60
      Although Aquinas’s discussions of judgment as the act of the intellect by which the 
intellect reaches the “esse rei” are infrequent and always occur within the context of 
another question (i.e., the matter is never itself thematized), and although there has been 
dissenting opinions concerning such an existentialized reading of such a operation, the 
places where he does introduce such an operation must be treated carefully.
 For a tradition that thinks being conceptually, 
it is no surprise that metaphysics has “lost existence,” and existence’s restoration to 
ontological primacy requires great difficulty. Thus, it has been argued, against the static 
essentializing of conceptualization, the dynamism of esse can only be reached through 
judgment. “Judgment” as the second operation of the intellect thinks being as the 
dynamic act of beings (i.e., their having being), against static conceptualization.  
61
                                                 
59 One case in which Aquinas refers to esse as an accident: “...quod accidens dicitur hic quod non est de 
intellectu alicujus, sicut rationale dicitur animali accidere; et ita cuilibet quidditati creatae accidit esse, quia 
non est de intellectu ipsius quidditatis; potest enim intelligi humanitas, et tamen dubitari, utrum homo 
habeat esse.” In I Sent. d. 8 Expositio Primae Partis Textus. 
60 See Chapter I above. See also Suarez, DM 31.6. In favor of the rational distinction, he argues that 
because creatures do not exist necessarily, they can be conceived apart from their efficient cause. Thus, the 
intellect abstracts the essence, precinding from actual existence.  
61 The locus classicus of existential Thomism’s emphasis on judgment are the following texts: In I Sent., d. 
19, q. 5, a. 1, ad. 7. Ibid d. 38, q. 1, a. 3. ST I, q. 14, a. 14. obj. 2. Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, 
t. 1*/1: Expositio libri Peryereneias (2a ed.: Commisio Leonina-J. Vrin, Roma-Paris 1989) I. lect. 8, n. 3, n. 
21and lect. 9 n. 2. Opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, t. 50: Super Boethium De Trinitate 
(Commissio Leonina-Éditions Du Cerf, Roma-Paris, 1992) q. 5, a. 3. Hereafter: “In Boethium De 
Trinitate.” For the dissenting opinion, cf. L.M. Régis, Epistemology. 
 In the 
Sentences Commentary, Aquinas introduces the two operations of the intellect: one, 
which has been called the “imagination of the intellect,” and Aristotle called the 
“understanding of indivisibles” (intelligentiam indivisibilium), which is responsible for 
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apprehending the simple quiddity; the other, which some call “faith” (fidem), is 
responsible for the composition and division of propositions.62
      “Truth,” Aquinas argues in Summa Contra Gentiles, is the adequation of intellect and 
thing (adequatio intellectus et rei). Thus, to partake of truth or falsity there needs to be a 
ground in reality (res), not merely in concepts alone. This means, Aquinas maintains 
following Aristotle, definition as the expression of the quiddity of the thing (i.e., as an 
indivisible) cannot by itself be true or false. As Aristotle argues concerning indivisibles, 
 The former activity 
receives the quiddity of something and the latter looks to the “being of it” (esse ipsius). 
Thus, we understand the essence of phoenix or human and the second activity is 
responsible for judging its esse or withholding judgment through doubt. An account of 
truth (ratio veritatis), Aquinas argues, is founded in being (funditur in esse), and not in 
quiddity. Thus, once static quiddities have been received from their dynamic element of 
being (i.e., either in re or in intellectu), judgment is the act responsible for restoring them 
to “the real,” and even essential judgments (e.g., “man is an animal”) requires an 
existential synthesis. It will be this grounding of truth in the real (i.e., in esse) that, per 
existential Thomists, allows Aquinas to avoid conceptual imperialism whereby truth 
merely becomes part of the interplay of a conceptual exchange.   
                                                 
62 The account of truth is funded (funditur) in esse. To the question “whether truth is the essence of a 
thing,” Aquinas addresses the argument “Item, veritas et falsitas sunt tantum in complexis; quia singulum 
incomplexorum neque verum neque falsum est. Sed essentia est rerum incomplexarum. Ergo non est idem 
quod veritas.” He responds: “Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una 
quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus III De anima, text. 21, nominat 
intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis, quae alio etiam nomine 
formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: 
prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, 
et non in quidditate, ut dictum est, ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in 
signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo ejus quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid; sicut 
etiam quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima operatione 
intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera.” In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad. 7. 
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falsehood is impossible.63 If nous grasps the essence of something, it cannot be mistaken 
in such an immediate grasp. Aquinas argues that only insofar as definition involves some 
composition can it be “accidentally false.”64
      As Owens and others have argued, what is known in the second operation of the 
intellect is the synthesis that is the thing’s existence (esse rei).
 Thus, truth and falsity are based in judgment 
as grounded in esse. Even when we judge, for example, that “a phoenix is not (i.e., in re)” 
or that “a phoenix is (i.e., in intellectu)” the truth derived—from even such an 
existentially sparse judgment—is grounded in esse.  
65 Such existential 
syntheses can most easily be seen in cases where an accident is synthesized with a subject 
both as predicamental (i.e., as one of the nine categories of accidents) and also as 
predicable (i.e., as being per accidens in the sense of not following from genus, species, 
property, or quality). As Owens states: “‘Cleon is pale’ follows neither from the nature of 
Cleon as a man nor from the nature of the accident ‘pale.’ It is a synthesis in existence at 
the moment.”66 Although existential syntheses also fund substantial and essential 
judgments, such a fund goes unnoticed, however, due to the conceptual imperialism of 
metaphysical thought, which attempts to render all thinking in terms of substantial units 
reducible to the pictorial-images of the first operation of the intellect (imaginatio 
intellectus). Thus, “Cleon’s being pale” would be grounded only in static and atemporal 
images, not in the dynamic reality that temporally brings together this man with 
paleness.67
                                                 
63 In this claim, Aquinas follows Aristotle (De Anima, Book 3, Chapter 6).  
64 SCG I.59. 
65 See, for example, Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing Existence,” The Review of Metaphysics 29.4 (June 
1976): 678.  
66 Ibid.  
  
67 Owens wants to argue that the existence reached through judgment is always analogically diverse insofar 
as each instance cannot attain to the unique primary instance (i.e., subsisting existence). Existence is 
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      The reason why metaphysics has been and continues to be so “esse-blind,” and 
thinkers from Aristotle to Siger to Scotus and Suarez even when thoroughly conceiving a 
being (ens), have all managed to lose esse, is because esse cannot be “seen” or 
“pictured.” The tradition of conceptualism, so thoroughly rooted in concepts as picture-
images corresponding to reality, has failed to place enough emphasis on the dynamic 
activity of judgment.68
      But the “esse” thought by judgment, Owens argues, is not accidental is the sense of a 
predicamental accident posterior to substance and should—I would reassert—be referred 
to as incidental (i.e., per accidens). When avoiding this confusion of incidental being 
with predicamental form of accidentality (i.e., an accidental form inhering in the nature 
and following substance), one can behold against the dominance of the concept’s 
imperialism how existential synthesis underlies all forms of judgment.
 Thus, once Aquinas begins speaking of esse as “otherwise than 
substance,” in the ears and eyes of conceptual metaphysics such a “concept”—and here 
we see the problem—becomes relegated to the register of the accidental. What is not 
substance must be an accident.  
69
The problem, however, becomes more difficult in the case of predicates that remain 
within the category of substance, and in general wherever the predicate is a generic 
 As Owens states 
noting the difficulty:  
                                                                                                                                                 
diverse for each individual and constitutes a temporally located existential synthesis varying from moment 
to moment. Judgment says being at determinate moments of time, unlike the prior act of essential 
apprehension which had abstracted the essence from such temporality. Owens, “Aquinas on Knowing 
Existence,” 29-31. 
68 “[…] the intellectus essentiae argument if alleged to conclude immediately to a real distinction would be 
taking for granted that existence has a real positive content of its own over and above the content of the 
quiddity. But this is something very difficult to prove. Spontaneously, when the question is faced for the 
first time, a thing and its existing may appear to be really the same. The expression ‘existing’ would seem 
to add merely a reference to the duration between beginning and end, but imply no real content besides the 
thing itself. For a number of modern thinkers, in fact, existence has been an empty concept, a blank, a 
surd.” Owens, “Aquinas’ Distinction,” 280. 
69 Owens, “The Causal Proposition—Principle or Conclusion,” The Modern Schoolman XXXII (May 
1955): 323-339. Owens, An Interpretation of Existence, 33-38. 
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characteristic of the subject. “Socrates is a man,” for example, or “Man is an animal,” 
may seem at first sight beyond the need of existential synthesis and above the conditions 
of time. Yet there is nothing in the nature of “man” that requires it to be found in 
Socrates. Human nature can be found just as easily apart from Socrates, for instance, in 
Plato, in Beethoven, in Johnson. Similarly, there is nothing in the nature of “animal” that 
requires it to be realized in man. Animality can be found equally well apart from man in 
brutes. The apparent difficulty here lies in the one-sided approach. Socrates is necessarily 
an animal. But man is not necessarily Socrates, nor is an animal necessarily a man. To 
see the requirement for existential synthesizing in this area, one approaches from the 
more generic or, in the case of the individual, from the specific side. [...] So, for a subject 
to be anything at all, in a way that offers the ground for a proposition, existence in its 
synthesizing function has to be involved.70
Thus, existence provides the ground from which all judgment arises, even though we 
often fail to recognize its activity behind the balanced totality of the essential equation 
(i.e., S=P). Judgment reaches beyond the static images and concepts of the first operation 
and restores thought to the real, the foundation upon which truth (i.e., as adequation 
between the intellect and the thing) emerges.
 
71
      As noted, such an interpretation of Aquinas departs from standard Arisotelianism and 
is not without its opponents. Régis, for example, argues that judgment—by working with 
concepts already known by apprehension—completes and perfects the act of 
  
                                                 
70 Ibid., 34. Elsewhere, Owens argues that only in logic, where terms precede propositions, are indivisibles 
prior to the synthesis. See Owens, “Knowing Existence,” 679.  
71 See also Gilson: “[...] the actual object of a concept always contains more than its abstract definition. 
What is contains over and above its formal definition is its act of existing, and, because such acts transcend 
both essence and representation, they can be reached only by means of judgment. The proper function of 
judgment is to say existence, and this is why judgment is a type of cognition distinct from, and superior to, 
pure and simple abstract conceptualization.” Being and Some Philosophers, 202. This saying existence, 
which finds existence through judgment, reaches beyond the categories of essence. And Maritain: “The 
intellect, laying hold of the intelligibiles, disengaging them by its own strength from sense experience, 
reaches, at the heart of its own inner vitality, those natures or essences which, by abstracting them, it has 
detached from their material existence at a given point in space and time. But to what end? Merely in order 
to contemplate the picture of the essences in its ideas? Certainly not! Rather in order to restore them to 
existence by the act in which intellection is completed and consummated, I mean the judgement 
pronounced in the words ita est, thus it is.” Jacques Maritain, Existence and the Existent, 11-12. 
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apprehension without moving beyond the concepts themselves to an external reality.72 
Truth, he argues, is found in the mind, and judgment—from which the ratio veritatis 
emerges—concerns mental activity.73
Thus, we must insist that judgment consists not in knowing what things are, neither in 
their quiddity nor in their existence, for apprehension does that, but rather in regrouping 
the concepts by which we apprehend the quiddity and the existere of things, in order to 
perfect our initial knowledge of them.
 What judgment perfects is not the mind’s extension 
to some extra-mental existential actuality, but a regrouping of conceptual content for the 
sake of greater conceptual clarity. He states:  
74
                                                 
72 “In other words, judgment works with concepts, with the already known, and not with exterior reality.” 
Régis, Epistemology, 312. This passage is cited by Salas, “The Judgmental Character,” 121. See also the 
“exchange” between Gilson and Régis in the Appendix to Being and Some Philosophers, 216-227. 
73 “Thus, to know truth is first and foremost simultaneously to know distinct concepts, previously 
possessed; it is not to apprehend an aspect of the real that has escaped apprehension. In the judgment there 
is no superexistence of a new thing in us, as there is in apprehension, but the unified superexistence of that 
which previously was multiple: No more things are known, but the same thing is better known.” Régis, 
Epistemology, 313 [Emphasis in Original].  
 
74 Ibid. Régis’s project is situated as an attempt to overcome the naïve or direct realism to which many 
Thomists fall prey. We see such naïve realism in play in Owens’s attempt to explain the difference between 
a judgment that reaches the real (e.g., this is a chair) versus one concerning fictional objects (e.g., Zeus is 
mightier than Poseidon). Owens answers that such “existence in thought” is not some partial existence 
half-way between being and nothingness en route to real existence, but a genuine, albeit lesser, way of 
existing. What needs to be explained, however, is how exactly judgment puts us in contact with the real as 
something distinct from the merely fictional. Ibid., 38. To make the case, Owens appeals to a noetical 
difference available to judgment upon reflection such that we can recognize when we are performing 
fictitious judgments and when real judgments. He states: “These two ways of existence, real and 
cognitional, are known by means of different judgments, each radically irreducible to the other.” Ibid 41. 
This passage continues “To know whether a thing exists in the external world, you have to ‘look outside 
and see.’ The ‘look,’ on the intellectual level is the judgment that grasps real existence. Correspondingly, to 
know that one is thinking or feeling or deciding, one has to look in and see. One has to reflect on one’s own 
activities. The inward look also is a judgment, in the technical sense of the term as an intuition of existence. 
Again, the existence known is real existence, existence of the really occurring activity in oneself. But 
within the cognitional activity one is aware of the existence it gives the objects known. Reflexively, one 
judges that they exist in one’s cognition. It is this judgment that is the knowledge of cognitional existence. 
It is a new and different judgment from the judgment by which the thing’s real existence is grasped.” Thus, 
he argues, reflection judges that the objects in such cases are merely cognitional objects and their esse, a 
fictional esse given to them by the mind. Such reflection makes one aware of the fictitiousness of the object 
as distinct from cases involving real existence. But how does such a view protect against relapse into 
idealism, a position existential Thomism certainly intends to avoid and one held by their transcendental 
brethren. Hegel was well aware of the dynamism of judgment set against the static abstractions of concepts; 
to reach existence outside conceptual determinations through the movement of synthetic thought, however, 
requires existentialism to locate the gap in thought where the ideal encounters the real without the latter 
being enfolded by the former. But does the synthetic dynamism of judgment locate this gap and allow us to 
think the real beyond conceptual determinations? The question, however, remains: why treat esse as really 
other than (or composed with) essence? Why not count esse as the determination of the essence in time, but 
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Thus all thought, even the so-called second operation of the intellect, operates within the 
conceptual exchange. Such a view of judgment presents an obvious departure from the 
existential tradition, which heralded judgment as the break from conceptual imperialism.   
      Against Régis’s attempt to return Aquinas’s thought to conceptual imperialism, Salas 
argues judgment is a mental operation that thinks existential reality beyond the concept. 
He states:  
When, however, one shifts ontological perspectives [from the substantialism of Aristotle] 
to the ‘creation’ metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, in which the ultimate ground of being 
is an act beyond form, then one realizes that to apprehend a thing’s nature or quiddity is 
not thereby to encounter its existence…Now, if simple apprehension, the first operation 
of the intellect, is directed only to a thing’s quiddity, then we must turn to another 
intellectual act whereby the human knower encounters the actual existence of a thing; and 
this faculty I suggest, contrary to Régis and in agreement with Gilson and Owens, is none 
other than judgment.75
Where Régis in particular and essentialism in general go wrong, Salas argues, is in 
treating Aquinas’s “epistemology” as an extension of Aristotle’s essentialism wherein all 
being is parsed in terms of substance and the “an sit?” of Posterior Analytics represents 
nothing more than a fact of being.
 
76
                                                                                                                                                 
not as a distinct principle apart from its essential constitution? This, of course, would mean that esse is 
merely a surd, a slight variation in the syntax of “thing” or “substance,” not rising to the level of a distinct 
utterance. Judgment, which is supposed to find the gaps in thinking, relapses into ideas and does not reach 
materiality. Judgment for Aquinas does not find the other of thought allowing him to think the real. P.T. 
Geach, “Assertion,” The Philosophical Review, 40.4 (Oct, 1965): 449-465. Owens argues that esse as the 
actuality of all actuality indicates the dynamism of actuality known only through judgment. Owens, “Stages 
and Distinction in ‘De Ente,’” 107 
75 Salas, “The Judgmental Character,” 122.  
76 Ibid. For an attempt to understand Aristotle’s an sit in existential terms contra Gilson, see McInerny, 
Praeambula Fidei, 293-306. 
 As soon as one departs from essentialism wherein all 
intelligibility is inscribed in terms of formal actuality, another operation of the intellect is 
required to think extra-formal actuality. This activity is judgment. Even if—as Gilson 
acknowledges in his exchange with Régis—the existential reading of the second 
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operation of the intellect requires some historically inaccurate formulation in order to 
prune any lingering essentialism from the existential lexicon of Aquinas, much of which 
he inherits from Aristotle, such is the price to be paid to free “judgment” (i.e., the second 
operation of the intellect) from the imperialism of the concept (conceptus).77
      Again in his Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, Aquinas discusses the two 
operations of the intellect, one which concerns an “understanding of indivisibles” 
(intelligentia indivisibilium), the other which composes and divides by forming 
affirmative and negative enunciations.
  
78
                                                 
77 Being and Some Philosophers, 216-227. Gilson uses “conceptus” to distinguish “concept” in the narrow 
sense of simple apprehension of the intellect from “conceptio” in the broader sense of conception, or what 
might be called “thinking,” which could include judgment. Ibid., 223.  
78 “Sciendum est igitur quod secundum philosophum in III De anima duplex est operatio intellectus: una, 
que dicitur intelligentia indiuisibilium, qua cognoscit de unoquoque quid est, alia uero, qua componit et 
diuidit, scilicet enuntiationem affirmativam vel negativam formando. Et hee quidem due operationes 
duobus que sunt in rebus respondent. Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, secundum quam 
res intellecta aliquem gradum in entibus obtinet, siue sit res completa, ut totum aliquod, siue res 
incompleta, ut pars vel accidens. Secunda uero operatio respicit ipsum esse rei; quod quidem resultat ex 
congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, uel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in 
substantiis simplicibus [m.e.]. Et quia ueritas intellectus est ex hoc quod conformatur <rei>, patet quod 
secundum hanc secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem 
coniunctum est; quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse rei, sicut si abstraho 
hominem ab albedine dicendo homo non est albus, significo esse separationem in re, unde si secundum rem 
homo et albedo non sint separata, erit intellectus falsus. Hac ergo operatione intellectus uere abstraere non 
potest nisi ea que sunt secundum rem separata, ut cum dicitur homo non est asinus. Set secundum primam 
operationem potest abstraere ea que secundum rem separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, sed aliqua. Cum 
enim unaqueque res sit intelligibilis secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphisice, oportet quod 
ipsa natura siue quiditas rei intelligatur uel secundum quod est actus quidam, sicut accidit de ipsis formis et 
substantiis simplicibus, uel secundum id quod est actus eius, sicut substantie composite per suas formas uel 
secundum id quod est ei loco actus, sicut materia prima per habitudinem ad formam et vacuum per 
privationem locati; et hoc est illud ex quo unaquaeque natura suam rationem sortitur.” In Boethium De 
Trinitate, q. 5, a. 3.  
 Each operation corresponds to a principle in the 
thing. The first looks to the nature of the thing, according to which the understood thing 
(res intellecta) obtains some grade amongst entities, whether it be a complete thing (res 
completa) or incomplete like an accident or a part. Unlike the first operation, which 
divests the intellecta from its real status—whether it be in rerum natura or in intellectu—
the second operation synthesizes such isolated “frames” through composition and 
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division whose truth requires a restoration to its original unity (…quod secundum hanc 
secundam operationem intellectus non potest vere abstrahere quod secundum rem 
coniunctum est, quia in abstrahendo significaretur esse separatio secundum ipsum esse 
rei). 
      This second operation—which we will call “judgment,” once again, following the 
existential Thomists—is concered with the being of the thing (Secunda vero operatio 
respicit ipsum esse rei…), for example “a man’s not being white.” As Aquinas goes on to 
specify, such esse is “that which results (resultat) from the congregation of principles in 
composite things and accompanies (concomitatur) the simple nature in simple 
substances.” The terms “resultat” and “concomitatur,” however, suggest a greater 
intimacy to essential principles than would be granted by an existential interpretation. 
“Esse,” in this context, suggests only the condition of the essence, not a distinct 
existential act. Following from the first operation’s grasp of an essence, the second 
operation judges that it is so or that it is not so. But that temporal dynamism of 
judgment—“Barack Obama is President,” “Socrates is no longer,” “a phoenix is not and 
never was”—which restores the isolated frame of intellection (i.e., the first operation) to 
the moving picture of reality, fails to indicate an extra-essential actus essendi. The 
reason, I would argue in keeping with my ongoing claim, is that “esse” for Aquinas can 
only signify the condition of something’s essence or its causal relation to ipsum esse 
subsistens, but not an intrinsic actus essendi.  
      Even though all of our concepts—esse and otherwise—originate on this side of 
creation, through the need to purify esse of any traces of finitude so that it can be applied 
to actus essendi primus et purus, esse no longer retains the dynamic actuality of 
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something’s ultimate reality.79
                                                 
79 It is with this difficulty of getting a philosophical tradition so thoroughly immersed in essentialism that 
Gilson turns to a more theological solution.  “All our notions of God are directly or indirectly borrowed 
from our notions of finite beings, and if we did not first discern the act of existing in the structure of God’s 
creatures, how could we think of identifying it with the very essence of the divine being? Still, this is a 
good time to remember the curious remark made by Thomas himself at the end of the Summa Contra 
Gentiles, I, chapter 22, where, after establishing God’s essence is his very esse, the theologian adds that 
‘this sublime truth Moses was taught by our Lord.’ Now, Moses could not learn this sublime truth from our 
Lord without at the same time learning from Him the notion of what it is to be a pure existential act. This 
invites us to admit that, according to Thomas himself, his notion of esse can be learned from the very words 
of God.” Gilson points to such a burden of proof as follows: “[...] but if an actually existing being has been 
produced by its cause, why should one attribute to it an ‘existence’ distinct from the fact that it exists? This 
is the very point that Thomas is anxious to make us understand; but how can he make us see it if we don’t? 
One cannot abstract from reality a notion whose object one fails to perceive. What has divided the Thomist 
school from the other great schools of theology, ever since the thirteenth century, is a general reluctance to 
conceive the act of being (esse) as a distinct object of understanding. To tell the whole truth, even the so-
called ‘Thomists’ have been and still are divided on this point. No such disagreement would take place if 
the presence, in things themselves, of an act in virtue of which they can be called ‘beings’ were a 
conclusion susceptible of demonstration. This impasse is an invitation to us to give up the philosophical 
way—from creatures to God—and to try the theological way—from God to creatures. Thomas Aquinas 
may well have first conceived the notion of an act of being (esse) in connection with God and then, starting 
from God, made use of it in his analysis of the metaphysical structure of composite substances. At first 
sight, this is not very likely.” Elements of Christian Philosophy, 130-131. This difficulty, I have argued, is 
insurmountable insofar as the “acts of existing” borrowed from the structure of God’s creatures, must retain 
a univocal commonality with the concept of being attributable to God. Thus, a proper name of “esse” can 
only result for humans through illumination or revelation. But, we might ask, without embracing Gilson’s 
theological way, can we not seek a conceptualism without imperialism, such that we both reject a real 
otherness between esse and essence and yet—with respect and deference to the insights of existential 
Thomism against essentialism—avoid the hegemonic totalizing by which reality becomes a perfectly 
adequate object of the concept’s dominion (i.e., imperialism)?   
 The unity reflected by judgment, a unity of formal 
components synthesized by an existential act, thus fails to indicate some existential 
perfection exercised by each existent, but instead establishes the enacting of esse for an 
essence by its cause, ipsum esse subsistens, or if we are to grant a more active role to the 
essence, the way in which it reflects the influence of its cause. Against existential 
Thomism, which would argue such a unity is that of the existential act having been 
restored to its original dynamism from out of the intellect’s conceptual fragmentation, I 
would argue instead that such a unity is not existential, but providential. Such a unity is 
providential because the that it is so or that it is not so of any being—what for us appears 
as the fact of its being—reflects a higher unity of principles (i.e., both existential and 
essential) according to what should and will be according to God’s indebtedness to his 
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own providential plan. Our judgmental knowledge, which restores unity to that which is 
known and thereby serves as the ground of truth, corresponds to a more fundamental 
unity contained within the divine intellect and expressed through his providential plan for 
the universe as a whole. Thus, what we judge that it is so as an enunciation, God plans 
(i.e., practically knows) that is should (and will) be so (fiendum). The incidental has a 
practical scientia. This can be seen in reference to Aquinas’s treatment of what God 
knows in the case of enunciables.  
      In the Sentences Commentary, and again in Summa Theologiae, Aquinas addresses 
the issue of esse and judgment in asking whether God knows “enunciables.”80
                                                 
80 “Respondeo dicendum, quod secundum opinionem Avicennae et ex dictis Algazelis videtur sequi quod 
Deus enuntiabilia nesciat, et praecipue in rebus singularibus; quia ponunt quod scit singularia tantum 
universaliter, idest secundum quod sunt in causis universalibus, et non particulariter, id est in natura 
particularitatis suae. Unde concedunt quod scit hoc individuum et illud; sed non scit hoc individuum nunc 
esse et postmodum non esse; sicut si aliquis sciret eclipsim quae futura est cras in suis causis universalibus, 
non tamen sciret an modo esset vel non esset, nisi sensibiliter videret. Sed quia supra ostensum est quod 
Deus non solum habet hujusmodi cognitionem de particularibus, sed perfectam, inquantum cognoscit ea in 
sua particularitate secundum omnes conditiones individuales quae in eis sunt; ideo dicendum est, quod 
Deus non solum cognoscit ipsas res, sed etiam enuntiabilia et complexa; tamen simplici cognitione per 
modum suum; quod sic patet. Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex 
operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam 
a Philosopho in III De anima dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, 
componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, 
consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum. Similiter etiam in ipso 
Deo est considerare naturam ipsius, et esse ejus; et sicut natura sua est causa et exemplar omnis naturae, ita 
etiam esse suum est causa et exemplar omnis esse. Unde sicut cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit 
omnem rem; ita cognoscendo esse suum, cognoscit esse cujuslibet rei; et sic cognoscit omnia enuntiabilia, 
quibus esse significatur; non tamen diversa operatione nec compositione, sed simpliciter; quia esse suum 
non est aliud ab essentia, nec est compositum consequens; et sicut per idem cognoscit bonum et malum, ita 
per idem cognoscit affirmationes et negationes.” In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, resp. In the Summa, against the 
question “does God know enunciables,” Aquinas presents the following objection: “Praeterea, omnis 
cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino 
simplex. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.” To this he responds: “Ad secundum dicendum quod 
compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est 
similitudo omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.” ST I, q. 14, a. 14, ad et obj. 2. See also SCG 
I. 59.  
 It seems 
that due to the simplicity of divine cognition, God would not know enunciables, 
especially as they relate to singulars (i.e., insofar as they are individuated through matter) 
and future contingents. Such intellectual oversight, however, would pose problems for a 
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view of personal providence. In response to the question, Aquinas argues God not only 
knows individuals (i.e., as opposed to merely knowing them through their species), but he 
also has knowledge of that which is enunciable and complex. God’s cognition 
nevertheless remains simple because all that is is a reflective similitude of the divine 
essence. God’s knowledge extends as far as his causality extends: he knows things insofar 
as he is their principle.81
      Following Dionysius, Aquinas states that God knows things in the same way he 
hands down (tradidit) esse to them: as the total principle of their production.
 As the principle for the production of everything that is, God’s 
practical cognition must co-extend with God’s causality to singulars, which are the 
terminus of such practical activity.  
82 In the 
“handing down of being to things” (i.e., the act of creation), God operates as the 
immediate cause of all that follows in its totality. From this passage, we witness how 
Aquinas’s primary concern is not to distinguish esse from the essential structure of the 
thing, although God is the cause and exemplar of both its nature and its esse.83
                                                 
81 See, for example, SCG I.65.  
82 “[Dionysius] Dicit enim, quod cum Deus cognoscit res per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum, eodem 
modo cognoscit res quo modo esse rebus tradidit; unde si aliquid est in rebus non cognitum ab ipso, oportet 
quod circa illud vacet divina operatio, idest quod non sit operatum ab ipso; et ex hoc accidit difficultas 
philosophis propter duo: primo, quia quidam ipsorum non ponebant Deum operari immediate in rebus 
omnibus, sed ab ipso esse primas res, quibus mediantibus ab eo aliae producuntur; et ideo non poterant 
invenire qualiter cognosceret res quae sunt hic, nisi in primis causis universalibus: secundo, quia quidam 
eorum non ponebant materiam esse factam, sed Deum agere tantum inducendo formam. Et ideo cum 
materia sit principium individuationis, non poterat inveniri apud eos, quomodo Deus singularia, inquantum 
hujusmodi, cognoscat. Sed quia nos ponimus Deum immediate operantem in rebus omnibus, et ab ipso esse 
non solum principia formalia, sed etiam materiam rei; ideo per essentiam suam, sicut per causam, totum 
quod est in re cognoscit, et formalia et materialia; unde non tantum cognoscit res secundum naturas 
universales, sed secundum quod sunt individuatae per materiam; sicut aedificator si per formam artis 
conceptam posset producere totam domum, quantum ad materiam et formam, per formam artis quam habet 
apud se, cognosceret domum hanc et illam; sed quia per artem suam non inducit nisi formam, ideo ars sua 
est solum similitudo formae domus; unde non potest per eam cognoscere hanc domum vel illam, nisi per 
aliquid acceptum a sensu.” In I Sent. d. 36, q. 1, a. 1, resp.  
83 For “God as the cause and exemplar of all natures,” see Chapter IV above. For “God as the cause and 
exemplar of all esse,” see Chapter V above.  
 Instead, 
the concern—and this seems to be a dominant concern throughout Aquinas’s 
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metaphysics—is to find a unity for both grounds (i.e., the essential and the existential) in 
an effect that terminates God’s practical activity: an actually existing individual totally 
and immediately caused by the first. This concern, I would argue, reflects the perceived 
need to counter those who would deny causal immediacy and totality to the first as the 
principium of the total order of being.  
      Thus, to establish such a principative role, the first must hand down esse to all 
possible beings deemed necessary by it to fulfill its (i.e., the first’s) intended order for the 
universe as a whole. Aquinas confronts those who would deny a causal immediacy of 
God to the total effect, but instead remove his causal influence to the production of 
secondary plenipotentiaries, which would mediately cause further effects on God’s 
behalf. Instead, Aquinas argues, “we hold that God operates immediately in all things” 
(nos ponimus Deum immediate operantem in rebus omnibus), which entails that the total 
effect has been produced by God. Thus, “the handing down of esse,” a relation of 
dependence sustained by conservation, needs mean nothing more than the practical 
production of a complete effect, that is, of both its form and matter in the case of 
hylomorphic substances. Aquinas’s concern, once again, is to show how the divine causal 
operation permeates the entirety of its effect, thus assigning no part of the effect to causal 
influences outside the allotment of divine provision.  
      Forms in the divine intellect, by reaching (pertingat) to the “least of things” (ad 
rerum minima) by both divine exemplarity and causality, reaches to the singularity of 
sensible and material forms.84
                                                 
84 “Forma igitur rei sensibilis, cum sit per suam materialitatem individuata, suae singularitatis similitudinem 
perducere non potest in hoc quod sit omnino immaterialis, sed solum usque ad vires quae organis 
materialibus utuntur; ad intellectum autem perducitur per virtutem intellectus agentis, inquantum omnino a 
conditionibus materiae exuitur; et sic similitudo singularitatis formae sensibilis non potest pervenire usque 
 Insofar as divine knowledge functions like practical 
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knowledge, such knowledge—unlike speculative knowledge—terminates in the domain 
of singulars.85 The importance of God’s knowledge of both singulars and enunciables 
concerns the extent to which creation can be made intelligibile as a providential whole, 
thereby bringing together principative duality of essence and esse within a single unified 
order.86 Lest the individual fall to the purview of chance and only be known by its 
architect qua universal, God must know the particular not only as such, but as this.87 As 
Mark D. Jordan has argued, Aquinas’s unique achievement with respect to divine ideas 
has been to “secure the principle of direct exemplarity for the disposition of beings within 
providence.” Further, he states: “The single existing thing, the particular composite of 
form and matter with its accidents, stands in relation to the Ideas as a direct effect of 
divine creation and as a subject of divine providence.”88
                                                                                                                                                 
ad intellectum humanum. Similitudo autem formae intellectus divini, cum pertingat usque ad rerum 
minima, ad quae pertingit sua causalitas, pervenit usque ad singularitatem formae sensibilis et materialis. 
Intellectus igitur divinus potest cognoscere singularia, non autem humanus.” SCG I.65. 
85 “Divinus intellectus ex rebus cognitionem non sumit, sicut noster, sed magis per suam cognitionem est 
causa rerum, ut infra ostendetur: et sic eius cognitio quam de rebus aliis habet, est ad modum practicae 
cognitionis. Practica autem cognitio non est perfecta nisi ad singularia perveniatur: nam practicae 
cognitionis finis est operatio, quae in singularibus est. Divina igitur cognitio quam de aliis rebus habet, se 
usque ad singularia extendit.” SCG I.65. 
86 On the relation between divine ideas of essential possibilities in relation to individuals, see: De Veritate, 
q. 3, a. 8, ad 2. “Ad secundum dicendum, quod si loquamur de idea proprie, secundum quod est rei, eo 
modo quo est in esse producibilis; sic una idea respondet singulari, speciei, et generi, individuatis in ipso 
singulari, eo quod Socrates, homo et animal non distinguuntur secundum esse. Si autem accipiamus ideam 
communiter pro similitudine vel ratione, sic, cum diversa sit consideratio Socratis ut Socrates est, et ut 
homo est, et ut est animal, respondebunt ei secundum hoc plures ideae vel similitudines.” 
87 For this argument, see ST I, q. 15, a. 3, resp.  
88 Jordan, “The Intelligibility of the World and the Divine Ideas in Aquinas,” The Review of Metaphysics 
38.1 (September 1984): 23. 
 The totality of the existing 
individual (i.e., form, matter, and accidents) follows as the product of divine creation and 
the subject of divine providence. Thus, esse no longer stands out in such a scheme as 
something radically extra-essential, but merely expresses the condition or the state of 
essences within the total order of the universe as a whole, as terminated in existing 
individuals who complete such an order.   
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      The existing singular, as stated in De Veritate, receives its true intelligibility only as 
the subject of providence: “Ponimus etiam, quod per divinam providentiam definiuntur 
omnia singularia.”89 The unity of God’s principative duality, and thereby the unity of the 
universe as an ordered totality, arises through a “providential integration” first instituted 
through God’s commitment to conserve all things in being, an intellectual commitment 
which, as outlined by Scotus, neutralizes the will’s free spontaneity. In the existing 
singular qua providential subject, the essential and existential threads of Thomistic 
metaphysics merge and find their highest expression. In those individuals terminating the 
operation of God practical cognition, already marked “fiendum” due to God’s unwavering 
foreknowledge of those components necessary to execute his plan, the existing individual 
becomes part of divine providential scientia. Esse, however, loses its otherness to 
thought, as even human judgment—the existential operation enunciating ita est–becomes 
the attempt to restore unity, a unity whose true ground resides in providential 
intelligibility.90
                                                 
89 Aquinas argues against Plato that divine ideas of singulars are necessary to uphold an account of 
providence. He states: “[E]t eadem ratione Plato non ponebat ideas generum, quia intentio naturae non 
terminatur ad productionem formae generis sed solum formae speciei. Nos autem ponimus Deum causam 
esse singularis et quantum ad formam et quantum ad materiam, ponimus etiam, quod per divinam 
providentiam definiuntur omnia singularia; et ideo oportet nos etiam singularium ponere ideas.” De 
Veritate, q. 3, a. 8, resp. In De Potentia q. 3, a. 6, resp., Aquinas addresses the same problem and attempts 
to show how everything (i.e., corruptible and incorruptible, corporeal and spiritual, etc.) come together in 
one order. 
90 Jordan states: “[…] the intelligibility of the concrete substance depends on its relation to God in creation 
and providence. Those relations are deeply obscure. Each relation ties the intelligible character of the world 
to God’s self understanding. In divine knowing there is neither prediction, nor abstraction, nor judgment. 
Human understanding, by contrast, begins by collation of sensibly perceived particulars, making meaning 
out of them by subsuming them under logically manipulable classes. If the intelligibility of the world 
depends upon the direct exemplarity of the divine essence in particulars, then abstractive knowing is at best 
a distant and refracted acquaintance with reality.” “The Intelligibility of the World,” 24. Jordan goes on to 
argue that Aquinas does not back away from such conclusions, but comes to embrace such a conclusion 
throughout his subsequent (to the Sentences Commentary) writings. He cites the passage from De Veritate 
q. 3, a. 8, resp. in support of this claim.  
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Section 3: Providence, Esse as Gift or God as Patron? 
      We began by reviewing the existentialist’s claim that being (esse), for Aquinas, 
functions as the extra-essential ground of all essential actuality. Given a being’s lack of 
existential determination per se, it requires a cause with being per se to give being to it. 
This “giving of being,” which happens through creation and is preserved through 
conservation, is the mark of creation according to existential Thomists, both because of 
its manner and because of its object. Unlike Avicennian emanation, esse, for Aquinas, 
does not result from an essential determination on the part of the creator, but is given in a 
free act of the will. Also, in contrast to fellow creationists (e.g., Scotus and Suarez), esse 
is the highest perfection (or gift) given in creation because such can only be given by 
divine efficient causation. This has led existential Thomists and others to emphasize the 
irreducibly existential nature of Aquinas’s account of creation. Creation is the incident 
par excellence, Marion holds, because it arrives without any sufficient reason. He states:  
All the reasons, all the circumstances, and all the passions in the world cannot provoke 
the gift necessarily—except by making it necessary, therefore annulling it as gift. The 
calculation of the best is opposed to the good of the gift in that it submits it, though at the 
limit, to the principle of sufficient reason. The freedom of the gift implies that the 
decision to give it obeys only the logic of givenness, therefore its [sic] gratuity without 
return.91
      A thread we have been tracing over the last two chapters, however, is the role of 
providence in Aquinas’s thought, especially in regard to the “gratuity without return” of 
creation. We saw above with Scotus that by submitting certain divine ideas to the 
practical intellect for approval—whereby they are marked fiendum and non-fiendum in 
  
Esse, as that which is given outside all essential determination, offers no return.   
                                                 
91 Being Given, 106-107. 
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terms of fulfillment of God’s plan—the will faces certain constraints in its execution. 
Likewise, in reference to the possible annihilation of creatures (i.e., withdrawal of 
conservation), Aquinas argued that God’s first providential act was to resolve himself to 
their preservation. This allowed certain creatures to take on a necessity of being, whereas 
others only a contingency, albeit contingency with respect to generation and corruption, 
not being and nothingness. This means that the radical contingency emphasized by 
existential Thomists is quickly sublated once God resolves himself to a certain plan. 
Although God owes nothing to creatures, nor could they offer return on anything given to 
them—as of themselves they are nothing and even their ideational pre-existence borrows 
its being from God—Aquinas’s account of providence minimizes the radical gratuity of 
creation by making intelligible (even though if not for us) the being of creatures. This 
happens insofar as God both indebts himself to his own plan, and as integral parts of this 
plan, creatures pay back the gift they have on loan.  
      To understand the nature of the gift, and the extent to which such is even possible, we 
might for a moment turn to an unlikely source the Roman Stoic Seneca, who provides a 
profound analysis of such a matter. In his De Beneficiis, a tract produced within the 
context of the Roman system of patronage, Seneca observes that in order to give, as 
opposed to merely to lend, an account cannot be rendered of the benefit given.92
                                                 
92 See Seneca, Moral Essays vol. III De Beneficiis, trans. John W. Basore (Cambridge: Loeb Classical 
Library No. 310, 1935).  
 
Otherwise, the gift functions like a loan, operating within an economy of exchange, 
reducible to an account. A true gift, he argues, if such a thing is possible, would have to 
be given without any horizon of return. There could be no recognition of the giver lest 
such an act of recognition be itself a return upon that which was given. Any gift, 
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including being (esse), in which the recipient could offer return upon the gift violates the 
very logic of the gift. Thus, the problem with understanding creation primarily in terms of 
givenness and esse in terms of a gift is that a benefit given for the realization of the good, 
whereby each existing singular renders a return upon its being as part of providential 
whole, likewise inscribes the “gift of being” within an order of providential patronage.  
      Above we outlined how Aquinas separates the grounds of something’s possibility in 
the divine intellect from its actuality through the divine will.93
      It seems obvious enough why the gift of being should be without ground: there is 
nothing besides God in his pure act of perfection that could prompt him or require him to 
supplement his being; thus anything that does result is purely gratuitous. Because the first 
is primus et purus actus essendi, it must remain unmoved by desire insofar as desire 
would constitute a breach of pure actuality. Just as one can reach the end of a journey 
without the means of a horse (e.g., traveling by foot alone), so too divine perfection need 
not include the addition of creatures in order to supplement its goodness.
 As the principium essendi, 
God must act as unmotivated by any purpose for the very reason that such an act is the 
very inscription of purpose itself. Thus, if creation is not to be transformed into a system 
of divine patronage, there can be no sufficient reason for creation. And yet, there seems 
to be a tension in Aquinas’s thought between making intelligible the universe in terms of 
rendering return on the gift of being through providence, thereby making it a closed 
system of calculability and covering over the incalculability of the gift, one the one hand, 
and leaving open existential gratuity as that which is without return on the other.  
94
                                                 
93 See Chapters IV and V above.  
94 SCG I.81. 
 In other 
words, if the whole of creation were to move God toward an actualization of his own 
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goodness, this would introduce a potency in the divine nature—a potency satiated by 
creation.95 God wills for the sake of an end (i.e., goodness). Although necessarily willing 
his own goodness as an end, because such an end does not require other things (i.e., 
creatures) for its fulfillment, God is in no way indebted to such supplemental beings.96 
Any creative expression by the first thereby is not the result of a necessary overflow of 
itself, but what we can only call a “gratuitous” act of generosity (actus liberalitatis).97 
Aquinas relates such an unnecessary use of means to a doctor, who based on her intention 
to heal, only gives the patient medicine in cases when the medicine is necessary to 
achieve such an end; otherwise, if health can be reached without medicine, such a means 
is excessive.98 This is because God does not will creatures on account of any necessity of 
his nature. But as Aquinas goes on to argue, God acts on account of his wisdom, which 
means that he produces everything like an artisan, who orders his works according to 
intellect and wisdom.99
                                                 
95 ST I. q. 19, a. 3, ad 3. 
96 ST I. q. 19, a.3. resp.  
97 “Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, finis ultimus propter quem Deus vult omnia, nullo modo dependet 
ab his quae sunt ad finem, nec quantum ad esse nec quantum ad perfectionem aliquam. Unde non vult 
alicui suam bonitatem communicare ad hoc ut sibi exinde aliquid accrescat, sed quia ipsum communicare 
est sibi conveniens sicut fonti bonitatis. Dare autem non propter aliquod commodum ex datione 
expectatum, sed propter ipsam bonitatem et convenientiam dationis, est actus liberalitatis, ut patet per 
philosophum, in IV Ethicorum. Deus igitur est maxime liberalis: et, ut Avicenna dicit, ipse solus liberalis 
proprie dici potest; nam omne aliud agens praeter ipsum ex sua actione aliquod bonum acquirit, quod est 
finis intentus. Hanc autem eius liberalitatem Scriptura ostendit, dicens in Psalmo: aperiente te manum 
tuam, omnia implebuntur bonitate; et Iac. 1-5: qui dat omnibus affluenter et non improperat.” SCG I.93. 
The passage Aquinas references from Avicenna (i.e., Metaphysics Book VI Chapter 5 231-234) discusses 
“liberality” as an act of giving for which there is no recompense for the giver. For Avicenna, however, 
unlike Aquinas, although the giving of a benefit does not supplement the giver, there need be a cause if it is 
given.  
98 SCG I.81. 
99 See SCG I.81. Also: “Ea quae sunt a voluntate, vel sunt agibilia, sicut actus virtutum, qui sunt 
perfectiones operantis: vel transeunt in exteriorem materiam, quae factibiles dicuntur. Et sic patet quod res 
creatae sunt a Deo sicut factae. Factibilium autem ratio est ars, sicut philosophus dicit. Comparantur igitur 
omnes res creatae ad Deum sicut artificiata ad artificem. Sed artifex per ordinem suae sapientiae et 
intellectus artificiata in esse producit. Ergo et Deus omnes creaturas per ordinem sui intellectus fecit... Per 
haec autem excluditur quorundam error qui dicebant omnia ex simplici divina voluntate dependere, absque 
aliqua ratione.” Ibid., II.24.  
 This means that God neither acts according to absolute necessity 
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nor, however, by simple act of his will. Instead, he acts on account of some reason 
(aliqua ratione), which is grounded in divine wisdom and its grasp of the best possible 
order for a would-be universe. Thus a reason can be assigned to the divine will, even 
though this reason is not a necessitating cause that would compel God to act. Although 
God’s own self-sufficiency of being and goodness does not require other creatures in 
order to reach this end of goodness, once divine wisdom elects them to be,100 
nevertheless they are on account of this end, and thus indebted to it.101 As will be seen, 
such a debt is repaid in terms of service to the good: insofar as anything exists it is 
ordered to divine goodness as to an end, which Aquinas argues, makes it a subject of 
providence.102
      As Aquinas argues in Summa Contra Gentiles, the incident of creation cannot be due 
to any debt of justice on the part of God to creatures.
    
103 Insofar as justice is “rendering 
what is due,” God owes nothing to creatures: a debt of justice cannot precede having 
something as one’s own; and without esse prior to creation, creatures per se can exact 
nothing from God. As Aquinas argues, prior to the universal production of things, there is 
nothing to which being could be due.104
                                                 
100 Will, Aquinas argues, is of the end, and election is of that which is for an end. SCG I.88. 
 However, once God has resolved himself to 
101 SCG I. 86-87 “Colligere autem ex praedictis possumus quod divinae voluntatis ratio assignari potest. 
Finis enim est ratio volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Deus autem vult bonitatem suam tanquam finem, omnia 
autem alia vult tanquam ea quae sunt ad finem. Sua igitur bonitas est ratio quare vult alia quae sunt diversa 
ab ipso. Rursus. Bonum particulare ordinatur ad bonum totius sicut ad finem, ut imperfectum ad perfectum. 
Sic autem cadunt aliqua sub divina voluntate secundum quod se habent in ordine boni. Relinquitur igitur 
quod bonum universi sit ratio quare Deus vult unumquodque particulare bonum in universo.” SCG I.86. 
And further: “Quamvis autem aliqua ratio divinae voluntatis assignari possit, non tamen sequitur quod 
voluntatis eius sit aliquid causa. Voluntati enim causa volendi est finis. Finis autem divinae voluntatis est 
sua bonitas. Ipsa igitur est Deo causa volendi, quae est etiam ipsum suum velle.” SCG I.87. “Vult enim 
Deus ut creaturae sint propter eius bonitatem, ut eam scilicet suo modo imitentur et repraesentent [m.e.]; 
quod quidem faciunt in quantum ab ea esse habent, et in suis naturis subsistunt.” De Pot. q. 5, a. 4, resp.  
102 SCG III.64, 65, and 97. 
103 SCG II.28-29.  
104 “Licet autem universalem rerum productionem nihil creatum praecedat cui aliquid debitum esse possit, 
praecedit tamen aliquid increatum, quod est creationis principium. Quod quidem dupliciter considerari 
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create, due to his own necessary act of self-love, this same necessary orientation is 
handed-down to creatures and there is a propriety (condecet) between such goodness and 
the order of creation.105 This is, if God creates, then he must indebt creatures to his own 
goodness. If God were to will creatures to be and yet allow them to remain without an 
orientation toward the good, they would not be loved as God loves himself. Allowing the 
being of creatures to remain a sheer excess of divine generosity would make creatures 
idle and useless and the universe would not be a work of intelligence and wisdom, but a 
contant display of unguided power. God, who necessarily indebets himself to his own 
goodness, would act unwisely if he were to create and yet not indebt creatures toward the 
end of goodness.106
                                                                                                                                                 
potest. Ipsa enim divina bonitas praecedit ut finis et primum motivum ad creandum: secundum 
Augustinum, qui dicit: quia Deus bonus est, sumus. Scientia autem eius et voluntas praecedunt sicut ea 
quibus res in esse producuntur. Si igitur ipsam divinam bonitatem absolute consideremus, nullum debitum 
in creatione rerum invenimus. Dicitur enim uno modo aliquid alicui debitum ex ordine alterius ad ipsum, 
quod scilicet in ipsum debet referre quod ab ipso accepit: sicut debitum est benefactori quod ei de beneficiis 
gratiae agantur, inquantum ille qui accepit beneficium hoc ei debet. Hic tamen modus debiti in rerum 
creatione locum non habet: cum non sit aliquid praeexistens cui possit competere aliquid Deo debere, nec 
aliquod eius beneficium praeexistat. Alio modo dicitur aliquid alicui debitum secundum se: hoc enim est ex 
necessitate alicui debitum quod ad eius perfectionem requiritur; sicut homini debitum est habere manus vel 
virtutem, quia sine his perfectus esse non potest. Divina autem bonitas nullo exteriori indiget ad sui 
perfectionem. Non est igitur per modum necessitatis ei debita creaturarum productio.” SCG II.28-29. 
105 For the former argument, see SCG I.8. For the latter: “Potest tamen dici esse sibi debitum per modum 
cuiusdam condecentiae. Iustitia autem proprie dicta debitum necessitatis requirit: quod enim ex iustitia 
alicui redditur, ex necessitate iuris ei debetur. Sicut igitur creaturarum productio non potest dici fuisse ex 
debito iustitiae quo Deus creaturae sit debitor, ita nec ex tali iustitiae debito quo suae bonitati sit debitor, si 
iustitia proprie accipiatur. Large tamen iustitia accepta, potest dici in creatione rerum iustitia, inquantum 
divinam condecet bonitatem.” SCG II.28-29 
 That is, lest the recipeints of the gift of being become useless and 
106 “Item. Contra rationem sapientiae est ut sit aliquid frustra in operibus sapientis. Si autem res creatae 
nullo modo operarentur ad effectus producendos, sed solus Deus operaretur omnia immediate, frustra 
essent adhibitae ab ipso aliae res ad producendos effectus. Repugnat igitur praedicta positio divinae 
sapientiae. Adhuc. Quod dat alicui aliquod principale, dat eidem omnia quae consequuntur ad illud: sicut 
causa quae dat corpori elementari gravitatem, dat ei motum deorsum. Facere autem aliquid actu consequitur 
ad hoc quod est esse actu, ut patet in Deo: ipse enim est actus purus, et est etiam prima causa essendi 
omnibus, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur communicavit aliis similitudinem suam quantum ad esse, 
inquantum res in esse produxit, consequens est quod communicaverit eis similitudinem suam quantum ad 
agere, ut etiam res creatae habeant proprias actiones. Amplius. Perfectio effectus demonstrat perfectionem 
causae: maior enim virtus perfectiorem effectum inducit. Deus autem est perfectissimum agens. Oportet 
igitur quod res ab ipso creatae perfectionem ab ipso consequantur. Detrahere ergo perfectioni creaturarum 
est detrahere perfectioni divinae virtutis. Sed si nulla creatura habet aliquam actionem ad aliquem effectum 
producendum, multum detrahitur perfectioni creaturae: ex abundantia enim perfectionis est quod 
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idle, God must pass on to creatures his own indebtedness to himself. Just as the cause of 
weight also causes downward propensity, Aquinas argues, by communicating his own 
likeness as a pure act of being to creatures, God also communicates his own action of 
necessary indebtedness to divine goodness. Thus to love creatures, God must place the 
debt of necessity upon them, the debt of necessarily loving his goodness, which he 
himself owes.  
      To overcome any lingering imbalance between a receiver to whom nothing is owed 
and a giver to whom nothing can be gained, God employs the universe of creatures in 
useful ways whereby he receives nothing in return and yet they repay their debt of being 
to the good of the universe as a whole.107 We might say that God indebts himself not to 
creatures, but to his own providential scientia aimed at matching the means of created 
being to the end of goodness (i.e., the ordered diversity of created being imitating God’s 
incommunicable being). And, as we have discussed, insofar as he resolves that he shall 
do something, it is impossible for him not to do it (non enim potest esse quod Deus 
aliquid se facturum disposuerit quod postmodum ipse non faciat). Although God’s power 
has no obligation or debt to things of this order, his immutability requires that he cannot 
do otherwise than carry out what eternally falls under his providential order.108 God is 
correctly said to be a debtor, not to creatures, but to the fulfillment of his own ordered 
arrangement (suae dispositioni implendae).109
                                                                                                                                                 
perfectionem quam aliquid habet, possit alteri communicare. Detrahit igitur haec positio divinae virtuti.” 
SCG III.69 
107 SCG III.69. 
108 “Potest tamen alia facere quam ea quae subduntur eius providentiae vel operationi, si absolute 
consideretur eius potestas: sed nec potest facere aliqua quae sub ordine providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non 
fuerint, eo quod mutabilis esse non potest.” SCG III.98. 
109 “In quibus omnibus, si recte attenditur, Deus creaturae debitor non dicitur, sed suae dispositioni 
implendae.” SCG II.28-29.  
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      Although any creature can be parsed in terms of its dual influences from the divine 
will, which causes its esse, and divine intellect, which causes its essence, as we have 
done, such principles themselves find their highest expression in terms of the existing 
individual as subject of providence. Despite Aquinas’s constant insistence on the 
originary act of will by which God freely decides on being against nothingness and 
conservation against annihilation, once resolved, such an act loses its vitality and 
becomes eclipsed by the rational design of providence.110 Thus, what is need not be: 
creatures lack the “vehemence of being” (vehementia essendi) or second-order necessity 
ascribed to them by Avicennian emanation. But because God has resolved himself 
according to a certain plan, everything that is becomes intelligible in terms of such plan. 
Such providential unity helps Aquinas to overcome the dual errors either of extreme 
intellectualism, on the one hand, which would limit God’s power by intellectual 
necessity, or extreme voluntarism on the other, which would make everything follow 
from the sheer will of God.111
      We have surveyed above Aquinas’s responses to Avicenna and the problems of such 
intellectual necessity. The problem, however, with voluntarism, has not occupied our 
immediate attention. On this matter, Aquinas states the following: “Per praedicta autem 
 Either extreme misses the wise order grounding the totality 
of the universe.  
                                                 
110 “Manifestum igitur fit quod providentia secundum rationem quandam res dispensat: et tamen haec ratio 
sumitur ex suppositione voluntatis divinae.” SCG III.97. 
111 Although Aquinas does not use these terms, they fit his argument: “Sic igitur per praedicta excluditur 
duplex error. Eorum scilicet qui, divinam potentiam limitantes, dicebant Deum non posse facere nisi quae 
facit, quia sic facere debet; et eorum qui dicunt quod omnia sequuntur simplicem voluntatem, absque aliqua 
alia ratione vel quaerenda in rebus vel assignanda.” SCG II.28-29. Also: “Sic igitur per praemissa duplex 
error excluditur. Eorum scilicet qui credunt quod omnia simplicem voluntatem sequuntur absque ratione. 
Qui est error loquentium in lege Saracenorum, ut Rabbi Moyses dicit: secundum quos nulla differentia est 
quod ignis calefaciat et infrigidet, nisi quia Deus ita vult. Excluditur etiam error eorum qui dicunt causarum 
ordinem ex divina providentia secundum modum necessitatis provenire. Quorum utrumque patet esse 
falsum ex dictis.” SCG III.97. 
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excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnia procedere a Deo secundum simplicem 
voluntatem: ut de nullo oporteat rationem reddere nisi quia Deus vult.”112 The error has 
been refuted, Aquinas argues, an error that he himself at times commits, that all things 
proceed from God only according to simple will, without rendering an account (rationem 
reddere).113 Aquinas argues that there is a reason for the divine will, even though this is 
not a necessitating cause that would compel God’s will. Thus, he argues, will alone does 
not suffice to explain the procession of creatures from God. This means that in explaining 
the universe, more reason must be offered than “because God wills it.” Instead, divine 
wisdom seems to factor heavily into the original decision to institute an order of creation 
in the first place, a factoring, according to Scotus, that compromises the groundless 
contingency of the universe. It is true that in regard to the “original institution of things,” 
such dependents in their subordination to God come forth through an act of simple 
will.114
                                                 
112 SCG I.87. 
113 Elsewhere, Aquinas seems to maintain this position himself: “Cum enim loquimur de productione 
alicuius singularis creaturae, potest assignari ratio quare talis sit, ex aliqua alia creatura, vel saltem ex 
ordine universi, ad quem quaelibet creatura ordinatur, sicut pars ad formam totius. Cum autem de toto 
universo loquimur educendo in esse, non possumus ulterius aliquod creatum invenire ex quo possit sumi 
ratio quare sit tale vel tale; unde, cum nec etiam ex parte divinae potentiae quae est infinita, nec divinae 
bonitatis, quae rebus non indiget, ratio determinatae dispositionis universi sumi possit, oportet quod eius 
ratio sumatur ex simplici voluntate producentis ut si quaeratur, quare quantitas caeli sit tanta et non maior, 
non potest huius ratio reddi nisi ex voluntate producentis.” De Pot. q. 3, a. 17, resp.  
 However, despite the absolute consideration of the divine will, given God’s 
114 “Ostensum est autem in secundo quod res ipsae quae a Deo sub ordine ponuntur, proveniunt ab ipso non 
sicut ab agente per necessitatem naturae, vel cuiuscumque alterius, sed ex simplici voluntate, maxime 
quantum ad primam rerum institutionem. Relinquitur ergo quod praeter ea quae sub ordine divinae 
providentiae cadunt, Deus aliqua facere potest; non enim est eius virtus ad has res obligata. Si autem 
consideremus praedictum ordinem quantum ad rationem a principio dependentem, sic praeter ordinem 
illum Deus facere non potest. Ordo enim ille procedit, ut ostensum est, ex scientia et voluntate Dei omnia 
ordinante in suam bonitatem sicut in finem. Non est autem possibile quod Deus aliquid faciat quod non sit 
ab eo volitum: cum creaturae ab ipso non prodeant naturaliter, sed per voluntatem, ut ostensum est. Neque 
etiam est possibile ab eo aliquid fieri quod eius scientia non comprehendatur: cum voluntas esse non possit 
nisi de aliquo noto. Neque iterum est possibile quod in creaturis aliquid faciat quod in suam bonitatem non 
sit ordinatum sicut in finem: cum sua bonitas sit proprium obiectum voluntatis ipsius. Similiter autem, cum 
Deus sit omnino immutabilis, impossibile est quod aliquid velit cum prius noluerit; aut aliquid de novo 
incipiat scire, vel in suam ordinet bonitatem. Nihil igitur Deus facere potest quin sub ordine suae 
providentiae cadat: sicut non potest aliquid facere quod eius operationi non subdatur. Potest tamen alia 
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immutability, he cannot do something which is not under his order of providence (“nec 
potest facere aliqua quae sub ordine providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non fuerint…”). 
What comes to be “should come to be” (fiendum) according God’s practical intellection 
and providence of the universe as a whole. Aquinas, however, is clear to point out that 
this does not necessitate the contingent affairs of the sublunary world. The rational may 
be the actual, and the actual the rational, but such intelligibility results from a 
providence that, as a concurring cause, would make an allowance for contingency 
without either necessitating it—as in the case of occasionalism—or being ignorant of it.  
      For Aquinas, even the cropping up of bad, of which God is the providential cause per 
accidens, can be recovered within the work of divine providence. God allows and 
provides for contingency, despite the fact that he does not actively necessitate the 
unfolding of future contingents. God preordains and chooses a universe in which the 
events unfold, as Blanchette states “not any more closed to the initiative of creatures than 
[…] necessitated by any requirement of the final end of creation as a whole, which is the 
divine goodness itself.”115
                                                                                                                                                 
facere quam ea quae subduntur eius providentiae vel operationi, si absolute consideretur eius potestas: sed 
nec potest facere aliqua quae sub ordine providentiae ipsius ab aeterno non fuerint, eo quod mutabilis esse 
non potest.” SCG III.98.  
115 Blanchette discusses the ways in which spiritual creatures as secondary providers come to reflect divine 
providence. Thus, against a Hegelian preconception of providential determinism, he argues that for 
Aquinas: “[…] the order of divine providence is not any more closed to the initiative of creatures than it is 
necessitated by any requirement of the final end of creation as a whole, which is the divine goodness itself. 
In fact, it may even require such activity and initiative, not out of any necessity or any ‘deficiency of His 
power, but because of the abundance of His goodness, so that He communicates the dignity of causality 
even to creatures’ (S.T., I, q. 22, a. 3, c). ‘The magnitude of His goodness is manifested more in that He 
governs the lower by the higher (De Ver., q. 5, a. 8, ad 12). God is therefore not the only one with 
providence for the perfection of the universe. Creatures can also exercise such providence, or participate in 
it, but once again, in diverse ways.” The Order of the Universe, 311. 
 Such a final end for creation as a whole (i.e., divine goodness) 
integrates the otherwise disparate parts into a unity, or “universal order.” The allowance 
from which contingency follows can be restored to intelligibility as an integral part of 
divine providence. This is why Aquinas can justify sublunary excess and even monsters, 
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arguing for example, that a lion would cease to live if there were no slaying of animals; 
and there would be no martyrs without tyrannical persecution.116
      According to Aquinas, insofar as everything is immediately created and preordained 
by God, to that extent the contingency of “chance” can be resolved within the 
providential order foreknown (praescit) by its creative First Cause. There is an allowance 
or provision for contingency. Even human affairs, where contingency seems to reign the 
greatest and which unfold according to deliberation and choice, do not proceed by brute 
chance but are reduced to higher causes and are immediately arranged by God.
  
117 He 
argues that the origin of contingency is divine providence, which does not mean that God 
necessitates such contingent events, but allows for their occurrence in accordance with 
his providential foresight. God as the cause of all existence (omnium existentium causa), 
who has conferred being upon all things (rebus omnibus conferens esse) through his 
creative act, also must provide for all creatures.118 From the handing down of being to 
creatures, divine wisdom decrees that God should provide for such beings, first of all, by 
not annihilating, but instead, conserving beings, some according to an eternal necessity of 
being, others only for a time. Providence thus arranges all things by the eternal 
forethought of wisdom.119
                                                 
116 ST I. q. 22, a. 2, ad 2. See also De Pot. q. 3, a. 6, ad 4. On the claim that monsters may exceed 
something’s particular nature, but cannot exceed universal nature, see Ibid. q. 6, a. 2, ad 8. 
117 Aquinas puts forward the maxim (ratio) that all things manifold, mutable, and able to fail may be 
reduced to a uniform, unchangeable, and unfailing principle. “Ex his ergo quae supra ostensa sunt, colligere 
possumus quomodo humana ad superiores causas reducuntur, et non aguntur fortuito. Nam electiones et 
voluntatum motus immediate a Deo disponuntur. Cognitio vero humana ad intellectum pertinens a Deo 
mediantibus Angelis ordinatur. Ea vero quae ad corporalia pertinent, sive sint interiora sive exteriora, in 
usum hominis venientia, a Deo mediantibus Angelis et caelestibus corporibus dispensantur. Huius autem 
ratio generaliter una est. Nam oportet omne multiforme, et mutabile, et deficere potens, reduci sicut in 
principium in aliquod uniforme, et immobile, et deficere non valens. Omnia autem quae in nobis sunt, 
inveniuntur esse multiplicia, variabilia, et defectibilia.”SCG III.91.  
118 SCG III.94. 
 The creative provider foreknows what will unfold, although 
119 God foresees things, Aquinas argues, as unfolding either by necessity or contingently. Thus, Aquinas 
can conclusively state that it is true that whatever is foreseen by God, will come to be. “Sicut autem dictum 
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such knowing does not necessitate its occurrence. Thus, such contingency unfolds only 
according to divine provision and thus, given such allotment, cannot hinder or annul the 
execution of divine providence in any way. 
      Aquinas’s providential account can absorb contingency without denying it because 
God’s knowledge extends to everything of which he is the cause, and as the cause of both 
singulars and accidents, even future contingent singulars fall under divine purview. 
Aquinas argues that the being (esse) of such future contingent singulars is known by God, 
not only in their causes, but according to the being that they have in themselves 
(“secundum esse quod habent in seipsis”).120
                                                                                                                                                 
est, ens inquantum ens est, habet causam ipsum Deum: unde sicut divinae providentiae subditur ipsum ens, 
ita etiam omnia accidentia entis inquantum est ens, inter quae sunt necessarium et contingens. Ad divinam 
igitur providentiam pertinet non solum quod faciat hoc ens, sed quod det ei contingentiam vel necessitatem. 
Secundum enim quod unicuique dare voluit contingentiam vel necessitatem, praeparavit ei causas medias, 
ex quibus de necessitate sequatur, vel contingenter. Invenitur igitur uniuscuiusque effectus secundum quod 
est sub ordine divinae providentiae necessitatem habere. Ex quo contingit quod haec conditionalis est vera, 
si aliquid est a Deo provisum, hoc erit. Secundum autem quod effectus aliquis consideratur sub ordine 
causae proximae, sic non omnis effectus est necessarius; sed quidam necessarius et quidam contingens 
secundum analogiam suae causae. Effectus enim in suis naturis similantur causis proximis, non autem 
remotis, ad quarum conditionem pertingere non possunt. Sic ergo patet, quod cum de divina providentia 
loquimur, non est dicendum solum, hoc est provisum a Deo ut sit, sed hoc est provisum a Deo, ut 
contingenter sit, vel ut necessario sit. Unde non sequitur secundum rationem Aristotelis hic inductam, quod 
ex quo divina providentia est posita, quod omnes effectus sint necessarii; sed necessarium est effectus esse 
contingenter, vel de necessitate. Quod quidem est singulare in hac causa, scilicet in divina providentia. 
Reliquae enim causae non constituunt legem necessitatis vel contingentiae, sed constituta a superiori causa 
utuntur. Unde causalitati cuiuslibet alterius causae subditur solum quod eius effectus sit. Quod autem sit 
necessario vel contingenter, dependet ex causa altiori, quae est causa entis inquantum est ens; a qua ordo 
necessitatis et contingentiae in rebus provenit.” Expositio Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, lib. 6, lec. 3. As 
argued in the Summa Theologiae, as present to the eternal gaze of God, everything happens infallibly; only 
in relation to its proximate causes do things happen contingently. Although contingents actually come to be 
in succession, God knows each thing in its own true being (in suo esse), the totality of which he grasps in a 
simultaneous presence. Thus, everything that is bears his gaze from eternity (eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno 
super omnia) (ST. I, q. 14, a. 13, resp.). Aquinas describes this non-interfering gaze as one watching two 
travelers along a road, one following the other. Although the preceding traveler does not see the consequent 
(traveler), an observer perched in a tree can witness their simultaneous movement ST. I, q. 14, a. 13, ad 3. 
Likewise, the remote observation of the divine gaze captures the entirety of the situation, which for 
Aquinas corresponds to the de dicto necessity of divine knowledge, but not a necessity de re (i.e., 
concerning its causes). Proximate causes, although relegated to the necessary imperium of divine 
providence, work to save contingency for Aquinas.  
120 “Divinus autem intellectus ab aeterno cognoscit res non solum secundum esse quod habent in causis 
suis, sed etiam secundum esse quod habent in seipsis.” SCG I.67. 
 The esse that it has in itself is the factual 
state of its essence as part of the divine plan. Thus, the existing individual in its 
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singularity becomes for Aquinas some ideational content marked out to be a subject of 
divine providence. Esse, it seems, contrary to the role reserved for it by existential 
Thomism, does not express a radical act through which a being stands out against the 
canvass of nothingness, but instead, the mode (i.e., contingent or necessary) by which all 
beings have been dispensed with the task of seeking the good.  
      Even though Aquinas will continue to insist on the original act of the divine will, and 
thereby to uphold the radical gratuity of esse and the incidentality of having resolved to 
create and conserve, nevertheless, by accounting for the creative procession from God in 
terms of “the good of the universe,” every being can be measured according to a 
providential exchange. Such an exchange unifies, and also sublates, what we have treated 
as distinct essential and existential grounds. The radical inceptuality of giving being 
(esse) comes to be marked as a benefit entrusted for the sake of an end. The teleo-
providential order of the universe, wherein everything desires the good on account of its 
nature, provides the proper orientation for creatures to give back or repay their gift of 
being, making the seemingly-excessive and incidental phenomenon of creation part of the 
divine scientia of providence. The providential return (reditus) of everything to its first 
principle thus banishes the irrationality at the ground of creation.  
      The radical break of the first act by which esse comes forth in creation is covered 
over by this second act whereby every being as recipient of such a gift must be for the 
good of the universe. Once inscribed within this totalized order, an order oriented toward 
the good, the groundlessness from whence esse first arises finds a providential ground in 
the good. We even witness such a return with Gilson, who speaks of the universe as a 
cooperation of all beings in harmony. Expressing the underlying unity of the three 
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grounds—existential, essential, and providential—he states: “To be, to be a certain a 
certain nature, and to operate according to the specific determination of such a nature, all 
this is identically, to resemble God and to co-operate with God.”121
                                                 
121 Elements of Christian Philosophy, 195. 
 Such cooperation, 
although overlooked by Gilson at this point, is that by which each creature—albeit 
inadequately—repays a debt to its divine patron, whereby the originary gift of being in 
its existential excess comes to function as a providential loan of which an account is 
rendered.  
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